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Foreword
Bert Park's new book is of singular interest and importance because it
deals with the age-old problem of the impact of disease upon history,
particularly upon some of the people who played a large part in mak-
ing it.
Nothing startles so much as the obvious. One obvious fact is that
history is biography writ large. Another obvious fact is that history has
been changed, for better or worse, by a handful of people. The unknown
billions have passed through the stream of history known only to God.
They have been the sinews of the human race. Leaderless, they have
been an inert mass. It is not fashionable to say such things these days;
we historians are supposed to be interested in writing "from the bottom
up, 11 about the so-called common people. The difficulty is that we know
virtually nothing about most of them except as aggregates. And, to
repeat, history has been changed by a few individuals about whom we
know a great deal.
Another obvious fact is that the lives of all people have been, in a
determinative way, affected by good health or illness and disease. Most
historians would say that this is a truism, and yet most of them are
either startled or incredulous when confronted with the corollary of this
trusim: disease often changes the course of history when it affects
detrimentally history's shakers and movers.
From one angle I am not being altogether fair to historians, who
have long been aware of the gross effect of disease upon macrohistory-
for example, the depopulation of the Italian peninsula during the latter
days of the Roman Empire, the Black Death of the 1340s, or the influ-
enza pandemic of 1918. More recently, historians have discovered the
devastating effects of diseases new to the peoples of the Americas after
their contact with the Europeans in the sixteenth century. This resulted
in the greatest demographic disaster in recorded history. It is biog-
raphers who have the most trouble in dealing with notable subjects
whose behavior has been profoundly affected by disease. Often biog-
raphers simply pass the matter by. For example, one can read Ray
Stannard Baker's multivolume biography of Woodrow Wilson without
knowing that Wilson suffered during most of his adult life from hyper-
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tension and cerebrovascular disease. Actually, Baker knew this fact and
may have thought it bad taste to discuss this aspect of Wilson's biogra-
phy. But for most biographers, the medical histories of their subjects
simply seem bodies of knowledge too esoteric and unknown for them to
deal with; they are historians and biographers, not medical specialists.
Dr. Park has some very wise things to say to them on this subject.
I first came to know Dr. Park in 1985, when he sent me a copy of the
page proofs of his first book, The Impact of Illness on World Leaders
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), which contained a chapter on
Woodrow Wilson. This was a time when, as editor of The Papers of
Woodrow Wilson, I was approaching that period in Wilson's life when
cerebrovascular disease, which culminated in a massive stroke on Octo-
ber 2, 1919, was beginning to have an unambiguous impact on Wilson's
behavior. I invited Dr. Park to become a member of the Editorial Advi-
sory Committee of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. He accepted and was
a wise counselor and guide through the labyrinths of Wilson's illnesses
from 1918 to 1920. In addition, he contributed editorial notes to The
Papers on Wilson during the Paris Peace Conference and the controversy
in the United States over ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, the first
article of which was the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Dr. Park has all the training and skills that every biographer would
like to possess. To begin with, he is well-trained in history and histor-
ical methodology and, with his incredible energy, finds time to teach
courses in that subject. Trained medically first in pathology, he has an
astounding knowledge of disease in general. He then shifted to neurol-
ogy, neuropsychiatry, and neurosurgery. I have never known anyone
who is more avid or more honest in searching for the truth of the matter
at hand. He is the first to say that he has made a mistake and to try to
correct it. He knows the limits of medical historical knowledge and is
skeptical when skepticism is in order, as it usually is. And his bete noir
is medical reductionism, that is, saying that illness accounts for all
deviant or uncharacteristic behavior. All these talents and devotion to
the search for truth shine forth in the book for which these words are a
foreword.
The three chapters in Part I on Napoleon, Henry VIII, and temporal
lobe epilepsy as it affected (or did not affect) Hitler, Joan of Arc, St. Paul,
and John Brown (of Harper's Ferry) show what a pathologist and neu-
rologist can do in the absence of medical records (except for the report of
Napoleon's autopsy). Medical records aside, we do have an enormous
body of evidence (the observations of contemporaries, the writings and
sayings of these subjects, and above all their behavior) on the subjects of
this chapter. Dr. Park's conclusions are cautious, sometimes tentative,
but I find most of them convincing. He is now not so sure as he was in
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The Impact of Illness that Hitler was afflicted with TLE. It seems to me
that he has discovered the disease, schistosomiasis, contracted in Egypt,
that did Napoleon in over the long run, although arsenic poisoning may
have hastened his death; that he has proved that Henry was not a
syphilitic; and that John Brown had a classic case of TLE. As for St. Paul,
it is hard for Dr. Park to believe that he suffered from the seizures and
hallucinations of TLE: "As intriguing as the evidence for TLE is from
my perspective as a neurosurgeon, it is difficult for me as a Christian to
believe that so many theologians who have studied Paul could be wrong.
Yet nothing clouds rational thinking as much as deeply held convic-
tions born of faith. The question remains whether in regard to Paul we
have allowed that to happen."
The three chapters in Part lIon Stalin, Wilson, and Churchill attack
the central questions of the biographies of these twentieth-century
leaders: whether their careers were affected by disease or psychological
deficits. About these individuals we have enough medical evidence to
enable Dr. Park to write with a sure hand, when he argues that each
suffered from an identical underlying disease that accentuated their
psychological deficits. The evidence on Stalin is now voluminous and is
becoming more so every day of glasnost; he was, as Park says, a "premier
paranoic," the victim of one of the worst diseases that can affect a
functioning person. In Stalin's case, it turned him into the incarnation
of evil. The chapter on Wilson ought, it seems to me, to settle the
question of w~ether neurological disease and stroke or psychological
defects caused the collapse of Wilson's leadership during the treaty
fight. (Dr. Park has covered Wilson's earlier cerebrovascular disease in
The Impact of Illness, and, on the basis of new medical evidence, has
been able to validate his earlier clinical judgment). Dr. Park does not go
much into Churchill's medical history before 1945, because Churchill's
hypertension strokes did not begin until 1949. For the pathetic story of
the great prime minister's decline, he relies mainly on the detailed
evidence in the diary of Lord Moran, Churchill's physician.
In Part III, Chapter 7, Dr. Park greatly expands his discussion in The
Impact of Illness of the abuse of amphetamines that certainly played the
major role in Anthony Eden's bizarre behavior and downfall during the
Suez Crisis of 1956. Chapter 8 on John F. Kennedy will probably interest
American readers most, particularly its account of how the Kennedy
family and entourage effected a complete cover-up of the young presi-
dent's Addison's disease and dependence upon steroids. Then, along
came the semiquack, Dr. Max Jacobson, who frequently gave Kennedy
injections of amphetamines as well as steroids. They probably enhanced
the president's sexual appetite, but Dr. Park doubts that they had any
effect on Kennedy's political behavior, for example, during the Cuban
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missile crisis-the Vienna summit setback with Krushchev perhaps
excepted. However, as Park says, "Given the huge dosages of ampheta-
mines and steroids to which Kennedy was subjected, it is a wonder that
his performance as president was as exemplary as history recalls."
Dr. Park has long been concerned about ways to deal with the
problem of presidential disability. He is, I think, quite right in saying
that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment fails to provide a reliable method to
assure the succession of the vice president in the event the president
becomes incompetent to perform the duties of his office. In The Impact
of Illness, Dr. Park proposed the establishment of a Presidential Disabil-
ity Commission composed of physicians, neurologists among them, to
examine sick presidents and make "an objective recommendation
based on the data it gathers." That suggestion did not evoke much
support, even much discussion by politicians, political scientists, and
the media.
In the last two chapters of the present book, Dr. Park comes back to
the same problem and proposal while reviewing the crippled presiden-
cies of Garfield, Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Reagan.
But Park would now expand the duties of the commission to include
examining presidential candidates and monitoring the health of presi-
dents during their incumbency. Whether the merits and possibilities of
this plan outweigh its demerits and are politically possible, I must leave
to the reader to decide. However, thoughtful Americans will surely
demand a second opinion on a subject of such enormous importance.
But to get back to Ailing, Aging, Addicted in general, let me conclude
by saying that it is a tour de force. It will be indispensable for historians
and biographers and fascinating for general readers.
ARTHUR S. LINK
Preface
This study is a sequel to my first book, The Impact of Illness on World
Leaders. At least one motive for undertaking the original work was
admittedly self-serving: to make some small contribution that might
afford me an opportunity to rub elbows with members of the fraternity
of historical scholars. On a less narcissistic note, I hoped to show that an
interdisciplinary approach to history can provide valuable insight into a
few of the more obscure and neglected aspects of our past, among them
the blinders we have worn while chronicling the health of leaders in
general and American presidents in particular.
So what came of that effort? At least with respect to my fragile ego,
I got my wish. The book caught the attention of Arthur S. Link of
Princeton University. Among other scholarly credits spanning five dec-
ades, he has edited a truly monumental work entitled The Papers of
Woodrow Wilson. That led to a fruitful association as a member of the
project's Editorial Advisory Committee with this esteemed scholar,
who became my mentor, collaborator, and (what I cherish most) dear
friend. His willingness to explore the medical dimensions of the presi-
dent's changing personality prompted Link to ask me to write several
editorial essays for the Papers on Wilson's long-suffered cerebrovascular
disease, its impact on him personally, and its influence on some of the
most important events of the twentieth century~
Equally encouraging, a plethora of works dealing with leadership
health and presidential disability have appeared since the publication of
my book some seven years ago. If such studies have enhanced the
scholar's awareness, it is fair to say that the general reader-not to
mention those in a position to effect changes for the better-remains
somewhat in the dark. Until the hue and cry from the public at risk
becomes so deafening that the politician can no longer ignore it, the
potential for calamity will remain. Hence the impetus for a sequel. Yet
to capture the attention of both requires speaking their language, draw-
ing upon familiar historical figures, and critically reassessing what has
been written about their infirmities, both perceived and real.
In the preface to my first work, I lavished praise on Amo Karlen's
incisive critique entitled Napoleon's Glands and Other Ventures in
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Biohistory. Having once partaken of this inviting smorgasbord of path-
ology, I thought it only fitting to introduce my second bill of fare by
ruminating on the virtues of Karlen's perspective with respect to Na-
poleon himself. Well enough. But why then regurgitate, in part, the
medical histories of Woodrow Wilson, Adolf Hitler, Winston Churchill,
and Anthony Eden for a second tasting? For one thing, the thesis of my
first book was framed around the political collapse of Europe between
the world wars. That alone precluded a detailed recounting of the latter
two case histories. For another, Hitler warrants resurrecting if for no
other reason than to cast doubt on my former belief that he was a victim
of epilepsy. And as for Wilson, previously unpublished primary source
materials now attest to the fact that his medical history remained
incomplete at the time my first manuscript went to press. That said, I
am grateful that its original thesis has since been validated.
So much for particulars. If taking the message to the general reader
is the intent of the present work, why market it through a university
press, which has fewer inroads into the large bookselling-chains that
dictate what we read today? Simply because this issue of physiologically
compromised leadership is a delicate and exacting pursuit that deserves
the imprimatur of peer review both before and after publication-and is
not a matter to be left to whimsical interpretations with the proverbial
Bottom Line of sales in mind. Not that any university press editor who
publishes such material need worry. Properly presented, there is enough
of the bizarre and macabre to be found in these pages and similar works
to compete with the most felicitous wordsmiths of popular history.
Whether that is enough for the reader to sit up and take notice, and our
legislators to take action, only the future will judge.
Introduction: On Prudence
and Skepticism
Can one man's sickness make millions suffer? Have diseases of the
brain in particular adversely affected the behavior of certain leaders? If
so, how did that change history-and when did it signify nothing more
than a footnote to the past?
To answer such questions, historians and physicians bedded down
in the unkempt lair of "pathography," where studies of disease as it has
affected famous people are conceived. Following what their critics
would dismiss as unseemly one-night stands in biographical research,
these odd bedfellows often face the morning-after of peer review with
self-reproach-as if they have awakened in some sort of cheap flop-
house on Scholars' Row, chastened by the prospect of having their repu-
tations impugned.
On occasion, to be sure, stimulating works with redeeming value
come out of such academic trysts. Yet to flaunt them as serious schol-
arship without first making certain one's backside is covered entails
some hazards.
For historians who have made their marks in more traditional
pursuits, established reputations are at stake; physicians who ignore
their history risk being labeled medical reductionists. All too often such
self-appointed diagnosticians have forsaken the virtues of prudence and
skepticism in their haste to conceive a viable thesis. Even if the diseases
these writers ascribe to their subjects seem plausible enough~ they
usually fail to convince their colleagues that poor health had any bear-
ing on individual behavior, much less on history.
Some of this criticism is justified. More than its fair share, however,
stems from a Tolstoyan prejudice that discounts the role of anyone
person-sick or healthy-in shaping the past. Thomas Carlyle's Great
Man theory of historical causation has fallen on hard times. So has the
credibility of pathography. Biohistorians deem it less relevant to con-
jure up the effects of hemorrhoids on Napoleon's conduct at Waterloo,
for example, than to highlight the typhus epidemic and its depletion of
his troops in Russia. l
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Many psychohistorians too are critical of their sibling rival. They
would have us believe that virtually all behavior can be traced to
childhood, that we need to know less of diseases that come later and
more of how character is formed. Mapping out those delicate connec-
tions in the brain known as "synapses," they say, tells us nothing about
motives.2 Reduced to the lowest common denominator, what they are
naively proposing is that physiology has little bearing on behavior.
Perhaps suppressing unpleasant memories of their own struggle for re-
spectability, the psychoanalysts have dismissed pathography as little
more than an obscure subject in search of an audience.
Before we allow such skeptics to hurl this fledgling discipline out of
academe, maybe we should ask ourselves whether there are not ele-
ments of truth in these retrospective postmortems. Must psychoan-
alysts be allowed to claim that only they have the tools necessary to
reconstruct the comportment of kings, the genius of artists, or the
behavior of madmen? Can pathographers, who concentrate on physical
disease, carve any niche for themselves in the writing of history and
biography?
I believe they can. Although environment, economic forces, and the
like playa large if often mysterious role in the historical process, the
lone individual may play an equally crucial role independent of those
factors. To exemplify the point, perhaps no man had a greater impact on
twentieth-century history than Mikhail Gorbachev. Not that the port-
wine stain on his forehead accounted for Gorbachev's genius (or some-
thing more sinister). To argue either would be to view history through
pathographical 3-D: deceiving, derisory, and dumb. Rather, drawing
attention to a harmless birthmark on the scalp serves to remind us that
unrecognized disorders of the underlying brain may have a determina-
tive influence on behavior. In a leader, that can have disturbing implica-
tions.3
To confine behavioral analysis to childhood influences, as some
psychoanalysts would have us do, limits the biographer's perspective.
There is both an alpha and an omega to the evolution of character, as any
physician familiar with the aging process knows. And those mysterious
brain-cell connections to which we have referred have something to do
with that: how they transmit environmental stimuli has as much
bearing on a grown man's behavior as do undescended testicles, thumb
sucking, or psychological abuse in childhood. Not only do high blood
pressure, hardening of the arteries, and just plain old age affect the way
these synapses function; drugs, epilepsy, or hormonal imbalances may
cause them to misfire altogether. Perplexing behavior results, and char-
acter changes.
Those who counter that these physiologic derangements remain
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indecipherable without a barrage of confirmatory tests risk exposing
their lack of familiarity with how physicians diagnose disease. Should
the doctor lack a strong suspicion of what it is that ails the patient after
taking a careful medical history, he or she is unlikely to uncover the
cause with a physical examination or laboratory tests. Similarly, the
pathographer has the observations of the historical figure's associates
and his or her own clinical intuition to rely upon in the absence or
unavailability of complete medical records.
Sources are sources-whether they are grounded in medicine, psy-
chology, or history. All the data, both physiological and psychological,
must be weighed before a full understanding of individual behavior can
be had. To eliminate either, just as to ignore the political circumstances
in which decisions are made, is to select out the evidence beforehand;
the result is medical or psychoanalytical reductionism. Little wonder
that neither alone has convinced the historian trained in more tradi-
tional methodology.
On the one hand, there is much to be said for being skeptical of
retrospective medical diagnoses; on the other, we should be just as wary
of knee-jerk criticisms of the pathographer's methods. Yet to demon-
strate that this relatively new discipline can make significant contribu-
tions to biography demands some housecleaning. We must discard the
junk that clutters pathography's hallways, which the unwary biog-
rapher stumbles over on his way to the door separating fantasy from
reality. To open it requires what the historian calls "the verdict of peer
review." The clinician would see it as "asking for a second opinion"-or
a third or fourth.
Perhaps the best way to reach common ground is to review pathog-
raphy's literature in an attempt to uncover what worthwhile questions
it has raised, and then to offer second opinions on its diagnoses on behalf
of a number of historical personages. This book attempts to do that by
organizing a critique around the most mortifying of diseases identified
as crucial determinants of behavior-say, syphilis and epilepsy-and
then by clarifying the possible influence of more common ailments:
premature or age-related senility, depression accompanying a stroke,
drug abuse, chronic disease and pain-anyone of which weighs on the
psyche and affects the way a person thinks as much as do more dramatic
blows to the brain.
Yet what repulses in the literature at the same time it intrigues
also manages to sell. That is why pathographers who cater more to
marketing than to scholars have tended to ignore the mundane for
the morbid. Similarly, some biographers, in an effort to make the
historical personality come alive, have assumed the role of armchair
psychologists, though lacking the necessary training. As a result, both
4 AILING, AGING, ADDICTED
psychohistory and pathography have been viewed as little more than
shams.
Perhaps the fault stems as much as anything from a lack of expertise
in both medicine and history. Arno Karlen succinctly describes the
problem. Historians, bound by what he terms the "Law of Repetition,"
are guilty through lack of medical knowledge of recounting worn and
hackneyed views posited by alleged medical scientists.4 For example,
until Dr. I. MacAlpine and others made a very credible case that George
III had been victimized by porphyria, historians had accepted as gospel a
manic-depressive state leading to alleged insanity.5 (MacAlpine's meth-
odology should serve as a model for future pathographers; whether or
not her conclusions are embraced by everyone, the depth and breadth of
commitment to detail set this investigation apart from its predeces-
sors.)
Another rule of clinical prudence-that the truly important disease
must not be missed, whereas the less serious ones may well be ig-
nored-is equally important for the biographer. Many health problems,
though interesting in themselves, offer little insight into behavior.
Mary, Queen of Scots, was allegedly a victim of a veritable smorgasbord
of diseases-Marfan's syndrome, rheumatoid arthritis, anorexia ner-
vosa, amenorrhea, peptic ulcer disease, and yes, porphyria-but none
that can be linked to her role in the succession crises in England of the
sixteenth century. From the historian's perspective, there is little to
recommend what remains of obscure significance.
Nor, as the old saying goes, should one who hears hoofbeats think
first of zebras-unless, of course, zebras happen to be in the vicinity.
That is, the wary physician disdains the unusual cause when a more
common disease suffices to explain a set of symptoms. Yet it behooves
us to remember that diseases decidedly rare in one location may be quite
common in another. Take, for example, a parasitic disease like schisto-
somiasis: at first glance that would appear to the European or American
scholar an unlikely affliction for Napoleon-until one recalls that
schistosomiasis was endemic in the Middle East precisely where (Egypt)
and at which point (1800) his health began to fail. This is merely to
suggest that, on the African plain at least, hoofbeats may quite validly
suggest zebras.
Still another prudent rule of thumb is a willingness to continue to
debate the evidence even after the data are ostensibly established. Few
maladies deserve as much skepticism as does syphilis. It is unlikely that
much more primary source material will be uncovered on such histor-
ical figures as Ivan the Terrible and Henry VIII, for whom that diagnosis
has been accepted by most biographers all too ready to embrace what
previous pathographers assumed. Like a resourceful blind man selling
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pencils out of a tin cup on the street comer, the clever writer pushes his
wares upon the gullible biographer while recounting a story he once
overheard about an infamous despot who suffered from syphilis. The
buyer, in his haste to dash off and record the story he has just heard,
overlooks the fact that his new pencil has no eraser. Presumably such
pencils were used to brand still another tyrant with syphilis-until new
data on Adolf Hitler came to light to debunk that myth.
Just as the honest diagnostician acknowledges the prejudices that
characterize his or her own clinical style, the biographer must guard
against the tendency to address only those data with which he or she
feels comfortable, to the exclusion of the less familiar. Historians who
are uncomfortable with medical jargon must either undertake the nec-
essary training to deal with it or seek the advice of medical specialists.
Likewise, medical writers must immerse themselves in the social,
economic, military, and political evidence that is the historian's stock-
in-trade; otherwise, they run the risk of blowing a medical diagnosis
totally out of proportion to its impact on the past.
Finally, the skeptical pathographer must be wary of hunches. He
may well choose to gamble with his own reputation, but not at the
expense of his defenseless historical subject. If a Swedish toxicologist
once made a valuable contribution to the study of Napoleon with his
landmark discovery of the emperor's arsenic intoxication, he neverthe-
less lapsed badly by playing a hunch that the presence of arsenic was
grounds for the charge of premeditated murder.6
What both biography and biohistory require is not medical reduc-
tionism that ascribes to disease the sole or even primary force behind a
leader's conduct, but pathography soundly based upon medical factors
weighed carefully in the totality of causation. For their findings to be
taken seriously by other scholars, then, pathographers must be skep-
tical enough to refuse to fall victim to the Law of Repetition; be willing
to master the nuances of both medical diagnosis and historical method;
be prudent enough to obtain second opinions; and above all, be honest
enough to accept that some of history's most intriguing cases will still
defy their best efforts at resolution. The chapters that follow deal with
cases in which divergent opinions as to biohistorical diagnoses exist and
with whether the medical condition itself may have made an impact on
history. Moreover, they examine only those instances in which disease
appears to have affected either the behavior or the thought processes of
the individual in question and, consequently, his or her decisions. I can
only hope that I have followed my own advice in the second opinions I
have proposed.
The first section of the book rehashes the medical case studies of a
number of historical figures whose meteoric rise and fall have often
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been linked to disease. The case of Napoleon Bonaparte introduces the
term "differential diagnosis"-establishing that plausible range of al-
ternatives which might account for the symptoms described-whereas
Henry VIII's medical history illustrates the opposing tendency to hone
in on a single disease, with all the pitfalls such as an approach implies. If
only to propose that a second look is of value in exploding some popular
myths that continue to color our understanding of both men's behavior,
these chapters concentrate on certain shortcomings of the methodology
used by earlier pathographers. By emphasizing the excessive passions
(sexual and otherwise) of two select monarchs to explain either their
slow burnout at the top or more spectacular crashes in the fast lane,
previous investigators may have led both themselves and their readers
astray.
Similarly, epilepsy has been suggested as a plausible influence on
some of history's most colorful characters-among them, Adolf Hitler,
Saul of Tarsus (the Apostle Paul), Joan of Arc, and John Brown of Harpers
Ferry fame. Seizures were the first phenomenon that neurologists iden-
tified as an alternative explanation for the bizarre behavior? that many
persons have seen as divinely (or demonically) inspired. And indeed,
psychologists who followed in the neurologists' wake may have over-
looked physical disease as an underlying cause for the pathologic be-
havior they described. The intent here is to offer at least an opinion that
mysticism and clairvoyant behavior may have deeper roots than those
uncovered by the psychoanalysts.
The second section deals with three leaders of the twentieth cen-
tury who labored under pressures as much physiologic as political. Josef
Stalin, Woodrow Wilson, and Winston Churchill shared a common dis-
ease that predictably accentuated certain underlying character traits.
Long burdened with high blood pressure, Stalin became more paranoid,
Wilson more self-righteous, and Churchill more egocentric as they
aged; their leadership suffered as a result. The purpose of the second
section, then, is twofold: to refocus upon previous psychoanalytical
accounts of their character through the retrospectoscope of neurological
disease, and to highlight the impact of accelerated brain aging on human
behavior and history.
The third section dramatizes the role that drugs have played in the
health and conduct of world leaders in the twentieth century by com-
paring two men who used them to excess. Both Anthony Eden and John
F. Kennedy embroiled themselves in covert military operations and
duplicitous diplomacy that compromised their credibility and the na-
tions they governed. The question remains to what extent, if any, the
amphetamines they abused governed their actions. Merely indulging in
the same drug does not assure that different individuals will react in the
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same way, as these two chapters make clear. Even so, the price paid
(both potential and real) is disturbing.
The last section chronicles the effects of poor health on the behavior
of selected presidents of the United States and examines the impact not
only on the workings of the office itself but on the succession crises that
frequently resulted. Yet it is not enough simply to identify the problem;
if there is any value in such exercises, they must, as their parting
gesture, offer some suggestions for dealing with the specter of compro-
mised leadership in the future. As these two chapters demonstrate, the
public would do well to seek a second opinion from someone other than
the presidential physician when judging medical disability in its chief
executive. How that can perhaps best be done is the intended legacy of
the final chapter.
Using a case-study approach, then, I have tried to offer first a critical
look at pathography as a legitimate discipline; second, exploration of
those areas in which it can make and has made meaningful contribu-
tions to the study of biography and history; and last, some suggestions it
might offer us for the future.
That much of the material is not new explains, in part, the need to
cite a larger number of secondary sources than is typically found in more
"scholarly" accounts. For the ultimate intent of this project is to reex-
amine existing medical and biohistorical interpretations in search of
those defensible observations that may enhance our understanding of
the individuals in question.
Not that I presume to have had the proverbial last word on these
important subjects. Pathographers' pencils still need erasers. In the
continuum of historical and biographical analysis, this work represents
but one pathographer's attempt to offer his own second opinions. Un-
doubtedly, and for the good of the discipline, there will be more in the
future.
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PART I
Sick Heads
and Tall Tales
Few things threaten biographers more than finding themselve~ on
grounds as unfamiliar as disease and its impact on behavior. Embold-
ened by a fistful of what were considered irrefutable scientific data in
the first half of the twentieth century (when biohistory came into
vogue on the heels of psychoanalysis and the now disgraced musings
of phrenology), they found it expedient to assault their subjects with
such diagnoses as defective glands, syphilis, and epilepsy. After all,
contemporary medical thought assured them that anyone of these
conditions, untreated, could dramatically alter personality.
Appreciative reviewers and unwary readers, encountering some-
thing both novel and intriguing, passed on what they had read
without much reflection and even less understanding. Were one to
believe those writers who have ignored more prudent seconds in their
own corner, virtually every tyrant has at one time or another let his
guard down, only to be rendered punch-drunk by the slings and
arrows of pathophysiology. Yet with time and the evolution of
medical knowledge, a few discerning critics began to suspect that
some "classic" matches between disease and behavior were little
more than charades.
Napoleon Bonaparte is a case in point. To explain his mid-life
transformation, the voyeur with books to sell began by pummeling
below the emperor's belt at his infested genitals and an unruly case of
piles-or changed tactics and jabbed at Napoleon's seizure-riddled
brain. Yet assuming that the defenseless subject could not have been
totally irrational and still rule an empire or win a battle, some writers
pulled an ill-defined "hormonal imbalance" from the grab bag of
diagnoses for the knockout punch. By such sleight-of-hand has the
corpse of the Little Corporal grown larger than life.
The same applies to a despot of an earlier time whose girth grew
as if to accommodate his self-indulgence; few men in history were
said to have matched sex, sport, and suds with Henry VIII. In time,
however, the king's formidable reputation was eclipsed by the very
excesses that marked his reign. No one disputes that the years were
unkind to Bluff Hal. What is less certain is whether the regal head or
tail took a greater beating at the hand of the syphilitic sphirochete
while he lived or from the imaginative pathographer long after he
died.
Once more sophisticated explorers of the mind came to disdain
the medieval belief that disease and peculiar behavior were attribut-
able to moral transgression or divine retribution, they were left to
ponder the secular and often competing contributions of neurology
and psychology. If the former was initially limited to identifying
infestations growing within the brain, the identification of epilepsy
some fifty years before the emergence of Freudian psychoanalysis
catapulted the concept of a seizure-induced personality into the
mainstream of pathography. Few theses have been so liberally
exploited, though it is one that all too often smacks of medical
reductionism in the hands of imprudent sleuths frantic to uncover
pathography's next Rosetta Stone. I know that from experience: as an
older, other person, I now recognize the limitations of having" once
applied the temporal-lobe-epilepsy thesis to Adolf Hitler. Mark it
well: no second opinion is more painful than that which brings one's
own first into question. Whether the same might pertain to the other
case studies presented in the final essay remains to be seen. Despite
what the skeptic would surely term a hackneyed concept, this thesis
deserves a second look with regard to Hitler and other zealots, if only
to reexamine one admittedly rare physiologic phenomenon that
subsequent psychoanalysts have managed to ignore.
CHAPTER 1
Napoleon Bonaparte:
Heads or Tails?
Can the pathographer make head or tail of Napoleon's perplexing medi-
cal history? Despite the attempts of a myriad of imaginative specialists
to reduce this Corsican upstart to little more than a walking textbook of
disease, even the most skeptical investigators are willing to consider
that Napoleon might have won the battle of Waterloo had he not been
indisposed; for thrombosed hemorrhoids were said to have diverted the
general's attention during his final curtain calion the stage of European
history.! In that sense, a painful tail wagged what remained of the dog
days of Napoleonic France. The more cerebrally inclined believe the
causes for his downfall lie elsewhere: whether as a result of an imperial
pituitary gland that failed, a brain that occasionally misfired in sporadic
bursts of epilepsy, or a psyche warped with Freudian complexes, Napo-
leon was a psychophysiologic wreck waiting to happen. Yet perhaps the
real answer to biohistory's most popularized enigma may be found in
neither the emperor's head nor his tail but somewhere in the middle-
in what physicians of the Victorian era discretely termed the "equator-
ial zone" of the abdominal cavity.
About Waterloo itself, at least one thing seems certain: Napoleon
lost the battle on June 18, 1815, by closing his window of opportunity the
day before. Although on June 16 the struggle against the British and
Prussians had proved indecisive, a rout of Napoleon's adversaries on
June 17 looked propitious, given the strength of French reserves. Yet as
historian Frederick Cartwright has concluded: "It was in those twelve
hours from 9:00 P.M. on the 16th to 9:00 A.M. on the 17th that the
campaign was lost." 2 What is now known is that Napoleon was un-
characteristically indecisive during that twelve-hour period and lost
contact with the Prussians during the morning of the seventeenth. We
also know that he was in a great deal of pain. Quite unlike the disci-
plined warrior of earlier years, Napoleon slept late and confined himself
to his tent on that fateful day, losing the advantage in the early morning
hours. Why such perplexing behavior?
Dr. William Ober offered an intriguing clue in his essay "Seats of the
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Mighty." Napoleon, he says, was suffering yet again from painful hem-
orrhoids occasioned by long hours in the saddle. He had earlier ridden in
a bouncing carriage across the Alps to Paris after his daring escape from
Elba, only to endure further the subsequent journey to Waterloo. On
June 13, portents of disaster gripped the imperial loins. As the bio-
historical critic Arno Karlen so aptly described its implications: "Riding
horseback with piles is a fate to be wished on one's worst enemy." 3 That
is precisely the painful position in which pathology placed Napoleon
before the decisive conflict with Blucher and Wellington. History tells
us that when a leader crosses the Rubicon of his career, what goes on in
his head is usually the decisive factor. Yet for French history, what came
out of the tail in a very literal sense may have weighed as heavily-and
as painfully. From the pathographer's perspective at least, the future of
Napoleon's empire rested less on his shoulders than on his sensitive and
fragile bottom.4
If the emperor's bulging hemorrhoids obscured a more penetrating
look at his behavior through the historical proctoscope, the persevering
medical investigator might do well to hang Napoleon in the·stirrups of
the urologist's examining table to study his diseased bladder. After his
return from Egypt in 1799, he began to suffer from painful and hesitant
urination that plagued him until the end of his military career. Victor
Hugo recorded that not only did Napoleon ride through the day at
Waterloo with "ghastly bladder pain" but that similar symptoms had
begun as early as 1800 during the Battle of Marengo, only to recur at
Borodino and Dresden during the 1812-13 campaign. Nor did the painful
malady ever unleash its grip. In captivity at St. Helena during his last
years, Napoleon was often observed leaning his head against a tree,
trying in vain to urinate.5
No one knows for sure whether the front or back of Napoleon's
imperiled loins was more of a burden for him at Waterloo. What washes
this discussion out of gossip's gutter and into the mainstream of histor-
ical analysis is that his military conduct arguably suffered as a result.
Yet were bleeding piles or a shriveled bladder enough to account for a
dethroned emperor's ultimate failure on the battlefield? Hardly so. To
argue that Napoleon lost his tactical advantage to the fickle dictates of
disease is to ignore those military historians who have already given us
good and sufficient reasons for his defeat. Though he may have been in
some distress at the time, the weight of the evidence suggests that
Wellington's superior resourcefulness and patience in battlefield com-
mand were the decisive factors.
It is one thing for the diagnostician to reduce a set of symptoms to
their lowest common denominator; it is quite another to lead the
gullible historian down the primrose path of medical reductionism by
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attributing historical effect to pathologic cause. Still, subsequent reve-
lations will at least risk suggesting that underlying illness did account
in large measure for Napoleon's dramatic change in appearance and
behavior-and perhaps even a change in history itself-but not before
other myths concerning his health are dispelled and the limits of the
medical argument defined.
If civility and common sense are reasons enough to dispense with
further speculation about an unruly case of hemorrhoids, greater liber-
ties continue to be taken with Napoleon's chronically inflamed bladder.
His heavily sedimented and painful urinary stream brought to mind two
distressing-if undeserved-implications linked to the emperor's re-
calcitrant genital hardware. The first was his failure to produce heirs
during his marriage to Josephine, leading to the spurious assumption
that chronic infection of the urinary tract accounted for his suspected
impotency. This theory was dispelled by imperial ejaculates that pro-
duced Napoleon II and at least two illegitimate children.6 Reversing
their steps to the entrance of that blind alley, a few intrepid gumshoes
entered another by suggesting that Napoleon had returned to Josephine
from a lengthy military campaign in Egypt with venereal disease. There
was much of medical significance in that campaign (revealed below),
but syphilis was not a part of it. No credible evidence links Napoleon to
that source, despite what some biographers have said.
The tail end of the medical legends that surround Napoleon and
other historical figures cannot be told without paying homage to the
testicles of the elite, which always seem to weigh so heavily for the
Freudian investigator. The heaviest on record, at least by the criterion of
literary license, were the testes of Harry S Truman, of whom someone
quipped that after his victorious showdown with John L. Lewis in the
coal strike of 1946, one could "hear his balls clank" as he walked down
the halls of the White House. 7 Though fumbling with the genitalia of
deceased generals and presidents recalls the naivete of the phrenologist,
who once assumed that greatness could be mapped out by the contour of
the skull or the convolutions of the cerebral cortex, Napoleon was not
immune to such ribald scrutiny. He was said to have suffered from
underdeveloped genitalia (once attributed also to Adolf Hitler) by tem-
erarious genital fixators, smug in their assurance that a small penis is
injurious enough to the afflicted's psyche that he overextends himself to
bolster his compromised masculinity. This charge can be dismissed in
Napoleon's case, given the discovery of normal, albeit retracted, geni-
talia at his autopsy.8
Nor did Napoleon's drive and ambition wither away in time like his
private parts ensconced in an increasingly corpulent groin, as boldly
asserted by those who refused to look above the Corsican beltline for
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explanations of Napoleon's inactivity and lethargy in his later years.9
Some have even gone so far as to cite Napoleon's deprived manhood as
evidence linking his deterioration to a hormonal deficiencylO-which
brings matters to a head in a very literal sense.
We are not referring in this instance to Napoleon's brain; rather, a
few pathographers have drawn attention to a small organ at its base (the
pituitary gland), which is the control center for hormonal and endocrine
balance in the body. A British neurologist was the first to suggest that
Napoleon suffered from a deficiency of this master gland, a disease
known as Froehlich's syndrome.11 That surmise was pounced upon by
other physicians, one of whom referred to the emperor's "infantile
genitals, "12 while another pronounced him a "pituitary eunuch" on the
basis of his corpulence, lethargy, thinning hair, and pudgy hands.13
True, these changes in Napoleon's physical appearance were uni-
versally acknowledged at the relatively young age of thirty-six. Truer
still, the renowned Napoleonic self-discipline disappeared as rapidly as
did his theretofore insatiable vitality and capacity for work. For one who
had always prided himself on burning his candle at both ends, the wax of
Napoleon's genius had clearly begun to melt down. Could his physical
and mental decline, at least descriptively consistent with a burned-out
pituitary gland, have been responsible? Hence the opening of the door of
the bony vault at the base of Napoleon's skull encasing this tiny organ to
the pathographer's examination-a door that has been forced open
despite the absence of a key to fit the Froehlich lock. I4
Though Napoleon may have suffered from a relative degree of
thyroid deficiency,IS it would represent a quantum leap of imagination
to blame the pituitary gland as the cause. An underactive thyroid is
certainly a more common condition in the aged than has been pre-
viously recognized, but to postulate this in a man of thirty-six defies the
law of averages, unless some underlying pathology in the pituitary
could account for a hypothyroid state in concert with other hormonal
deficiencies. At first glance, the observations of one British physician
who had attended Napoleon's autopsy cannot be dismissed out of hand
as incriminating primary data implicating a lack of testosterone. "The
pubis much resembled the mons veneris in women," he recalled. "The
muscles of the chest were small, the shoulders narrow, and the hips
wide. The penis and testicles were small." 16 In his most imaginative (if
not politically motivated) prose, Dr. Walter Henry was depicting an
effeminate male with a glandular deficiency. In reality, he was describ-
ing a pear-shaped habitus that probably reflected the physical inactivity
of Napoleon's later years. As for the alleged "defective genitals" found
at autopsy, allowance must be made for the well-known fact that the
penis and scrotum normally contract against the body after death.
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Moreover, Napoleon had hardly been impotent or infertile, a distinction
at variance with persons victimized by Froehlich's syndrome. Nor is an
underactive pituitary gland an evanescent condition. Without drug
replacement it remains a pervasive, day-to-day physiologic burden, one
hardly consistent with the brief displays of energy, brilliance, and vi-
vacity that characterized the ailing emperor until very near the end.
And what of Napoleon's alleged short structure? Could this have
been due to a lack of growth hormone from the same "failing" pituitary
gland? Once again, the imaginative investigator has harnessed a re-
calcitrant Froehlich steed to a wagonload of unsupportive data. In truth,
Napoleon was not as short as popular mythology recalls. At five feet, six
inches, he was of average height for a Frenchman of that age. That he
was not taller perhaps speaks as much to the misguided anticipations of
those who, upon meeting a giant by reputation, were disappointed to
find a middle-aged man of average size who had let his body balloon over
a slender frame. I?
The charge of homosexuality18 has proved equally indefensible.
Sensationalists are peculiarly prone to conjure up defective or overac-
tive genitals, venereal disease, or homosexuality to explain a despot's
character. In the most intriguing scenario of all, an unrestrained libido
inevitably lands one in the lap of syphilis. And if that tenuous relation-
ship cannot be sustained, then it is posited that the genitalia in question
must have been embraced by members of the same sex. Like the Freud-
ian psychoanalyst always searching for the"complex" to explain defec-
tive character, or the neurologist who sees an epilepsy sufferer behind
every tyrannical leader, the sex researcher implicates "homosexual
tendenices" to emasculate the powerful.
For that matter, no group of researchers has spilled more ink over
the greats and not-so-greats of history than have the psychoanalysts and
psychologists. Depending on how the ink blots their pages-and more
important, which investigator examines the image conveyed-Napo-
leon has become the Rorschach of the psychohistorical world. Some
attribute his behavior to his small stature, which allegedly led to over-
bearing and tyrannical compensation (the so-called "little man syn-
drome"). To Freud himself, Napoleon embodied the essentials of the
Joseph complex, more familiar to today's reader as the "big brother
syndrome." 19 Defense of these theses makes interesting reading but
hardly provides the necessary push to roll the stone away and resurrect
the essence of the man in his later years. Rather, it is the combination of
physical changes coinciding with Napoleon's altered behavior that con-
tinues to spur the search for a single underlying disease process to unify
the biohistorical verdict.
A few physicians, presumably putting their training in comparative
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anatomy to good use, sought answers in comparative pathography. The
medical biographer Boris Sokoloff was among the first to perceive a
continuity of behavior between Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and
Napoleon Bonaparte, characterized by certain tragic if self-defeating
flaws in the ambitious tyrant consumed by delusions of grandeur. No
one would dispute that Napoleon epitomized that description during
the ten-year period preceding Waterloo. Not only had he declared him-
self emperor; he personally designed his own coronation robes, adopted
the sword and insignia of Charlemagne, and placed himself in service at
the right hand of God (if not to reverse the relationship in his own mind
on occasion). In Sokoloff's view, Napoleon eventually became a victim
of the same psychological complex-hubris-that had accounted for
his success in earlier years as it did his ultimate failure. 20
So much for the complex; could there have been an underlying
neurophysiological cause for it? For example, one specific type of epi-
lepsy sufferer occasionally exhibits peculiar personality traits, among
them erratic and intemperate behavior, alterations in sexual activity,
and grandiose delusions of his rightful place in history. These are endur-
ing qualities that persist between episodes suggestive of seizure ac-
tivity, and even the most cynical would be hard pressed to dismiss out of
hand their plausible application to Napoleon after 1805. It behooves the
proponents of this theory,21 however, to identify suggestive behavioral
disturbances that might be interpreted as manifestations of epilepsy.
True, Napoleon was said to have suffered several seizures between 1803
and 1805, which must have made him fear for his sanity on occasion.22
As he once lamented: "One cannot lie in the bed of kings without
catching from them the madness of destruction. II 23 One of his mis-
tresses, awakened by the rigors of a full-blown seizure gripping her
lover, ran screaming from the room-only to meet the displaced (and
presumably distraught) empress in the hal1.24 That Napoleon suffered
from some form of seizure disorder, then, is not at issue. Whether this
alone could have accounted for his personality change is another mat-
ter.
Though at least two investigators proposed precisely that by equat-
ing what they termed "formes frustes of epilepsy" with psychomotor
seizure activity emanating from the temporallobe,25 on closer review
the incidents in question bear little resemblance to the brief periods of
unawareness ("fugue states"), behavioral automatisms, or repetitive
motor or speech activity devoid of meaning that would be identified
with this category of seizures per see Moreover, acquiring the person-
ality features that result from this specific type of epilepsy usually
requires a lifelong experience of hundreds of such episodes left un-
treated.26 The fact that none of the handful of seizurelike episodes
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found in Napoleon's extant record is said to have occurred after 1805
diffuses their plausible impact on his enigmatic behavior beyond that
point. If their occurrence is undisputed (Talleyrand himself witnessed
one such episode) and their description convincing enough to be com-
patiblewith epilepsy ("face distorted," "appeared to lose consciousness,"
"fell to the ground"),27 it would still be impru~ent for the retrospective
diagnostician to call them anything but grand mal seizures-which,
insofar as neurologists have been able to determine, are not accom-
panied by a well-defined personality disorder.
Persistent seizure activity of any sort is both uncommon and de-
bilitating enough that it would have been unlikely for Napoleon to rise
to such a high position under its onus-or, once he had arrived, for such
abnormal behavior to pass unnoticed in one so frequently before the
public eye. More damning still, those who argue that epilepsy was a
pervasive influence on Napoleon's behavior have made inaccurate asso-
ciations to substantiate their claims: for example, citing the emperor's
slow pulse and paroxysmal behavioral disturbances as evidence of a
conduction defect of the heart, incongruously attributed to "some dis-
turbance of the ... pituitary gland." 28 Nor is there evidence to support
the audacious assertion of one writer that the epilepsy thesis represents
the "key" to his military triumphs, that "Napoleon's triumphs were
triumphs of epilepsy." 29 If still another concluded that"the endocrine
origin of Napoleon's nervous paroxysms is more than reasonably cer-
tain," 30 the skeptic would at least agree that it is indeed more than
reasonable; it is pure fantasy.
We can do little else with Napoleon's brain, then, but to offer
speculative explanations for why the man behaved as he did: Examina-
tion of neither that organ nor the pituitary gland was permitted at
autopsy. Yet diseases outside the brain can have an impact on its
function and indirectly, therefore, on behavior. Consider the biochem-
ical induction of abnormal constriction and painful dilatation of blood
vessels under the scalp known as migraine. Napoleon's behavior
throughout his career, but more notably after 1805, was punctuated by
frenetic periods of constructive activity and creative thinking, alternat-
ing with interludes of lethargy and inactivity that characterize some
artists, executives, and leaders today who are victimized by these pain-
.ful vascular systems. Yet those who have defended the migraine hy-
pothesis have overshot the mark, not only ascribing the alleged "fits" to
"vascular spasms" of his brain (a distinctly unusual occurrence in
migraine), but proposing consequent permanent damage to that or-
gan.31 Some have gone so far as to lay the mysterious lethargy and
physical changes postdating his midlife crisis at migraine's doorstep.
Better such notions be laid to rest. The vast majority of migraine
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sufferers lead useful and productive lives; very few are victimized by the
permanent complications some investigators have suggested. Nor was
Napoleon. That he suffered from migraine is, at best, problematic; the
allegation that it accounted for his changed behavior at the tum of the
century underscores the limitations of fitting ill-defined data into a
preconceived thesis.
The inroads of normal aging left the sam.e scars on Napoleon as they
do today on the rich and powerful-not to mention the commoners
among us. Those who have lived a lifetime burdened with ambition,
realized or not, often have difficulty tolerating the stress that accom-
panies it as they wrestle in older age with more mundane matters of
clouded memory or recalcitrant genitalia. At least in their younger
years, three primal motivations have been said to goad the movers and
shakers of the world: sex, money, and power (and usually in that order).
Yet like the roles of their wives in the dynamics of such men's lives-
mistresses in their youth, companions in middle age, and ultimately
nursemaids-these formative motivations not only change but become
relatively unimportant as the overachievers are undermined by aging.
The question that remains to be answered in Napoleon's case is why he
aged so rapidly.
Chronic illnesses of the least intriguing sort prematurely age the
national leader no less than the ordinary mortal. Any combination of
long-standing afflictions might be anticipated to accelerate that proc-
ess, not to mention a destructive lifestyle that ages the body even in the
absence of overt disease. Living on three hour's sleep a night, bolting his
food (as he did his sex) while plunging from one project into another,
traveling on military campaigns almost incessantly during his last
active years before final captivity on St. Helena, Napoleon had arguably
signed his own death warrant long before Waterloo.
His military travels in particular may have exposed him to a chronic
debilitating infection that could account for the myriad of symptoms
from which he suffered. During the Egyptian campaign of 1798-99
Napoleon may have been infested with the schistosome, a ubiquitous
parasite endemic to ponds and rivers of the Middle East.32 The resulting
disease, schistosomiasis, has been found in autopsies of several mum-
mified Egyptian pharaohs33 and has reached epidemic proportions dur-
ing frequent periods of that region's later history. As was his custom,
Napoleon bathed frequently while in Egypt as elsewhere. Perhaps, then,
the unheralded schistosome gained entrance into his bloodstream by bur-
rowing through the skin, thereafter traveling to other organs of the body.34
To argue the point, one needs to know something about this rel-
atively unknown parasite. Depending on the species responsible,
schistosomiasis presents itself as two distinctly different diseases in
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humans. One causes dysentery; the other (Schistosoma hematobium)
affects the pelvic region and is the type of schistosomiasis that is
endemic in the Middle East. After invading the skin of its host, the
parasite first implants eggs in the bladder wall and veins of the rectum.
The latter infestation causes painful dilatation and thrombosis of ven-
ous structures, which the victim ruefully recognizes as hemorrhoids. As
for the bladder, the eggs chronically inflame its walls and lead to the
excretion of mucous, pus, and blood. Concretions develop around the
implanted eggs, eventually obstructing the urinary tract altogether.
Once the veins lining the pelvis are infested, the schistosome rapidly
spreads in the bloodstream to the lungs and may be deposited there. In
severe cases, the lungs prove ineffective filters, and the larvae proceed to
infect the liver, stomach, and even the brain.35
Schistosomiasis remains the second most common parasitic dis-
ease (next to malaria) in humans. Involvement of the bladder, rectum,
and stomach is found 80 percent, 75 percent, and 30 percent of the time,
respectively, in patients who die of the disease.36 Though frequently a
silent invader in its early stages, rigor and fever eventually occur and are
indistinguishable from symptoms of malaria, its partner in crime.
These facts are perhaps of more than passing interest in relation to a
French general who was a compulsive bather, who was documented to
have suffered from at least one episode of "the ague" while in Egypt,37
and who was later victimized by diseases of each of the three organs
most prevalently involved by the schistosome.
It may, then, be more than coincidental that Napoleon began to
show all the usual symptoms of schistosomiasis (not to mention an
exacerbation of hemorrhoids) only after his return from Egypt.38 These
included an increasingly prominent ache in his right side, perhaps
reflecting kidney, liver, or even stomach involvement with the parasite;
painful urination with subsequent stone formation as a possible result
of bladder infestation; and a hacking cough that may have been related
to the calcified granulomata or "tubercles" found in his left lung at
autopsy.39
Proceeding from the defensible to the more speculative, any dis-
seminated disease in the bloodstream (whether of tumor or parasitic
origin) involves the pituitary gland with greater incidence than its small
size and location would suggest, ostensibly on the basis of this gland's
rich blood supply.40 Though the supposition that Napoleon suffered
pituitary failure is fraught with contradictions, those who cling to this
hypothesis have yet to posit a cause for its alleged occurrence. Perhaps
the schistosome thread offers a rope with which the Froehlich-syn-
drome advocates might one day hang their critics. That intriguing
surmise will be left for others to argue.
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For the purpose of this review, schistosomiasis may prove to have
important ties to still another maligned theory concerning Napoleon's
demise that deserves a second look: the popular belief that Napoleon
had been poisoned, based on the arsenic that detailed· photospectro-
metric analyses of samples of his hair revealed.41 Yet modem toxi-
cologists are now aware that antimony may be confused with arsenic in
the type of analysis used.42 And that is of singular importance, as
antimony was a mainstay of treatment for parasitic diseases of all kinds
in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.43 This leaves the skeptic
with food for thought: Was Napoleon being treated with antimony for a
parasitic disease that was believed at the time to be malaria but was
really a case of schisotosomiasis heretofore undocumented in the medi-
cal record? Even if the schistosome was not the culprit, the record
indicates that he suffered a bout of "malaria" at Auxonne in 1789.44
Setting the arsenic question aside for the moment, what this ubiquitous
parasite affords the pathographer is a single unifying disease that could
account for a host of seemingly unrelated symptoms, and which had a
chronicity that links long-standing illness to the phenomenon of pre-
mature aging.
Many investigators have accepted out of hand that Napoleon's
recurring abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting were manifestations of
a peptic ulcer that eventually transformed itself into a cancerous growth
in the stomach.45 No doubt his dietary habits, perpetual stress, and
destructive lifestyle might have predisposed the emperor to the former
condition in any case. The real question is whether the"cancer" was the
cause of his death, as his physicians certified following the autopsy.46
Given the various accounts of the autopsy findings, however, it is by no
means certain that the growth found to be penetrating the back wall of
his stomach was in fact a cancer. For one thing, a chronic yet benign
peptic ulcer (not to mention an indolent schistosomiatic infestation
known to induce ulcerations) can produce such scarring that it resem-
bles a tumorous growth. For another, it may also penetrate the outer
layer of the stomach, as every general surgeon knows.
Nor does stomach cancer, in and of itself, kill its host merely by
being present. An overwhelming number of its victims die for one of
four reasons: the cancer obstructs the gastrointestinal tract, leading to
starvation; it spreads to other vital organs, most notably the liver and
lungs; it induces an infection in the abdominal cavity known as "perito-
nitis" once a perforation of the stomach occurs; or the patient slowly (on
occasion, precipitately) bleeds to death as the ulcer enlarges. Not only is
the evidence for obstruction (until the very end) unpersuasive in Napo-
leon's case; his autopsy affirms that there was no dissemination of
cancer to other organs. Moreover, the location of the perforation pre-
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eluded a fulminant infection (despite some investigators' assertions to
the contrary),47 as the rent was in effect sealed by the juxtaposition to it
of the liver.48
While recognizing that the Corsican pathologist who performed
Napoleon's autopsy was a borderline clinician (not to mention that
some thought he was a confirmed liar as well),49 it would be imprudent
to dismiss Francesco Antommarchi's findings altogether. After all, he
had been trained by an eminent anatomist and at least recognized his
limitations as a clinician, having had only corpses to deal with in the
past.50 Though Antommarchi found no evidence of peritonitis, the
intermittent episodes of acute abdominal distress that his patient expe-
rienced while on St. Helena at least suggest that earlier infections might
still have occurred. To be more precise, descriptions of these illnesses
implicate some form of inflammatory process, possibly on the basis of a
transient perforation of the ulcer into the abdominal cavity. Beginning
in 1816 Napoleon suffered from spasmodic abdominal cramping and
vomiting that were accompanied by a rapid pulse, fever, profuse sweat-
ing, and pain referred to the right shoulder. Not only does the shoulder
discomfort suggest diaphragmatic irritation from an inflammatory
source in the abdomen with referred pain to that area, but the notation
of jaundice thereafter raises the possibility of liver involvement-pre-
cisely as might be expected by the close approximation of the ulcer to
the liver's edge, found at his autopsy.
Simply stated, there are unresolved problems with the cancer thesis
to account for Napoleon's death, unless the amount of gastrointestinal
bleeding that did occur over time was enough to induce a life-threaten-
ing anemia and subsequent shock. On the surface, there is much to
suggest that his frequent episodes of loss of consciousness were due to
blood loss rather than to the mysterious "seizures" that some have
proposed. Count Monthalon recorded in his diary that Napoleon's lips
and fingernails were "entirely colorless" in the end, only to embellish
his observation with an equally colorless metaphor: "There was no
more oil in the lamp." 51 This was enough for some pathographers to
conclude that chronic anemia was slowly snuffing the flame of Napo-
leon's vitality. True, there was evidence of active bleeding in the stom-
ach just prior to his death j true, too, chronic infection is known to
induce a gradual fall in the blood count, even in the absence of overt
hemorrhage. Nevertheless, descriptions of Napoleon's last hours do not
convincingly match those of patients dying of hypovolemic shock. One
therefore could hardly be faulted for looking elsewhere for the cause of
his death, as a Swedish dentist with a lifelong interest in toxicology has
done. We return, then, to the arsenic theory.
Readers familiar with pathography's literature will readily surmise
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that this account of Napoleon's health thus far is quite in keeping with
Arno Karlen's incisive critique. This is only to emphasize that Karlen's
examination, as far as it goes, represents the most balanced and thought-
provoking study of its kind that has been written to date. It is not to say,
however, that second opinions are out of order, for Karlen largely ig-
nores the arsenic question. Yet it can now be argued that arsenic ties in
closely to the phenomenon of chronic infection in particular (and pre-
mature aging in general) that the record has already highlighted in bold
relief. To fit the puzzle together requires reexamining the arsenic thesis
in some detail.
In 1961, Dr. Sten Forshufvud published a landmark study document-
ing the presence of large quantities of arsenic in hairs taken from
Napoleon's shorn head at the time of his autopsy.52 Using a sensitive
activation-analysis technique, Forshufvud pursued a hunch (and the
hair) after reading previously unpublished diary entries of a member of
the emperor's entourage. Two literary phenomena followed, the first of
which was based on Forshufvud's jump from an assimilation of hard
data substantiating the presence of arsenic to a far softer assumption
that one of Napoleon's associates had systematically poisoned him at
the behest of French royalists who feared his return to power.53 The
second body of literature to emerge was a series of vituperative dis-
claimers concerning that assumption, published in the distinguished
British medical journal The Lancet. 54
As a result of this debate and subsquent studies, Forshufvud's the-
ory has been largely discounted55-albeit not for all of the right reasons.
Forshufvud dismissed his critics in kind with a cynical riposte: "History
belongs to the historians, not the scientists." 56 Still, if historians could
not ignore the fact that many of his fellow scientists disputed the
Swedish dentist-toxicologist's claims,57 neither could investigators dis-
pel the data indicating that arsenic was present in higher concentrations
than is normally the case. Though later independent analyses of dif-
ferent locks of Napoleon's hair revealed even higher concentrations of
antimony, the weight of the evidence still suggests a place for arsenic in
his medical history. Even so, Forshufvud may have overlooked the real
reason why it was there. That toxic levels of a heavy metal were found in
fragments of hair (and that they belonged to Napoleon) is not at issue.
What is really in dispute is, first, did arsenic contribute to the emperor's
decline and death, and second, was it administered as a poison?
With regard to arsenic's contribution to Napoleon's deteriorating
health, Forshufvud drew an important distinction between acute and
chronic poisoning. He surmised that Napoleon's own doctors missed
the telltale symptoms of chronic arsenic intoxication because these
were not precisely known until a hundred years later.58 Forshufvud
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emphasized loss of body hair, swollen feet and legs, an enlarged liver,
somnolence and paradoxical insomnia, and obesity as typical symp-
toms of the condition (the last two features are open to question) but
failed to mention one of the most prevalent signs of this particular type
of prolonged heavy metal exposure: a blotchy pigmentation of the skin
in general and thickening of the skin of the palms and soles in par-
ticular.59 Napoleon's hands were described in detail at his death (men-
tion is made of their "puffiness" but not thickness per se), and though
his torso was examined closely enough that the absence of body hair was
observed, no pigmented lesions were noted.60
Further, one does not advance to chronic arsenic intoxication with-
out first going through its subacute stage. Patients with subacute poi-
soning suffer from puffiness of the skin and eyelids, which Napoleon
had, but where are the bouts of diarrhea so characteristic of this stage of
the disease?61 On only two occasions during Napoleon's stay on St.
Helena is diarrhea even mentioned,62 hardly in keeping with the univer-
sal observation of frequent bouts of "the runs" each time the heavy
metal is ingested. In short, not all of Napoleon's clinical signs and
symptoms fit today's textbook descriptions of this particular type of
exposure.
To add to the confusion, not all who have studied the problem are
consistent in their findings. One investigator acknowledged that most
of the signs and symptoms descriptively fit arsenic poisoning, under-
scoring the presence of leg swelling and loss of hair, yet concluded that
Napoleon's symptoms did not fit that condition after al1.63 This is not to
dismiss his and others'64 contributions to the debate altogether. They
are on more solid ground in debunking Forshufvud's theory that the
remarkable preservation of Napoleon's body at the time of his exhuma-
tion two decades later was due to the preservative effect of high levels of
arsenic in the body.65 One suspects that Forshufvud was hearing zebras
where horses' hoofbeats signaled their far more familiar cadence: Napo-
leon's entombment in four airtight coffins was a more than adequate
explanation for his well-preserved remains.66
These caveats to Forshufvud's thesis notwithstanding, even the
most cynical observer would be hard pressed to dismiss his subsequent
studies masterfully correlating Napoleon's hair growth with sequential
clinical stages of the disease.67 True, some scientists have reminded us
that antimony can be confused with arsenic, despite the alleged specif-
icity of the activation analysis testj still others have pointed out that the
tartar emetic that Napoleon took on his deathbed contained antimony,
even though it may not have been used to disguise the real poison as
Forshufvud suggested.68 On balance, however, the impartial patho-
grapher would view with skepticism the claim that arsenic wasn't there
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or that the amounts weren't clinically significant.69 It was, and they
were.70 The question that really needs to be addressed is how it got
there. What the record suggests is the possibility that Napoleon had
been treated all along, for a nUmber of recurring symptoms, with either
antimony or arsenic-or, more likely still, both.
To illustrate the difficulty in following a trail that has long since
grown cold, we would do well to remember that a little knowledge can
go a dangerously long way toward turning the casual scholar in the
wrong direction. By way of example, I recall one French professor who
smugly reminded me of a "fact" that accounted for the presence of
arsenic in Napoleon's hair: "As every good pharmacist knows, arsenic
was used as an aphrodisiac in France in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries." He got the genital part right, but made the wrong associa-
tion: drugs containing arsenic were used to treat syphilis-and all
manner of other illnesses, including parasitic diseases. 71
One such preparation was Fowler's solution. Although this tonic
did not reach widespread use until the mid-1800's, it was available in
Napoleon's day.72 Strange indeed that the emperor's health seemed to
improve during those periods in which he was medically unattended.73
Was there more than meets the eye in the numerous references to
purgatives, tonics, and paregorics that Napoleon received from his
doctors, of which some had side effects at least suggestive of subacute
arsenical effect? 74 Taking an optimist's view of my predecessors rather
than searching for the diabolical motive behind every action, one might
conclude instead that Napoleon had unwittingly become a victim of
polypharmacy-including certain drugs containing arsenic that were
used for medical purposes.
Not that the chronic consumption of arsenic necessarily leads to
physiologic incapacitation or death. During the nineteenth century,
Austrian peasants of the Styrian Alps habitually consumed huge quan-
tities of arsenic as a means of promoting physical stamina-testimony
to the fact that one may become acclimated to quantities known to
produce immediate death in the individual without prior exposure.75
Apothecaries and physicians had long used that fact to advantage. Not
only had the Chinese been treating syphilis with arsenic since the
seventeenth century; it was also administered as a cheap antidote for
malaria, which Napoleon was believed to have had. 76 Moreover, one of
its most prevalent uses in Napoleonic France was to treat recurring skin
eruptions, and history records that the emperor was no stranger to that
affliction either. 77
Perhaps Napoleon even believed that he had syphilis and requested
arsenic surreptitiously-a reasonable enough suspicion until his fears
of impotence resolved after his divorce from Josephine. Though some
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have argued that he characteristically refused all manner of medication
until very near the end, when failing health softened his resolve, on
balance the extant data suggest that he was not averse to taking medi-
cines on occasion, even as a young man. 78 The syphilis connection
seems rather far-fetched to account for the presence of arsenic, but its
use as treatment for a parasitic infection has a ring of plausibility about
it. Coupled with at least two other diseases that Napoleon was per-
ceived to have had, and for which arsenic was the treatment of choice of
that day, the chances are good that it found its way into his body as a
medicine rather than a poison.
Further, there is still the possibility of environmental exposure.
Both the wallpaper and heavily brocaded curtains in the emperor's room
contained arsenic, 79 which was frequently found in interior decor of the
eighteenth century, and inhalation of arsenic from such sources is one
means of acquiring toxic levels of the heavy metal in the body. It can
also be ingested in substances other than medicine. Could the unwary
prisoner on St. Helena have eaten vegetables or drunk spring water
contaminated with it? Arsenic was used as a pesticide during the eigh-
teenth century.80 What has yet to be clarified is whether such pesticides
were used on the island before or during Napoleon's captivity, and
whether the volcanic soil or water of St. Helena was laden with arsenic.
Such important questions may defy the retrospective tools of inves-
tigation that today's science affords. Proponents of the poison hypoth-
esis dismiss these possibilities out of hand, arguing that inadvertent
environmental exposure would have affected others on St. Helena. Yet
much in the way of defensible inference can still be made. For one thing,
hepatitis (or at least a variation of that liver ailment) was almost en-
demic on the island. To date, its origins there remain unclear. What is
now known is that heavy metals of various types, including arsenic,
adversely affect liver function. 81 Moreover, rats were prevalent on St.
Helena-virtually every diary mentions their presence-and we know
that arsenic was used as a rat poison on the Continent in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.82 Perhaps the British had exported it to St.
Helena in an attempt to eliminate the feared rodent-for Europeans had
much in their past history to be skittish about when it came to rats.
None of these potential sources of arsenic can be established with
certainty. They do, however, seem more plausible-if admittedly less
intriguing-than the poison theory. Forshufvud believed he had dis-
covered both how the poisoning was perpetrated (chronically) and how
it was covered up (with calomel and tartar emetic). He was postulating
the perfect crime; all he needed was a motive-suggestive elements of
which were found in obscure diary entries.83 These were enough to con-
vince this modem-day Hercule Poirot that one of Napoleon's trusted
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entourage had been sent to St. Helena at the behest of French royalty to
assure that the audacious Corsican would not be around to haunt any
future succession crisis.84
In one sense, Forshufvud appeared to be his own worst enemy. After
reading Louis Marchand's diary, and before documenting the presence
of arsenic in Napoleon's body, the fertile imagination of the toxicologist
had all but closed his mind to any alternatives to premeditated murder.
Slamming shut the diary, he had exclaimed to his wife: "That's how
they did it. They poisoned him with arsenic! 11 8S Yet constructing an
engrossing spy thriller on subjective premises, complete with motive,
method, and murderer, would leave such purists as Sherlock Holmes
exasperated, to say the least. If poisoning was the name of the game once
Napoleon reached St. Helena, then how explain the earlier documenta-
tion of arsenic in his hair when he was neither incarcerated on St.
Helena nor in the company of his alleged assassin? As Forshuvfud
himself admitted, "Napoleon was exposed to substantial amounts of
arsenic ... before being exiled to St. Helena." 86
Although arsenic alone did not kill Napoleon, it may have contrib-
uted to his death, for it is now known to decrease the immune response
to all kinds of diseases.87 If the emperor in fact suffered from chronic
schistosomiasis, then his immune response to the spread of the parasite
to other organs may have been compromised by the arsenic present.
That surmise at least deserves more consideration than the conclusions
of one cynic, who not only asserted that thirteen times the usual
amount of arsenic in the body was "within the range of normal" but
lamely argued in the end that"corrosion of the soul" and"asphyxiation
of the spirit" accounted for Napoleon's death.88 People don't die of de-
pression and loss of self-esteem alone. These factors do, however, affect
an individual's willingness to push on in the face of chronic disease-
and may arguably have affected Napoleon's long-standing battle with
schistosomiasis every bit as much as did the arsenic that lowered his
immune response.
It seems hardly necessary, then, to postulate an exhaustion of the
pituitary gland, a brain full of spirochetes, or a lifetime of seizures to
explain Napoleon's changed appearance and behavior. Probably victim-
ized by a chronic parasitic infection with frequently painful manifesta-
tions, depressed and tired of life, perceptive enough to realize in the
stifling confines of his barren captivity that he had met his match in the
British, and weakened further by progressive anemia from a bleeding
ulcer and chronic heavy metal exposure, Napoleon lost his last battle in
1821 to overwhelming psychological and physiological forces. Yet his-
tory had already passed him by. And that, in the judgment of more sober
scholars, may be reason enough to account for his terminal decline.
CHAPTER 2
Henryvm:
Syphilitic Sovereign?
What more need be said of King Henry VIII? His popularly recounted life
story reads like a soap opera: eventually falling victim to syphilis after
years of debauchery, Bluff Hal spent the rest of his life captive to
murderous passions that earned him the dubious distinction of being
among the most violent monarchs who ever ruled England. At mid-life,
we are told, both his health and his character changed for the worse,
such that the royal flagon was by then more half empty than half full.
Yet in retrospect one wonders whether the pathographer, with his yard
of "ail" in hand, has proved too intoxicated to assimilate the meager
pool of medical facts left to ferment in the dregs. To render its contents
more potent, he has filled the remainder with more than a splash of
inference, thereby masking the real physical ailments that may (or may
not) have accounted for Henry's perplexing behavior.
Those who subscribe to the syphilis theory to explain the king's
transformation peddle their wares out of four shopworn containers.
First, syphilis burst upon the English scene in pandemic proportions
during a period when Henry both sat on the royal throne and presum-
ably slept in some less-than-regal beds. l Second, the obstetrical histo-
ries of his wives, most notably Catherine of Aragon, bear a striking
resemblance to those of syphilitic women who bear children, and the
medical histories of some of Henry's surviving offspring to those of the
children of such women.2 Third, Henry later manifested certain fea-
tures suggestive of an individual afflicted with syphilis of the nervous
system: difficulty in walking, behavioral changes, loss of judgment,
poor memory, fits of rage-all said to be typical of "paresis of the
insane." 3 Finally, an "ulcer" of Henry's leg (and an obscure scar on his
nose) appeared during the time he was deteriorating physically and
mentally, raising the possibility that both lesions were syphilitic gum-
mas known to affect the bones in late stages of the disease.4 From such
evidence comes the "presumptive diagnosis" of syphilis.
What gave birth, as it were, to the syphilis theory in the first place?
It all began with the obstetrical histories of Henry's wives. On the basis
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of their multiple premature births and stillbirths, the earliest pathog-
raphers embraced the theory that syphilis lay behind these failures of
propagation. After all, no effects of disease are said to be quite so
predictable as what happens to syphilitic women who attempt to have
children. Catherine of Aragon's track record set the stage for the medi-
cal reductionists. During her first two years of marriage alone, she
produced a stillborn daughter and a son who lived only fifty-two days. A
year later the queen suffered both a second miscarriage and another
stillbirth. After four unsuccessful pregnancies, Catherine finally deliv-
ered her only viable child, a daughter who one day would rule England
and earn for herself the tasteless epithet "Bloody Mary."
With no male heir forthcoming and the royal succession in doubt
(for no queen had ever been crowned sole ruler of England), the king's
patience was sorely tried by Catherine's labors. The same could be said
for his later detractors, who labored in vain to uncover that elusive
venereal "sore" responsible for bringing the scourge of syphilis to the
Tudor line.5 Both Henry and Catherine have been repeatedly "tried" in
the court of pathographical review through the years, yet neither has
been found guilty of harboring such a sore beyond a reasonable doubt.
Quite frankly, the indictment of Henry smacks of the ex post facto.
Because his later history suggests an avid interest in sowing the royal
seed, some have assumed that the prince must have had a lot of practice
prior to meeting Catherine. But did he really? One historian who was
hardly an apologist for Henry admitted that, for all the rumors of his
sexual excesses as a young man, "he was careful to contain his passions
within bounds." 6 Moreover, the tight reins held by his father, the
austere Henry VII, were restrictive enough to dampen the excesses of a
son who, by all accounts, was kept well under thumb. 7 If, as one
"syphilophile" surmised, Bluff Hal had "probably forgotten the trifling
incident" that exposed him to syphilis in his ribald youth,8 no scholar
has yet uncovered it. Though the elusive sore was first ascribed to
Henry, such inferential scabs have left no scar.
Of necessity we tum to Catherine. Here the extant data are as
titillating as they are subjective. A solicitious Spanish ambassador once
took it upon himself to alert the royal court to Catherine's "scandalous
involvement" with one Diego Fernandez, a confessor to this recently
widowed matron whose first husband happened to have been Henry's
brother. Whether their relationship was purely platonic and aboveboard
(or at least out-of-bed), as the queen asserted to her dying day, Fernandez
certainly lived up to his racy reputation. He was later convicted of
fornication and driven from court.9 Though no evidence exists to sup-
port the notion that he ever had syphilis, perhaps there was more than
meets the eye in the comment of Catherine's doctor: "The only pains
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from which she now suffers are moral afflictions beyond the reach of her
physician." 10
A third and often discussed possibility as to who got sores from
whom ignores the fact that simple chronology belies the hypothesis. In
1514 (some four years after his marriage to Catherine), Henry returned
from a military campaign in France. A few weeks later he contracted a
rash that one observer cavalierly labeled the "French disease," a par-
ochial term of the day for syphilis. Henry, no mean healer and producer
of nostrums himself, proclaimed that he had smallpox, as did his physi-
cian Thomas Linacre. Still others who were charged with monitoring
the king's health saw nothing more in the affliction than a case of
measles. II It was left to future speculators who never saw the rash
themselves to attribute it to syphilis. I2 If so, had Henry acquired it
during an uncircumspect tryst in France? Or did the queen infect her
husband on his return? Either way, the verdict is moot, because Cather-
ine had already experienced three miscarriages and stillbirths. For the
syphilis thesis to fit her obstetrical history, Henry would have to have
contracted the disease long before the French campaign.
Few would dispute that Catherine's predicament was unfair,
trapped as she was between the demands of royal prerogative and a
recalcitrant womb. Aside from her suspicious obstetrical history, is
there anything objective with which to substantiate the claim that she
was given to sexual excess, regardless of who was the alleged guilty
party linking lues to the loins of Tudor? In all too few instances can the
pathographer's retrospective postmortems be tested against the real
thing: an autopsy of the deceased. Lest one mistakenly suppose that the
sixteenth-century autopsy provided unassailable scientific evidence
upon which to base retrospective suppositions, we must be prudent
enough to recognize that what is found at autopsies, then and today, lies
largely in the eye of the beholder.
In Catherine's case, a candlemaker turned embalmer found no ab-
normal pathology except in her heart, which was described as "black
and hideous, with a black excrescence that clung closely to the out-
side." 13 It is less than informative to see what some have made of this
description, ranging from a distinctly unusual cancer of the heart, on the
one hand, to "syphilitic aortitis" on the otherI4 (ignoring the rudimen-
tary fact that the aorta is quite distinct from the heart itself). Yet far
removed from any manifestation of syphilis, perhaps a more mundane
explanation fits the clinical context of the queen's death: a myocardial
infarction that extended itself over a period of days might have rendered
a portion of the heart necrotic (and possibly "black") with a postmortem
clot lodged under the thinned-out wall of heart muscle that has died. IS
Suffering from pangs of false labor himself over a thesis that is
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scarcely more viable than the corpses and stillbirths he ponders, the
syphilophile is forced to throw out some babies with the bathwater that
don't mesh with his preconceived scenario. Failing that, he remakes the
survivors in his own image. As for Henry's next wife, Anne Boleyn, her
firstborn was a normal girl, Elizabeth I, who sat on the English throne for
nearly a half century and never showed any stigmata of the dread
disease. This birthing record contradicts that usually found among
syphilitic mothers. 16
Faced with healthy progeny to explain away, at least one writer
seized on the contemporary rumor that Elizabeth may not have been
Henry's daughter after all. Citing Anne's known proclivity for flirting,
why not brand her a nymphomaniac and proclaim her daughter to have
been born out of wedlock? 17 But as one who held the king at arm's length
for six years, steadfastly refusing to be Henry's mistress until his divorce
from Catherine assured the throne for herself, Anne would hardly have
risked it all in the eleventh hour by involving herself with another
man.18 There were other ways to provoke Henry's jealousy, which she
had exercised already. To jeopardize both the royal prize and her head as
well squares with neither her motives nor the dictates of prudence.
Nor is Anne's the only obstetrical history that doesn't fit the syph-
ilology party line. Henry's third wife, Jane Seymour, successfully gave
birth to a viable if admittedly frail male heir, the luckless Edward VI.
What at first glance, then, suggests an engaging thesis born of the failed
birthing process suffers from illegitimacy, as two of the king's first three
wives simply do not fit the mold of syphilitic maternity history.19
That is, of course, unless the undaunted researcher can prove that
his surviving children themselves bore the stigmata of syphilis. Not
surprisingly, just such an argument has been advanced with regard to
three of Henry's offspring. If the cases of Henry Fitzroy (Henry's bastard
son born to Anne's sister Mary) and Edward VI are similar insofar as both
.died at a young age,20 no one has convincingly portrayed either as a
syphilitic child.21 Apart from their fragile health, the extant records fail
to describe any incontrovertible signs of congenitally acquired venereal
disease.
What we do know of congenital syphilitics who survive into child-
hood is the following: the child's growth is usually stunted, and the
perceptual senses of hearing and seeing are impaired. The teeth resem-
ble foreshortened pegs, the nose may be flat, and the skull prominent.
Mental development is slowed, and many victims are institutionalized
on that 'account.22 To be sure, some of these features have been at-
tributed to Henry's daughter Mary: one investigation asserts that her
portrait by the Spanish artist Moro depicts a "classic hereditary syph-
ilitic'i with its frontal bossing, flat nose, and wrinkled face.23 Yet the
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restrictions that apply to the interpretation of autopsy reports also apply
to art; others who have studied the same painting have failed to see in it
any damning physical stigmata.24
Proponents of the syphilis argument have also catered to the less
than scientific practice of selecting the evidence. More discerning crit-
ics, drawing upon other portraits and unbiased descriptions by Mary's
contemporaries, have refused to allow the oil depicting her as a syph-
ilitic to dry on the canvas of historical reappraisal. Though some might
take exception to the Venetian ambassador Michiel's description of
Mary as a "seemly woman" (enough to posit the hope that he was a
better diplomat than a judge of beauty), perhaps Michiel was taking into
account her other redeeming features. For one, she had become an
accomplished musician by the age of four; for another, she was fluent in
four languages by the age of ten-achievements that hardly reflect the
intellectual attributes of the congenital syphilitic.25
Those researchers who embrace more objective data than aging
portraits still must consider Mary's poor eyesight, which some have
argued to be representative of interstitial keratitis so prevalent among
hereditary syphilitics.26 Sad to relate, the skeptics' cause was hardly
strengthened by one otherWise incisive critic of the syphilis thesis who
lamely attributed Mary's failing vision to "severe eye strain" induced by
long hours of study as a youth or, worse yet, to "the incessant weeping"
provoked by Henry's treatment of her mother Catherine! 27 The less
romantically inclined would point out instead a multitude of other
causes for compromised vision, not to mention the lack of documenta-
tion for Mary's having had poor hearing or pegged teeth. And the latter is
of singular importance, as the presence of interstitial keratitis supports
the diagnosis of syphilis only when linked with these other two defects
in what is collectively known as Hutchinson's triad.28
Given the history of childbirths during that era, the frequent birth-
ing failures in Henry's family probably matched what the times al-
lowed, even for pregnancies among the well-to-do. His older sister
Margaret had an obstetrical history little better than that of the unfortu-
nate Catherine: two of her children died at birth, and three others
expired in their infancy.29 Not all failures of propagation can be laid at
syphilis's doorstep, even during the worst of times when the scourge
had reached pandemic proportions.
That brings us to the best of times to consider whether the quasi-
incestuous relationships in which Henry and his kin were involved
might have contributed to a larger share of congenital defects, miscar-
riages, and stillbirths than a more diversified genetic pool would have
afforded. In truth, consanguinity was no more prevalent among the
Tudors than within other royal families of the sixteenth century. That
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bit of circumstantial evidence probably warrants more consideration
than the suggestion that something known as "Rh incompatibility"
accounted for Catherine's frequent fertility failures.3D Whereas the
obstetrical histories of Anne Boleyn and Jane Seymour contradict the
syphilis thesis in that their firstborn survived, Catherine's history is at
odds with Rh incompatibility precisely because her first did not. For a
woman to acquire the Rh factor leading to abortions and miscarriages in
later pregnancies, her firstborn by definition is unaffected, as circulating
antibodies in the mother's blood militating against subsequent normal
pregnancies are not present until Rh positive and Rh negative serum
combine.31 Moreover, Mary's survival so late in the picture further
serves to negate the hypothesis.
If, as the record could be interpreted to suggest and the natural
history of syphilis transmission allows, Henry became less infectious
with time,32 he still had ample opportunity during the course of his
subsequent marriages to reload and fire at will, as the saying goes, in an
attempt to father a son. Viewed from this perspective, the syphilis thesis
remains at best a blip on the screen of Tudor history-unless, of course,
it can be proved that Henry's later behavior itself bore the stigmata of
neurologic involvement. And here again subsequent argument will
suggest that the imaginative pathographer has gone too far.
That said, are we justified in labeling Henry an unwary syphilitic
simply because much of the population undeniably was victimized by
this new and frightening venereal disease? After all, syphilis had burst
upon the scene with such alacrity and virulence that during the first
thirty years of the sixteenth century alone, one-half to two-thirds of
patients admitted to asylums and sanatoriums were said to be afflicted
by the scourge.33 To some scholars, this statistic alone solidified the
case: "Syphilis was a common disease at the beginning of the sixteenth
century, and the simple explanation is that Henry suffered from it." 34
Yet the skeptic might suggest substituting the word "simplistic" for
"simple" to underscore the shallow appeal of circumstantial evidence
in the face of more unassailable data.
Though its origins were at best poorly understood, the manifesta-
tions of syphilis were so descriptively specific by 1520 that few victims
of what was then called the "Great Pox" passed undiagnosed. Therein
lies one very telling argument against Henry's having been so afflicted:
despite the best medical care of the day (not to mention the scrutiny of
ambassadors dutifully charged-and handsomely rewarded-with
keeping abreast of the king's health), no account of his ever having the
disease, much less having been treated for it, exists.35 Certainly it
would have been difficult to disguise, in a victim with Henry's imposing
physical credentials and social standings, the slobbering that would
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have occurred under the influence of mercury ingestion, the accepted
treatment of the day.36
That syphilis was the latest in a long list of plagues to ravage the
English countryside does not imply that everyone in Tudor society got
it. For those who did succumb, its skin eruptions alone were so striking
and loathsome that the spirochete's presence could hardly be missed.
Obviously, there are inherent dangers in applying what we know of
syphilis today to its manifestations at the tum of the sixteenth century;
still, a few facts are generally accepted as timeless. Statistically, only
one-third of those who contract the disease and pass without treatment
go on to central-nervous-system involvement; and of that subgroup,
only one-third are infected in such a way as to affect their behavior.37
Not only would Henry have been unlikely to develop neurosyphilis on
percentages alone, then, but his later conduct hardly suggests the need
to raise the issue in the first place.
Most investigators now refute the popular myth generated by a
handful of earlier biographers that Henry's behavior dramatically
changed as he aged.38 On balance, they regard as more apparent than real
the much touted midlife crisis that allegedly transformed him at about
the time he obtained his divorce from Catherine. The underpinnings of
Henry's character, including an unbridled egotism and an insistence on
having his own way, were already well entrenched in what today's
physicians would identify as his "premorbid personality": that is, be-
fore the onset of any disease that might have afflicted him during this
period. One prudent scholar has spoken for most of his colleagues in
asserting that "something of the King's cruelty and inherent assump-
tion that clean breaks with the past could solve deep-rooted problems
was already in evidence" at an early age.39 Much of this has been
ascribed to an inferiority complex suffered at the hand of his father,
though it seems excessive to embellish that with an Oedipus complex,
as one psychologist has done.40
What we do discover very early on in Henry's reign is a dearth of
illness per se but a plethora of frustrations. Take an individual intent
upon legitimizing a line that had very tenuous foundations, add his
lifelong pretensions against the French, then throw at him a succession
of diplomatic affronts, a wife who could not bear him a male heir, and a
mistress who refused his entreaties for six years. Is it any wonder that
this consummate egotist would become more paranoid and vindictive
seemingly overnight? Henry's ego had always been his Achilles heel.
Crafty enough to fend off potentially lethal arrows shot from the bows of
opponents and subordinates alike, the king's pride nevertheless suffered
grievous wounds. He was as victimized by his own passions as he was by
self-perceived offenses, either personal or diplomatic. Not only had his
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erstwhile allies turned archrivals-Ferdinand, Maximilian, and Charles
V-renounced a treaty that had earlier made them common enemies of
Henry's much coveted France;41 his sexual passions neither produced
redeeming progeny nor found an outlet in Anne, who steadfastly refused
his amorous advances.
As a self-styled Renaissance man, Henry's intellectual passions
were equally boundless. Into the ferment of anticlericalism rocking the
foundation of the English church dropped his divorce of Catherine.
During the proceedings, the king became, as one historian well put it, a
"mendacious theologian." 42 Using his perverted theological constructs
just long enough to effect a legitimate divorce (at least in his own eyes),
he just as quickly dropped his obsession with formulating doctrine and
began to exercise it. Perhaps that was just as well, insofar as his reputa-
tion as a serious theologian was concerned. Shakespeare, for one, im-
plied that the king's religious views extended no higher than the bodice
of his mistress's gowns. In the second a.ct of Henry VIII the Lord Cham-
berlain remarks: "It seems the marriage with his brother's wife has
crept too near his conscience." To which the Duke of Suffolk retorts:
"No, his conscience has crept too near another lady." 43
Straining under the yoke of Rome as much as the barrenness of
Catherine's womb, Henry vigorously enforced his self-serving tenets for
the purpose of removing both problems altogether. The measure of his
resourcefulness is that he succeeded-but not without immersing him-
self deeper in self-indulgence. That only opened his eyes to the limitless
bounds of what his will alone could accomplish, some of which was
admittedly unwarranted. The later beheadings of Anne Boleyn and Sir
Thomas More were cases in point.
Yet falling victim to one's passions (even sexual ones on occasion)
hardly equates, a priori, with succumbing to a social disease. It was not
the dread spirochete but Henry's overweening will that embroiled him
in crises of both a personal and political nature-to the effect that he
was corrupted in the end by his own sense of power.44 The influence he
wielded in temporal and spiritual matters was so formidable that, his
perennial designs on the French excepted, Henry's reign was marked by
one success after another. In the sober analysis of one authority: "On
the twin issues of monarchic theory and lust for conquest, there is
everything to be said for the view that Henry VIII's policy was consis-
tent throughout his reign." 45 Indeed, at this point in the story he had
succeeded in gaining control of both church and state-a supreme com-
pliment for an alleged victim of syphilis who had accomplished what
virtually all other kinds had sought in vain since the lay-investiture
crisis of the Middle Ages.
If any change in Henry's character occurred at all, it arguably came
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only after a literal blow to the head and a later figurative blow to his
fragile ego. While participating in a jousting tournament in 1536, Henry
had been knocked from his horse and rendered unconscious for two
hours. That was a landmark incident whose possible physiologic signifi-
cance is discussed in further detail below. From the standpoint of
appearance and behavior, the king became a changed man-and not the
least of the changes can be attributed to the fact that he never rode in the
jousts again, forfeiting the one physical activity that had not only
afforded him self-esteem but had kept him thin and robust. A man who
has found pleasure in physical contests that are now denied him may
well become depressed. Moreover, obesity is a cardinal sequela of both
depression and a sedentary lifestyle, as depressed and inactive individu-
als both eat more and expend fewer calories. Hence the king's trans-
formation within a three-year period into the gargantuan blob with
which history identifies him. For those who have used Henry's ex-
panding waistline as a measure of progression of whatever intriguing
diseases they have attributed to it-whether syphilis,46 gout,47 or amy-
loidosis48-such a bland equation as balancing caloric expenditure with
dietary intake is bound to disappoint.
Equally disappointing for the retrospective voyeur, Henry's glut-
tony no longer extended to his erstwhile prodigious sexual appetite.
Shortly after his fortieth birthday, word spread that England's most
renowned womanizer had become impotent. There is no documenta-
tion to support the allegation, though the rumor alone was enough for
some later writers to suggest that his alleged impotence was yet another
sign of advancing syphilis.49 Prudent physicians who deal with de-
pressed patients on a daily basis would recognize instead that Henry's
depression may have had more to do with his diminished sexual drive
than did organic disease per se, for depressed patients often complain of
their loss of interest in sex.50
Their mates may tum by default to other sexual outlets, as seems to
have been the case with Henry's fifth wife: the scandalous Catherine
Howard was described by one chronicler as a "nymphomaniac from the
age of twelve" and by another as little more than IIan animated flapper
with the glitter of a jewel and the morals of a female guttersnipe." 51
Morals aside, Henry loved Catherine dearly. When she was ultimately
convicted of adultery in 1541 at the behest of Henry's councilors, rival
ambassadors could hardly fail to remark to their superiors how terribly
affected he was by the queen's treason, which he was powerless to
pardon. The Venetian ambassador, Chapuys, reported that Henry had
IIgreatly fallen away" into melancholy since learning of Catherine's
misconduct; Marillac, the French liaison to Henry's court, found him
still a year later to be livery old and gray since the malheur of his last
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queen." 52 Now rapidly aging, he would soon tum to a sixth wife, who
would afford him the solace of a nursemaid.
Not all his scars were emotional. Even before Catherine Howard's
indiscretion, physical ailments other than obesity and depression were
nipping at the increasingly vulnerable heels of poor Henry. In 1537 Lord
Montague confided that the king had developed an "ulcerous leg," the
serious nature of which was underscored by Henry's belief that it might
someday kill him.53 A later scholar ascribed undue significance to the
lesion's occurrence at precisely the time Henry's physical incapacities
accelerated, going so far as to interpret this and other physical man-
ifestations as late sequelae of a syphilitic gumma that had ulcerated and
become infected.54
To begin with, the lesion's date of onset is as unclear as most of the
other physical stigmata with which popular history has castigated
hapless Hal. According to one source, as early as 1515 (at age twenty-
five) Henry had developed a "leg ulcer," presumably of traumatic originj
another set the date at 1528-noting in passing that the ulcer eventually
affected both legs.55 That both extremities were involved is supported
by primary sources such as the deposition of the Duke of Norfolk and
any number of ambassadors' recollections.56 To account for this, the
prudent diagnostician might be inclined to invoke a generalized condi-
tion, the most common of which, given Henry's increasing corpulence,
would be varicose veins.57 If compresses could not heal the bulging and
unsightly veins in Henry's thighs, it would be natural for his surgeon,
Sir Thomas Vicary, to incise them and, in so doing, perhaps induce a
superimposed abscess in the process. Each time the draining ulcer
sealed, Henry would be wracked with fever. 58
To be as precise as possible, descriptions of Henry's leg malady
closely parallel our present-day understanding of something called a
"post-thrombotic syndrome" that occasionally occurs in varicosities of
long standing. This is a perversely chronic affliction that defies even the
best treatment available today. Acute blockage in one vein may lead to
dilatation of interconnected tributaries in the leg, predisposing in time
to chronic occlusion of the entire system. Blood is forced into less
resilient pathways in the venous system, increasing pressure against
thin-walled channels whose eventual rupture leads to subcutaneous
hemorrhage, scarring, and ulceration. The condition then becomes a
self-perpetuating process.59
Not only is the thigh an unusual location for a syphilitic gumma
(and most authorities are of the opinion that his ulcers emerged there, as
they were visible to neither contemporaries nor portraitists),60 but
Henry had both the physical attributes and lifestyle that would have
predisposed him to such a common disorder as varicose veins. To a king
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who demanded prompt resolution of problems-whether in marriages
that soured, wombs that did not work, or popes that defied him-the
skills of an aggressive surgeon would seem tailor made-even if, by
applying them, Vicary may have induced recurrent infections that
would plague Henry to the end.
One of the most feared complications of sluggish blood flow in the
legs is a potentially fatal condition known as pulmonary embolism.
Evidence suggests Henry suffered precisely that on one occasion when
he lay at death's door for several days, "black in the face without
speaking." 61 Though this has been considered by some a manifestation
of epilepsy or neurosis,62 ascribing it to a blood clot that had traveled
from chronically thrombosed veins to his lungs is far more believable.
Even if one were to postulate a petit-mal variant of epilepsy, a blackened
face has less to do with that condition than with a lack of oxygen as a
result of blood clots lodged in the lungs.
Even less tenable is the supposition that Henry's leg affliction was
due to a build-up of uric acid crystals in the subcutaneous tissue, which
occurs in individuals afflicted with long-standing gout. This pervasive
malady has allegedly afflicted, at one time or another, virtually every
gluttonous monarch of biohistorical interest. Even Henry's father was
said to have ·suffered from it, though that surmise is far from convincing.
All that is known is that Henry VII was a victim o~ an ill-defined
arthritic condition (among other maladies), hardly a firm basis upon
which to build an open-and-shut case for gout. What Henry's father died
of was "a disease that wasted his lungs." Not that there is any known
association between excessive uric acid in the bloodstream and lung
disease; nor is there any direct relationship to the high blood pressure
and depression that one researcher mistakenly ascribed to gout in Henry
VIII.63
Inference must also serve those scholars who have asserted that
"indirectly, through its derangement of his renal functions, gout was
responsible for Henry's headaches and, eventually, his death" as a result
of uremia.64 In point of fact, there is no evidence that he ever had kidney
failure; it was merely supposed by some observers (more likely, sug-
gested by one and repeated as fact by a few that followed) that he died in
a uremic coma. Individuals suffering from uremia typically manifest
stupor, either intermittently or continuously, for long periods of time
before dropping into coma. Nothing of Henry's demise suggests that
this occurred. Nor does corpulence (to cite another bit of specious
circumstantial evidence) equate with having gout. Henry's sedentary
lifestyle and depression alone were enough to account for this, the most
obvious of the physical changes that befell him.
To bury the argument completely, consider a few well-known facts
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about gout. There is both a high incidence of kidney stones in its victims
and painful swelling of the big toe, the latter so common as to be almost
synonymous with the disease-yet Henry never contracted either con-
dition. Moreover, only a small percentage of individuals with high uric
acid levels ultimately develop gout.65 The limitations of subjective
opinion are nowhere more apparent than in one investigator's attempt
to prop up what was already a wobbly case by dragging out yet another
musty portrait-this one of Henry's father, allegedly depicting "physi-
cal suffering long endured" from the pain of gouty arthritis.66 Perhaps
we should take the portrait at face value for what it really depicts: a
prude with sour features.
This"art" of viewing portraits with the intent of making retrospec-
tive diagnoses catapulted the gumma thesis back into the limelight long
after it had already been dismissed. A Danish physician suggested that
the vaguest hint of a "lesion" on the right side of the nose in some
portraits and sketches of Henry done after 1536 was yet another gumma
of the type that allegedly afflicted the king's legs. The qualifier "some"
is of more significance to the critics of such a supposition than it
apparently was to its lone supporter, who took the liberty of dismissing
three other portraits of the same period, which failed to show any lesion
on Henry's nose, on the grounds that the king's vanity compelled him to
order the portraitists"to leave the deformity out." 67 This is culling the
evidence that supports one's claim from any contradictory data that do
not. What the retrospective investigator chooses to see in portraits-as
in autopsy reports and obstetrical histories-is largely what so spec-
ulative a diagnostician wishes to emphasize.
If a selection of aged portraits has failed to convince the skeptic of
the merits of the syphilis thesis, and an examination of Henry's physical
infirmities and the obstetrical histories of his wives only further refutes
the assumptions undergirding it, can the spirochete's trail still be un-
covered in poor Henry's cerebral cortex? Should objective data fail such
diehard proponents, vituperation must suffice: having been accused of
our own improvisations when "the obvious medical truth [of syphilis] is
staring us in the face," what could we "mindless fools ... who love to
hug [our] little delusions" have missed? With all due respect, certainly
nothing as foolish as linking Henry's "terrible mental and moral degen-
eration" to the scourge of venereal disease.68 Reducing Henry VIII's
phobias and obsessions to symptoms that are uniquely linked to syph-
ilis simply doesn't wash. Yet galloping naked to the field of scholarly
combat, the syphilologist proclaims that Bluff Hal's central nervous
system was running amok with burrowing spirochetes. For their part,
most laypersons would equate the term "syphilis" with the cerebral
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form of the disease; hence the "terrible degeneration" responsible for
the excesses of Henry's reign.
If syphilis alone cannot account for all the symptoms described,
there is always the shotgun approach: "Valvular diease, atheroma, and
arteriosclerosis were causing 'dropsy' of [Henry's] legs.... Due to his
rising blood pressure, he began to suffer from very severe headaches ...
[while] his corpulence was aggravated by the development of cirrhosis
[of the liver]." 69 There you have four distinctly different diseases postu-
lated a priori-without a shred of evidence presented to support anyone
of them-to cover all the physical ailments the spirochete has missed.
The most explosive indictment of all, however, Henry's "syphili-
tic" behavior, assumes a change of character so dramatic that only an
underlying disease affecting the brain could account for the delusions of
grandeur, megalomania, paranoia, and cruelty that emerged.70 More
prescient biographers have concluded instead that his behavior (with
some minor augmentation of earlier character traits) was consistent
from beginning to end-his moral persuasions and modi operandi hard-
ly out of step with other monarchs of his time. In one historian's
summary: "The pattern of his life did not change; it simply sharp-
ened." 71 Admittedly, this entailed a ripening of his fears and suspicions
(many of which were well founded), his lust for power, and an increasing
compulsion to control. Yet in thought and deed, Bluff Hal remained as
much a realist in adulthood and old age as he had been as an adolescent
seeking to carve out a niche for himself in the Tudor hierarchy.72
Despite a plethora of physical changes quite compatible with aging,
Henry remained in remarkable control of the diverse social, political,
and diplomatic forces bearing down upon him. In the face of rival
factions vying for power within his own kingdom (not to mention the
machinations of the Holy Roman Emperor, the Pope, and the King of
France), he managed to balance the scales weighing against him by the
sheer force of his personality. 73 Beyond a doubt, Henry endured the last
eighteen months of his life gravely ill, wracked by recurring fevers from
his ulcerated leg. Even then he "thrust and parried like a master," never
losing his grip; in the assessment of those around him, he now appeared
more confident and more formidable than he had ever been.74
Again, this is hardly the portrait of a neurosyphilitic madman.
Henry's remarkable last speech to Parliament but one year before his
death was considered a masterful, if histrionic, stroke of royal pre-
rogative. And the detail of his will, intent as it was in assuring the Tudor
lineage, reflected the same capacity to weigh the consequences of his
actions: he committed neither to the Catholic nor to the Protestant
splinter groups in the end, entrusting some powers to both within his
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own council during his son's regency.75 For those who would decry
Henry's executions and terrorist methods, it bears remembering that
such treacherous acts were superseded in their zeal not only by the
French and Spanish Inquisitions but by his father as well, who executed
large numbers of opponents through acts of attainder and forfeiture. 76
Henry's reign, compared with those of sixteenth-century rulers (Ivan
the Terrible and Henry's own daughter among them), seems almost
benign. He never killed anyone with his own hand, or used poison, or
burned victims at the stake.77
What the king required was not so much blind obedience from his
subjects as an absolute freedom from restraint for himself, whether in
the realm of religion, war, or wives. 78 In matters of religion, Henry fer-
vently believed that spiritual deviation might open the door to social
revolution. His wars, on the other hand, resulted from a combination of
factors, not the least of which were pretensions born of his youth to
secure French conquests for himself, added to in time by more prag-
matic concerns for securing Tudor legitimacy (if not hegemony) in Euro-
pean affairs.79 As for Henry's vindictiveness, that resulted in part from
being paradoxically ruled by the wombs and whims of Catherine of Ara-
gon and Anne Boleyn. Nor should we forget that the king treated his last
four wives (Catherine Howard excepted, who arguably deserved her
fate) far better than he did his first two. Such behavior is hardly consis-
tent with neurosyphilis, which by its very nature is a progressive disor-
der.
For that matter, Henry actually learned from experience, a quality
that a diseased brain would have precluded. He had learned a bitter
lesson in public relations with Anne Boleyn's execution. Thereafter he
assiduously prepared public opinion before acting and skillfully drew
Parliament into assuming responsibility for some distasteful actions-
the execution of Catherine Howard among them. As one biographer
concluded: "He had reflected and mastered his lesson." 80 And in per-
sonal relations, one would expect a syphilis sufferer's latter years to be
marked by more treachery than existed earlier. Certainly Sir Thomas
More, Cardinal Wolsey, and Ann Boleyn-all either executed or dis-
missed relatively early in Henry's reign-would have had difficulty in
seeing that claim. So have countless scholars who have examined his
conduct with more than a stethoscope or tongue blade applied retro-
spectively to the primary sources.
Though Henry's reign had profound historical significance, it was
hardly of the sort that the medical reductionist would have us believe.
For one thing, the absence of a male heir was said to have signified the
"beginning of the end of the Tudor dynasty." 81 Surely feminist readers
today would be offended to have fifty years of Queen Elizabeth's benefi-
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cent reign overlooked-though the preceding bloody interlude of her
half-sister is an era they would like to forget. Even if the brief reigns of
Bloody Mary and the immature Edward VI bespoke a rapacity that
prevented a Catholic restoration, the syphilophiles have ignored a size-
able anticlerical sector of English society that would have made such a
reconciliation difficult at best.82 With or without their allegedly dis-
ease-influenced leadership, a period of strife and turmoil was already in
the cards. Though Henry's break with the Roman Catholic Church
eventually led to civil war, there was little the spirochete did to make
way for the ensuing"attempted absolutism of the weaker Stuarts." 83
Where else do the allegations of Henry VIII's central-nervous-sys-
tem involvement with syphilis not fit the mold? If some physicians
have unwittingly ignored much of the social and political data while
rewriting history, a few have unaccountably taken liberties with the
medical facts as well. For some things about neurosyphilis ("paresis of
the insane") have been agreed to by all, both at the turn of the century
when the syphilologists were constructing their arguments and in the
context of our present understanding of this disease. Perhaps the most
esteemed medical authority during the period syphilis was intensively
studied was Sir William Osler. His textbook Modem Medicine high-
lights the most common symptoms and physical findings found in
neurosyphilis.
In its earliest stages, the victim of cerebral syphilis experiences
disturbances in speech and becomes indifferent to his surroundings.
Henry had no such symptoms, at least none recorded by his doctors or
the ambassadors who monitored his behavior with a critical eye. There-
after a marked change in temperament and behavior occurs, arguably of
the sort that might account for the king's "fits of rage," so frequently
alluded to. In conjunction with this, however, memory becomes pro-
gressively defective, a trait hardly in keeping with Henry's ability to
stay abreast of the myriad of diplomatic, theological, and state concerns
that consumed his working day.
As the disease progresses, delusions of grandeur emerge, and some
reductionists would argue that just such disease-induced obsessions
characterized Henry's dealings with the church and his claims to pri-
macy in state affairs as well. Yet here Osler adds an important caveat:
these delusions are "wholly unsystematized extravagant utterances
that do not constitute the basis for purposeful actions," such as might
occur in the paranoid state alone.84 By all accounts, Henry's "delu-
sions" most assuredly led to decisive actions that were as consistent as
they were distorted to some degree by paranoia. Yet they had a purpose:
the need to assure the Tudor line and to control the apparatus of state
and church affairs to promote stability.
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As untreated syphilis evolves, speech becomes more affected still,
acquiring a tremendous quality. Words are difficult to find, and articu-
lation becomes indistinct. Osler himself underscored that point: "The
suspicion of general paresis rests more often upon this one symptom
than any other" (emphasis added); indeed, the "paretic speech" of the
tertiary syphilitic can hardly be mistaken for any other speech distur-
bance.85 Again, there is no documentation that Henry had difficulty in
speaking.
In the disease's late stages a tremor of the facial muscles and hands
develops, and writing is difficult. The victim becomes progressively
demented, unaware of his or her surroundings and incapable of mean-
ingful personal interaction.86 None of these descriptions fit Henry VIII.
Nowhere is there mention of a tremor of any sort, nor have cursory
analyses of his handwriting uncovered consistent deterioration in his
script. And certainly overt dementia did not ensue even during the last
sad year of his life.
True, most authorities agree that the disease either in Osler's time
or in its rare occurrence today seems to run a much slower course than it
did in the sixteenth century, when victims succumbed to the scourge
within two to three years. But if Henry's death at the age of fifty-three
seems a relatively youthful demise, recall that even the fifth decade in
Tudor times was considered old age. He outlived both his father and
elder sister, neither of whom was ever accused of having the Great Pox.
Despite the effectiveness of penicillin in reducing the incidence of
neurosyphilis, there is little reason to suspect that its neurological
manifestations have significantly changed with the passage of years.
Textbooks published seventy years after Osler presented his findings
and still in use today list garbled speech, facial and extremity tremors,
and impaired handwriting as the most common features87 of tertiary
syphilis. Yet in the one hundred years since the disease was first as-
cribed to Henry VIII, no authority has been able to document any of
these findings to substantiate that case. Some have skirted the edge of
incredulity instead by asserting that such nondescript behaviorial
changes as violence, cowardice, and obscenity are "diagnostic" of syph-
ilis.88
To muddy the waters further, a leading advocate of the syphilis
thesis is willing to admit that Henry may not have had full-blown
neurosyphilis.89 But syphilis does not stop at the edge of the brain and
still give rise to fits of rage, personal indiscretions, and self-glorification
without infesting the cerebral cortex. Either one has neurosyphilis or
one does not. There is no halfway house of diagnosis to protect the
medical reductionist from his own inferences. Such arguments only
drown in their self-contradictions.
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Neurosyphilis can, of course, affect the spinal cord, with or without
concomitant brain involvement. This is a condition known as "tabes
dorsalis," which some have imputed to Henry in an attempt to explain
his difficulty in walking during his last year.90 Yet they fail to mention
two other characteristic symptoms recognized to be almost diagnostic
of tabes dorsalis. First, well over 90 percent of its victims have sharp,
"electric" pains shooting into the legs, appropriately termed "lancin-
ating pains." No description of Henry's "sore legs" is consistent with
these. Second, many sufferers experience "gastric crises" of neurologic
origin that mimic acute abdominal catastrophes. None appear in the
king's medical history. In concert with both types of pain, tabes dorsalis
patients also experience hyperesthesia; contact with clothes, for exam-
ple, is exceedingly painful. Again, no mention is made of this on Henry's
behalf.
Bladder disturbances also occur with tabes, principally in the form
of incontinence. It is instructive to see how often a failing bladder is
equated in the mind of the less than circumspect investigator (not to
mention an unwary lay public) with impotence-which, as noted above
is another unsubstantiated charge laid on Henry's later years. More
incriminating yet less defensible still is the allegation that syphilitics
are impotent. One imprudent writer called attention to what he admit-
ted to be an "inference" by asserting that Henry's "impotence" repre-
sented the most damning evidence available substantiating the syphilis
thesis.91 In reality, only a small percentage of syphilitics suffer from
impotence.92 Nor are there any hard data to substantiate that Henry was
indeed impotent; rather, inference is again substituted for evidence.
How, then, did this whole fabrication of Henry's syphilis gain such
widespread acceptance? To begin with, neurosyphilis was one of the
first mental disorders for which a definite cause could be established.
That led to its getting more than a fair share of ex post facto credit in
history. Popular literature and the cinema have embellished the image
of Henry as a mad and gluttonous despot, as excessive in his rule as he
was in the royal bedchamber. The discovery of syphilis as a cause for
insanity, coupled with its mode of transmission, made the spirochete at
least an intriguing and explicable culprit to explain away Henry's be-
havior. If the study of syphilis was in the mainstream of medicine
during the first quarter of the twentieth century, as seems to have been
the case, perhaps the pathographers of that period took Osler's warning
too much to heart: "Know syphilis in all its manifestations and rela-
tions, and all other things clinical shall be added unto you." 93 Precisely
at the time the study of pathography was coming into vogue, the
pervasive spirochete ruled the roost of diagnostic alternatives.
As animals evolve over time, however, so do diseases-and bio-
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historical appraisals of them. In making a retrospective diagnosis,
analysts must be aware first of the disease as it presented itself at the
time it afflicted the subject; second, of the disease as described by their
predecessors; and third, of the disease as it is currently understood.
Witness what used to be known and feared as the Great Pox versus the
mild skin manifestations of the second stage of the disease today. Our
knowledge of any given disease is in a continual state of flux. Failing to
recognize how strongly the times influence one's perceptions locks an
already much maligned discipline into simplistic diagnoses peculiarly
attractive only for that period. Hence they run the risk of becoming as
dated as their methodology is flawed. Perhaps the eminent physician
John Hunter said it best: "Never ask me what I have said or written,
but ask me what my present opinions are and I will tell you. 11 94 Few
have been so honest as this prudent skeptic, who appreciated that med-
ical knowledge changes with time, compelling us to accept changes in
our thinking.
Nor should we forget that the perspectives we bring to a given
historical case, based on our experiences as clinicians, color our out-
look-if they do not blind us entirely to other alternatives. To take but
one example which I can legitimately address: as a neurosurgeon, I
found myself reading the data in such a fashion as to incriminate
Henry's head injuries as a suitable explanation for his behavior.95 While
discounting a previous scholar's view that a rather trivial blow to the
faceguard of Henry's helmet in 1524 had much to do with his headaches
or later behavior,96 I would submit that the more serious injury in 1536
was of singular importance.97 This had not been simply a concussion;
by definition, a two-hour loss of consciousness signifies, at the very
least, a contusion of the brain with possible permanent injury resulting
from bruising of the cerebral cortex.
Nor does the evidence exclude the possibility that a small blood clot
on the surface of the brain might have resulted. That it was not a large
hematoma in any case is suggested by the absence of paralysis or sensory
loss thereafter-unless the bleeding occurred in the frontal lobes, in
which case only behavioral disturbances, changes in affect, or a defi-
cient memory might have evolved. Either way, these blood clots break
down and occasionally form membranes over the brain, which are prone
to recurrent hemorrhages in the future with trivial blows to the head.98
If untreated, such hemorrhagic fluid collections begin to cause
physical signs of brain compression. One of the most frequently ob-
served results of this evolving process is an unsteady gait99-precisely
the most noticeable symptom from which Henry suffered during the
last two years of his life. The fact that he could not move his legs at all
during the week prior to his death only adds further fuel to the suspicion
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that his head injury in 1536 was perhaps more significant than most
investigators have acknowledged.
Lest we place all our alternative diagnostic eggs in one basket for
future pathographers to shatter, still other neurosurgeons might be
inclined to ascribe the ultimate impact of his head injuries and falls to a
traumatic myelopathy in the cervical spine. Myelopathy implies injury
to or chronic compression of the spinal cord in the neck, with resultant
spasticity and difficulty in walking. Hyperextension of the spine, such
as occurs with blows to the face or forehead, is a common mechanism of
injury. Viewed from this perspective, either of Henry's head injuries
may have accounted for his subsequent gait disturbance.
But cervical spine injuries do not cause behavioral changes or coma.
Therefore, a panel of neurosurgeons might well favor an intracranial
cause for the multiplicity of symptoms from which Henry VIII suf-
fered-perhaps his coma and death as well, should the postulated fluid
collections have re-bled one final time. Yet even this is not as straight-
forward as it may seem. It is offered only to make a point: as convincing
as such an explanation is to a neurologist or neurosurgeon weighing the
evidence today, the prudent skeptic would point out that because
chronic subdural hematomas and spinal cord myelopathy are frequently
seen by these specialists in their medical practices, there is an inherent
prejudice in the way they would interpret the evidence-just as an
expert in venereal disease or an obstetrician might be inclined to sup-
port a diagnosis of syphilis, or a rheumatologist to suggest gout or
amyloidosis as the underlying disease process that best explains vir-
tually all of Henry's medical history.
So what is the answer to this most perplexing enigma? Quite simply
stated with respect to the impact of disease, I believe there is no answer
that the extant data can support with full conviction. Perhaps one of the
king's biographers had the last word: "Enough sins have been laid at
Henry's doorstep without adding a social disease to the list." 100 To
paraphrase what was abundantly clear to at least this one observer: the
results of a man's life are easy enough to chronicle, but his innermost
thoughts and motivations may defy our best analytical efforts. Leonardo
da Vinci discovered the same in his art: "A good painter has two objects,
to paint man and to unveil the intention of his soul; the former is easy,
the latter hard." 101 In like manner, it is easy enough to recognize
disease and old age, but measuring their impact on the minds and
motivations of people in general, and rulers in particular, is more diffi-
cult. Unless the data with which one molds his opinions are unassail-
able, the difficult becomes indefensible in the court of scholarly review.
From a neurosurgeon's perspective, the cerebral contusion-chronic
subdural hypothesis has a natural-however biased-ring of truth. But
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like all other retrospective diagnosis, it remains a hypothesis at best.
Such one-dimensional thinking is precisely what has obscured the
merits of some otherwise telling criticisms of the syphilis thesis-the
best examples of which are Ellery's Rh incompatibility theory, Barrett's
amyloid hypothesis, and Shrewsbury's arguments for gout.
Perhaps-as is occasionally the case among our own patients-we
should be prudent enough to recognize that suggesting anyone disease
to explain what ailed poor Henry will continue to frustrate our best
efforts. Have we lingered too long over sparse medical data that defy
retrospective analysis? Ponder an opened bottle of wine for too long, and
it turns sour; subject Henry VIII to too much medical scrutiny, and the
essence of the man evaporates. Perhaps Mark Twain, no sufferer of
either fools or pretentious scholars, understood poor Henry and his ilk
best of all. As his Huckleberry Finn declares: "All I say is, kings is kings,
and you got to make allowances. Take them all around, they're a mighty
ornery lot. It's the way they're raised."
CHAPTER 3
Fanatics and Saints:
The Case for Epilepsy
If personality can be defined as "an enduring style of relating to one's
environment" as the mind perceives it,l then it follows that physiologic
changes within the brain may profoundly affect how a person behaves.
Perhaps the most enigmatic of all personalities to have had an impact on
history are those mystical leaders who embraced the burning issues of
the day with an eye toward molding them in their image, if not to their
own benefit. Whether divinely inspired or physiologically unbalanced,
such persons have run the gamut from altruistic self-sacrifice to
heinous crimes carried out in God's name.
As one measure of how broadly this spectrum of "inspired" lead-
ership extends, the lives of Adolf Hitler, Joan of Arc, John Brown, and
even the Apostle Paul have seductive parallels that have been ignored.
All were alleged to have spoken and acted at the behest of mysterious
forces outside themselves. All left a prodigious legacy of written and
oral testimony to justify their actions. And all, most assuredly, continue
to perplex the historian no less than the psychoanalyst who dissects
their characters with Freudian scalpels. Yet those who treat organic
diseases of the brain for a living might wonder whether these four
movers and shakers among mystics of the past can be reduced to a
single, shared disease that explains their behavior in pathophysiologic
terms.
In an earlier publication I built a much too detailed case for Adolf
Hitler's having been a victim of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE).2 At the
time I offered that diagnosis as hypothetical at best. Still, the facts in the
matter were suggestive enough to warrant ongoing study. Rehashing
the available data from the perspective of devil's advocate some years
later has failed to dispel that lingering suspicion altogether, yet it
remains nothing more than that. Of one thing, however, I am certain:
any deleterious impact such a condition may have had on the Fuehrer's
behavior during the last four years of his life pales in comparison with
the effects of an astounding combination of drugs and central-nervous-
system stimulants prescribed by his unprincipled physician. More ger-
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mane to this study, I soon discovered other subjects to consider with
respect to the impact of seizure disorders on history.
While reviewing the medical literature on temporal lobe epilepsy, I
was first struck by the relatively high incidence of that condition in the
general population. Fully three persons per thousand suffer from sei-
zures arising from the temporal lobe,3 a figure not far below that of
insulin-dependent diabetes and of inguinal hernias, to mention but two
of the more familiar conditions that afflict humankind. Acknowledging
that some seizure-riddled personalities manage to become charismatic
enough in their own right to attract attention, I turned to the historical
literature in search of other possible victims. To my surprise, I found
the genre of popular history replete with largely speculative accounts
of all manner of seizure disorders among the greats and not so greats of
the past.4 Just when I thought I had stumbled upon a diagnostic coup or
two, I was made to feel like the interloper in Robert Louis Stevenson's
Treasure Island, who threw open the shutters of an empty room and
shouted in exasperation: "Pew, they've been before us! 11 My disappoint-
ment was tempered by the discovery that virtually every founder of the
world's great religions, from Buddha to Mohammed, was also said to
have been afflicted by the scourge. If Confucius's neurologist has yet to
be heard from, that seems to be the exception and not the rule. Count-
less saints and prophets alike have also been linked to temporal lobe
epilepsy.5
To have uncovered such a potpourri of alleged epileptics bearing
witness to faiths that mankind has lived and died for raises some
disturbing questions. Wouldn't the law of averages alone speak against
there being so many prophets victimized by a single disease? That said,
could there still exist an underlying thread of illness linking at least a
few of what past generations reared on the Good Book assumed to be
divinely inspired actions? As for those agnostics among the psycho-
analysts who claim to know better, have they too missed a seizure
suspect or two along the way?
What of the darker side of messianic leadership, whether divinely or
demonically driven? God knows, what with television evangelists run-
ning amok nowadays, there is no lack of suitable candidates. If some
would have us believe they are picking up where their predecessors left
off by feigning apocalyptic visions of Jesus and prophecies of their own
death, the one thing they seem to be picking for sure is our collective
pocket. And if speaking in tongues (even forked ones on occasion) seems
faintly reminiscent of temporal lobe seizure activity, we would be
giving some of the world's truly great actors far too much succor by
attributing their behavior to diseased brains. It may well be more appro-
priate to remove such Guardians of the Faith from the medical examin-
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ing table and consign them to the Temple with those money changers to
whom we sell not only our souls, but occasionally our senses.
As prevalent as TLE is alleged to be, my search for its victims in
history took me back some 130 years before I stumbled upon a case so
suggestive of that malady that its story simply begged to be told. Enter
John Brown of Harpers Ferry fame, self-presumably descending to the
stage from God's right hand. Brown's lengthy diaries and texts, laced as
they are with religious and moral themes, epitomize one singular preoc-
cupation of the long-standing TLE victim known as "hypergraphia."
Those documents alone offer the pathographer a wealth of primary
source material from which to reconstruct a prototype of this seizure-
induced personality· disorder.
That leads one to wonder where still another enigmatic warrior
such as Joan of Arc might fit in this bevy of divinely inspiring (or
sporadically misfiring) brains. On the strength of her apocalyptic vi-
sions she managed to rally the French populace behind the pathetic
figure of one Charles VII, whose royal legitimacy was dictated by those
same visions as interpreted by a French teenager. Though Joan's execu-
tion at the youthful age of eighteen perhaps precluded the development
of the entire spectrum of personality change one associates with TLE,
any neurologist familiar with her story, replete with celestial voices
from above commanding her to secular combat below, might rush to
slap brain-wave electrodes on her head in search of a seizure focus. As
with John Brown, readers will have to decide for themselves.
On the other hand, a few intrepid authorities seem to have decided
for us already when it comes to categorizing the conversion and subse-
quent behavior of Saul of Tarsus. Some have seen in his vision of Christ
on the road to Damascus and resultant conversion little more than a
seizure disorder, complete with hallucinations and a religiosity that
simply reeks of the theological preoccupations of the TLE victim. And
like both Hitler and Brown, Paul's writings arguably reflect the hyper-
graphia of a psychomotor-seizure-induced personality. Most physicians
who have examined this case study remain as captivated by the TLE
thesis as theologians are perplexed and horrified by it. Who, then,
possesses a monopoly on truth?
If some readers have difficulty believing that Adolf Hitler's diabol-
ical nature can be explained, in part, by misfiring neurons in the tem-
porallobe, surely it would test their credence to suggest that at least
three other figures of the past may have been afflicted in kind. To be
sure, that consideration will remain the strongest argument against
what follows. Yet to dismiss out of hand a recognizable personality
disorder stemming from a specific anatomic structure in the brain is no
longer a tenable position. Confusion in the past arose when earlier
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researchers mistakenly applied an all-encompassing "epileptic person-
ality" to seizures of whatever origin.6 Recent investigators have con-
fined such' a profile to those suffering from TLE, and even the data
generated by their critics support the notion that some identifiable
personality characteristics do in fact exist.7
No one disputes that type-specific personality changes arising from
epilepsy are uncommon. This may explain why the diagnosis is missed
in a few of our patients today, as it may have been overlooked in a
handful of tyrants and saints of the past. Before truly bizarre behavior
becomes so obvious that it can no longer be ignored, even a zealot may
be taken at face value. In too readily identifying the mystic with a
religion or sacred cause, perhaps we have overlooked the disease for the
sake of the divine.
To understand the argument, one needs to know something about
the salient features of the personality profile that develop in approx-
imately one-fourth of those suffering from the "complex partial" or
"psychomotor" seizures of TLE. This personality disorder must not be
confused with the seizures themselves; rather, it emerges years after
they begin and occurs between them in the form of enduring behavioral
traits. The intensity of these changes appears to parallel the duration of
the underlying epileptic condition rather than the frequency of seizures
per see Of paramount importance, it is the occurrence of several recog-
nizable but seemingly unrelated traits in combination that raises the
wary clinician's suspicions, whether in the clinic or on the pages of
history.8
What, then, are these collective features that separate seizure-
induced behavior from the merely peculiar or eccentric? To begin with,
there is an intense preoccupation with religious, cosmic, or even de-
monic themes. The victim may undergo multiple religious conversions,
often precipitated by hallucinations during a typical seizure episode.
Second, the sufferer feels compelled to write copious volumes pertain-
ing to these themes in general and as they might apply to the writer in
particular. Such texts are filled with underlined words, sentences in
capital letters, and· repetitious phrases. These autobiographical ac-
counts characteristically unmask a third attribute of the TLE person-
ality, referred to as "hypermorality," which is reflected in their speech
as well as their writing. Victims embrace a rigid sense of right and
wrong, brood incessantly over issues that seem less pressing to others,
and fail to see humor in anything. Long-winded monologues imbue
them with what the clinician has picturesquely termed "viscosity" in
relations: they miss obvious social cues to terminate a conversation.
Finally, what few friends they manage to keep describe them as being
indifferent to sex. They may experience a gender crisis or deny normal
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sexual drives altogether-although in a few instances TLE sufferers
paradoxically evince hypersexuality, fetishism, or transvestism. Either
way, the sex lives of these seizure victims are far from norma1.9
A less frequent but very characteristic phenomenon that occurs in
TLE subjects of long standing is something called an "organic delu-
sional syndrome": the victim is so overwhelmed by delusions that he or
she assumes a new identity.10 More often, only a dramatic change in life
view occurs. Given the proclivity for hypermoralism and religiosity, a
conversion experience may result. Interestingly enough, organic delu-
sional syndromes associated with religiosity and hypermoralism are
said to occur more frequently in those with a left-sided seizure focus,
whereas emotional lability and overt aggression are more common in
those with right-sided lesions of the brain.
The association of left-sided seizures with mood disorders and right-
sided with mood disturbances is consistent with split brain function as
neuropsychologists understand the concept. Though this distinction is
not as clear-cut as it is sometimes made to seem, the left (or dominant)
side of the brain generally processes intellectual information, whereas
the right side tends to control emotional response to the environment.
That may also explain why those with a right-sided seizure focus tend to
minimize or deny the negative attributes of their behavior, whereas
victims of more "ideative" left-sided seizures express an intense reac-
tion to their shortcomings, as would be expected in ruminative individ-
uals who intellectualize everything to the extreme.II
To be sure, the most ostensibly normal individual may manifest any
one of these qualities. What sets the TLE sufferer apart is their occur-
rence in concert. I2 To ignore that fact is to neglect any consideration of
what clinicians would term the "differential diagnosis" in a given case:
that plausible range of alternatives which may explain unusual be-
havior in either a patient or a historical figure.
Reduced to its lowest common denominator of anatomy and phys-
iology, temporal lobe disorder involves both an underlying substrate
and an identifiable mechanism that triggers the evolution of such a
personality. The mechanism involves an inability to assign appropriate
emotional significance to external stimuli; its anatomic substrate re-
sides in an area of the brain known as the "limbic system," comprising
delicate, multiconnected pathways linking the temporal and frontal
lobes with deeper structures that propagate emotional impulses in the
human brain. In a word, this system is "overcharged" in the TLE
sufferer. Whereas destruction of anyone of these pathways results in
precisely the opposite behavior (that is, the patient becomes placid,
tame, and indifferent), temporal lobe epilepsy brings about a functional
"hyperconnection" that suffuses experience with charged emotion. I3
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What one sees in the TLE personality, then, is an exaggerated
response to previously neutral stimuli or events. Taken to the extreme,
that only enhances the self-righteousness and even paranoia that vic-
tims experience should no one take them seriously. They refuse to
allow themselves (or others) to become passive pawns in the hands of
more powerful forces. Whereas the pathologic religious zealot may use
this as a divinely inspired calling card to sway an apathetic flock,
afflicted political mavericks may feel so fervently about rules and laws,
right and wrong, that they take the law into their own hands.14
It is an axiom of clinical and laboratory experience that permanent
changes in the brain's physiologic function may occur as a result of
repeated stimulation. What we are less certain of is the degree to which
such changes depend on, or are determined by, external events. Yet to
those who have studied this distinctive subset of fascinating patients it
does seem that episodic changes in limbic activity of the brain tem-
porally related to coincidental happenings in the environment can lead
to altered modes of "processing" the significance of external events:
hence the telltale alteration of personality in times of crisis, both
perceived and rea1. 1S A precise medical understanding of these person-
ality changes can not only lend plausibility to the four cases under
consideration, but even, on the basis of available sources, substantiate
beyond a reasonable degree of medical doubt which side of the brain was
affected.
This assumes, however, that yet another diagnostic criterion, apart
from the personality itself, has been fulfilled: the occurrence of distinct
episodes retrospectively identifiable as seizure activity. And here the
screws of certainty loosen considerably, as temporal lobe seizures by
their very nature are notoriously difficult for even the most astute
clinician to detect. More perplexing still, a few authorities contend that
overt seizures do not have to occur at all, that underlying pathology in
the temporal lobe-perversely silent-may effect enough physiologic
change to induce the personality disorder described.16 This conclusion
may not be as unfounded as its critics claim, because the change in
personality appears to be more dependent on the duration of the disease
than on the epileptic manifestations themselves.
To diagnose a seizure, the investigator first applies certain general
criteria to individuals not previously known to have experienced overt
epilepsy. These may be summarized as' (1) an abrupt onset of psychosis
in a previously healthy individual; (2) a sudden occurrence of an unac-
countable delirium; (3) episodes characterized by unusual behavior; or
(4) a history of unexplained "falling out" spells. Yet identifying any of
these in our historical patients is far from conclusive; to confirm a
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diagnosis of TLE, evidence of much more specific behavioral distur-
bances is required.
Transient periods of unawareness known as "absence attacks" are
among the most frequent manifestations of temporal lobe epilepsy.
Though the victim may appear to be interacting with the environment,
he <;>r she has no recall of the period in question. Unawareness is sug-
gested by certain activities such as smacking of lips, repeating stock
phrases, or other symptoms that the unwary observer ascribes to nerv-
ous tension or habit spasms. I? The sufferer of such a spell then picks up
where he or she left off as if nothing had happened, without appreciating
the consequences of what has occurred.
One of the most intriguing examples of psychomotor seizure ac-
tivity is that elicited by a specific sensory stimulus. Flashing lights,
certain strains of music, or even such mundane activities as reading or
walking can precipitate an attack of TLE. These fall in the category of
"reflex epilepsies." 18 Sleep deprivation, fatigue, or anxiety states may
also precipitate psychomotor seizures. They may begin and end with an
absence attack or, as a prodrome to a more elaborate psychomotor
seizure, go on to full-blown epilepsy.
To make the diagnosis more difficult still, the pattern of behavior
associated with a psychomotor disturbance may differ from seizure to
seizure in the same patient. Even so, an unexplained feeling of fear
accompanies well over half of all TLE episodes, whether they take the
form of absence attacks or more elaborate stereotyped motor activity.19
The victim perseverates on fears unexperienced by anyone else and
becomes enslaved to their dictates, for these ideas force themselves into
the patient's mind to the exclusion of all others.20
Overt delusions and hallucinations are other forms of temporal lobe
epilepsy which can be more readily recognized. These may manifest
themselves as imaginery voices, horrifying nightmares, or flights into
fantasy. The patient's ability to regain composure after the seizure has
passed separates such sporadic delusions and hallucinations from those
of the schizophrenic.21 Either way, the fear, anxiety, and even dream
states that usually accompany such disorders of perception are more
characteristic of TLE than of other delusional syndromes.
That both the personality disorder and the seizure manifestations
are characteristic enough of TLE for the wary clinician to send today's
patient packing to the electroencephalograph (EEG) lab for confirma-
tory testing is of little solace to the biographer left to wrestle with
bizarre and unexplained behavior. Armed only with records of descrip-
tions given by associates and subordinates or family and friends of the
subject, where does one draw the line between the merely peculiar or
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egocentric and the pathophysiologic? Some"authoritative" accounts to
the contrary, not every mystic, martyr, or man of war can be reduced to a
clinical case study, whether in the neurologist's imagination or the
psychoanalyst's dreams. To confine our efforts to either branch of
analysis is not only to risk falling prey to reductionism but to run
counter to the laws of nature that make for the great diversity of
personalities characterizing the human condition. As one wag so aptly
described us all: "There is much of human nature in mankind." 22
As a corollary, there is also much of human nature in the scholar
longing to make a reputation. Perhaps the most ingenuous method used
by the pathographer is to describe an obscure disease process, selec-
tively apply available data to it, and then sanctify the diagnosis with
medical jargon and case studies from literature quite foreign to the
average reader. To underscore the point, few diseases have been invoked
so often as epilepsy to disarm the pathographer's archrival, the psycho-
historian. As convincing as the epilepsy thesis may be made to seem, it
behooves the investigator first to rule out more common causes of
abnormal behavior.
No individual has been skewered on the horns of this pathographic-
psychoanalytic dilemma with more relish than Adolf Hitler. To be sure,
some contributions to the debate have proved less than edifying. For
one, it is simply no longer adequate to ascribe his behavior to an
Oedipus complex or an undescended testicle. To do so is to fly in the
face of so much incriminating data concerning his poor health that one
of the few remaining questions to be answered is how Hitler managed to
carry on under such duress for so long-and to carry Nazi Germany with
him. In my own recent account, I not only proposed that the Fuehrer
suffered from gallbladder disease and Parkinson's syndrome but also
suggested that his personality disorder might have been explained on
the basis of temporal lobe epilepsy, accentuated by at least seven cen-
tral-nervous-system stimulants he took to excess during the last four
years of World War 11.23
Yet the question remains: just how convincing is the epilepsy
thesis, particularly when other scholars have heretofore failed to sup-
port it? Moreover, the amphetamines Hitler abused can elicit some of
the same behavior often associated with temporal lobe epilepsy. Taken
to excess, they not only unleash the aggression, volatility, irrational
fear, and paranoia typical of TLE paroxysms but may transform the
indivdual's personality into a striking likeness of one afflicted with this
seizure disorder.24
Though imaginary fears and bizarre behavior are part and parcel of
TLE, the neurologist must also distinguish between what might be
seizure-induced and something known as "parasomnia" (of which
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sleepwalking is the most obvious manifestation). This is of particular
relevance to Hitler, who was frequently victimized during later stages of
the war by terrifying hallucinations that woke him from sleep. Para-
somnia is a far more common disorder than TLE, is frequently associ-
ated with "night terrors," and is not a seizure as such. Nor are night
terrors the same as nightmares; they last much longer, and the sufferer
cannot be convinced that the terrifying images are imaginary. The
parasomniac may also exhibit violent, purposeless behavior and have no
recollection of it. Yet insofar as parasomnia is not seizure activity, it
carries no implications for personality development.
Critics of the TLE hypothesis would further point out that the
amphetamines and cocaine Hitler took to excess can interrupt the sleep
cycle, thereby predisposing the abuser to this rather common disorder-
not to mention the deleterious effects of sleep deprivation alone. We
would do well to remember, after all, that the overwhelming majority of
the behavioral disturbances in question occurred after Hitler became an
unwitting victim of Dr. Theo Morell's potpourri of some seventy-odd
medications. By that late date, perhaps there were simply too many
ingredients in the differential diagnostic pot to extract a single diagnosis
accounting for the Fuehrer's increasingly bizarre behavior.
Moreover, the psychohistorians at least deserve credit for under-
scoring other factors that may have made him behave as he did. No
one who has read Robert G.L. Waite's incisive psychoanalytical treat-
ment, The Psychopathic God, has put down the book without having
gained some insight into those inner demons that drove Adolf Hitler.25
Nor would skeptics of the TLE hypothesis accept out of hand that
those various and sundry irrational outbursts attributed to misfiring
neurons in the brain necessarily signified seizure activity per see Take
such a man, who is suspicious to begin with, place him in an isolated
setting where his world is both literally and figuratively tumbling
down over his ears, add a host of central-nervous-system stimulants
that enhance his suspicions, and he may well become overtly para-
noid-enough to provoke unbridled anger at best and totally irrational
acts at worst.
While few individuals appear at first glance to fit the cardinal
features of a seizure-induced personality more than this fanatical Jew-
baiter and mastermind of the Master Race, undeniable caveats remain.
On balance, a few reviewers of the epilepsy thesis as it was applied to
Adolf Hitler found the idea intriguing; fewer still, I suspect, were con-
vinced.
The same probably applies to the conversion experience of the
apostle Paul. Though French scholars of the mid-nineteenth century
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were among the earliest writers to profile the religiosity of the epileptic,
it was not until 1873 that a physician first ascribed a specific conversion
to the effects of a seizure.26 This academic revelation of sorts opened a
Pandora's box from which a number of suspect mystics emerged, cul-
minating in the 1960s when several landmark studies on temporal lobe
epilepsy appeared in the medical literature. Not only were mystical
delusions quite common among the patients described, but those that
embraced them were convinced of their validity as bona fide religious
experiences. One clinical investigator drew attention to states of ec-
stasy in which the victims saw the heavens open, heard God speaking,
and felt themselves transfigured.27 Another described TLE patients who
had visions of Christ "coming down from the sky" as part of their
hallucinations.28 Still others treated individuals who had a series of
visions, during which they were made to feel that their lives were being
judged.29
It was only a matter of time until someone emboldened by these
clinical observations examined the most famous convert of all from the
perspective of TLE. Saul of Tarsus was a man who, until the time of his
fateful encounter on the road to Damascus, had made it his vocation to
persecute Christians. Yet his life's view was completely changed by
what happened on that day, when, by his own account, a vision of Christ
cast him to the ground and rendered him blind and out of sorts for fully
three days. As a result of that experience Saul of Tarsus, orthodox Jew,
became the Apostle Paul, convert to and major spokesman for Christi-
anity. Yet he lived his remaining years in fear and dread of a mysterious
"thorn in the flesh" that some believe was a seizure disorder, the price
paid for his conversion.3D
Few words have caught the pathographer's eye more than Paul's
own description of that seminal event: "I know a man ... who fourteen
years ago was caught up to the third heaven. In the body or out of the
body? That I do not know ... [yet) this man was caught up to paradise
and heard sacred secrets which no human lips can repeat." 31 By portray-
ing himself as being in a state of unreality in relation to his body, Paul
was describing a dreamlike state that arguably predisposed him to audi-
tory and visual hallucinations. Suffice it to say, it was a depersonalizing
experience of the sort that one often associates with TLE, for by now he
was referring to himself in the third person.
Had Paul been made to feel (as other psychomotor seizure victims
are wont to recount) that at this moment in his life he was being judged?
Undoubtedly. Did his subsequent impairment reflect the experience of
another TLE victim who believed that he was in heaven, became deper-
sonalized, and "took three days for his body to be reunited with his
soul? "32 Was not Paul's experience much like that of yet another
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seizure sufferer who believed that "God had sent the seizure as a means
of converting him? "33 Was epilepsy the "thorn in the flesh" to which
Paul alluded? In short, did his experience mirror that of countless other
victims of temporal lobe epilepsy? These are all hypothetical considera-
tions, of course, but they seem so compelling when considered together
that some would have us believe Paul to be the standard by which all
other seizure suspects in history can be judged.
Yet I am not quite so certain. Suggesting that Paul's visions were
nothing more than hallucinations is one thing; tracing his activities
thereafter is quite another-and far removed from what usually follows
figments of the imagination or sporadic discharges from the temporal
lobe. In view of the total record, it is really defensible to ascribe to
epilepsy not only his conversion but that of the five hundred or more
who also claimed to have seen Christ after his resurrection?34 If so,
what should we make of countless prophets of the Old Testament, not
to mention John, whose visions are spelled out in explicit detail in the
Book of Revelation? To extend the argument to so many would imply
that TLE had reached epidemic proportions and affected all sufferers in
much the same way.
Can we even be sure that the "thorn" to which Paul referred was
really epilepsy? At least one piece of evidence implicates instead the
failing vision that plagued him throughout his life. As Paul himself
exclaimed: "But even though my physical condition was a great trial
to you ... I myself can say that you would have taken out your own
eyes, if you could, and given them to me." 35 Some would conclude
from this that Paul's eyesight, not his brain, was the "thorn that
wracked him. II 36
One final note of caution: since much of the New Testament
consists of Paul's writings, it would be troubling indeed if subsequent
Christian scholars have been misled by the delusions of a hypergraphic
TLE victim. Perhaps we should give Paul the benefit of the doubt in-
stead, which he himself referred to: "Even if I am unskilled in speaking,
I am not in knowledge." 37 What Paul was implying is that he knew that
he had trouble reaching his audience with the spoken word. From that
perspective, his copious letter writing may not have been the product of
epilepsy after all but simply a reflection of his awareness of what he did
best. This is all to say that we must not allow our scientific training and
biases as retrospective clinicians to cloud our thinking. As intriguing as
the evidence for TLE is from my perspective as a neurosurgeon, it is
difficult for me as a Christian to believe that so many theologians who
have studied Paul could be wrong. Yet nothing clouds rational thinking
as much as deeply held convictions born of faith. The question remains
whether in regard to Paul we have allowed that to happen.
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Few cases on record mimic Paul's conversion experience, complete
with visual and auditory hallucinations, more explicitly than that of the
Maid of Orleans, Joan of Arc. For her exploits in delivering an op-
pressed people and their depressed king from the yoke of England, as
God had directed her to do, Joan ultimately joined the ranks of a long
line of persecuted saints. Make no mistake about it: such folk are
different from you and me. If the Catholic Church has underscored
that distinction by immortalizing them, a few skeptical medical obser-
vers have'pointed instead to a litany of seizures that may have made
them so. To date, Joan has not been included beyond a reasonable
degree of medical certainty on this list. That would only add to the
embarrassment of a church loath to surrender the supposition that its
pope, who is elected by a college of mortals, has a direct pipeline to
Peter. Presumably fishermen plumbing for saints, like physicians diag-
nosing disease, are circumspect enough to obtain second opinions. One
can only hope that somewhere along that pipeline, if not behind the
Pearly Gates themselves, there is an EEG lab spitting out brain-wave
tests on saints-to-be.
After all, the list of seizure-suffering saints is legion. As an adoles-
cent, St. Teresa of Avila (1515-82) experienced a series of apparitions of
such intensity that she likened the chronic noises in her head to /I a
number of waterfalls" interrupted on occasion by "voices of birds sing-
ing and whistling." 38 She also suffered from chronic headaches, but not
before having been given up for dead at the tender age of twenty-four. For
four days she was wracked by one seizure after another that left her with
a bitten tongue, dislocated joints, and bruises and abrasions allover her
body. After she emerged from her coma, Teresa's visions became laden
with religious overtones-enough to lead her to sainthood rather than
to the sanatorium where she arguably belonged.
Three centuries later a saint of the same name but different locale,
Lisieux, fell victim to a series of mystical states strongly suggestive of
TLE. As a young girl she was seized by "strange and violent tremblings
allover her body," later to be transformed into terrifying hallucinations
that merged on occasion with celestial visions. Like Joan of Arc some
four hundred years before, this Teresa too had undergone a quasi-
religious experience in adolescence that brought about a "complete
conversion." 39
Still other saints are alleged to have suffered from abnormal mental
states. Some bordered on hysteria; more than a few were attributed to
psychomotor seizures. Included in the epilepsy category were St. Cath-
erine of Genoa (1447-1510), St. Marguerite Maria (1647-90), and the
Florentine saint, Catherine dei Ricci {1552-90).40 To be sure, the last had
a series of visions peculiarly governed by the clock, enough to suggest
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that such bizarre behavior was not seizure-induced; for irritable neu-
rons would be unlikely to misfire precisely at noon on Thursday and
revert to normal at 4:00 P.M. the next day, as invariably occurred in
Catherine's case.41
Lest one detect an unseemly Catholic addiction to epilepsy, let me
add that both Buddha and Mohammed were said to be afflicted by the
same disease. There is also the case of the Mormon founder, Joseph
Smith, to consider. In the spring of 1820, Smith experienced such an
overpowering apparition that it left him speechless. After encountering
two celestial beings whose brightness and glory "defied all description"
as they spoke to him, Smith found himself"delivered." He also found
himself lying on his back "looking up to heaven," 42 as would be the
position of one who had just experienced a grand mal seizure.
Those who would dismiss the epilepsy link out of hand have left at
least one troubling question unanswered. How could God, or Allah, or
whatever deity one acknowledges as the Creator, select out so many
leaders of different faiths to be the Chosen Few? As for Joan of Arc, why
should God have seen fit to choose a province or two of oppressed
French peasantry and a pathetic imitation of a king over the fortunes of
England-or of Burgundians? Could it be that these suddenly enlight-
ened subjects were duped by a seizure victim?
The details of Joan's short-lived existence are a matter of record. At
about the age of thirteen this ostensibly normal, albeit pious, farmer's
daughter experienced a celestial vision that altered the course of French
history. Amid a flash of light, Joan was visited by angels whose intent
was unclear to the frightened girl. When the visions recurred with
increasing frequency, she came to believe that two apparitions in par-
ticular, St. Michael and St. Catherine, were commanding her to take up
the banner of an Armagnac regent (soon to become Charles VII) in order
to deliver her people from the yoke of English and Burgundian tyranny.
Somehow, Joan managed to convince Charles that together they could
rid France of its predators. Their fortunes soared with one victory after
another. Yet she ultimately fell into the hands of the enemy and was
tried in an ecclesiastical court as a heretic. Joan was found guilty,
temporarily recanted, and then reverted to her visionary claims. That
assured her death at the stake. Some twenty years later her reputation in
the Church was rescued, leading to her canonization in 1920.
Joan's conversion experiences and subsequent behavior bear a strik-
ing resemblance to those of persons victimized by a seizure-induced
personality disorder. Her own description of what occurred in the
garden one day, detailed in testimony during her later trial, recapitu-
lates the essential features of a temporal lobe seizure: "I heard the voice
on my right hand, towards the church," she recalled. "There was a great
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light all about." Two angels then appeared, reminding her of the "pitiful
state of the kingdom of France" and beseeching her to "depart and go to
France . . . to succor the king." For days thereafter she heard the voice
precisely at the time the church bell chimed, and the message was
always the same. Yet Joan was perplexed by what she had heard: "I
answered ... that I was but a poor girl who knew nothing of riding and
warfare." Nevertheless, she eventually steeled her resolve and vowed to
keep her virginity "for as long as it should please God," until the issue
was resolved in His and her compatriots' favor.43
Joan was visited by her celestial guardians for three years before she
eventually left home against her parents' wishes and made a pilgrimage
to Chalon to convince Charles of her legitimacy. In the meantime, her
visions had become as elaborate as her revelations proved prophetic.
Not only were her guardian angels adorned with rich crowns; they were
often accompanied by hundreds of knights bearing torches. Her revela-
tions from heaven included a number of events that came to pass: the
English siege of Orleans would be lifted; the citizens of Rheims would
come out unsolicited to meet Charles and anoint him on the spot; and
before many years were out the English would be defeated and driven
from France. All this Joan learned firsthand from those she called her
three counselors: "There is one who remains with me always, another
... visits me often, and the third is He from whom the other two take
command." 44
Strange indeed· that God would see fit to take sides in a squabble
over a few French provinces. Stranger still that her celestial visitors
spoke fluent French and would require her to wear men's clothing. If
Joan, in her perpetually rapturous state, failed to see something odd in
all of this, her trial inquisitors begged to differ. So have future historians
and psychoanalysts who have wrestled with Joan's personality, but still
failed to solve the enigma of the French Maid. As one investigator has
said: "In all other respects she was quite healthy.... Further than this,
history cannot go, and the choice between insanity and inspiration
must be made by another science." 45
Welcome, then, to the science of neurology-and to questions beg-
ging for answers. Are insanity and inspiration the poles between which
lies the entire list of differential diagnoses? Was there something over-
looked in Joan's youth, not to mention her underlying health? In a word,
was temporal lobe epilepsy the missing link tying her to other saints and
mystics who may have suffered from the same disease? No doubt the
environment in general and certain happenings in childhood in par-
ticular profoundly influence the evolution of one's personality, seizure
victim or not. From that perspective, the Maid's early years may offer
more clues to this enigma than preceding investigators have realized.
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Consider what was happening in the village of Domremy, where Joan
grew up, just prior to her conversion. At a time when marauding bands
of Englishmen and Burgundians were ravaging the countryside, the
townspeople remained loyal to their Armagnac leader, Charles. When
Joan was thirteen, Domremy was overrun.46 It was shortly thereafter
that she began to hear voices in the garden beseeching her to go to the aid
of her people and their beleaguered leader.
Each of these factors undoubtedly influenced Joan's subsequent
mind-set. Like many TLE victims who undergo a religious conversion
in such charged circumstances, what arguably began with hallucina-
tions was transformed in her mind into a covenant with God. As she
wrestled with unconscious conflicts that were superimposed on her
religious background and the mayhem of her environment, Joan's vi-
sions provided a suitable impetus for her conversion. The question that
remains is whether the visions were seizure-induced.
If one of the hallmarks of TLE is unexplained fear, it should not pass
unnoticed that Joan had been "much frightened" when she first heard
the voices in the garden. Yet what she already knew added a peculiar
twist to her fears. For one thing, Charles had taken St. Michael as his
patron saint only six years before and had recently erected a statue of St.
Catherine in the town square. For another, Joan was aware of the
popularly held prophecy that France was to be "ruined by a woman and
restored by a virgin." 47 Hence, perhaps, the identity of the angels and
the perceived need to remain chaste until her work was done. She even
insisted on wearing men's clothing, a practice that paradoxically pushed
'her closer to the martyrdom she may have sought all along.
Any impact that TLE may have had on Joan's suppressed sexuality
could have related to its age of onset. Experts in the field have discerned
that "if seizures begin before puberty, normal sexual interests may fail
to develop." 48 That the seizure victim evinces little interest in sex is of
no particular concern to the afflicted; if anything, that seems entirely in
keeping with his or her new life's view. Joan of Arc was no exception.
Such thinking extended to her insistence upon disengaging herself from
the hedonistic lifestyle of the rabble.49 She forbade profanity in her
presence, detested camp followers, and sought to isolate herself from
any situation smacking of sexual connotations. That went a long way
toward convincing Joan's contemporaries that she was somehow dif-
ferent. As one authority on TLE makes clear: "These victims seem
different because they feel different; [accordingly] they tend to with-
draw from ordinary social interactions." 50 From a sexual perspective at
least, Joan's vibrations were ambivalent at best; no man who rode with
her ever admitted to any carnal feelings toward the Maid, believing as
they did that"she was from God." 51
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Comparable behavior can be found in many TLE suspects today who
have yet to reach puberty before their first seizure occurs. Joan's per-
ceived mission and virginity pledge mirror the account of one of the first
described seizure victims on record: IIAfter a seizure, the youth declared
he had been given a mission by God to reform the world! " He had heard
the voices of God and the Virgin Mary, who commanded him IInot to eat
until the project was finished." Still another patient, who had experi-
enced her first seizure at the age of ten, became so devoutly religious
four years later that a conversion experience occurred, sealed with the
same vow of chastity that the French Maid had embraced.52
That Joan felt compelled to act in the face of her parents' disapproval
was evidenced by her later testimony: IISince God had commanded me
to go, I must do it.... Had I had a hundred fathers ... and mothers, I
would have gone."53 What Joan was alluding to, as many later TLE
victims have done, were unbridled obsessions that drove her, even
against her will. One such patient experienced lI a sudden dream-like
feeling, saw a flash of light, and proclaimed 'I have seen the light.' He
suddenly knew that God was behind this, and that he could have power
from God if he only asked for it." Another had always perceived herself
as a religious person, but her feelings intensified during periods of inner
conflict. Despite the assurances of voices telling her that the strong and
upright like herself had lithe hand of God," she later attempted sui-
cide-just as Joan did in a fit of despair when she leaped seventy feet
from a tower in which she was incarcerated. A third patient described
having IIheard a voice, soft and tender." Later the same day a church bell
chimed in her right ear and a vision appeared of a woman wearing a
black dress, extending an arm with lights. At such times the Almighty
would then speak to her.54
There is much, then, to suggest that Joan of Arc's celestial visions
and voices, as well as her subsequent behavior, may have had their roots
in temporal lobe epilepsy. Yet a few loopholes remain. Where, one
wonders, are the cardinal manifestations of hypergraphia in Joan's rec-
ord? Without that, her behavior falls short of the typical profile of the
seizure-induced personality. Yet there is a simple explanation: Joan was
illiterate.55 Nevertheless, she did from time to time dictate the equiv-
alent of letters, pronouncements that bore the indelible stamp of self-
righteousness and hypennoralism so typical of the TLE victim's writ-
ings. For example, her communique to the English before the siege of
Orleans commanded them to lay down their weapons lest the scourge of
God visit itself upon them. Even the banner she carried into battle
betrayed her holier-than-thou attitudes; she bore it with the same self-
righteousness as did a later seizure victim who walked the street carry-
ing a sign with the inscription IIBe prepared to meet thy God." 56 For all
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intents and purposes, Joan was warning the English to do the same.
Moreover, her trial testimony betrays an excessive compulsion with
choosing her words and weighing her arguments carefully. True, Joan
was very much aware that the prosecution was trying to coax her into
contradicting herself, and that she assiduously avoided. Yet her meas-
ured responses may have also been a reflection of the hypergraphic TLE
personality, for these individuals are obsessed with the clarity of their
thinking in a subconscious effort to control their emotions.57
In an indirect sense, Joan's warrior mentality mirrored the aggres-
sion that later investigators have identified as yet another cardinal
feature of the TLE personality. Time and again her dogged persistence in
countermanding orders by her more experienced subordinates turned
the tide of battle when all was believed lost. On one occasion her
commanders wanted to skirmish before reaching Paris. Joan ignored
them and crossed the moats to engage the more heavily fortified enemy
there. In like manner, she had ordered her soldiers and the townspeople
to rush out and assault the bastille at Orleans. That eventual success
was literally in the wind was intimated by a sudden shift in its direction
which allowed the boats to cross the river. To Joan's ways of thinking,
that was a sure sign of divine intervention.58
These events bring to mind the strongest argument against Joan's
meteoric rise having been the result of temporal lobe seizures: how does
one explain the military successes of a farmer's daughter described as
having formidable aptitudes as a horsewoman and military tactician
without prior training in either? For all the stigmata suggestive of a
psychomotor seizure victim, the retrospective diagnostician must ac-
knowledge the possibility of supernatural forces at work, particularly
when it comes to chronicling results rather than merely describing
behavior.
This scarcely negates the hypothesis that Joan of Arc might still
have been a seizure sufferer. One of the attributes of such victims is
their ability to interact effectively with others, despite their disabil-
ity.59 Viewed from that perspective, and acknowledging that her people
had every reason to support any self-proclaimed savior who might
reverse their shared misfortune, Joan's pivotal role in what transpired
deserves a second look from neurologist and historian alike-if only to
suggest that future scholars should give some consideration to a dis-
eased brain that may have driven her.
If being driven by a sense of hypermoralism, self-righteousness, and
re'ligiosity characterized Joan of Arc's behavior, those same qualities
apply to few persons more than to John Brown before, during, and after
the Harpers Ferry debacle. Whereas the life of the French Maid was so
64 SICK HEADS AND TALL TALES
short as perhaps to preclude the full development of every aspect of the
TLE personality, Brown epitomized those characteristics to a degree
that would be anticipated in a man who lived six decades. For all his
eccentric mannerisms, history records that something transformed
Brown during the last years of his life. As fate would have it, that
happened to be a time of gathering storm clouds before the thunderclap
of civil war divided the country.
Though obviously concerned with the slavery issue throughout
his life, it was not until the 1850s that Brown became totally con-
sumed by it.6o At virtually the same time, this now very militant
abolitionist became inordinately self-righteous, embellishing his be-
havior with such evangelical fervor that his associates found him
insufferable.61 Perhaps an undue sensitivity, pathophysiologically in-
duced, accounted in part for Brown's conversion once a truly worthy
cause became ripe for the picking. Not only do the last years of his life
recapitulate many attributes of TLE to the letter, but both psychologi-
cal and and physical evidence coincides with what the pathographer
might expect to find.
Recall that victims of a left-sided seizure focus can be distinguished
by their ideative, contemplative, or religious conceptualizations, while
those with a right-sided focus demonstrate more emotive and impulsive
actions.62 Whereas Adolf Hitler's behavior was suggestive of the latter,
given his proclivity to act through instinct and emotion, Brown typified
the obverse by being profoundly introspective and contemplative. Se-
lected photographers taken as early as 1856 suggest why this might have
been so. A noticeable flattening of the right side of Brown's face in
conjunction with a sagging lower eyelid raises at least the suspicion of a
subtle paralysis-perhaps on the basis of a structural lesion in the left
side of his brain.63 Though the long beard and mustache he grew after
that date were put to good use by disguising the features of the fugitive
from justice that Brown had become, they may have inadvertently
disguised something more deeply seated in a literal sense: a tumor of the
left temporal lobe. Despite the limitations of relying on musty repro-
ductions (acknowledged in the preceding chapter), the implications are
at least intriguing: was there more than messianism brewing in the
brain of one of history's more infamous zealots?
That unproved surmise notwithstanding, one critical link is miss-
ing to tie this wizened warrior to the scourge of epilepsy. In contrast to
both Paul the Apostle and Joan of Arc (and arguably Adolf Hitler), there
is little in the record to suggest that John Brown suffered from recogniz-
able seizures. But such an omission is not as damaging as it may seem,
since we now know that the subsequent behavior of these victims
correlates more with the duration of the epilepsy than with the number
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of seizures per see Indeed, overt seizures (at least those apparent enough
to be recognized) do not have to occur at all. The behavioral syndrome
may develop instead as a result of subtle damage to the temporal lobe in
the absence of obvious epilepsy.64
Yet perhaps we are getting ahead of the story. To understand John
Brown requires knowing something of his early years and influences
long before the changes that became obvious after 1848. Much of his
childhood was spent in the Western Reserve of Ohio, a hotbed of
abolitionism to which his father had become an early convert through
his work with the underground railroad.65 It would also be safe to say
that the son's views on the subject were colored at an early age by
religion.66 Such influences exacerbated his imperious nature. Above all,
John Brown longed to lead. Even as a young man he took himself and his
causes very seriously. Witness his audacity in interrupting a sermon on
one occasion to debate certain scriptural points with a startled minister
and his perplexed parishioners.67 That said, Brown's subsequent record
in one failed business after another reveals a tragic flaw in his character.
As one contemporary later recalled: "He failed not for lack of ingenuity
and perseverance, but because his basic judgment was wrong." 68
Although Brown's education was paltry, he was an avid enough
reader to immerse himself in the works of other fanatics and revolution-
aries such as Toussaint l'Ouverture and Oliver Cromwell-the latter of
whom, prophetically enough, believed himself to be an instrument of
God. Eventually, such weighty influences would sink home; Brown's
"god-idea" begat in him a feeling that he was "the Moses that was to lead
the Exodus of the colored people." 69 All the same, such plans would
have to wait for a man still struggling to make his way in an increasingly
wayward world. George Delamater, who perhaps knew Brown as well as
anyone during the early years, described his high-strung neighbor as one
whose mind "was rather intent upon his business pursuits, the educa-
tion and improvement of his family and ... other projects of public
interest or utility." 70 Only after he had failed repeatedly at the first did
the last consume him-and with such intensity that it terrorized his
contemporaries as much as it has perplexed historians.
For all his highbrow pretensions, John Brown was a self-righteous
boor. Yet "however unlovely his personal characteristics," one editor
noted, "he was lifted above the herd because he was inspired." 71 If so,
then by what? How could one observer revere Brown as "an exalted
hero" while another saw nothing more in him than a "horse thief and a
murderer? "72 Did this "volcano beneath a covering of snow," 73 sim-
mering with frustrated intentions superimposed on fundamentalist
pretensions, require merely a spark from misfiring temporal lobe neu-
rons to activate it?
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Or was Brown simply insane, as attested by nineteen separate
affidavits provided by family members during his trial? After all, a long
line of insanity was said to have run on his mother's side and believed to
have been inherited by a few of Brown's sons.74 To argue the case on
these terms, however, misses the point on at least two counts: first,
insanity is not necessarily hereditary; and second, the affidavits sup-
plied by family members to validate his insanity have proved to be
transparent in the extreme. His second wife, who probably knew him
best, vehemently denied the charge.75 Nor did Brown's closest associ-
ates testify to his madness, including those members of the highly
educated Secret Six in Boston, who underwrote the entire Harpers Ferry
scheme. One of the six, himself a doctor who treated the mentally
disturbed, categorically denied that Brown was insane.76
Certainly the Old Man was no psychotic like Nat Turner, who had
unleashed his own slave insurrection some thirty years before at the
behest of celestial visions and voices. In that sense, the eminent histo-
rian Samuel E. Morison's assessment of John Brown rings true: "He was
a madman with a method." 77 If the method was so firmly rooted in
Brown's mind that he overcame formidable obstacles to bring it to
fruition, Morison has less to say about the behavior of madmen, who are
erratic in connecting means and ends. And on that count Brown was
obviously guilty. Yet that in itself does not make him insane. Zealots
and fanatics may behave the same way. So do some temporal lobe
seizure victims.
Sensing failure as a provider for his family, Brown's "cast of mind
began to alter" during the late 1840s.78 Until his exploits in "Bleeding
Kansas," however, it might be argued that Brown's actions "flowed
from normal human drives." True, he had an insatiable appetite for
command. Truer still, his involvement in the antislavery cause re-
flected in part an "overcompensation for all his failures." 79 But there
was something more: a true metamorphosis of personality from mere
advocate to ardent fanatic. A little reflection from the neurophysiologic
perspective might shed some light on why this was so.
As early as 1848, antislavery themes began to dominate what now
seemed Brown's compulsion to write. From letters devoted to family
matters or a plethora of personal travails, there emerged a distinct tum
toward hypergraphia, sermons composed with heavily underlined script
based upon a single theme. As such, "Sambo's Mistakes," a series
written for the Negro paper The Ram's Hom, marked a watershed.
Written as-if Brown were a black man reciting his own errors,80 the work
heralded his preoccupation with the antislavery issue. Further intima-
tions of things to come appeared in a letter to Joshua R. Giddings, in
which Brown began to display imbalance and strange ideas about aboli-
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tionism.81 Even so, these essays did not yet reflect the patent religiosity
and aggression that would come to typify his later efforts.
In his letter to the League of Gileadites, an organization for the
protection of fugitive slaves in Massachusetts, Brown took on the air of
a self-appointed counselor, embellishing the title WORDS OF ADVICE
in capital letters with the byline "as written and recommended by John
Brown." The letter is filled with prophetic warnings (for example, "All
traitors must die") and heavily underlined words: "Do not delay one
moment after you are ready." While religious overtones lent some re-
spectability to the message, Brown's aggressiveness only hardened the
tone of his rhetoric: "Let the first blow be the signal for all to engage," he
wrote. "Make clean work of your enemies.... Stand by one another . ..
while a drop of blood remains; and be hanged if you must." 82
Still other letters reflect the cosmic bias of the psychomotor seizure
personality. To cite an early example written in 1852: "My attachments
to this world have been very strong, [but] Divine Providence has been
cutting me loose one Cord after another.... All ties must soon be
severed. " By 1853 he was rebuking his son in a sermonlike epistle, again
filled with underlining, capital letters, and bits of scripture. About the
same time he drafted an essay, titled "Law and Order," to the black
leader Frederick Douglass.83 Here was but one of many hints that, as
TLE victims are prone to do, John Brown was prepared to take the law
into his own hands in order to right the wrongs that others passively
accepted.
It was not until the mid-1850s in Kansas that Brown irrevocably
committed himself to militant abolitionism, come what may. By his
own hand, he dragged out five pros1avery advocates in the middle of the
night at Pottawatomie Creek and massacred them. As was now typical
of virtually everything he did, Brown justified the heinous crime as part
of a religious crusade. "May God still gird our loins and hold our right
hands," he wrote, "and to him may we give the glory." Presumably the
unbalanced warrior wished to include among his gifts the heads of
murdered victims served up to the Lord on a bloody platter. Yet as one
measure of the derangement of his mind at the time, Brown denied that
he had ever taken part in any slaughter-all other witnesses' accounts
to the contrary.84
From the neurophysiologic perspective, two possible explanations
for Brown's denial emerge. The first, and one emphasized by all inves-
tigators to be distinctly rare, is episodic aggression that occurs during a
psychomotor seizure. ·Consumed by impulses beyond his control, the
TLE sufferer may commit a violent act85 (much like those later at-
tributed to the infamous Boston Strangler) as part of a seizure and not
remember what he has done. Yet it would be stretching the argument to
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suggest that Brown was in the throes of epilepsy at Pottawatomie, for he
had planned all along to perpetrate just such a crime.
The second possibility involves what the neuropsychologist terms a
"dissociative state." In its extreme form, the victim becomes a bona fide
split personality; failing that, he blames his behavior on benevolent or
malevolent powers86_just as Brown attributed his actions to God's
will. Recalling for the moment that no issue is minor for TLE sufferers,
slavery could scarcely be seen from either Brown's background or his
now distorted perspective as anything but "the greatest sin against
God." 87 Yet there are problems with attributing what happened at
Pottawatomie to the dictates of a dissociated personality. In the absence
of ongoing seizures, it is distinctly rare for perpetrators of such to claim
amnesia for what they do; indeed, they usually recall these actions with
considerable regret-particularly when the underlying pathology in-
volves the left temporal lobe, which has already been attributed to
Brown.
This is simply to say that not every activity of even the most
pathologic individuals can be explained in physiologic terms. Even so,
virtually the whole of John Brown's subsequent behavior appears to fit
the mold of a TLE personality. One aspect of his meteoric rise and fall
that has perplexed historians to the present day is how this failed
sheepskinner .and erstwhile businessman turned renegade managed to
gain the support of a few highly educated members of Boston society,
who underwrote not only his activities in Kansas but the sad debacle at
Harpers Ferry. Yet once one learns that the temporal lobe epileptic may
prove to be an engaging conversationalist, Brown's hold on the Secret
Six may be more re~dilyunderstood. As one measure of the "viscosity"
that characterizes the TLE victim, he startles the unwary object of his
conversation with instant intimacy and extraordinary candor.88 More-
over, .he takes both himself and his world quite seriously-and what
could be more appealing to this band of abolitionists than just such a
man with a plan, one willing to assume the martyr's "role? The part-
nership proved mutually beneficial: Brown needed a cause as much as
abolitionism needed a martyr.
True, the winsome warrior gave the Secret Six a misleading account
of his future plans. They were made to believe that he would embark on
a limited military engagement in an unspecified setting.89 That too
might come as no surprise to the neuropsychologist because many long-
standing TLE sufferers have difficulty giving straight answers to direct
questions. Yet Brown's circuitous recitations seem to have held him in
good stead when it came to soliciting support from ardent conspirators
who failed to do their own homework.
The tragedy, of course, was the extension of Brown's powers of
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persuasion to the naive young men who were to accompany him to
Kansas and Harpers Ferry. He corrupted these youths by turning them
from nonentities into Real Men like himself once they embraced the
antislavery issue. He granted them high offices in a phantom govern-
ment and handed out commissions in a nonexistent army in exchange
for the blind obedience that cost many of them their lives. And that is
why Edwin Coppoc's later deposition at Brown's trial weighed so heav-
ily on the outcome. "You don't know John Brown," he told the jury.
"When he wants a man to do a thing, the man does it." 90
Brown's predilection for cosmic and social issues only intensified
during those frenetic months before Harpers Ferry, paralleled by his
equally frenetic turn from mere advocate to messiah. As he later
proclaimed: "You know that Christ once armed Peter. So also in my
case I think he put a sword into my hands." 91 Here was a telling
reflection of the epileptic's intensely emotional response to his en-
vironment. Brown's Bible-thumping fanaticism had become his raison
d'etre. He was as consumed by what God had in store for him as he was
by efforts to define the cosmos in his own terms. While bivouacking on
a cold, snowy night with his clan on the way to Virginia, he conducted .
what his son Owen described as a "hot discussion upon the Bible and
war, .. . commerce and manufacture, also upon the . . . civilized
world." A few of Brown's contemporaries excused his fanaticism as a
reflection of the times. Many more dismissed it as the ravings of a
madman.92
Either way, by 1858 the Old Man was clearly more irascible and
nervous than he had ever been before. He remained completely ab-
sorbed in an idea that most believed transcended "ordinary thought
and reason," scarcely acknowledging his critics as he spoke.93 That
was but one measure of what the psychiatrist would term a "viscous
affect," for Brown remained as insensitive to social cues as he was to
unwelcome advice. Perhaps that is why the hypergraphic syndrome
served him so well, allowing him to lecture through the written word
to silent and unseen audiences that might otherwise have turned him a
deaf ear.
Brown's letters also depict the depersonalization that evolves over
time in some TLE sufferers, referring to himself as he sometimes did in
the third person. He even considered writing a book about his life, only
to abandon it as his mercurial mind set roamed the gamut of delusional
thought. As he wrote at about the same time in typically abstruse prose:
"I believe, when you come to look at the ample field I labored in and the
rich harvest ... the Whole World ... mayreap from its cultivation; you
will feel that you are out of your element unless you are in it. "94
As the pace of his writing picked up, Brown's "element" became
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captive to the limitations of his hypergraphic pen. Incapable of erudite
prose, TLE victims rely instead on heavily stylized script laden with
underlining and capital letters. In just eight lines of a letter to the
Reverend Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Brown italicized nine words.
A letter to his daughter about the importance of her husband to his
scheme declared: "I have a PARTICULAR and VERY IMPORTANT
(but not dangerous) place for HIM to fill . ... I know of NO MAN living
so well adapted to fill it." A seven-line letter to his wife in the same year
bore the indelible stamp of hypergraphia with its twenty-four under-
lined words.95
On the eve of Harpers Ferry, John Brown was treading a fine line
between the militant abolitionist he had become and the pathological
personality that had already defined him for upward of ten years. Prepar-
ing himself on the morning of the conflict that would catapult him into
infamy, Brown rose and "prayed as in a trance, eyes closed, his hands
swaying, [enforcing] conformity to his ideas of what must or must not be
done." He was acting now as but"an instrument of God," ready to die
"for God's eternal truth on the scaffold" if that were required.96
For all his fanaticism and self-righteousness, Brown's judgment
remained as impaired as it had ever been. In choosing Harpers Ferry, he
turned the original plan as understood by the Secret Six on its head.
Here was no mountain redoubt but a pit. The raid itself was not to be
an avoidance of bloody confrontation, as Brown had intimated, but just
the opposite. And if twenty-one diehards seemed a pathetically small
number to rescue thousands of oppressed slaves, Brown had already
convinced himself that they would be deluged with black reinforce-
ments the moment hostilities began-though in fact, not one slave
voluntarily joined the insurrection. Misreading his history and his
religion as much as he had misinterpreted the advice of those foolish
enough to counsel him, Brown mistakenly assured his flock that Nat
Turner had "held Virginia captive for five weeks"; now he assured
them in kind that "God [has] appointed us as the men to do his
bidding. " 97
In the absence of divine intervention, the enterprise was doomed
from the beginning. Trapped in the armory's wagonhouse with shells
splintering through wooden peepholes that his terrified man ducked
under rather than fired through, Brown became confused and indecisive.
Failing to negotiate an escape in exchange for an end to hostilities, he
rashly surrendered his pretensions and his arms, but not before ten of his
men had died-among them, his son Oliver, whom he admonished in
the strictest terms: "Be quiet, son. If you must die, die like a man." 98
Captured and hastily tried in the county court of Charles Town, the
forsaken prophet was hanged six weeks later. Even in defeat he had
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refused to accept that God had never been at Harpers Ferry at all-much
less, perhaps, aligned against him. He expressed no remorse during his
incarceration and refused to implicate anyone else. "No man sent me
here," he testified. "It was my own prompting and that of my Maker."
Asked whether he believed himself to be an instrument in the hand of
God, he responded simply: "I do." 99
No doubt Brown's Calvinist ideas about predestination and salva-
tion had always been an overriding influence in his life. Yet today's
neuropsychologist might identify his religiosity as one element of a
seizure-riddled mind. Surely something more than religious upbringing
compelled this zealot to quest for martyrdom with such little regard for
human life. If, as he fervently believed, "God had often covered [his]
head in battle" so that he would be left to do good works, Brown evinced
little concern that those he loved were not protected in like manner. His
response in either case was fatalistic. As for Oliver: "I guess he's dead."
As for himself, on his way to the scaffold: "Now, when He intends to use
me in a different way, shall I not most cheerfully go? " 100
Like other fanatics, John Brown carried his pretensions with him to
the grave. On the morning of his execution he handed a note to a guard
that, perhaps more than any other single sentence, epitomizes the self-
righteousness and aggression of the TLE personality: "I John Brown am
now quite certain that the crimes of this guiltyland will never be purged
away; but with Blood." 101 John Brown lived and died a fanatic, and the
impact of fanatics on history has been immense, as every historian
knows. To cite but one: "Without such men there would be no organ-
ized religion and few, if any, 'causes.'" 102 Without temporal lobe epi-
lepsy, perhaps those numbers might be fewer still.
So what is one to conclude from all of this? First, the vantage point
from which we have examined this handful of zealots suffers from a very
narrow perspective; and second, the intent was not so much to fill in the
blanks of perhaps unanswerable questions as it was to raise them with
an eye toward enlarging our retrospective focus beyond the psychoana-
lytic. That said, most readers will still want answers. Within the limits
inherent in studies of this sort, here are mine. Whether Adolf Hitler
really suffered from an overactive temporal lobe probably deserves less
notice than the drugs he took, which changed the course of German
history after 1941. Likewise, the data supporting the TLE thesis for Paul
and Joan seem less than conclusive, particularly when it comes to
weighing concrete results. For all my scientific and medical training, I
concede that there may indeed be an element of the supernatural here.
Only with John Brown do the data appear to fit to the exclusion of
virtually every other consideration. This may seem paradoxical, as
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Brown was the only one of the four in which overt seizure activity lacks
documentation. That in itself speaks to the need to have raised the issue
of TLE in the first place. After all, this diagnosis is probably missed more
often than any other in the psychiatrist's clinic. The question remains
whether it has been overlooked elsewhere.
PART II
Brain Failure at the Top:
Psychology or Pathologyl
Second opinions are as valuable in rehashing history as in diagnosing
disease. Accepted schools of historical thought are forever being
challenged by what that profession has termed "revisionist views,"
often influenced as much by the scholars' own biases and the times
in which they write as by new data. Digging up a treasure trove of
documents may occur but once in a lifetime for the historian; as for
the pathographer, a public figure's medical record may remain buried
under mounds of doctor-patient confidentiality. Still, as every good
researcher knows, the same data may, in receptive soil, sprout differ-
ent conclusions. Yet far from stumbling upon undiscovered diamonds
in the rough, many revisionist gumshoes have soiled the soles of their
reputations with discarded excrement long after foraging familiar
fields has lost its appeal for the rest of the herd. Some are left to
wallow in obscure journals; others are butchered on the spot or put
out to pasture without a publication.
No doubt knowledgeable physicians offering their own second
opinions on the musings of the preceding chapter would hesitate to
push its thesis too far. Relatively few men and women suffer from
seizures; fewer still, the personality disorder that accompanies them.
On the other hand, everyone has a mother and father. Sigmund Freud
put that elementary fact to good use in deciphering human nature.
Viewing peculiar behavior not as some short circuit of the neuronal
network but as the subliminal outgrowth of one's childhood, Freud
went to great lengths to imprint that notion on society's collective
conscious in the 1920s. It was only a matter of time before his con-
verts began to apply such thinking to history.
Today the limitations of psychoanalytical theory are common
knowledge to practicing physicians. Not that this discipline should
be dismissed out of hand by either the historian or the biographer;
rather, the prudent scholar would merely ask that its disciples strike
a proper balance. Reenter the neurologist, now armed with more
substantial data than seizure-riddled psyches, to highlight more
prevalent diseases that have been all but ignored.
One of the most disabling is poorly controlled high blood pres-
sure. As if to underscore its impact on history, four world leaders in
the twentieth century alone suffered from particularly virulent cases
of hypertension that adversely affected their brain function. Yet to
date, Josef Stalin, Woodrow Wilson, and, to a lesser degree, Winston
Churchill have been indicted on the pages of history by the psychoan-
alyst more than by the neurologist. (The exception among the four is
Franklin D. Roosevelt, for whom the psychohistorians-excluding
the effect of polio on his subsequent quest for office-have managed
to leave well enough alone.) Whereas both agree that all three men
were but shadows of their former selves in the end, neither discipline
has been willing to revise its thinking enough to admit what they
have in common: that each of these leaders manifested signs of accel-
erated brain aging, which magnified those personality attributes the
psychologists have so capably identified. In short, Stalin became more
paranoid, Wilson more rigid, and Churchill more egocentric as a re-
sult of hypertension-induced cerebrovascular disease.
It follows that a complete historical appraisal of the first half of
the twentieth century must include the largely overlooked issue of
physiologically compromised leadership, if for no other reason than
that few men in modem history (sick or healthy) exercised so much
power over so many for so long. It therefore falls to the pathographer,
as something of a revisionist in his or her own "write", to offer
second opinions on that issue's implications, both psychological and
political. As such, the chapters that follow attempt to shed some
light on what has been to date an obscure contribution by pathogra-
phy to psychohistory.
CHAPTER 4
Josef Stalin:
A Premier Paranoic
Before condemning the proponents of revisionism (or impugning their
motives), we would do well to acknowledge that some revisionists have
contributed immeasurably to our understanding of the past. To cite but
a few examples: Did the Age of Jackson truly signify the emergence of
the "common man" in American politics, or was it a time in which
mere deference was paid to the common man by the "uncommon men"
who really ran things?l Was the Spanish-American War the logical
culmination of our Manifest Destiny or a byproduct of imperialistic
pretension? 2
Nor have the revisionists ignored the origins of the Cold War and
America's responsibility for it. Did a headstrong president really push
Josef Stalin into a defensive posture at the end of World War II, thereby
initiating the Cold War?3 Can a single individual have such an impact
on history? Surely there is something to be said for the suspicions of
contemporaries and later scholars alike that Stalin's paranoia also had
something to do with dropping East-West relations into the deep freeze.
Taking that argument one step further than the psychoanalysts have
done to date, we now have medical support for the view that his lifelong
paranoia may have been augmented in the end by hypertension-induced
brain aging. On this subject, the pathographer is singularly blessed with
an increasing quantity of medical data trickling out from the former
Soviet Union that adds a new dimension to Stalin's psychological pro-
file.
Of course, historians have already given the origins of the Cold War
a detailed second look. Whereas the consensus view suggests that Soviet
designs on Eastern Europe were largely responsible for the split that
emerged, some revisionists believe it was the United States that aban-
doned the wartime partnership and subconsciously backed the Soviets
against the wall long before they chose to build a real one for them-
selves.4 At best, America's twentieth-century infatuation with inter-
national peace-keeping organizations ran counter to age-old Russian
preoccupations with spheres of influence; at worst, some suspect that
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Harry Truman was guilty of deliberate provocation.5 Emboldened by
the gloved fist of Marshall Plan aid slammed into the open palm of
Europe on the one hand and the strong-armed threat of nuclear hege-
mony on the other, the United States, it has been argued, shouldered
legitimate Soviet considerations aside.
How else to explain Truman's aggressive rhetoric when, on the eve
of the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, he gave the Soviet
ambassador a "straight one-two to the jaw"?6 That was more than a
verbal tongue-lashing, for Truman's bite was as penetrating as his bark
was shrill. At least for the moment, America's diplomatic clout was
sustained by a self-conscious awareness of its economic and military
might. In contrast, Russia, with its twenty million dead and an econ-
omy in dire need of resuscitation, not only had to rebuild but also feared
capitalist encirclement and future expansion. Whether or not the Soviet
Union was truly the object of an international conspiracy led by the
United States, the Soviets perceived itself as such. And it is the mind of
Josef Stalin in particular that offers the most sensitive barometer of
pressures coming to bear on postwar Soviet behavior.
Here the argments of both traditionalist and revisionist dovetail in
an ironic fashion, hinged as much to the cornerstone of individual
disease as mutual distrust. Whereas the revisionists have argued that
the United States was guilty of several actions that only augumented, if
not justified, much of the Soviet Union's somewhat paranoid machina-
tions, proponents of the traditionalist school such as Arthur Schles-
inger, Jr., highlighted that paranoia in peculiarly personal terms: "Stalin
... was plainly a man of deep and morbid obsessions and compulsions.
. . . His paranoia ... led to the terrible purges of the mid-thirties and the
wanton murder of thousands of his Bolshevik comrades." In time, it
would lead to much more, including the execution of a best friend, a
lover, and members of his own family. As Schlesinger bluntly con-
cluded: "In the end nothing could satisfy Stalin's paranoia. His own
associates failed. Why does anyone suppose that any conceivable Amer-
ican policy [designed to keep the Soviet Union as an ally] would have
succeeded?" 7
This distinguished scholar was implying that the Cold War was in
all likelihood unavoidable. Much of that thesis rests on Russian history
in general and Stalin's morbid obsession in particular, which made any
diplomatic rapprochement between the superpowers an exercise in self-
deceit. Through the centuries, Czarist paranoia had been spawned by
invasions and conquests that compelled its leaders to protect the"moth-
erland's borders from Huns, Mongols, and Germans alike.8 Lenin's later
perversion of Marxist ideology to a death struggle between capitalism
and socialism, rather than a predetermined progression from one to the
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other, accentuated this peculiar aspect of the Russian psyche. So long as
capitalism existed anywhere in the world, the Soviet Union and its
newly acclaimed ideology were at risk. By the end of World War II, what
had seemed a theoretical risk now became an overt threat: bourgeois
capitalists were knocking on Russia's western door. To complicate
matters further, what had been a movement led by a strongly cen-
tralized party of revolutionary elite had devolved during the Stalin era to
a personality cult-a personality that alone spoke and acted for Soviet
interests.
Historians on both sides of the fence have for some time now been
willing to recognize these underpinnings of Soviet Russia's postwar
paranoia. Perhaps one of its most astute contemporary observers was
the United States attache in Moscow, George F. Kennan, who empha-
sized what he felt to be a permanent and enduring feature of Russian
psychology that resulted in a "neurotic view" of world 'affairs. What
Kennan appreciated more than most was an "age-old sense of insecurity
of a sedentary people reared on an exposed plain in the neighborhood of
fierce nomadic peoples." 9 Schlesinger took this geopolitical factor one
step further and tied it to two others: any analysis of the origins of the
Cold War must include not only what he termed these"sinister dynam-
ics" of Russian society but also the intransigence of Leninist ideology
and Stalin's "madness." 10
Neither ideologies nor pathologic personalities develop in a vac-
uum. No understanding of postwar Soviet mentality can be had without
acknowledging past grievances that contributed in large measure to the
profound paranoia of the Stalin era. On two occasions during a twenty-
five year period of Russia's recent history alone, its borders had been
overrun by jackbooted Germans swarming across the Polish corridor. It
was perhaps understandable, then, that Stalin would perceive the post-
war reorganization of Poland not as a question of honor but as a "life and
death" struggle. II To make matters worse, after both world wars overt
German hostility was supplanted by Western interference in Russian
and Soviet affairs. From the beginning, Bolsheviks reacted with dismay
to Western support of the Whites (which occurred despite Woodrow
Wilson's objections to Allied interference in Russia) during the six years
of civil war before the Reds established control within their own bor-
ders. I2 Now, a quarter of a century later, Russia's erstwhile allies were
denying the Soviets their spheres of influence in Eastern Europe as well.
Nor had Stalin forgiven the Allies' delay in opening the western front
until June 1944, at the expense of millions of Russians lost before
Germany was required to divert its forces to its defenses in the West.
And if Soviet interference in Polish affairs and elsewhere offended
Western liberal thought, Stalin could point to the unilateral surrender
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and dismemberment of Italy without Russian input as justification for
later Soviet incursions in Eastern Europe.
What Stalin really feared was contact with a more powerful and
economically healthy West-unless, of course, the Soviet economy
might benefit from that without any strings attached. Hence his early
refusal to allow potential satellite states in the eastern cordon sanitaire
to participate in the Marshall Plan.13 Not that their suffering population
would have cared where the aid came from; what had become a per-
vasive neurosis framed in insecurity afflicted Soviet rulers far more than
it did the ruled.14 In one sense, the tribulations of war had moved the
Russian people away from the internationalist pretensions of the Com-
munist Party toward a more protective, if pragmatic, embrace of the
motherland. Stalin recognized that himself. As he ruefully admitted to
Averell Harriman during the war: "We are under no illusions that the
people are fighting for us. They are fighting for Mother Russia." 15
While tying its people by the necessity of hard times to a totalitarian
dictatorship, Communist ideology itself no longer tugged at the heart-
strings of popular emotions at war's end. Yet sustenance and survival
did-and Stalin believed that he alone knew how to assuage those
elemental concerns. Such hubris hinged on a submissive Russian men-
tality as much as it stemmed from what Dostoevski termed the "mental
degeneration" of Russian revolutionaries, who believed that human
beings, "vicious and depraved as they are," have to be coerced into
accepting ends and means for which they are not ready but which will
ultimately serve them well.16 That the Soviet people perceived freedom
of choice as a luxury they could scarcely afford was to their immediate
benefit but long-term distress, because subjugation and murder there-
after became part and parcel of the state's means to achieve desired ends.
As Freud assessed Soviet leaders through the confessions of Dostoevski:
"Truly they were like the barbarians of the great invasions who murder
and do penance, whereafter pentience becomes a technique to enable
murder to be done." 17
This was all, of course, a magnified reflection of Russia's history as
personified by past tyrannical rulers, Peter the Great and Ivan the
Terrible among them. A preeminent Russian scholar of the Stalin era,
Gustav Bychowski, perceived what evolved under Stalin's rule as "un-
conscious identification" with the methods and ideals of his fore-
bears. Is In addition, the anxiety and frustr~tionof the postwar world
created in the shell-shocked Russian mind set a deeply seated need for
ideals backed by material power. Providing these was a mandate Stalin
intended to preempt for himself by whatever means proved necessary.
If despotic oppression had long blighted Russian history, that same
instrument now buried its blade to the hilt in a malleable populace to
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effect a cure for ills that its rulers had, in large measure, created. Ivan the
Terrible was among the first to initiate a system based on opriezniki,
faithful servants of the czar who carried out the functions of a modem-
day secret police.19 In Lenin's time, by extension, the "haves" were no
longer masters over the "have-nots." Hence the suppression of the
wealthy, quasi-capitalist kulaks, farmers whose rural districts were
completely depopulated by forced mass exportations. By such stringent
measures were the oppressed compelled to take their medicine as re-
tribution for the wrongs done by a few to the subjugated many. The
prescription for Russia's ills was deceptively simple: scalpels wielded
by its leaders must penetrate deeply to cut out this bourgeois cancer.
It was left to Lenin to administer the anesthetic that ultimately
allowed his successor to operate. As one admirer recalled: "Lenin ap-
peared to be burdened, oppressed with all the pain and ... suffering of
the Russian people." 20 Like all good revolutionaries, he needed a scape-
goat, which capitalism and the bourgeoisie supplied: they were the
alleged persecutors of Russia's oppressed classes. As such, Soviet ide-
ology found its psychological catharsis in the persecution of the bour-
geoisie within and the defense against capitalists without.
This only intensified the inveterate Russian suspicion of a hostile
West-but not before opponents from inside Soviet borders fell victim
to its excesses. Once Stalin came to power, the purge trials from 1928 to
1938 transformed one individual's neurosis into collective paranoia.
Terrorism became palatable in the defense against traitors, allowing
Stalin to use any means necessary to exact social obedience, including
mass murders without parallel in human history (his former enemies,
the Nazis, perhaps excepted).21 In addition, Stalin's own past only
fueled the flames of his paranoia. As a Georgian, he ruminated over the
domination that Russian officials had exercised over his homeland.22
Vengeance would be had, as he consciously or subconsciously identified
past oppressors with allies-turned-internationalists.
Stalin was hardly the first Bolshevik to perceive the utility of
violence and terror in gaining his ends. That modus operandi had been
sanctified long before by Leon Trotsky in his "Defense of Terrorism,"
which justified the use of violence to "break the class will of the
enemy." 23 Lenin subsequently put that theory into practice with the
systematic use of terror by one class against another.24 In the process, a
notable contradiction in Marxist theory evolved: Though the state was
supposed to "wither away," the revolution evolved in precisely the
opposite direction-toward increasing its power. In such a fashion were
the redeeming features of socialism ultimately subverted by terrorism.
Lenin's successor would elevate that practice to such a level that
Stalinism became "the enduring legacy of Leninism," as one perceptive
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student of Soviet culture, Zbigniew Brzezinski, defined it.25 Whereas
Lenin had rationalized the development of totalitarianism by the mere
presence of capitalist enemies at home and abroad, Stalin extended its
application to all opponents, perceived and real. In his mentor's col-
lected works, one sentence most assuredly caught his eye: "The sci-
entific concept of dictatorship means nothing other than unlimited
government unrestrained by any law ... [and] supporting itself directly
by force." 26 One might imagine Stalin closing the book, rubbing his
hands together, and exclaiming through tobacco-stained teeth in his
Georgian-accented Rusian: "Harasho [good]!"
Into the maelstrom of collective Soviet insecurity, then, dropped
one who was already paranoid in his own right. Habitually mistreated as
a youth by his drunken father, blighted with a withered left arm that
paradoxically compelled him to strong-arm his opponents, having
chafed under the yoke of inquisitors and monks at the seminary he once
attended (not to mention the oppression of his Georgian people by
previous Czarist regimes), Josef Stalin was a physically and emotionally
deprived captive of his past. If Soviet leadership in general has been aptly
characterized as having "unconsciously identified" with past Russian
tyrants, Stalin in particular had just as unconsciously "identified with
aggressors" (or so one psychohistorian has argued), among them, past
czars who had thrown off institutional restraints and behaved as out-
laws and autocrats in their own right.27 When employed against pu-
nitive authority figures, identifying with aggressors is not in itself
pathologic. Yet when projected against innocent persons, the practice
becomes pathologic in a very real sense. Both before and after the war,
Stalin was guilty on all counts. (It did not pass unnoticed by his infre-
quent visitors in later years that a portrait of Ivan the Terrible graced the
wall over his desk. Yet the paranoid premier had exercised the worst
excesses of his identified benefactor long before consulting his interior
decorator).
As the first writer to explore Stalin's "heart of darkness" systemati-
cally, Gustav Bychowski compared the rise of Stalin to what occurs in
primitive societies, in which the other sons of a past venerated leader
are eliminated one by one by the most cunning and powerful among
them.28 The motivation is simple: the would-be new father figure fears
retaliation. Once all pretenders are eliminated, subordinates ingratiate
themselves with ostensible loyalty to the survivor, who then becomes
the idealized leader in his own right. Yet the anger of suppressed hos-
tility always remains. To protect himself, the idealized leader creates
powerful safeguards. In primitive societies, restrictive taboos suffice;
in a modem totalitarian stage, they include terrorism and subterfuge
through the secret police.
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Stalin subconsciously followed this hypothetical construct to the
letter. He had to-for even Lenin mistrusted the Georgian Bear from the
beginning, as well he should have. A loyal cadre of spies infiltrated
Lenin's administration, Stalin's wife among them: while serving as
Lenin's secretary, she acted as a double agent on her husband's behalf.29
After Lenin's death Stalin proceeded to eliminate his potential opposi-
tion in a timely fashion through numerous purges. And some of those
directly involved in drawing up lists of their comrades to be executed
continued to sit on the Politburo even after their wives had already been
carted off, on Stalin's orders, to forced labor camps.3D
Lenin's death from cerebrovascular disease in 1924 rekindled a
Stalin-Trotsky feud that had been smoldering since 1918. Lenin's biog-
rapher Louis Fischer asserts that the Moscow purge trials of the 1930s,
which cost the country its top leaders, were in reality "trials" of Trot-
sky, reflecting Stalin's paranoid vendetta against his exiled archrival.
Nor can one ignore the impact of that on state policy, leading to the
premature implementation of industrialization and collectivization
that resulted in famine for millions.31
This is all to underscore what one modern psychiatrist was driving
at when he observed that "paranoia is the most political of all mental
illnesses." Should the victim happen to rule in a totalitarian state, and
hence not be constrained by the political system he dominates, then the
consequences not only for his enemies (perceived or real) but for the
state can be enormous.32 Ironically, the system itself may both contrib-
ute to the evolution of paranoia and obscure its presence, particularly in
closed societies such as existed in Russia long before Josef Stalin ever
came to power.
Having left the seminary to follow Lenin along the road toward a
future Bolshevik revolution, Stalin reentered a society rife with conspir-
acy, intrigue, and paranoia that had epitomized the czarist state since
the turn of the century. The eminent psychiatrist and founder of Rus-
sian neurology, Mikhailovich Bekhtenev, dared to diagnose this un-
healthy state of affairs as early as 1897 with a stinging social critique. He
likened the Russian people to a "distinct personality" that was being
"systematically repressed, ... gasping for air in the vise of arbitrary
despotism as dark and suffocating as a dungeon." 33 Just such an op-
pressive environment not only reflected but magnified Stalin's life view
and suspicions.
With the substitution of one authoritarian system for another,
Soviet society under Stalin became more closed than ever. Hence,
perhaps, the collective torpor that permitted its suffering millions to
ignore these increasing manifestations of Stalin's suspicious nature. Dr.
Jerrold Post has described their predicament succinctly enough: "In the
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1930s, Stalin's suspiciousness mounted to a degree that would have
warranted a diagnosis of 'paranoid personality disorder' in an open
society. Yet the question of pathology was masked by the conspiratorial
environment in which he lived and to which he contributed." 34
In fact, that diagnosis had been made in Russia long before-though
never divulged in Stalin's lifetime-by none other than Mikhailovich
Bekhtenev. As early as 1927, this preeminent psychoneurological au-
thority was called to the Kremlin by Stalin himself to treat the premier's
depression. What Bekhtenev encountered was a man enslaved by irre-
pressible fears. That was enough for the improvident doctor to render, at
once, both a diagnosis of "grave paranoia" for Stalin and a death warrant
for himself. Bekhtenev never left the Kremlin. He died the same day,
poisoned by the hand of his own patient.3s
Even Stalin's wife fell victim to her husband's paranoia in the end.
Rather than confront Stalin with reports of widespread famine in the
South, Nadezhda Alliluyeva surreptitiously traveled there herself to
investigate and presented her report without her husband's consent to
the Central Committee of the Party. Stalin's fury over her meddling in
Party affairs was further inflamed by Nedezhda's rebuke for his involve-
ment in the shooting death of nine of her fellow students at the Com-
mercial Institute outside the Kremlin. In a fit of rage, Stalin shot his wife
on November 21,1932, according to the nurse of one Dr. Pletnev, who
had been Stalin's physician in attendance during the 1930s. That crime
of impassioned paranoia was enough to trigger some later uncharac-
teristic remorse on Stalin's part, for Nedezhda was the only person he
had ever loved. Yet remorse did not sit well with Josef Stalin, nor was it
enough to divert this disturbed man from completing what had to be
done in its aftermath. He later brought Pletnev to trial on trumped-up
charges, along with other physicians who had knowledge of the crime,
and executed them as wel1.36
Recalling the psychoanalyst's dictum that the projection of aggres-
sion onto one's opponents becomes truly pathologic only when it is
directed at friends, siblings, spouses, and other undeserving persons, we
can see how truly pathological Stalin became at a very early stage. He
personally shot his one-time best friend, Avely Yenukidze, who was
secretary of the Central Executive Committee at the time and a close
friend of Stalin's wife. A son by his first marriage was discovered in 1941
to be a prisoner of the Germans; for reasons that still defy explanation,
Stalin ordered his agents to find the boy and kill him. Then there was the
fate of one Liza Kazanova, with whom Stalin had carried on a passionate
love affair after the death of his wife. Ridding himself of her fiance by
having him deported to a gulag was not enough to satisfy Stalin's morbid
obsessions; he later had Liza gang-raped by four OGPU thugs and
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thereafter arrested his former lover and sent her to prison, where she
mysteriously disappeared.37
Naturally, Stalin reserved most of his unbridled aggression for his
political opponents. The murder of Trotsky and countless others aside,
the assassination of Maxim Gorky is perhaps the most celebrated exam-
ple of his pathologic excess. Hero of the poor, the oppressed, and the
forgotten in Soviet society of Stalin's day, Gorky was a thorn in the
hypersensitive side of the Georgian Bear. Accordingly, Stalin had the
writer strangled in his own apartment. To cover the tracks of blood
running straight to the Kremlin's door, the assassin himself was elimi-
nated, as was Gorky's doctor, who had been entrusted with his patient's
papers and diaries before the assassination. Three other witnesses to the
crime also disappeared, as did Gorky's manuscripts-but not before he
had inscribed his own epitaph memorializing a self-fulfilling prophecy:
"All you Russians are still savages," he had charged. "Evidently killing
is easier than persuasion [for the Communist hierarchy)." 38
Bychowski's linking of Soviet behavior to that found in primitive
societies also explains much of the projection of aggression onto hostile
outside forces-and brings us back full circle to the origins of the Cold
War. In theory, the latent hostility of rebellious sons (read, Kremlin
subordinates) frequently breaks through in a form of what the psycho-
analyst calls "paranoid projection." Too unsure of their own strength to
take on the substitute father who has become an idolized leader, they
tum on one another or, more acceptable still, on their past oppressors,
perceived and real. In practice, this led to a singular result in Soviet
Russia. Not that the merging of international Bolshevism with Russian
nationalism (that is, the fusion of a revolutionary ideology with nation-
alist sentiments) was unique; similar circumstances had arisen before
in history. What imbued the Russo-Soviet blend with an insidious
persecution complex in the 1920s and 1930s was that both were break-
ing out from perceived repression.39 Hence the hatred and suspicion of
all foreigners forged with the sickle and hammer of ideology on the anvil
of past historical conflicts. That this fusion was solidified by one who
was already paranoid in his own right assured a morbid intransigence in
postwar diplomacy.
Psychoanalysts have pointed out that the war itself only contrib-
uted to Stalin's paranoia. Some have gone so far as to call him a pro-
totypical "warfare personality," suggesting that he possessed paranoid
characteristics unique to such individuals.40 That simply was not the
case; rather, Stalin's complete life history affirms that the exigencies of
war merely augmented a personality disorder already well entrenched.
That said, it would come as no surprise that imperialism after the war
was justified in Stalin's eyes by a few paranoid projections of his own-
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the fear of Western encirclement among them. Wrestling in the diplo-
matic arena with capitalism became a singular obsession. George Ken-
nan, for one, underscored this and fingered the paranoid premier as its
source: "Stalin sees the world only through the prism of his own am-
bitions and his own fears." Given the depth of his obsessions by 1948,
the pathographer might justifiably transpose the word "prison" for
"prism," for Stalin was enslaved by his compulsion for self-preserva-
tion, as Kennan had made clear: "His fundamental motive was the
protection of his position.... This is the key to his diplomacy." 41
Not that the United States was in any mood to salve Stalin's wounds
or assuage his paranoia-Harry Truman least of all. "If the Russians [do]
not wish to join us," he once warned his advisers in typical Trumanese,
"they [can] go to hell." 42 It was precisely this mindset and some of the
activities it engendered that made the United States an accessory to the
division of Europe at war's end. In that respect, the revisionist argument
may have more merit than the traditionalist has been willing to ac-
knowledge.
Truman's secretary of war, Henry L. Stimson, himself a classical
balance-of-power advocate, spoke to deaf presidential ears when he told
his superior that "the Russians [are] perhaps being more realistic than
we [are] in regard to their own security." To Stimson's way of thinking,
accepting the spheres-of-influence doctrine represented a rational alter-
native to "a head-on collision." As for George F. Kennan, he was just as
out of step with his president in supporting a "prompt and clear recogni-
tion of the divisions of Europe into spheres of influence," arguing that
nothing could be done to alter the course of events in Eastern Europe.43
Acknowledging Stalin's paranoia as he did, Kennan was being entirely
consistent with what his 'observations of the man told him.
The often maligned Henry A. Wallace agreed, perceiving the situa-
tion as analogous to James Monroe's hallowed doctrine, which isola-
tionist America had long before embraced: "We have no more business
in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political
affairs of Latin America." 44 Nor should we forget (as Stalin most as-
suredly did not) that Churchill had for some time been more tolerant of
spheres-of-influence preoccupations than his American allies. Long
before war's end Churchill had proposed that, with the impending
liberation of the Balkans, Russia should run things in Rumania and
Bulgaria in exchange for British control in Greece.
It was only natural, then, for a person with Stalin's psychological
profile to believe that America was his mortal enemy. The paranoid pre-
mier did not have long to wait to see his suspicions confirmed. In Janu-
ary 1945 the Russians asked the United States for a six-billion-dollar
credit for postwar reconstruction. That request was reported to have
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been inadvertently mislaid in the State Department, a circumstance
that even the least paranoid of the Soviet leadership had difficulty
believing. This was followed in May 1945 by the abrupt termination of
lend-lease shipments to Russia. Describing the manner in which they
were terminated as "brutal," Stalin was equally mortified to learn that
reparations from Western Germany would be delayed. When that issue
had arisen at Yalta, Roosevelt deferred any definitive consideration of
amounts to be paid to his ally. Schlesinger spoke for traditionalist and
revisionist alike, then, in observing that the "Russian hope for major
Western assistance ... foundered on three events which the Kremlin
could well have interpreted respectively as deliberate sabotage (the loan
request), blackmail (lend-lease cancellation) and pro-Germanism {rep-
arations)."45 The Kremlin could have believed this-and a paranoid
Josef Stalin obviously did.
All the more unbearable was his realization that by 1948 the United
States was generating one half of the world's industrial output-not to
mention its possession of the atom bomb, which was guaranteed to im-
press even the most psychologically stable Kremlin power brokers. At
this juncture in history, Harry Truman was speaking none too softly and
carrying big sticks loaded with bangs and bucks. As might be antici-
pated in such Machiavellian times, the realists accepted that the United
States would use its formidable power to best advantage, whether as a
diplomatic tool to forge agreements or as a weapon to compel com-
pliance.46 Stalin characteristically assumed the worst, as paranoics are
wont to do. He reacted as if these Western-style cattle prods were being
used to gore the hind parts of the Russian Bear where, as presumably
existed behind the Iron Curtain, the sun never shone.
After all, Stalin had his own opinions of Western leaders, which
Harry Truman's machinations hardly dispelled. "Churchill is the kind
who, if you don't watch him, will slip a kopeck out of your pocket," the
premier charged. "Roosevelt is not like that. He digs in his hand for
bigger coins."47 Presumably Truman had in mind robbing the bank
with an eye to mortgaging Russia's future security-or so Stalin per-
ceived the situation as his paranoia accelerated to alarming levels after
the war.
Obviously, then, there is nothing new to be said about the Soviet
premier's paranoia or the psychoanalytical theses that sustain it. If any
contribution is to be made by subsequent writers, it remains to define
the physiologic context within which this condition became pervasive.
And here the medical record has much to tell us. One investigator who
spent a lifetime studying this engimatic personality struck to the heart
of the matter: "In the period after the Second World War, Stalin's
inappropriate accusations of treason and morbid suspiciousness ...
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suggested a pathology associated with the process of aging and his
increasing sense of isolation." 48
To begin with, Josef Stalin was a very sick man by 1945. For years he
had suffered from recurrent heart trouble aggravated by high blood
pressure. Rumor had it that he had suffered a mild heart attack just prior
to the Potsdam Conference.49 How high his blood pressure was at the
time is uncertain, but the results of Stalin's later autopsy in 1953 attest
to the severity of that underlying condition. Like Franklin D. Roosevelt
eight years before, he died of a massive hemorrhage in the left side of his
brain.50 Far and away the most common cause of such hemorrhagic
strokes in an individual seventy-three years old is poorly controlled
hypertension.
Long-standing high blood pressure also leads to' heart failure. As
Stalin's autopsy report makes clear, hypertension had contributed to
"arteriosclerotic modifications of particularly important vessels in the
brain's arteries," as well as "considerable hypertonic disturbances of the
left ventricle of the heart." 51 In lay terms, the Soviet premier suffered
from hardening of the arteries to his brain and an enlarged heart, both
the results of accelerated hypertension. Though no mention of a stroke
appears in the medical record prior to his demise, Stalin had experienced
at least one transient disturbance of blood flow to his brain's speech
center as early as 1937. Again, far and away the most prevalent cause of
such stroke warnings is either poorly controlled hypertension or athe-
rosclerotic cerebrovascular disease. That would come as no surprise to
Stalin's pathographers; we now know that both conditions had already
reached life-threatening levels fully fifteen years before his death-
more than adequate confirmation of the severity of his underlying
hypertension.52
So much for the physical aspects of Stalin's health after 1945. How
might hypertension and atherosclerosis have contributed to his psycho-
logical deterioration? In fact, both diseases adversely affect brain func-
tion; in particular, they can change the way the victim behaves. As one
biographer assessed Stalin's increasingly bizarre conduct during this
period: "Apart from its physical effects, illness seems to have caused
some change in personality.... He was prone to bouts of irrational
anger and ... appeared increasingly suspicious of those about him. In
this he exhibited some symptoms of paranoia." 53 That indictment was
not unfounded. Stalin was once reported to have interrupted a meal
with his Kremlin colleagues to stare icily at a senior official, only to ask:
"Why are you looking at me like that?" On another occasion, Nikita
Khrushchev recalled, his mentor reproached him in a Party meeting for
failing to look him in the eye.54 Such behavior is typical of paranoics,
who are always searching for clues to substantiate their suspicions.
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Any physician familiar with Stalin's underlying physical deteriora-
tion might have understood at least in a subjective sense what sub-
sequent medical data have confirmed as an objective effect of long-
standing hypertension and atherosclerosis on brain function: premature
aging of the brain. That alone is often accompanied by unwarranted
suspicion and paranoia as the victim struggles to remain in control. In
someone who is already paranoid to begin with, these qualities may be
magnified tenfold. What cat'ches the pathographer's eye is the per-
vasiveness of this behavior on Stalin's part after the war and until his
death in 1953.
Though Stalin's paranoia has recently been described by one Rus-
sian psychiatrist as having been"cyclical," 55 it ultimately became a
permanent fixture in his personality. Marshal Zhukov believed that
Stalin himself was aware of this, but only as late as 1946, when he
readily admitted to "living in fear" of his own shadow.56 That was
perhaps Stalin's last recorded bit of self-revelation. From that point
forward, in fact, several associates would describe him in private as
bordering on the senile-a circumstance that can now be directly at-
tributed to his hypertensive cerebrovascular disease. Indeed, one psy-
chiatrist who has managed to disengage himself from the bondage of
psychoanalysis conclud~d that"age and cerebroarteriosclerosis moved
[Stalin] along the continuum from paranoid suspiciousness to full-
blown paranoia." 5 7
Senile individuals often assault or harangue members of their own
families or close associates, whether or not they harbored paranoid
tendencies before the onset of their deterioration. In Stalin, this be-
havior accelerated after the war-as would be anticipated with the
passage of years. His daughter Svetlana recalled one such event in 1947
during a dinner with the Politburo. Silence terrified Stalin, and on that
occasion Andre Zhadanov was deemed responsible for contributing to
it. "Look at him," Stalin angrily exclaimed to the others, "sitting there
like Christ, as if nothing was of any concern to him." Zhadanov, himself
quite ill and aware of his superior's penchant toward vengeance, grew
pale, and beads of perspiration stood out on his forehead. Everyone fell
silent out of fear of both Stalin's wrath and the possibility that Zhada-
nov might have a heart attack under the duress.58 Such outbursts,
which occurred time and again, were entirely consistent with the dis-
ease that drove him; the hypervigilant paranoic characteristically ex-
presses disdain for the weak, sickly, or defective.59
Meals always seemed to bring out the worst of Stalin's paranoia.
According to Khrushchev, he was forever looking for hemlock in every
chalice. Stalin always had others taste the dishes first, though every-
thing served at the table had already been tested by Kremlin analysts.
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"Look, here are the giblets, Nikita," he would say. "Have you tried
them?" If such rudimentary activities as eating disturbed the morbidly
suspicious premier, going out in public absolutely terrified him. Travel-
ing in a motorcade of five identical cars wherever he went, Stalin would
invariably have the order of the cars changed to foil possible assassina-
tion attempts. He never felt safe even in his own home, where security
was at a premium. Only carefully screened servants had access to his
dacha, and none was allowed to become accustomed to his routine.
Changes of the guard took on an air of interminably tevolving doors-
doors that were armored, bolted from the inside, and activated by
remote control. No one ever knew until the last moment where Stalin
would sleep. He had four identical rooms to choose from, their windows
blocked by slabs of reinforced concrete, and would bed down unan-
nounced in anyone of the four with a loaded revolver under his pillow.60
To the very end, Stalin lived in total isolation with his fears.
Physicians today would characterize such obsessions as being
grounded in a disease-induced paranoic state: "Once such character
defenses as rigid thinking and unwarranted discretion fail to protect the
individual from his deepest anxieties, persecutory symptoms emerge as
a means by which the personality defends against fears of death and
impending loss of functions and satisfactions." 61 So why, one might
ask, did Stalin's physicians fail to recognize what their empirical obser-
vations should have made clear all along? The fact is that no doctor was
close enough to the premier to establish an effective patient-physician
relationship, for Stalin's paranoia extended to those entrusted with his
health. Any doctor who had been allowed the chance was inevitably
dismissed on trumped-up charges, and the closest of all were executed,
just as Pletnev, Bekhtenev, and others had been.62 His daughter, for one,
believed that Stalin's self-imposed isolation from the medical profes-
sion shortened his life.63 It also increased his paranoia.
A few writers have suggested that there must have been something
in his doctors' conduct for Stalin to have so distrusted traditional
medicine; why else would he have banished them when he needed their
skills the most? The answer lies in the premier's morbid preoccupation
with controlling his environment. Any individual who potentially held
sway over his physical well-being was a part of that. One doctor's "plot"
after another was uncovered at Stalin's behest, yet there is no evidence
to support that any were plotting to do away with their feared patient-
who nevertheless continued to believe otherwise. As late as 1953, Prav-
da reported that Stalin had uncovered yet another sinister medical
conspiracy. Nine physicians in all were blacklisted, and only Stalin's
death saved them from the fate of their p,edecessors.64
In the final analysis, Stalin's paranoia on all matters-from security
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and eating to medicine and diplomacy-was only accentuated by his
failing health. As his trusted adviser Milovan Djilas perceived as early as
1948: "He seemed to be failing fast.... When I last saw him in 1945, he
was still lively, quick-witted, and had a pointed sense of humor. Now he
laughs at inanities and shallow jokes." More distressing still, Stalin's
abstract thinking suffered in kind, as Djilas testified: "On one occasion
he not only failed to get the political point of an anecdote I had told him
in which he outsmarted Churchill and Roosevelt, but I had the impres-
sion that he was offended, in the manner of old men." 65
Despite his lack of medical training, Djilas was a more astute
diagnostician than he realized. Aging frequently unmasks the underly-
ing flaws in a person's character. Should he or she also be in poor health
and relatively isolated, such traits are exhibited in bold relief as the
temperamental fuse shortens and adaptability disappears. One medical
authority adds that such individuals become "conspicuously more ped-
antic, self-righteous, petulant ... irascible, suspicious and with-
drawn."66 The morbid accentuation of Stalin's lifelong paranoia and
later self-imposed isolation related in the end as much to physiologic
compromise as to political considerations.
Before examining further the impact of aging on Stalin's paranoid
state of mind, I should make clear that I am not using the term "para-
noid" in only a descriptive sense with reference to Stalin's personality.
Obviously, every one of us has paranoid moments. For the most part,
however, we manage to disavow our suspicions when presented with a
reasonable explanation. The true paranoic, in contrast, will turn defen-
sive and even hostile. When such behavior becomes pervasive (that is,
pathological), it most often reflects one of three underlying conditions:
schizophrenia, a manic-depressive disorder, or dementia. In Stalin's
case, recent evidence suggests that the last of these conditions trans-
formed what some have described as paranoid tendencies into a truly
pathological state. To argue that point requires knowing something of
both dementia and paranoia as contemporary investigators have defined
them.
From the strictly medical standpoint, pure paranoia is characterized
by persecutory delusions that cannot be explained by other psychiatric
disorders. As opposed to those of schizophrenia or manic-depression,
these delusions are generally well developed and systematized logically.
Stated another way, the essential feature of paranoia is a permanent and
unshakable delusional system accompanied by the preservation of clear
and orderly thinking.67 This also differentiates de novo paranoia from
that which frequently accompanies an organic brain syndrome, in
which loss of memory, disorientation, and impaired judgment. and
impulse control are also manifest.68 This is not to say, however, that
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dementia cannot exacerbate an underlying paranoid state. And that, the
record suggests, is precisely what happened to Josef Stalin some five
years before he died.
Once having eliminated other psychiatric diseases, and in order to
substantiate a diagnosis of pure paranoia, the suspect must fulfill sev-
eral specific criteria, among them an unwarranted distrust of others,
hypersensitivity, and stifled emotions.69 Few of history's leaders better
fit both the general character of the paranoid personality and its specific
criteria than did Josef Stalin. As has already been suggested, his child-
hood had much to do with that. Many paranoics are victims of physical
beatings or mental cruelty, as was Stalin, and their parents are described
as distant, rigid, sadistic, or weak and ineffectual-all attributes shared
by his father. If parental figures cannot be relied upon to help deal with
humiliations and frustrations, the child tends to perceive the entire
environment as hostile and become hypersensitive to imagined slights.
Consumed with anger and hostility, and unable to face responsibility
for their rage, paranoics both project their resentment and anger onto
others and protect themselves from further rejection by turning their
positive feelings into negative ones.70
Projection comes into play in other ways. Intolerant of criticism,
they criticize others. Overaggressive themselves, paranoics see imag-
ined aggressors in everyone around them. They sublimate feelings of
inferiority with delusions of superiority, grandiosity, and omnipo-
tence-part of an elaborate system of fantasies that they embrace to
bolster their self-esteem. It is also of interest that paranoia is more
prevalent among minority and immigrant groups.71 After all, Josef
Stalin was a Georgian among the Russian ruling class.
Yet a deprived childhood alone does not assure a priori that a
paranoid personality disorder will emerge. Environmental influences
outside the home may assist in its development. Psychiatrists have
identified at least seven situations that may be contributory: (1) antic-
ipation of receiving sadistic treatmentj (2) situations that increase dis-
trust and suspicionj (3) social isolationj (4) predicaments that increase
envy and jealousYj (5) affronts that lower one's self-esteemj (6) circum-
stances that cause the individual to see his or her own sublimated
defects in othersj and (7) situations that lead to ruminating over hidden
meanings and motivations. 72 From these perspectives it is readily ap-
parent how Stalin's childhood predispositions toward the development
of overt paranoia were only augmented by what he himself later ac-
knowledged to be a distressing postwar situation-even before the
physiologically induced hardening of such attitudes that his hyperten-
sive brain disease would ultimately assure. Grievous Soviet losses dur-
ing the war, the threat of capitalistic encirclement by the West, and the
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less than sympathetic u.s. attitude toward his spheres-of-influence
preoccupations all contributed to an acceleration of Stalin's paranoia at
war's end.
When frustration from any combination of perceived slights ex-
ceeds the limits that the paranoid personality can tolerate, the victim
becomes anxious and withdrawn. So do leaders faced with predicaments
that they have difficulty understanding, particularly if they have lim-
ited resources to effect a change: "They realize something is wrong, but
cannot explain it." 73 The formation of a "delusional system" offers a
solution to the problem. That is precisely the answer Stalin subcon-
sciously embraced vis-a-vis Eastern Europe and the West.
Such sufferers begin by attributing malicious intent to others' ac-
tions. In the diplomatic environment the intentions of allied nations
turned adversaries may be similarly misread, just as Stalin failed to
acknowledge that the termination of lend-lease applied not uniquely to
the Soviet Union but to other nations as well, such as Great Britain.
Eventually, they see these perceived adversaries as organized into a
community of plotters, much as Stalin came to view the West as a
monolithic bloc engaging in an active conspiracy against the U.S.S.R.
Finally, they react to these threats, both real and imaginary.74 Hence
Stalin's perception that U.S. interference in Polish affairs, the an-
nouncement of the Truman Doctrine, and the implementation of the
Marshall Plan were nothing more than all-out attempts at quarantining
the Soviet Union. One psychiatrist has labeled the evolution of this
delusional system as a "pseudocommunity" with which paranoics bind
together their projected fears and justify their own aggression toward
some tangible target they have previously been unable to identify.75
That was but one reason why the West became the feared Soviet bogey-
man in the immediate postwar era.
A hypervigilant if not paranoid approach may also prove to be a
highly adaptive style with which to relate to one's potential enemies-
particularly during periods of social disruption such as war. Moreover,
preoccupation with small details and incessant questioning lend cre-
dence to paranoics' reputation for being businesslike and astute. Their
speech is both goal directed and logical, even if some of their premises
are manifestly false. 76 They would like others to believe that they are
convincing and in control, simply because control of their environment
is essential to their well-being. That is why a delusional system be-
comes paradoxically therapeutic.
Whether one chooses to embrace Bychowski's hypothetical con-
struct relating paranoia to primitive societies or feels more comfortable
with theories of "delusional systems" or "pseudocommunities," few
can deny that Stalin epitomized what would be identified today as a
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classic paranoid personality. Tho'ugh that condition in its early stages is
said to be distinct from such causes for paranoia as an evolving organic
brain syndrome, the two in time may become interdependent. It was
precisely the union of the two after 1945, with Stalin's rapidly accelerat-
ing hypertensive cerebrovascular disease, that contributed to his unpre-
dictable and at times potentially explosive behavior.
In both a literal and a figurative sense, refractory high blood pressure
lay at the heart of Josef Stalin's deterioration. Yet the impact of that
disease process on his brain has failed to capture the attention of his-
torians and psychoanalysts alike. Long-standing hypertension causes
premature aging-and aging, in the end, magnifies character. Less re-
silient to change, the elderly become caricatures of themselves over
time. It is within this context that such a one-time admirer as Djilas
could have become so disillusioned with Stalin's increasing paranoia
that he believed his leader was "bordering on the senile." As if to
solidify the case, Khrushchev drew attention to Stalin's rapidly failing
memory after the war. Now unable to recall the names even of some of
his closest associates, Stalin invariably became "very much unnerved"
when such slips of memory occurred. Above all, his increasing vulgarity
of speech and manners, "the primitive rudeness of his behavior,"
marked him as a rapidly aging man.77
Prone to excess in everything he did, the rapidly aging premier's
morbid obsessions were given such free reign that it was difficult for
him to assign anything but the most vile and base motives to Western
activity in postwar Europe. While his own doctor (before an untimely
death at the hand of his feared patient) had already perceived Stalin as a
"victim of mania of grandeur and persecution" long before the outbreak
of World War 11,78 a few of his later physicians may have recognized that
the premier's increasingly compromised health thereafter had much to
do with this deterioration in his character. Yet few survived to offer an
opinion. That is why Bychowski, as a layman, can be forgiven for failing
to acknowledge that underlying disease accounted, in part, for this
transformation. As he himself put it: "I am not aware of any new
material that might significantly add to an understanding [of Stalin's
personality]." 79 As for Cold War diplomacy itself, the genesis of that
personality proved to be not nearly so relevant as its accentuation, the
result of hypertension on the aging process as Josef Stalin's biologic
clock began to run down.
In time, new information did surface, most notably in the diaries of
N. Romano-Petrova and the revelations of Stalin's daughter.8o Khrush-
chev bared the facts to the entire world in his celebrated"secret" speech
of 1956, which, for all its self-serving motivations, only confirmed the
suspicions of Bychowski and others. "Everywhere and in everything,"
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Khrushchev recalled, "Stalin saw 'enemies,' 'double-dealers and spies.'
... The negative characteristics of his [personality] developed steadily
and during the last years acquired an absolutely insufferable character."
Above all, he had become "capricious, irritable and brutal. II What
Khrushchev concluded to be a "persecution mania" reached "unbe-
lievable dimensions" before Stalin died.81 For his part, Bychowski had
been perceptive enough to describe his premier as early as 1948 as "a
criminal paranoic of the type described by the French classic school
of psychiatry-the 'persecuted persecutor.' II 82 If both Bychowski and
Khrushchev were at least descriptively correct, they still lacked enough
medical information to implicate an underlying disease that magnified
the pSYGhiatric condition they had identified so well.
This is all to say that until the release of Stalin's autopsy report the
medical record was unknown and that subsequently (with one notable
exception)83 no physician has sought to link its findings to Stalin's
personality. Tying physical health to psychiatric disease is long over-
due, not only when specifically applied to Stalin but as it applies to
leaders in general, for hypertension and aging share with virtually all
afflictions the dubious distinction of transcending national boundaries.
Just as certain tragic elements of Woodrow Wilson's character can be
shown to have sharpened under the duress of hypertension and cere-
brovascular disease in the aftermath of the first world war,84 a percep-
tible accentuation of the worst aspects of Josef Stalin's personality
became apparent, in part, as a result of the same at the close of the
second. Though both leaders were on the winning side of wars that were
truly international in scope, they were losing very personal battles at
home to an identical disease.
The irony is compounded by the realization that Stalin's ally-in-
arms, Franklin D. Roosevelt, lost his own individual struggle on the
same account; had he not, subsequent u.S. history might well have
been different. Schlesinger has highlighted the lasting significance of
FDR's death at such a pivotal time: "Roosevelt retained a certain capac-
ity to influence Stalin to the end.... It is in this way that the death of
Roosevelt was crucial-not in the vulgar sense that his policy was then
reversed by his successor, which did not happen, but in the sense that no
other American could hope to have the restraining impact on Stalin
which Roosevelt might for a while have had." 85
Little wonder that revisionist historians who have already taken
offense at the more traditional views of the emerging Cold War that
Schlesinger and others have presented may have difficulty accepting a
new thesis that seems to smack of medical reductionism. Yet some
extrapolation might help to reconcile the two disparate views. Whereas
some revisionists have argued that the United States used its superior
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status as a "weapon" to compel compliance with American positions,86
the medical record may add to our understanding as to why, at least in
part, Josef Stalin responded to the challenge as he did. Beyond a doubt,
more than a few American diplomatic maneuvers were responsible for
triggering some reprehensible Soviet actions. If it is also true that
Truman's foreign policy was often "haughty, expansionist, and uncom-
promising," the question remains as to just how "flexible" Soviet policy
was in the immediate postwar years: whereas some revisionists assert
that Truman "failed to orient eastern Europe toward the United
States,"87 it now seems obvious that Stalin forbade that region the
chance to become so oriented.
If it might also be argued that American diplomacy was "self-
consciously expansionist," 88 none perc.eived this more than Josef Sta-
lin. By 1945, that perception and others were distorted by more than
their fair share of paranoia in all matters, however aggressive U.S.
intentions proved to be. In that sense, the traditionalist perhaps had the
final word, at least insofar as the neurologist or psychiatrist has come to
understand the Georgian Bear. As Schlesinger points out: "A revisionist
fallacy has been to treat Stalin as just another Realpolitik statesman, as
Second World War revisionists see Hitler as just another Stresemann or
Bismarck. But the record makes it clear that in the end nothing could
satisfy Stalin's paranoia." 89
Whether or not the Cold War was truly unpreventable hinges on
much larger and weightier issues than a medically oriented thesis can
hope to address. Yet there is more than an element of truth in the
assertion that any analysis leaving out past Russian history, the intran-
sigence of Leninist ideology, the sinister dynamics of a totalitarian
society, and the madness of Stalin is obviously incomplete. It has been
the intent of this study to define his "madness" in a less perjorative and
more medically precise sense. For the neurotic premier was not al-
together mad, nor-for all the manifest changes in his personality-was
he overtly senile. Yet Josef Stalin was most assuredly paranoid. And that
quality, arguably accentuated by hypertension and artherosclerosis,
imbued the divisions that separated the two former allies with what one
scholar termed the "apocalyptic potentiality" that we all lived with
throughout the Cold War.90
CHAPTERS
Woodrow Wilson:
Paralyzed Prophet
Perhaps the lingering nightmare of the Cold War (and most assuredly
the hot one that preceded it) had its origins in both irony and tragedy as
early as 1920, once the United States Senate had failed to ratify the
Versailles Treaty ending World War I. Ironic, because this was precisely
the period when Bolshevism, intoxicated by a recent revolution that
effectively removed Russia from the war, turned its back on Europe and
its attention toward the motherland, intent upon consolidating its
tenuous gains. And tragic, because America had just as effectively
removed itself from the game of governance in world affairs by rejecting
entry into the League of Nations. True, events in Russia were probably
well beyond the reach of the victorious, if beleaguered and exhausted,
Allies-with or without Woodrow Wilson's cherished League. Yet the
tragedy remains that these two slumbering leviathans on the world
stage left Europe to fend for itself during an era that would shortly usher
in yet another unstable dictator.
What also marked that misguided turn of events with pathos was
Wilson's self-defeating behavior during the Senate deliberations, which
left his reputation in question and his New World Order in shambles.
For Wilson had the most important political and diplomatic victory of
his career at his fingertips, had he but chosen to accommodate those
senators who favored ratification of the treaty with reservations. That
much is unassailable history.
If some writers have already offered compelling psychological rea-
sons for Wilson's refusal to yield, subsequent revelations in the medical
record compel a second opinion as to why poor health dictated his
behavior, at least in part. l That the same three words-irony, tragedy,
and pathos-time and again characterized Wilson's last two years in
office is agreed to by all. And each devolved from the stricken president
himself, whose character has been rigorously dissected by psycho-
analytically inclined scholars. The best among them, Alexander and
Juliette George, published a landmark work in 1956 depicting Wilson as
96 BRAIN FAILURE AT THE TOP
a man forever struggling with inner conflicts that arose from his child-
hood, largely at the hand of a strict, if well-intentioned, father. 2
To date, few have taken exception to their engaging thesis, defended
as it was with felicitous detail at a time when psychohistory was
maturing into an accepted discipline. One who did, however, happened
to be the recognized doyen of Wilson scholarship, Arthur S. Link of
Princeton University. And for good reason. As the Georges themselves
acknowledge in their revised edition of Woodrow Wilson and Colonel
House, a sizable portion of critical materials being edited for the Wilson
Papers had remained unexamined by them when their book had first
went to press.3 Adhering instead to Edwin Weinstein's view that a series
of strokes had more to do with Wilson's perplexing behavior than his
psychosocial background, Link was on solid footing that befit the wis-
dom of a scholar who had already painstakingly' reconstructed some
fifty-six volumes of primary Wilsonian sources.4
Subsequent publication of later sources has done nothing to weaken
Link's position. True, much of what the Georges and their allies have to
say provides a valuable framework upon which to reconstruct Wilson's
evolving character as he prematurely aged. Yet it is the pervasiveness
and depth of deterioration resulting from a diseased brain that marked
Wilson, in the end, as a tragically flawed leader. For this is precisely
what the primary sources from volumes 58 through 65 of the Wilson
Papers reveal in no uncertain terms. The complete record now affirms
that both his personal behavior and presidential conduct were adversely
affected by the inroads of a progressive illness that culminated with a
major stroke in 1919 at the height of the crisis.
To begin with, there is no longer any doubt that Wilson suffered
from severe hypertension long before he became president in 1913. That
this condition was hardly inconsequential is confirmed by the docu-
mentation of well-advanced vascular disease of his retina on that ac-
count as early as 1906. It would be overstating the case, however, to
accept one historian's assertion that "Wilson should never have been
nominated in 1912," given his "medical history of strokes and athe-
rosclerosis." 5 That ignores the president's formidable achievements
during his two terms in office-not to mention no such medical history
was known to anyone prior to 1912, much less accepted by all later
scholars. Psychologists and neurologists today, however, at least agree
that subtle deterioration of brain function occurring in the hypertensive
patient of long standing (with or without obvious strokes) can highlight
some less desirable attributes of the personality. This accounts in large
measure for why Wilson and the League of Nations both fell victim to
the most self-defeating elements of his character during a crucial period
in American history.
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To ignore the psychodynamics of the man as they were dictated, in
part, by childhood influences and dysfunctional relationships would do
a disservice to those who have so capably identified them. But those
alone have not been enough to explain why a man of Wilson's acknowl-
edged intellect and ability could himself later "destroy what he had
invested his lifeblood to create" in 1919.6 Recently published docu-
ments suggest that a catalyst added to his psychological ferment precip-
itated the destructive reaction. Hence the importance of reconstructing
Wilson's medical history. For it was precisely the disease-induced
blunting of his keen judgment and prodigious memory, on the one hand,
and an accentuation of his self-righteousness, intellectual arrogance,
and Calvinist life view, on the other, that ultimately unleashed the
"demons" goading Wilson.
Long before a relatively complete medical record of the president's
failing health was established retrospectively, a physician, Walter Freid-
lander, suggested that repetitive "small strokes" may have aggravated
some of Wilson's more unfortunate character traits. Those often seen in
such patients suffering from something called an "organic brain syn-
drome" included defective control of impulses and emotion. That led,
paradoxically, to a perverse magnification of his underlying personality.
If the barbs from his political opponents affected Wilson "as the prover-
bial red flag affects the proverbial bull," 7 it bears emphasizing that the
president's disease-induced egocentricity left him isolated in a treach-
erous political arena where he was ill suited to fend for either himself or
his cause.
Still other equally consequential (and controversial) issues have
clouded the last two years of Wilson's presidency. One involves the
matter of presidential disability and Dr. Cary Grayson's role in orches-
trating an alleged cover-up of his patient's final stroke. Some have
assumed that limited medical knowledge of the day precluded a precise
diagnosis. In light of recent revelations, that view is now untenable.
Others assert that Grayson was on solid ground in withholding informa-
tion for fear it might have been misinterpreted or prove politically
damaging for the president. This brings to mind the larger issue of
restricting the public's right to know and whether the nation's best
interests were served by so doing. That Wilson was impaired in the
medical sense and disabled in a constitutional sense-and that his
physician and closest associates knew it-is now a matter of record.
Both had singular implications for the Senate's rejection of the Ver-
sailles. Treaty and, ultimately, the fate of the League of Nations.
To pick up the story in the middle of its most important chapter,
Wilson had ventured to the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919,
tragically unaware of both his mortgaged future and that of the nation-
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state system he sought to reconstruct. Yet in the final analysis, his
tireless efforts there reflected little of the progressive neurologic deteri-
oration that would become so apparent during the following spring and
summer. That statement itself signifies a revision of previous accounts
(including my own) depicting a seriously ill president making numerous
concessions to the French premier, Georges Clemenceau, and thereby
compromising the treaty's legitimacy in the eyes of American oppo-
nents.8 To argue the point requires a proper understanding of Wilson's
underlying medical condition.
Once untreated hypertension reaches an accelerated phase, un-
toward effects on the body's blood vessels occur, such that retinal
hemorrhages and scarring appear, soon to be followed by intractable
headaches, congestive heart failure, renal insufficiency, and strokes.
The first manifestation of malignant hypertension was documented by
Wilson's opthalmologist six years before his patient assumed the presi-
dency. That thirteen further years of this untreated disorder would
eventually lead to overt multiple organ-system failure in 1919 should
come as no surprise.
To be sure, subtle alterations in brain function may occur long
before such physical changes appear. Recognizing their limitations,
victims revert to familiar themes and modes of behavior that served
them well in healthier times. That is to say, they become caricatures of
themselves, just as Wilson did during the latter half of his second term.
Yet like many patients with high blood pressure, he also appears to have
suffered a series of small strokes through the years on the basis of
hypertension's effects on small penetrating blood vessels deep within
the brain on both sides. That led to a perceptible degree of dementia as
defined retrospectively by specific medical criteria. These changes were
obvious to every medical observer following Wilson's severe, large-
vessel, atherosclerotically induced stroke in October 1919 but were
arguably manifest even before he ventured to Paris the preceding De-
cember.
Criteria for establishing a diagnosis of dementia, or organic brain
syndrome, include (1) cognitive changes that interfere with occupa-
tional or social obligations; (2) memory impairment; and (3) impaired
abstract thinking, faulty judgment, and behavioral aberrations.9 Bear in
mind that these changes do not occur overnight, nor are obvious strokes
required to account for them. In that sense, perhaps too much emphasis
has been placed on the postulated occurrence of the latter, their arguable
identification as lacunar infarcts notwithstanding. Io
Knowledgeable contemporary observers in fact believed that a sig-
nificant tum for the worse in Wilson's behavior was already apparent a
year and a half before the Paris Peace Conference. In August 1917 the
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president confided to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker that he was
becoming absentminded and his memory "leaky." A year later, Su-
preme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis bemoaned the fact that Wilson's
judgment was no longer infallible. Before that time, he had been a "bold
and imaginative leader"; now he was doing things that were "unnat-
ural" for him. II That Wilson became increasingly reclusive, suspicious,
and defensive perhaps accounts as much as anything for the "glacial
disdain" he showed for the interpersonal aspects of his conduct in office
from that point forward. I2
For example, from the time the armistice was declared, Wilson
sought to eliminate his opposition from any participation in the im-
pending peace conference by appointing to the American Commission
in Paris men he believed would support his position without question.
He became less discreet in his personal criticism of opponents and
supporters alike and dismissed unwelcome advice. Moreover, Wilson
downplayed unpleasant political realities, including the repudiation of
his appeal to the voters to send only Democrats to Congress in the off-
year November elections of 1918,and the vindictive mandates that his
negotiating allies brought with them to the bargaining table. Equally
telling, his relative disdain for detail and limited preparation before
going to Paris reflected a noteworthy change in one who had prided
himself on being so precise and methodical.
If an obvious loss of the president's ability to abstract would not
become manifest until after his return from Paris, other signs of cog-
nitive compromise began to appear well before the conference. Issues
for Wilson became black and white. Allies were transformed into adver-
saries. Abstract morality drew the sword against the self-interest and
balance-of-power considerations he anticipated meeting there. For him,
the League was now all that mattered. Yet he failed to appreciate that
his perception of it cut both ways: either the League as Wilson perceived
it would be too supranational for the Senate to accept, or else it would be
rendered impotent by the pious idealism underpinning it. I3
Certain changes that occur are recognized only in retrospect as
nascent manifestations of a condition that later becomes obvious with
time. Wilson's behavior during the period encompassing the Paris Peace
Conference underscores that fact. Such sufferers become increasingly
self-absorbed and exhibit a lowered threshold for frustration. This was
particularly characteristic of Wilson during the last week of March and
came to a head during a serious, viral illness that he suffered in early
April. They also show less respect for and insensitivity to the opinions
and feelings of others-a quality that French Premier Clemenceau,
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and the later German
delegation were exposed to, not to mention Secretary of State Robert
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Lansing throughout the conference and Wilson's personal adviser, Colo-
nel Edward House, during its latter half.
Some dementia victims tend to harbor unwarranted suspicions;
Wilson remained to the end as suspicious of alleged French spies as he
later became of advice from his most trusted subordinates. Still others
indulge in impulsive acts as a substitute for intuitive reflection; Wil-
son's compulsion to tie up loose ends at the conference within a ten-day
time limit in April prompted his insistence that participants hurriedly
sign a memorandum on the Kaiser's war guilt shortly after inexplicably
reversing himself on the same isue.14 The president's refusal to deal
with specifics may also in retrospect betray an incipient dementia
sufferer's inattention to detail. Those who are so afflicted cling to more
familiar themes to disguise both this and the loss of memory that goads
them. Hence Wilson's belief that the League Covenant and the League's
existence would in themselves suffice to overcome obstacles he refused
to confront on a point-by-point basis.
Not that these and other features of an evolving organic brain
syndrome necessarily translate into compromised leadership or nego-
tiating skills. Changes in cognition, abstraction, and memory occur
relative to the individual's prior intellectual capacity-and few would
deny that Wilson's capacities were formidable. Gifted persons may well
function adequately enough in the early going to match wits with those
of lesser caliber. Perhaps that accounts for the failure of Wilson's associ-
ates (and many later scholars) to recognize the subtle changes overcom-
ing him during the Paris Peace Conference. Although he was prostrated
by illness on at least two separate occasions while there, for the most
part the president remained an effective leader and negotiator through-
out the proceedings. This hardly negates the dementia thesis, as Wilson
fulfilled virtually every criterion of its earliest manifestations while
still in Paris. Yet to argue his effectiveness requires a brief reexamina-
tion of the issues that confronted the president.
Wilson returned to the United States in February after securing
acceptance of his much-beloved Covenant in Paris. He had exercised
enough flexibility to amend the Covenant in order to promote some
measure of domestic jurisdiction in League disputes, assure recognition
of the Monroe Doctrine, secure the right of the United States to with-
draw from the League if necessary, and implicitly limit the council's
power to issue a legally binding order of military intervention on its
members. IS Despite Wilson's critics, who found much of political value
in arguing each of these points to the contrary, he was not so compro-
mised at this juncture as to preclude his taking the opposition's con-
cerns into account.
That attitude began to change once the president had returned to
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Paris in March and the conference entered its "dark period." Intima-
tions of things to come occurred on April 3, when Wilson was felled by a
brief but debilitating viral illness during which he suffered a fever-
induced delirium. Although a precise diagnosis of influenza is debata-
ble, the illness undoubtedly accelerated his neurologic decline. For fever
in and of itself frequently induces transient confusion in older people,
particularly those already suffering from underlying cerebrovascular
disease or organic brain syndromes. Moreover, the intensity of the
delirium seems less dependent on the height of the fever than upon
psychogenic factors related to the preexisting personality.16 That is why
Wilson's "temperamental defects," to which all scholars have alluded,
may have had more to do with his literally feverish state of mind at the
time than his critics have been willing to admit.
That Wilson failed to demonstrate overt disorders of perception,
inappropriate behavior, or lapses in judgment during the Peace Con-
ference itself is hardly proof that a delirium did not occur. Its man-
ifestations are characteristically worse at night; indeed, the most
common form of delirium in older patients is the so-called "nocturnal
confusion" or "sundowning." Hence the significance of Dr. Grayson's
discreet comment that Wilson suffered two "very restless nights"
during his illness, and another close associate's observation that he
had never known the president to be "in such a difficult frame of mind
as he is now" or that "even while lying in bed he manifests peculi-
arities." 17
The identification of a delusional state, like a diagnosis of dementia,
rests on specific criteria-all of which Wilson met during his four-day
febrile illness. That is important simply because delirium may acceler-
ate the process of dementia in a predisposed individual-which Wilson
was, on account of his far-advanced hypertensive cerebrovascular dis-
ease. Many such persons in fact fail to return to their prior level of
function. 18 And that is precisely what Wilson's valet, Irwin Hoover,
intimated when he recalled that" the President was never the same after
this little spell of sickness." 19
Given the wide range of compromises reached during a two-week
period surrounding Wilson's illness, can the disease be said to have
adversely affected the president's judgment? Much to the medical re-
ductionist's surprise, the weight of the evidence on such key issues as
reparations, occupation of the Rhineland, surrendering the Saar coal
mines to the French and formulating a mutual security treaty with
them suggests that few of Wilson's principles (or the interests of the
United States) were compromised. In point of fact, Wilson appears to
have wrested as much-as he had a right to expect from Clemenceau in
exchange for the "essentials" of the Covenant and the League. To argue
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otherwise not only ascribes too much to an isolated disease but ignores
the primary sources as they reflect Wilson's previously espoused posi-
tions.
Despite some disturbing implications for his future health, Wilson
had not suffered a stroke in early April, as at one time was alleged.20 The
same cannot be said for a second, less-publicized illness later that
month: on April 28 he suffered a small stroke that affected his right arm.
In his consulting physician's convoluted prose, this "made of him a
changling with a very different personality and a markedly lessened
ability." 21 As one measure of his (transient) disability, Wilson began to
write with his unaffected left hand.22 Regardless of the stroke's impact
on the conference itself (which seems minor, except for the postulation
that the president may have been "in a daze and did not know what was
going on" when on May 1 he inexplicably allowed a change in the
wording concerning the Kaiser's guilt),23 the incident is significant
insofar as it substantiates the impression that Wilson's hypertension
was now out of control.
For one thing, a number of associates noted thereafter how tired and
worn Wilson appeared; Dr. Grayson himself admitted a day after the
stroke that these were "terrible days for the President physically and
otherwise." 24 For another, his memory seems to have undergone a
precipitate decline. Baker was perplexed to find a man of Wilson's
formidable recall reading over his cherished Fourteen Points to refresh
his memory! Indeed, on May 3 the president admitted to being too tired
to remember the day's events.25 A deficient memory may also have
accounted for one of his worst speeches on record six days later. In
midsentence he lost his train of thought and fell back on an oft repeated
metaphor about the "light streaming upon the path ahead, and nowhere
else." 26 That is typical of aging individuals, who characteristically
resurrect familiar themes or well-rehearsed vignettes to disguise their
inability to shift reflectively in their thinking.
That inability may also account, in part, for a perceptible hardening
of Wilson's attitude against further compromise. It was as if, a month
before, the president had crossed his last bridge of conciliation; he had
gone as far as diplomatic realities could push him. If both illnesses
accentuated the most tragic elements of Wilson's character, as seems
apparent, that is because they were superimposed on his underlying
neurologic condition. In a word, he had become increasingly egocentric.
His lofty principles began to shade into prejudice, his strong will into
intransigence.
Dr. Edwin Weinstein has synthesized the psychologic and neu-
rologic aspects of Wilson's persona into perhaps the most succinct and
proper balance possible: "The content of [his] behavioral alterations was
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closely related to personality and motivational factors ... [yet] their
occurrence was a sign of ... Wilson's underlying brain damage." 27
Charles Seymour, historian and Peace Conference commissioner, now
ruefully alluded to the president's "one-track mind." Colonel House
was disturbed by his friend's "inflexibility." He was of the opinion that
Wilson's "prejudice and self-will" were becoming liabilities, enough so
to predispose him to "getting into inextricable situations" in the fu-
ture.28 House did not have long to wait to see his worst fears realized
once Wilson returned home to meet the opposition in the United States
Senate.
The fact of the matter was that between his June 28 departure from
Paris and mid-July, Wilson was no longer operating at his normal capac-
ity. The record speaks for itself. Not only did he have difficulty compos-
ing his forthcoming speech of July la, in which he was to present the
treaty to the Senate, but he was forever confusing the legal technicali-
ties inherent in the terms "reservations" and"amendments" and the
degree to which they would affect the treaty's ratification. No longer
willing (or able?) to adapt to new circumstances, he failed to develop any
realistic strategy for forming a pro-League, bipartisan coalition in order
to assure that the Senate would consent to ratification.
Not that Wilson didn't have the chance. Public sentiment and a
clear majority of senators from the beginning were strongly in favor of
the concept of a League and its ratification. Fatefully enough, the chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Henry Cabot Lodge,
knew this. More fateful still, he had harbored an intense dislike of
Wilson for years and had his own presidential ambitions to consider.
Recognizing that he simply did not have the votes to defeat ratification
initially, Lodge proceeded slowly and deliberately to influence public
and senatorial opinion against the treaty. The strategy was nothing if
not brilliant. Lodge had no inclination to beat down the treaty with a
frontal assault; rather, he counted on Wilson to play into his hand
through the "indirect method" of reservations.29 Though Lodge had
assumed the mantle of a master psychologist, he had no way of knowing
just how compromised his adversary had now become.
As if to underscore his decline, Wilson suffered yet another physical
setback on July 19. Inexplicably, Grayson hustled his patient aboard the
presidental yacht Mayflower for a cruise, despite warnings of an impend-
ing storm and despite the doctor's official diagnosis of "dysentery" 30_
for which being whisked out of the capital onto stormy waters seems
hardly a suitable treatment. Perhaps Grayson was only warming to the
public relations task before him, given Wilson's prior medical history.
At any rate, on his return the president was still too ill to tend to
business and canceled all appointments. That, coupled with his subse-
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quent collapse in October, only strengthens the suspicion that he may
have suffered a second small stroke in mid-July.
Perhaps the most outwardly visible sign of Wilson's progressive
neurologic compromise during July and August was his increasingly
suspect memory. In response to Lodge's inquiry on July 22 as to whether
arrangements for the distribution of reparations had been agreed upon at
Paris, the president denied any knowledge of them-though it turned
out that he had already drafted a letter to Lodge on the very subject.31 In
like manner, on August 4 he denied having received any protests from
members of the American Commission against the controversial Shan-
tung settlement, yet at the same time was planning to send Lodge a copy
of a letter that registered one commissioner's displeasure in no uncer-
tain terms.32 In another letter to Lodge just two days later, Wilson again
erred, both in denying having any formal drafts of the Covenant except
"that presented by the American commissioners" (who in fact had
never presented one) and in insisting that there were no exant records of
the commission proceedings.33
To make matters worse, Wilson's increasingly irascible nature and
petulance were now given free rein. On August 8 alone he charac-
terized one of House's disclosures as "amazing and deeply disturbing,"
lambasted Rumania for acting in a "perfectly outrageous manner," and
threatened to withdraw the French Security Treaty. Three days later he
reacted vehemently against Lansing's advice to consider compromise
with the mild reservationists, leading his secretary of state to lament
Wilson's inflexibility and defiance.34 Within the week he considered
divorcing America from the League altogether, while vowing in the
same breath to send his opponents to Berlin to negotiate a new treaty
with Germany themselves should they succeed in emasculating his
own.3S
It was at this juncture that Wilson met with members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in an extensive give-and-take discussion.
Not surprisingly, he stumbled through at least sixteen overt errors,
misrepresentations, and self-contradictions during the three-hour inter-
view on August 19. Whether in recalling dates of what happened in
Paris, what documents he did or did not possess, or simply forgetting
some of the treaty itself, Wilson's memory was consistently faulty.36
More incriminating still, he failed to perceive either that his perform-
ance had been less than exemplary or that he had not changed any of the
senator's minds.
By now Wilson was so set in his beliefs that he had become a
caricature of his former self. Labeling his opposition "intriguers and
robbers," 37 he threatened to keep the United States out of the League al-
together unless he got his way-which he could have had if only he had
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accommodated the mild reservationists. Yet failing to shift reflectively
as changing circumstances dictated, the cornered president refused to
bend-despite reminders from virtually everyone that he simply didn't
have the votes for ratification without compromise.
To revive an earlier theme, there were touches of irony, pathos, and
tragedy in Wilson's behavior during the latter half of 1919. Irony, be-
cause Wilson had written years before in his critically acclaimed Con-
stitutional Government in the United States that it was the chief
executive's "plain duty" to reach an accommodation with the Senate on
matters that divided them, rather than to go over its head (as he did in
September) with an appeal to the people.3s Pathos, because his decision
to turn his back on what he had once perceived to be a president's
solemn obligation was less the result of rational calculation than of
disordered thinking. And tragedy because Wilson had unwittingly writ-
ten his own epitaph as early as 1890 when he singled out "uncompro-
mising thought [as] the luxury of the closeted recluse." 39 If the slings
and arrows of outrageous fortune would thrust Wilson into that very
predicament some thirty years later following his final stroke in Oc-
tober 1919, his premorbid mind set had already betrayed such instincts
long before-as Senator Lodge, at least, was well aware when he had set
his tactically flawless trap.
Lodge's prescience was further vindicated once the failing president
chose to go on a speaking tour in September to defend the treaty. That
decision in itself was made in anger and bordered on the irrationa1.4o
Perversely egocentric by then, Wilson challenged the Senate not to
reach an accommodation but to prepare for a fight. Impervious to all
advice, he vowed to give his opponents"a belly-full," ignoring both his
own tenuous health and the consequences of his absence from Wash-
ington for a month. Although it was obvious to everyone else that the
battle for the treaty was to be waged in the Senate and not out on the
hustings, they also recognized that Wilson had already mortgaged much
of his influence in all quarters. That was enough for Lansing to concede
that his president was no longer likely to be listened to as he had been in
the past.41
As if to lend credence to Lansing's surmise that Wilson was compro-
mising both himself and his office at that time, essays in the Wilson
Papers and elsewhere have applied guidelines routinely employed by
physicians today to quantitate the president's impairment in September
1919 on a percentage basis.42 Such a determination entails making a
clear distinction between the terms "impairment" and "disability."
Whereas impairment is solely related to the health status of the individ-
ual, disability can be determined only within the context of occupa-
tional requirements that he or she is unable to meet as a result of that
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impairment.43 Wilson was at the very least medically impaired during
the summer and fall, even before his October stroke; recent evidence
suggests that he may have been disabled in the constitutional sense as
well.
To argue the point requires an understanding of those criteria that a
neuropsychologist would apply to any person suffering enough brain
dysfunction to affect his or her social or occupational conduct. One
standard that has withstood the test of time relates to the failure of the
individual to utilize what is known as the"abstract attitude," resulting
in an inability to (1) shift reflectively as circumstances change; (2) ac-
count for personal acts or thoughts; (3) keep in mind various aspects of a
task to its completion; (4) grasp the essential parts of a given whole;
(5) learn from previous experience; (6) accept what is, and is not, possi-
ble; and (7) detach the ego from interpersonal conflict.44 No doubt the
psychologist would' point out that Wilson brought a few of these lia-
bilities with him to the White House. What catches the eye, however, is
the pervasiveness of all of them once his physiologic compromise accel-
erated.
With regard to the first, Wilson's perception of the treaty and the
League was set in stone from the moment he left Paris. He simply failed
to acknowledge what others told him of the necessity to shift his focus
toward gaining the best possible compromise once the opposition began
to coalesce. Although the mild reservationists could hardly believe that
Wilson would remain blind to the fact that they were offering their
president a way out of Lodge's trap, he seemed perversely incapable of
shifting reflectively to any point of view outside his own.
Virtually all of Wilson's associates were perplexed and.dismayed by
the president's inability to account for why he thought and acted as he
did during the summer and fall. True, to a great extent he had always
possessed the artist's temperament, preferring to work alone.45 Yet he
had never totally isolated himself to the extent that he did following his
break with House in the spring of 1919. Wilson had always resented the
intrusions of others into matters that he reserved for himself-and
somewhere in the halls of Versailles, Colonel House had finally crossed
the line. If it is also true, as others have surmised, that Wilson always
acted as if he "must fight to have his way," 46 he never satisfactorily
explained why he felt it necessary. Nor could he render a convincing
account of himself to others in a more literal sense when the time came
to report what had happened in Paris, as his performance before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August sadly attests.
Wilson's faulty memory betrayed him on so many occasions that he
was forever asking his associates to send him memoranda of their prior
discussions so he could keep in mind details of the task before him. His
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amnesia, at first selective and later pervasive, occasionally led to some
embarrassing and inexplicable gaffes. The most obvious was a nineteen-
day delay in informing the Senate of the French Security Treaty, which
he simply appeared to have forgotten to mention upon his return from
Paris. That made the task before him even more difficult, as Senate
opponents and supporters alike questioned his motives in not revealing
it earlier.
Wilson's failure to grasp the essentials of a given whole was no-
where more apparent than in his inability to distinguish Lodge and the
irreconciliables from the mild reservationists. His paranoia fostered the
delusion that "the given whole" was none other than a monolithic
Republican party, embodied in the person of Senator Lodge. Nor was it
at all certain that the "whole" of the problem was an inevitable re-
negotiation of the entire treaty should even mildly distasteful reserva-
tions be accepted, a position from which Wilson never wavered despite
its unsubstantiated premise.
Evoking prior experiences with an eye to learning from them like-
wise proved increasingly difficult for the beleaguered president. How
else to explain his turning a deaf ear to the results of the off-year election
"referendum" of 1918, not to mention his misdirected appeal to the
Italian people in April 1919 concerning its government's controversial
claims in the Adriatic? Wilson's decision five months later to take his
case for the League to the American public over the head of the Senate
seems equally irrational (if not tragically consistent) and proved just as
futile in the end. Having set his course, he would accept nothing short of
total victory on his terms, reflecting an inability to distinguish the
possible from the impossible. If that also reflected Wilson's lifelong
"refusal to yield to interference in that sphere of authority in which [he]
sought compensatory gratification," 47 his premature aging had some-
thing to do with magnifying this characteristic in the long run.
Finally, and most painfully obvious to his associates, Wilson was
never able to divorce his ego from the issues at hand. At one point in the
Senate conflict he was asked: "Do you never think yourself wrong?" To
which Wilson responded with typical egocentricity: "Not in matters
where I have qualified myself to speak." 48 That self-fulfilling prophecy
betrayed his unwillingness to consult when matters became emotion-
ally charged, for Wilson loathed exposing himself to potential criticism.
It also bespoke a pathologic augmentation of his character. Under the
duress of accelerated brain aging, the president's most undesirable traits
were unmasked-and his ego, arguably, most of all.
When Wilson embarked on the western speaking tour in early
September, only his physician and a handful of his closest associates
were aware that their president was seriously ill. Yet even later scholars
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little inclined to gauge the impact of his illness acknowledge that
Wilson had been suffering severe headaches as early as the month
before. Grayson himself alluded to them during the tour on at least nine
separate occasions, the last of which-just prior to the president's
collapse in Pueblo, Colorado, on September 25-he described as being
"so splitting" that Wilson"could hardly see." 49 That, coupled with his
small stroke in Paris and his documented retinal disease, is more than
enough to substantiate that Wilson's hypertension had reached a fulmi-
nant, or "malignant," stage. Added to this alarming medical history
were eight separate references to "congestion" an-d nightly coughing
spells that prevented Wilson from sleeping. On September 26 these
telltale signs of congestive heart failure reached crisis proportions;
indeed, Grayson's diary entry just the day before provides a classic
description of that condition.50
Moreover, the president had experienced at least two separate
stroke warnings during the trip before his overt breakdown occurred in
early October. Grayson had been the first to notice "a curious drag or
looseness of the left side" of Wilson's mouth, which he recognized to be
"a sign of danger that could no longer be obscured." 51 Even the press
correspondents sensed a problem, once the president's speeches became
uncharacteristically repetitive and rambling. One later news release al-
luded to an ill-defined "fatigue neurosis" that was said to have"affected
the nerves of one of his arms and to have been responsible for a twitch-
ing of the muscles of his face." 52
While the latter had nothing to do with the massive stroke Wilson
suffered a week later (he suffered from a chronic-and classic-case of
hemifacial spasm),53 it now seems clear that a transient ischemic attack
occurred on September 26. Though Grayson found his patient to be
suffering terribly and in "a highly nervous condition" early that morn-
ing, he made no mention of a temporary paralysis of Wilson's left arm, to
which both Mrs. Wilson and Joseph P. Tumulty later alluded.54 To
make matters worse, the cumulative strain on Wilson's heart and an
apparent acceleration of his hypertension were such that the president
himself remorsefully volunteered that he "had gone to pieces." On
balance, Wilson's collapse on September 26 was far more than"a nerv-
ous reaction in his digestive organs," as Grayson proclaimed.55 The
stroke five days later amply confirms in retrospect the occurrence of a
transient ischemic attack induced by hypertensive cerebrovascular dis-
ease.
That raises two heretofore unanswered questions: what did Gray-
son really know, and how candid was he in his revelations to the public
that he also served? Insofar as he at least recognized this convergence of
symptoms as a portentous development, Grayson's ministrations to the
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president (and the appropiate restrictions he placed upon him) reflect
well on the man as a treating physician. Yet it was left to Ray Stannard
Baker and Irwin Hoover to record for posterity that on October 2, after
returning to Washington, Wilson had in fact suffered a severe stroke
that paralyzed his left side. Despite speculations to that effect in the
press, the furthest that Grayson's medical bulletins ever went was to
describe Wilson's collapse as "nervous exhaustion," a condition he later
upgraded to a "functional," not organic, "fatigue neurosis." 56
Any suggestion that medical knowledge at the time precluded his
arriving at a definitive diagnosis, or that Grayson may have really
believed that exhaustion alone was the culprit, is now hard to defend in
view of the fact that he knew all along that Wilson had suffered a
devastating paralysis.57 In Grayson's defense, one might assume that as
a general practitioner he was merely adhering to the diagnosis of "neu-
rasthenia" rendered by his esteemed neurologic consultant, Dr. Francis
x. Dercum. To concude otherwise, then, requires examining the data in
some detail in relation to what was known of both neurasthenia and
stroke at the time, and Grayson's refusal to affirm publicly any diag-
nosis other than the former. Once having done that, it remains comfort-
ing for the retrospective diagnostician to have at his disposal Grayson's
unpublished records, which tell a story very different from anything he
ever divulged in his own lifetime.
Textbooks of Grayson's day defined neurasthenia and stroke as two
distinctly different entities.58 The former was believed to be a psycho-
somatic condition; the latter was attributed to structural damage in the
brain. Not only were strokes recognized to be caused by thrombosis or
embolism, but those involving the carotid, middle cerebral, and per-
forating arteries were already so explicitly described in the medical
literature that even the general practitioner was expected to know the
difference between them and neurasthenia. Above all, the signs and
symptoms of vascular disease elsewhere, especially in the heart and
retina, were said to "readily clarify the diagnosis" of stroke.59
Neurasthenia, on the other hand, was described by textbooks of
the day as a "functional neurosis" and was expected to yield readily to
"very simple treatment of the nerves," including enforced bed rest and
dietary modification. No other disorder was said to produce such
multiplicity of symptoms of the subjective physical type, among them
fatigue, indigestion, palpitations, headaches, and insomnia.6o No won-
der Grayson proposed just such a diagnosis to explain Wilson's collapse
in late September; after all, his patient initially had most of those
symptoms.
Yet ascribing to a functional neurosis a devastating paralysis six
days later ignored the accepted medical precept that precluded a diag-
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nosis of neurasthenia if an orga~ic disease of the brain was present.
When Dercum himself referred to neurasthenia after examining Wilson
on October 3, he took great pains to emphasize that he had "merely
confirmed Dr. Grayson's diagnosis," and not the other way around.61
Dercum never publicly commented on Wilson's illness again. As per-
haps the most eminent neurologist of his day, he could hardly have
failed to recognize that Wilson was now paralyzed. And as an acknowl-
edged authority on neurasthenia himself, Dercum obviously knew the
difference between that entity and a stroke; indeed, he wrote out the
latter diagnosis in very precise terms two weeks into Wilson's illness, a
copy of which has recently been uncovered in Dr. Grayson's files. Yet
the closed-lipped Grayson went to his grave without ever acknowledg-
ing that.
The dearth of revealing public statements notwithstanding, there is
now no doubt that on October 2 Wilson suffered a major stroke that left
him permanently paralyzed and cognitively impaired. Its underlying
pathogensis entails three possibilities: (1) a thrombosis or rupture of a
small, perforating vessel deep within the right side of his brain-of the
sort that may have repeatedly taken place as early as 1896 and as late as
April 1919; (2) a blood clot under the brain cover known as a "subdural
hematoma," which could have resulted from Wilson's fall at the time of
his collapse; or (3) an occlusion of the right carotid or middle cerebral
arteries that supply the superficial cortex of the brain.
The last seems the most plausible, if for no other reason that that
was the diagnosis Dercum himself arrived at from his painstakingly
detailed and recorded examination. On October 20, 1919, and only after
several further examinations, Dr. Dercum submitted to Dr. Grayson
what he described as a "final and complete" revised statement regarding
Wilson's medical condition:
THE DIAGNOSIS made on October 2 and confirmed at the subsequent
examinations was that of a severe organic hemiplegia, probably due to a
thrombosis of the middle cerebral artery of the right hemisphere.... At
the time of the first consultation, the diagnosis was communicated to
Mrs. Wilson and Miss Margaret Wilson. The subsequent course of the
case revealed the hemiplegia to be persistent. Notwithstanding, be-
cause of the improvement noted at various times, Dr. Grayson thought
it wise to issue general statements only [emphasis added].62
Wilson's impairment, then, was profound, was for all intents and pur-
poses permanent, and involved those portions of the brain most com-
monly affected by a large-vessel occlusion. Small-vessel strokes of the
lacunar type are rarely so devastating or permanent; moreover, deficits
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accruing from a blood clot overlying the brain seldom evolve,so rapidly
after a blow to the head-and there is no doubt that Wilson's paralysis
came on suddenly.
Regardless of the precise etiology of his stroke, the president's
condition remained shrouded in mystery for the remainder of his term.
Whether Grayson or Mrs. Wilson was responsible for that is unclear,
though the preponderant evidence seems to implicate the president's
wife in the decision to withhold any damaging medical information.
What is clear is that for at least the first three months of his illness
Wilson was disabled in both the medical and the constitutional senses
of the word: he was unable to carry out the duties of his office effec-
tively-if at all.
Bear in mind that, retrospectively, the president already warranted
an impairment rating of from 15 to 45 percent of the whole person
during the summer and early fal1.63 After his stroke, not only was
Wilson unable to perform most activities of daily living at a level even
approaching his previous norm, but he was forbidden to do so. That
equates by today's standards with an additional 15 percent impairment.
Disturbances in the use of language, a second criterion used to compute
neurologic impairment, have been elaborately detailed in Weinstein's
neuropsychological treatment of Wilson and warrant, at the very least, a
15 percent rating.64 Third, Wilson's nervous anxiety and burgeoning
paranoia so far exceeded the lowest level of "emotional disturbances
under stress" as to equate with a further 15 percent impairment. Finally,
his paralysis fits the criterion of focal neurologic disturbances to the
letter, with their own specified percentages of impairment. Most impor-
tant of all, percentages from separate categories are additive in arriving
at a final figure, attesting to the sobering conclusion that the stricken
president would be labeled today as well above a 50 percent level of
impairment of the whole person!65
The salient point to address from the historical perspective, of
course, is the impact of Wilson's impairment on his conduct in office:
that is, his disability. For the treaty fight in the Senate, that impact was
immense. To solidify the case, and to demonstrate that the nation's best
interests were poorly served while the president's true condition was
concealed, requires a closer examination of events following his fateful
stroke.
Prior to early February 1920 any role that Wilson's illness may have
played in the ratification struggle and a host of other suspended isues
relates primarily to his imposed isolation. As access to the president
was severely restricted, little was then known of his personal behavior
or official conduct. The recently published record now affirms that
Wilson failed to act as chief executive in any meaningful sense. His
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isolation cut both ways: not only was he unable to assess issues in con-
text, given the limited information he received, but his real thoughts on
any issue were obscured by those who were writing his responses and
memoranda for him-including even a few to themselves over the
stamp of the president's name.66
Any executive matters not deemed urgent by Tumulty or Mrs.
Wilson (and even some that were) were pigeonholed, among them the
ImperatoI controversy with Great Britain, return of the railroads to
private ownership, Italy's claims in the Adriatic, an impending treaty
with Turkey, the unstable Mexican situation, and a host of diplomatic
appointments. As if to highlight the impasse, when Tumulty himself
submitted a list of suspended business to the president as late as De-
cember 18, most of the items passed unacknowledged.67 Secretary of
State Robert Lansing convened more than a score of cabinet meetings
during the interlude in an attempt to keep the executive branch abreast
of its obligations.
As for the treaty fight itself, Wilson's resistance to reservations only
hardened in the sludgy amalgam of his imposed isolation. Despite his
entourage's attempts to protect the president from disturbing news,
Wilson simply had to be informed of Senate minority leader Gilbert
Hitchcock's urgent plea on November 18 that he reach an accommoda-
tion with the mild reservationists.68 Now gripped by paranoia, Wilson
could not help but feel that even his supporters were abandoning him.
That may have led to his refusal to see Hitchcock on November 29,
despite Grayson's assertion that there was no medical reason why the
president could not have kept the appointment.69
Wilson's December declaration of "no concessions and no compro-
mise," then, represented but the tip of the iceberg of his growing
intransigence. If Lansing now believed that his own "independence of
opinion" and "frankness of expression" displeased the president, Baker
and others had recognized all along that Wilson lacked the "compli-
ment of consultation" and the ability to "play upon men's vanities,"
which were instrumental in gaining desired political ends.70 That lack,
coupled with his increasingly pugnacious temperament, would only
multiply the administration's problems in the weeks ahead.
Despite official pronouncements in December that Wilson's "com-
plete recovery was now assured," 71 the feebleness of the stricken presi-
dent's attempt to compose his thoughts matched what any neurologist
would expect from a recent stroke victim, who has trouble completing
tasks that demand sustained attention. All too often, others were
obliged to think and act for him. On those few occasions when Wilson
did take the initiative, confusion as to his true intent frequently re-
sulted. Even from afar, Colonel House had learned enough from his
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many visitors to conclude that "the President is in no condition ... to di-
rect important business." 72 Lansing foresaw as early as mid-December
that he would soon be forced to resign, given the "violent passions and
exaggerated ego" resulting from Wilson's illness. 73
How else to explain the president's abortive challenge to the Senate
opposition on December 17 to resign their seats and seek reelection on
the treaty's ratification? Rather than abandoning this unprecedented
idea and seeking an accommodation, Wilson transformed it into a sui-
cidal instrument of partisan politics in his Jackson Day letter.74 That
may have been a reflection of his thinly disguised desire to seek a third
term; perhaps he even believed that the treaty's defeat would be in his
own best interests, since it would give him an excuse to run again. 75
If so, such a self-serving if pathetic rationalization offers a possible
glimpse into the convoluted recesses of Wilson's diseased brain and is
quite in keeping with the thought patterns of other victims of dementia,
whose ability to appreciate the consequences of their actions is typ-
ically diminished.
Whether or not such thinking was truly the product of an "illogical
mind," as Lansing believed, few denied that Wilson had painted himself
into a comer. Self-righteousness, always a hallmark of the Wilson
persona, was only magnified by his illness, highlighting the medical
axiom that strokes may induce"a marked and almost grotesque accen-
tuation" of prior personality traits. 76 In any case, all that could be hoped
for was a change for the better in the president's condition. As if on cue,
Dr. Grayson obliged with a press release predicting that Wilson would
be "as well as ever" by February.77 Others were less sanguine. With
TU:p1ulty's list of duties for the president to act upon still unfulfilled by
the new year, he gently prodded Wilson at least to change his position on
the treaty. That suggestion fell on deaf ears, and Edith Wilson's reply to
Tumultya day later speaks for itself: "The President does not like being
told a thing twice." 78
Although Wilson's increasingly active role by February appeared to
fit Grayson's timetable, he was a very different man from the one the
people had reelected in 1916. To underscore the public's misperceptions
of their leader, Wilson's preeminent editorial supporter, Frank I. Cobb,
missed the mark entirely when he asserted that his president would
never reject an honest compromise. 79 Those few who knew better
(Lodge among them) still failed to understand why Wilson acted as he
did. Yet once the president became more "visible" in early February, it
did not take long for at least the medical experts to form their own
opinions as to his inability to lead. Surmising that he had suffered a
stroke (which only Wilson's urologist had been willing to admit},80 a
former president of the American Medical Association, Arthur D. Bev-
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an, flatly stated that "under no circumstances" should Wilson be per-
mitted to return to his former duties.81 .
If anything, subsequent events belied the White House party line
that "in many ways the President [was] in better shape" than before his
illness.82 A mere three days later Wilson not only peremptorily dis-
missed Lansing but erred in allowing their private correspondence on
the matter to be publicized. He then laid what was by then a typically
"unalterable" proposal before a delegation of railroad leaders, and ended
the week by issuing to the Allied Supreme Council a "virtual ul-
timatum" on Italy's "unjust claims." 83 Wilson's critics were less than
kind, even if their observations were on the mark. In the captivating
prose of one editor, the president's correspondence to Lansing bespoke
"the wormwood and gall of the isolated, hermited [and] imperious
mind." 84 Even the more supportive New York Evening Post asserted that
"those always disconcerting qualities of the President's temperament"
were now being exaggerated by his illness and consequent isolation.85
Any neuropsychologist reviewing the evidence today would agree.
Having charged Lansing with insubordination for holding cabinet
meetings without the president's knowledge or approval, Wilson failed
to acknowledge (or remember) that his secretary of state had informed
both Tumulty and Grayson directly, and Wilson indirectly through
correspondence, that such meetings were taking place.86 Not that Wil-
son's charge concerning Lansing's usurpation of power marked the pres-
ident as a tyrant, as his displaced subordinate would have posterity
believe. It did, however, signify an increasingly rigid and suspicious
individual's obsession with controlling his environment. Whether Wil-
son's actions were "childish" or even "unbelievably stupid," there is
little doubt that his behavior bordered on the pathological. He was now
acting as much from the heart as the mind, and that, too, is in keeping
with a stroke-induced psychosyndrome, of which impaired control of
emotions and impulses is said to be the cardinal feature.87 Perhaps
Baker had the last word when he described the way in which Lansing
was dismissed as "the petulant and irritable act of a sick man." 88
Once Wilson resumed speaking and acting for himself in early
February, his character defects affected everything he did. If Italy's
claims in the Adriatic were indeed unjust, he "intended to resist them to
the end, no matter what the consequences" for his allies (emphasis
added).89 On February 3, Baker was moved to describe Wilson's disease
induced state of mind as "tragic" for a man who was now willing to
skewer his brainchild on the horns of his temperamental difficulties.
Ruing the "utter confusion" that had existed in the State Department
before Lansing's dismissal, Baker blamed it on the president's stubborn-
ness and closed-mindedness.9o
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Wilson's impairment led to some embarrassing displays of emo-
tionallability as well. On February 14 he was reduced to tears upon
hearing Homer S. Cummings's effusive peroration of him-only to
recover long enough to castigate his opponents for having "disgraced
America."91 (Still later, Wilson broke down in the middle of a story
being read to him, while his perplexed son-in-law, Stockton Axton,
sought in vain to find something in the text to account for it).92 Whereas
Baker had learned enough of Wilson's peculiar behavior to appreciate
how illness could unleash the "ungovernable element of [his] strong
nature," Lansing, in his more self-serving style, now dismissed his
president as a man who had become unable to control his "warped and
distorted passions." 93
Naturally, Wilson reserved his most flagrant outbursts for his sworn
enemies. Despite accepting in principle William H. Taft's draft of a
reservation to Article 10 that hardly differed from the opposition's,
Wilson exclaimed that "he would see both the treaty and Lodge in
Hades" before giving his nemesis the satisfaction of having the reserva-
tions labeled in his name.94 At this stage in his illness, Wilson's dis-
torted logic had convinced him that the political stage was simply too
small to accommodate any views other than his own. The same sort of
pathologic arrogance compelled him to dismiss even the advice of his
few remaining close associates, once he had chosen to shelve the treaty
by equating the acceptance of any reservations as a "nullification" of
it.95 In effect, Wilson heard only what he wanted to hear. That precluded
granting individual interviews to those senators who were still on the
fence, a practice he had dutifully cultivated (albeit with some distaste)
the previous summer.
By late February the "splendid attention" that Wilson was allegedly
giving affairs of state was as questionable as his ostensible recovery. The
New York Times openly discussed the impasse in Washington and the
responsibility for it of the president's health.96 If, as he fancied himself,
Wilson was the only legitimate peacemaker who placed international
stability above the interests of nation and self, why would one commen-
tator speak for the majority of his colleagues in categorizing the presi-
dent's personally revised and vituperative letter to Hitchcock on March
9 as "another war message?" Even the usually supportive New York
World was openly critical of Wilson and acknowledged that his rigid
stance and bullying methods were "weak and untenable. II 97 Whatever
his motivations, everyone now recognized that Wilson was a changed
man. That alone was enough to assure the treaty's subsequent defeat.
With respect to both his functional impairment and his disability,
Woodrow Wilson's medical history can be divided into two periods. The
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first was roughly a twenty-year interval, up to and through the Septem-
ber speaking tour of 1919, which was characterized by slowly progres-
sive multi-organ system failures on the basis of advanced hypertension.
Following his atherosclerosis-induced large-vessel stroke in early Oc-
tober, Wilson's health underwent a more precipitate decline-after
which few could deny that his mental faculties and comportment had
changed permanently for the worse.
From the strictly neuropsychological perspective, it is not until 1918
that a reduction in what might be termed his 1/adaptive versatility" can
be detected in the primary sources. Individuals suffering such a reduc-
tion typically manifest a lower threshold of frustration, are prone to
make unwarranted criticisms and judgments, and complain of tiring
easily. Unable to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances, they tend
to concentrate on one issue at a time in order to reduce their mistakes,
yet still pay less attention to detail as they become increasingly self-
absorbed. As their memory grows more impaired and their emotions
less restrained, they become impervious to advice and insensitive to
others' reactions. The complete record now affirms that these qualities
characterized Wilson to the letter during the spring and summer
months antedating the western tour.
Only during the accelerated phase of cognitive decline are their
associates' suspicions confirmed that something is definitely abnormal
about the behavior of such persons. That certainly applies to Wilson's
conduct in the aftermath of his stroke on October 2, 1919. Yet it is of
paramount importance that a major determinant of impairment is one's
preexisting ability to adapt, as defined by the underlying personality.
And that is why some elements of Wilson's character and lifelong inner
conflicts, which others have described, bear reemphasizing. Those who,
like Wilson, have more rigidly defined adaptive patterns to begin with
usually manifest greater impairment in the long run.98 This last obser-
vation, of course, has singular implications for Wilson's conduct during
the final year of his presidency, and perhaps squares the circle of debate
into a synthesis as to why he acted as he did.
Long ago, the British parliamentarian Edmund Burke made a pres-
cient distinction between a statesman and a moralist which has tragic
relevance to Wilson's predicament in 1919. Whereas a moralist has a
general view of society, said Burke, the statesman has a number of more
specific circumstances to take into consideration; a statesman, while
not losing sight of his moral principles, must first and foremost be
guided by political and diplomatic realities that are forever in a state of
flux.99 A subtly evolving dementia, induced by hypertension and cere-
brovascular disease, made this precisely what Wilson could no longer do
by late 1919 and 1920. He remained a moralist to the end. The quality
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that typified him from the beginning was only magnified by his under-
lying medical condition. Wilson's inability to shift reflectively with
changing circumstances was a matter of considerable significance for
the treaty's defeat and, ultimately, the emasculation of the League of
Nations.
CHAPTER 6
Winston Churchill:
Compromised Cold Warrior
That Wilson Churchill suffered all his life from what he called the
"black dog" of depression is well known. That this may have contrib-
uted to his relatively ineffectual leadership in the postwar years is less
appreciated. Moreover, we know that Churchill was in poor health
during his second tenure as prime minister, from 1951 to 1955, thanks to
the published memoirs of his physician, Lord Moran. Yet the real
underlying causes of Churchill's deterioration (hypertension and hard-
ening of the arteries) and their psychophysiologic manifestations (accel-
erated aging) have yet to be independently analyzed in depth. Like
Woodrow Wilson before him, Churchill still perceived himself to be
indispensable-though few of his contemporaries felt the same. The
perceptions of both, in the end, had as much to do with his tenuous
health as with wounded vanity.
To be sure, Moran had already noted some disturbing changes in his
patient's behavior and thought processes long before. On December 7,
1947, the doctor observed in his diary: "He is no longer fertile in ideas.
Last year his failure as Leader of the Opposition could be put down ... to
a lack of tact and to his indifference to the opinions of others. But now it
is more the sterility of his mind that bothers thoughtful people. The
once-teeming brain has run dry."l Nor had his condition improved four
years later. Just prior to Churchill's reelection as prime minister, Moran
admitted: "In the fourteen months since my last entry he has lost
ground, and has no longer the same grip on things and events.... If he
wins the election ... I doubt whether he is up to the job." 2
In medical terminology, the implication is clear that Churchill was
suffering the effects of early dementia, defined as IIan irreversible men-
tal state characterized by decreased intellectual function, personality
change, and impaired judgment." 3 It was left to a British psychiatrist,
Anthony Storr, to reflect on the progression of that process after
Churchill left office: liThe last five years of his protracted existence
were so melancholy that even Lord Moran drew a veil over them." 4 Yet
Churchill's daughter allowed fleeting glances behind that veil, with
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pathetic descriptions of meals eaten in embarrassing silence and the
long intervals of depression and apathy that consumed her father's last
days. He gave up reading, seldom spoke, and sat for hours in front of the
fire in a depressive stupor.5 These last years for Winston Churchill were
sad ones, and the sphinx-like facade of his residual persona gave little
indication of talents lost to the ages. There is nothing remarkable in
this: he was on the last leg of a lifetime spanning nine decades.
What is noteworthy from the historian's perspective, however, is
that the process of dementia was well under way during Churchill's last
tenure as prime minister. Moran himself had become convinced as early
as the last years of World War II that "exhaustion of mind and body"
accounted for much that was "otherwise inexplicable" in his patient's
behavior.6 Though few scholars today would take issue with that poign-
ant assessment, it remains to unravel the complexities of this phys-
iologic deterioration as it may have affected his leadership.
To begin with, Churchill's last years in office were characterized by
a relative indifference to pressing economic and domestic concerns,
subverted all the more by his unrelenting preoccupation with interna-
tional relations and Britain's waning role in them. This lack of re-
sourcefulness in tackling new problems, while doting on more familiar
ones, may be readily attributed to the deleterious impact of incipient
dementia on Churchill's behavior, for dementia victims sense the need
to establish a means of coping with their increasingly limited mental
reserves. By avoiding the complex or unfamiliar, they reduce their
failure rate to a level that falls short of being destructive to both social
position and self-respect. A physician may regard this as healthy com-
pensation in a patient; 7 the pathographer would hasten to add that such
behavior may be distinctly unhealthy for the best interests of a nation
being led by one so afflicted.
As if to disguise his deterioration, Churchill's staged performances
at the lectern remained relatively effective to the very end. Though the
painstaking care he took in editing prepared speeches lent support to his
reputation as both speaker and writer, few but the neuropsychologists
are aware that some individuals may paradoxically retain their verbal
skills in the early stages of dementia. Moreover, remote memory is
largely preserved, as a rule. 8 Whereas Churchill could recall many
incidents from World War I in vivid detail, events during World War II
ran together in his mind, compelling him when writing his memoirs to
depend on what had been committed to paper.9 Yet cognitive decline is
a relative matter. In a person of Churchill's formidable aptitudes, a
decline of, say, 30 to 40 percent may result in little discernible change to
the casual observer. Even so, certain subtleties and nuances in assim-
ilating data are inevitably lost.
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A further characteristic of dementia sufferers is their dependence
on external sources to maintain self-esteem. That is why Churchill
placed such a premium on vigor in his public performances. The well-
publicized appearance, a major speech, or the chairing of cabinet meet-
ings all became critical barometers of his vitality, both in his own eyes
and in those of his detractors. Deluding himself into believing he had
cleared each hurdle successfully, particularly after his major stroke in
1953, strengthened Churchill's resolve to stay on. In the end, this
required taking a staggering array of medical stimulants to bolster his
confidence and foster the illusion that he was, indeed, indispensable.
Considering, therefore, that Churchill's verbal skills were untar-
nished, that his cognitive decline was still a somewhat relative matter,
and that his public appearances were supported with drugs supplied by
his private physician, it is understandable that the insidious influence
of progressive dementia was largely lost on contemporaries and histo-
rians alike. But two other underlying illnesses aided and abetted the
aging process: cerebrovascular insufficiency and depression. The former
did not become evident until Churchill's first stroke in 1949; thereafter,
it was an increasingly pervasive influence on his leadership. The latter
dogged him at every step along the way.
Consider the fact that atherosclerosis can contribute to either the
development or the progression of dementia by reducing the supply of
oxygen to the brain. Overt strokes are not necessarily required to make
the diagnosis; nevertheless, Churchill did suffer at least two permanent
strokes and numerous temporary ones during the last six years of his
public life. Acknowledging this, the pathographer would do well to
ponder the accepted medical axiom that large strokes are but an end
stage of vascular dementia, with cognitive changes often occurring long
before. Io That is the basis on which Churchill's medical record can be
interpreted to reflect a perceptible degree of mental impairment even
before he assumed office for the last time.
It is also true that a disparity is often observed between cognitive
impairment and structural changes of the brain in patients afflicted
with dementia. This apparent discrepancy can be attributed to several
unrecognized factors, among them depression, inactivity, and social
deprivation. II Certainly Churchill was neither intellectually inactive
nor divorced from interpersonal contact, either as leader of the opposi-
tion or as prime minister. Yet it is to Anthony Storr's credit that he
identified the presence of the significant depression that affected
Churchill during his entire public life. This led Storr to conclude that no
understanding of his character is possible unless this "central fact" is
taken into account. I2
Certain features of the dementia victim's personality are accentu-
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ated as their compromise accelerates. That is what one investigator was
driving at when he asserted that hardening of the arteries to the brain
"makes it difficult for one to cope with his temperamental diffi-
culties." 13 What one would expect to see in Churchill's case, then, is
precisely what occurred: increasingly frequent bouts of depression and
periods of soul-searching, enough to compel him to seek pharmacolog-
ical aids from his physician in order to weather the emotional storm
from within and the undertow of criticism from without.
Since premorbid personality traits are often magnified both by the
multi-infarct state and by most forms of dementia, perhaps it would be
helpful to summarize Churchill's personality profile as succinctly as
possible before beginning a chronological evaluation of his progressive
illness. Several biographies and character sketches made by closely
positioned observers indicate that Churchill's personality was charac-
terized by the following features: egocentricity; a relative indifference
to, if not unawareness of, the "common man"; a flair for the romantic
and a deeply ingrained belief in the British Empire and its aristocracy;
extraordinary skills with both the spoken and written word; hypochon-
driacal concerns about his health; a propensity to make decisions based
on intuition; a crisis orientation; an artistic temperament that allowed
for sustained periods of creative activity; a remarkable independence of
mind; and last, a recurring depression. This list does not pretend to be
exhaustive or all-inclusive (and certainly not all historians would agree
with every item), but in the main these features represent the essential
qualities of Churchill's premorbid personality. And many were aug-
mented by the effects of his progressive illness.
R. Rhodes James shared the opinion of most historians in asserting
that Churchill was not a very effective leader of the opposition in the
House of Commons before reassuming the office of prime minister in
1951. For one thing, his stature often seemed greater abroad than in his
own country.14 For another, his egocentricity divorced him from the
everyday concerns of common people. Lady Asquith's assessment
speaks for itself: "I think that for him human beings fell roughly into
three categories: the great figures whom he weighed, measured, and
assessed in a historical perspective, ... the so-called average man and
woman who often made no impact on his attention, ... and lastly his
friends. " 15
These observers substantially account for Churchill's obsession
during his later years with constructing a lasting peace in face-to-face
consultation with world leaders whom he perceived to be of equal
historical stature. Yet in relation to the opposition years, they also
magnify his principal failing: a lack of genuine communication with
commoners. His approach was essentially rhetorical, capsulized now
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and then in a memorable speech. He had always lived somewhat apart
from the bulk of humankind, and his preoccupation only with matters
that suited him overshadowed those issues that genuinely concerned
the broad majority of the British public. For Churchill during the opposi-
tion years there were books to write, paintings to complete, and his
health to rejuvenate. He treated his political duties largely as an avoca-
tion as he awaited the inevitable time when Labour would be turned out
and he could return to center stage. Temporarily barred from the politi-
cal limelight, his interest in politics lacked the fervor of earlier years.
The game was scarcely so important if he could not lead.
Accordingly, Churchill understood two projects in which (at least to
his way of thinking) his participation was critical to success: effecting a
lasting detente with the Soviet Union, and promoting the movement for
European unity. Not that these were the most critical issues of the day
for Great Britain; rather, they interested Churchill most, and he per-
ceived them as the only areas in which he might still speak with
authority. One observer struck to the heart of the matter: "Ambition is
a trait of character which merely reflects a man's desire to find adequate
scope for his abilities." 16 The aging process had altered a great many
things for Churchill-but obviously not his search for a receptive au-
dience in high circles.
Realistically, two matters of more pressing importance should have
captured the attention of a career politician intent upon regaining
power: reorganizing his party, and formulating its policy. These were
the nuts-and-bolts matters necessary to ensure Churchill's political
future. After all, it was the Conservative party, not its leaders, that had
failed to impress the electorate in 1945. Yet Churchill left these critical
matters of restructuring to others. Discontent within his own party
evoked critical comments about his absence from the Commons and his
absorption in writing his memoirs. A substantial number of its mem-
bers called for his retirement, underscoring his ineffectiveness as a party
leader during this period. Churchill's response was characterized by a
degree of intransigence and suspicion often seen when elderly individu-
als are opposed or thwarted; he would "react violently, banging the floor
with his stick [in anger against] those who were plotting to displace
him." 17
Though many were as concerned about Churchill's health as about
his political performance, no obvious red flags of warning unfurled
before 1949. Lord Moran painted quite a different picture of his patient
behind closed doors, portraying him as increasingly subject to periods of
profound depression, possessed of a limited attention span, and preoc-
cupied with reveries of his past triumphs. I8 Others. with less accessi-
bility to the aging prime minister saw no obvious changes worthy of
Winston Churchill 123
note; the Times blithely recorded on July 17, 1947 that "he was looking
extremely well." 19
That image was shaken by what is now known to have been
Churchill's first stroke on August 24, 1949. At Max Beaverbrook's villa
on the French Riviera, he experienced a sudden loss of .sensation in his
right arm and leg. "He was playing cards," Lord Moran recalled, "when
he got up ... and bent his right leg several times. 'I've got a cramp in my
arm and leg,' was all he said." 20 Still another account described the
event as a "peculiar sensation of paralysis" that began in Churchill's
right hand.21 The mention of a "sensation" of paresis is important in
arriving at a diagnosis, as no genuine paralysis had occurred. Moreover,
Churchill had no difficulty in speaking. This allowed him to volunteer
that "there is a sensation in my arm that was not there before ... like a
tight feeling across my shoulder blade." 22
Those descriptions are more than sufficient for the retrospective
clinician to diagnose a tiny, hypertension-related stroke involving a
deeply seated structure in the left side of the brain known as the
thalamus, which is a relay station between the spinal cord and the
sensory cerebral cortex. These small infarcts known as "lacunes" usu-
ally represent the end stage of hypertension. They are not directly
related to large-vessel atherosclerosis; rather, they occur as a result of
occlusion of small penetrating arteries deep in the brain.23 That the
outer cerebral cortex supplied by larger blood vessels was not involved
in this instance is suggested by the lack of injury to Churchill's speech
center, which would have been affected by a large-vessel stroke signifi-
cant enough to involve both the arm and the leg. In the absence of other
clinical findings, his stroke must have occurred where these sensory
tracts converge.
For obvious political reasons, Churchill's brush with a serious ill-
ness was successfully hidden from the British public. Harold Macmillan
confided in his diary entry of August 25, 1949, that "this attack, happily,
proved slight, and by careful control of the news [emphasis added] was
effectively concealed." 24 Beaverbrook had decided that the truth should
be hidden and had prepared a bulletin stating only that "Churchill had
contracted a chill while bathing and would require a few days [of] rest
and quiet." 25 This remained the accepted story until the month after
Churchill's death in January 1965.
The entire episode is of significance for several reasons. First, it
defines the specific nature of Churchill's cerebrovascular disease, the
natural history of which is now well known to physicians. These
"minor" strokes occur repeatedly over the years and affect the brain on
both sides, frequently giving rise in time to what is known as the
"lacunar state." In spite of the victim's apparent recovery from each
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successive insult, the condition is inexorably progressive. The most
devastating consequence is the debilitating syndrome known in medi-
calese as "multi-infarct dementia."
Second, Churchill's rapid improvement was quite characteristic of a
small-vessel stroke, even though it gave his handlers a false sense of
security regarding his health and led to some spurious assumptions.
"Perhaps it was because he had faced death before and because of his
profound will-power that he recovered [so] quickly," one observer sur-
mised.26 Churchill~srecovery had little to do with either; rather, it was
compatible with what is usually seen in this disease. Permanent deficits
result only with larger lesions, as the aging prime minister would
ruefully discover four years later.
Third, and perhaps most significant, the episode led to the duplicity
employed by friend (Beaverbrook), colleague (Macmillan), and physi-
cian (Moran) alike in disguising its real nature. They withheld access to
facts that the British public had a right to know when it came to the next
general election, less than two years away. If the cover-up was under-
taken at Churchill's behest, as seems to have been the case, then he
ignored any consideration of what was in Britain's best interest. Such
duplicity, repeated time and again during his remaining years as prime
minister, reflects poorly on the professional conduct of the persons
responsible for perpetrating the myth of Churchill's vitality and good
health.
To return to the chronological narrative, what effects did this brief,
albeit portentous, setback have on political events of the day? In rela-
tion to Churchill's election two years thereafter, the effects were insig-
nificant, as he seemed by then to have recovered completely and the
British public was unaware of the stroke in any event. Nevertheless, it
may have adversely affected the speech he gave at Strasbourg in 1949, in
which he reversed his position regarding the concept of a united Europe.
Churchill had been among the first to call for European unity after the
war, and his new position was inexplicable and disappointing to unifica-
tion enthusiasts both at home and abroad. At about the same time, Lord
Moran began to detect in his patient a disconcerting lack of concern
about the future. "Winston is aging," he wrote. "The optimism of the
war years ... has oozed out through his wounds, and he has given up
planning new worlds. He does not pretend that he is interested in a
future he will not live to see." 27 What Moran was alluding to was an
accentuation in old age of the depression Churchill had always fought
and his recent stroke had rekindled. Yet this observation, made just
prior to the Strasbourg speech, may offer some insight into Churchill's
inexplicable reversal.
Had European unity become one of those "new worlds" he had
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given up planning for in old age? Possibly. Yet whatever else charac-
terized Churchill's later years as prime minister, planning for such
brave new worlds as a "special relationship" with the United States and
detente with Soviet Russia were precisely the two issues that consumed
him. Why, then, had he suddenly abandoned the Continent? Was Eu-
rope now extraneous to the other goals? Might Britain lose its way as an
independent mover and shaker in world affairs if it were smothered in a
European embrace? Not only had the timing of Churchill's reversal
raised eyebrows; it also reflected a certain ambiguity in his thinking
regarding Britain's new role in the world.
Whatever the verdict, Churchill's medical record fully two years
before he reassumed office attests to an incipient dementia, documents
his recurring depression, and acknowledges the occurrence of a stroke. If
the last was due to small-vessel disease deep within the brain on the
basis of hypertension, his larger vessels were also beginning to occlude
as early as 1950. Just five months after his first stroke, Churchill men-
tioned to Moran that "about an hour ago everything went misty. There
was no warning. I could just read with difficulty." 28 In medical terms,
what he was describing was a "transient ischemic attack" related to
decreased blood flow to the posterior portion of the brain where cerebral
impulses for vision ate assimilated. This area is supplied by two large
blood vessels of what is known as the "vertebral-basilar system," and
atherosclerosis is nearly always the cause. The fact that Churchill later
complained of "increasing tightness across both shoulders" 29 suggests
an attempt by other vessels at the base of the neck to supply collateral
flow past a partial or total occlusion-much as occurs in patients with
coronary artery insufficiency, who suffer chest pain due to inadequate
blood supply to the heart.
As if to substantiate that diagnosis, Churchill confided to Moran
shortly thereafter that he had a "muzzy feeling" in his brain and
suggested that it came on as a result of "poor circulation to the
head." 30 Giddiness, or lightheadedness, is perhaps the most frequent
complaint of individuals suffering from vertebral-basilar insufficiency.
Even though Churchill implored his physician to give him"something
more substantial" for these attacks, they were both relieved to dis-
cover that aspirin seemed to help. That request, in itself, underscored
his hypochondriacal mind set, which included an insatiable appetite
for medications to remedy various maladies both perceived and real.
Just as Lord Moran would be called at a moment's notice to check his
demanding patient's pulse merely to reassure him, by 1953 Churchill
was requesting pharmacologic stimulants on a regular basis when faced
with important public appearances and speeches.31 Once the usual
defenses fail to alleviate the anxiety that often accompanies aging, drugs
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offer the only solution for the host of psychosomatic symptoms that
emerge.32
Despite his deteriorating health, Churchill did not perceive himself
as too old to run again for office once the government called a general
election for October 15, 1951. Though the aging warrior must have
presented a convincing case with his programmed demonstrations of
fitness, he was seventy-seven years old, suffering from cerebrovascular
insufficiency, and subject to frequent bouts of depression and apathy
when away from the public eye. Only after his death would the public
learn that a mere fortnight before the election he had admitted privately
to Moran: "I am not so sure as I was that I shall be able to see things
through. 1133
It is an axiom of politics that reality is often less important than the
public's perception of it. Ironically, many of the Labour party's leaders
seemed as ill and infirm as only Churchill's physician knew him to be.
The charge that could have been directed against him focused instead on
the opposition.34 His carefully orchestrated public appearances, con-
trasting with Labour's all too obvious compromise and ineptitude,
brought the aging giant back for one last curtain call as prime minister.
Yet he would return to center stage with an anticlimactic encore that
featured a tedious monologue at best, a pathetic soliloquy at worst.
Many recognized that the Old Lion could only tarnish the well-deserved
fame and prestige of bygone years.3S
The most pressing issue at the time of Churchill's return was the
economy, which was on the verge of collapse. Imagine the concern of his
own backbenchers, once they realized that their former hero, now in
charge of his first peacetime administration, was facing financial prob-
lems for which he had shown only the most rudimentary interest and
understanding in the past. An occasionally memorable speech did little
to disarm his critics. As historian David Thomson has observed: "The
Government was haunted by a curious air of unreality, arising from the
disparity between the Churchillian ferocity of its utterances and the
tepidity of its deeds. II 36 Though Churchill chose his cabinet with care,
he offended the younger members of his own party, who correctly
perceived that they had no representation in policy-making. Given
what is known of the predilections of aging individuals, perhaps there
was more in Macmillan's observation than met the eye: "If these faces
brought no sense of novelty into our councils, they were his familiars,
with many of whom he had worked and striven through the darkest
days." 37 Not only did the prime minister's selections fulfill a deeply
seated need to retain a sense of familiarity around him; they intimated a
reluctance to embark on risky or untested courses of action.
Little wonder, then, that Churchill was unable to please the electo-
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rate during his first year in office. The depth of discontent was measured
by the gains Labour made in the spring elections of 1952, leading the
Times to predict "a permanent shift of political power to the Left."38
These objective results belied Macmillan's subjective assessment that
Churchill remained as energetic and industrious as ever.39 Other ob-
servers close to the prime minister would disagree with that characteri-
zation-including even some who later came to his defense in the face
of Moran's posthumous indictment of their leader-hero.
Though Churchill pursued his usual practice of concentrating on
one or two questions at a time, Lord Normanbrook conceded that his
instincts in selecting the most important issues were less sure in peace-
time than they had been in war.40 Moreover, the pace of the prime
minister's work was decidedly slower. Time allotted for cabinet meet-
ings frequently expired before Churchill arrived at the first item on the
agenda. No longer did the ubiquitous label"Action This Day" appear on
his messages and transcripts. Such troubling observations were echoed
by Sir John Colville, who disclosed that by the spring of 1952 Churchill's
periods of "lowness" were increasing and his "zest diminished. II 41 He
found it increasingly difficult to compose speeches, complaining that
"ideas no longer flowed. II 42 Added to this litany of disturbing indict-
ments was the response of Churchill's private secretary, Leslie Rowan,
when Moran asked whether he had noticed any changes in their old
friend: "'Oh yes,' he answered rather sadly, 'he has lost his tenacity; he
no longer pushes a thing through. He has lost, too, his power of filling in
all of the problems one to another.... And he forgets figures. In the war
he never did.' " 43
These descriptions by generally supportive associates who probably
spent more time with Churchill than anyone but his wife are revealing
enough. That aging individuals typically demonstrate a lack of staying
power with mental activities or issues they consider mundane or unim-
portant paradoxically contrasts with a few preoccupations that grab
their attention to the exclusion of nearly everything else. The neu-
rologist would identify the latter focus as a dementia-induced "persev-
eration." Such individuals compensate for an inability to view problems
in proper perspective by expending what residual intellectual capacity
they have on single issues. Though a single-minded devotion to a
solitary discipline or idea has been described as one definition of genius,
it becomes a liability for a political leader faced with a wide range of
issues.
There are also the frequent references to Churchill's deficient mem-
ory to consider, alluded to by Leslie Rowan in relation to numbers and
figures. Churchill himself confided to Moran in March 1952 that his
memory was failing; he had recently sat between two people he knew
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very well but whose names he could not remember. On a later occasion
Moran proposed that Churchill teach his pet bird, Toby, his telephone
number in case the bird got lost-only to discover that Winston no
longer knew himself.44 Nor did the aged prime minister appear to have
the capacity to learn new material, yet another liability that became
self-evident once unfamiliar economic issues surfaced. These observa-
tions had particularly disturbing implications because all of them were
made within three months of Churchill's return to Number 10 Downing
Street.
Moran's diary entries as early as February 1952 provided intimations
of things to come: "There are gaps everywhere in his grip of events. The
old appetite for work has gone . . . and how full of qualms he has
become! In 1940 when the world was tumbling about his ears-he did
not worry over anything. Now that he is Prime Minister and there is
peace he seems to worry over everything. Moods come and go. He is not
the same two days running." 45 Perseveration with the past, inability to
master new material, and apathy are mentioned time and again in these
and others' recollections. Moran's observations add two further at-
tributes to this typical portrait of dementia: a propensity to be con-
sumed by unnecessary fear and worry, and an extreme variability in
performance from day to day. The former ties in closely with depression
and the neurotic tendencies that accompany age-related disorders of the
brain; the latter is so characteristic of dementia that even severely
afflicted victims occasionally startle their companions with brief dis-
plays of lucidity and vitality.
Any suggestion that Churchill might not have suffered from gener-
alized cerebrovascular insufficiency was dispelled by yet another tran-
sient ischemic attack on February 21, 1952. As Churchill related to
Moran: "I took up the telephone when I woke an hour ago, and I couldn't
think of the words I wanted. Wrong words seemed to come into my
head, but I was quite clear what was happening and did not say them." 46
This is a classic example of what neurologists term "expressive apha-
sia." It almost invariably signifies disease referable to the left middle
cerebral artery of a right-handed person. This vessel is one of the two
major branches of the carotid artery, which (as opposed to the vertebral-
basilar artery system described earlier) supplies the more lateral portion
of the brain, specifically the temporal and parietal lobes.
Viewed as a continuum of disease, what this last episode under-
scores is the diffuse nature of Churchill's cerebrovascular insufficiency.
First, in 1949 a stroke had occurred on account of a small penetrating
artery occlusion deep in the left half of the brain. Second, decreased
blood flow to both halves of the back of the brain manifested itself as
early as 1950. Now, large-vessel disease of the more lateral surface of the
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left side of the brain was clearly evident. The fourth event, a major
stroke in 1953, would occur in still another location, deep in the brain on
the right side. The second and third events were attributed to large-
vessel disease; the first and fourth were associated with small-vessel
changes seen in hypertensive individuals. Churchill's cerebrovascular
insufficiency, then, was clearly a pervasive condition, with ominous
implications for his evolving dementia and subsequent conduct in
office.
The 1952 stroke warning drew attention to what was by then an
overriding question: when would Churchill retire? Moran recognized
that they had dodged too many bullets already; something more than
merely patching up his patient was now required. Accordingly, he
sought out some of the prime minister's closest contacts for advice-
among them Lord Salisbury (a high-ranking cabinet member), Jock
Colville (private secretary to the prime minister), and Alan Lascelles
(his parliamentary private secretary). All agreed that Churchill should
resign but ruefully acknowledged the difficulty of getting him to do
S047-and this was but five months into what became a four-year
tenure.
Their pessimism was justified. Churchill simply refused to step
down until the work he felt only he could do was done. Three issues
preoccupied him to the virtual exclusion of all others: reestablishing a
meaningful partnership with the United States, as befitted his dream of
unity among English-speaking peoples; effecting a meaningful detente
with the Soviet Union; and worrying whether either would come to pass
before he was goaded into retirement.
Churchill's daughter described the emotional tug of war that
haunted her father during his entire second administration. Fits of
depression and self-reproach on bad days alternated during better ones
with a stubborn resolve to continue in office. The ailing prime minister
was once heard to remark that he meant to carry on until "either things
become much better, or I become much worse." 48 He made this com-
ment in 1954, but it was representative of his thinking from the moment
he took office.
In truth, neither alternative weighed heavily in Churchill's think-
ing when he ultimately did retire, for neither did things get that much
better, nor (at least to his own way of thinking) did he get all that much
worse. For four years his pathologically enhanced denial of the implica-
tions of his disease had effectively eliminated any consideration of
resigning. Not that he was altogether unaware of his restricted abilities;
yet one limitation of such afflicted individuals is their inability to gauge
the quality of their own performance realistically. What limitations
Churchill perceived were (only he believed) both minor and manage-
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able. "I require more prodding to mental effort," he admitted. "I forget
names, ... people whose names I know as well as my own." 49
Fearing personal retribution in a face-to-face confrontation with his
increasingly irascible patient, Moran drafted a letter to Churchill on
March 12, 1952, for the express purpose of reminding him of the "insta-
bility of his cerebral circulation" that might be increased by what he
termed "excessive mental effort." 50 To his chagrin, Churchill con-
tinued to deny his illness, while reminding Moran that he was still
useful as the world's senior statesman, if not altogether indispensable.
That belief became so essential to his sense of self-worth that he
demanded both sedatives (barbiturates) and stimulants (amphetamines)
to get him over any unavoidable hurdles: "I must have a clear head
tomorrow for my speech.... I shall want three 'majors' to get me
through [it]. I'm short of ideas; they don't come to me as easily as they
did." 51 It was left to his worried physician to contain the irrepressible
tides of aging as best he could at the same time that he painfully
watched the government blunder from one crisis to another. "The
weakness in the Prime Minister's administration has taken everybody
by surprise," Moran lamented. "Churchill will go on squandering what
is left of his capital until he goes bankrupt.... The unmistakable signs
of old age are apparent ... and yet he has no intention of giving up." 52
The pressing nature of that issue abated somewhat in early 1953
with an inexplicable improvement in Churchill's condition, coupled
with his renewed zest for exercising leadership. Moran thought that he
had uncovered a clue to the temporary improvement: Anthony Eden
had gone to the United States for surgery (related to two previous
unsuccessful gallbladder operations), obliging Churchill himself to take
over at the Foreign Office and giving him a new lease on life. His
additional duties as acting foreign secretary were like a breath of fresh
air for this septuagenarian, who had been unable to find a forum for his ·
talents in domestic arenas so foreign to him.
Churchill's spirits were further bolstered in early March 1953 when,
with the death of Josef Stalin, he perceived that the time might be ripe
for a reconciliation with the Soviets through their new leadership. Here
was an opportunity that might not recur; indeed, Churchill thought of
little else but how to exploit it for both political and personal gain.53
Besides, it diverted the press from its increasing criticism of his inability
to produce any coherent policy in economic matters. This singular
preoccupation with leaving a lasting contribution to world peace boded
well for preserving Churchill's self-image but poorly for other issues
outside his one-dimensional thinking.
In a word, Eden's illness and absence temporarily legitimized the
delusion Churchill had held all along-that he was indeed indispens-
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able. Though he had designated Eden as his heir, he still regarded him in
a fashion typical of older men for younger subordinates. He had been
compelled grudgingly to acknowledge his protege's opinions in the past;
it now buoyed the prime minister's confidence not to be directly ex-
posed to them. Despite his foreign secretary's previously expressed
reservations, Churchill leaped at the opportunity to implement his
plans for meeting the Soviet Union halfway and drawing the United
States into his plan.
So the issue of resignation remained unsolved during the first half of
1953. In June, however, the matter was again brought to the forefront by
a fourth-and by far the most serious-breakdown in the blood supply
to Churchill's brain. On June 24, 1953, he suffered a second stroke,
manifested by weakness of the left side of his face and slurring of his
speech. The initial symptoms were so slight that Churchill even man-
aged to get through a scheduled cabinet meeting two hours later. Yet
what happened over the next three days was compatible with a condi-
tion the neurologist would identify as a "stroke-in-evolution": the
weakness progressed to involve his arm and leg.54 "Look! My hand is
clumsy," the prime minister cried out with alarm. Transferring his cigar
to his left hand, he made a wavering attempt to put it to his lips, only to
find that some loss of power and dexterity had developed since the day
before. More worrisome still, he was noted on June 27 to be "dragging
his left leg." 55
This last illness was laden with disturbing implications. First, from
the medical perspective, deep-seated strokes on both sides of the brain
portended the development of the "lacunar state" described above. That
syndrome often includes a loss of emotional control, with unprovoked
outbursts of laughing or crying.56 Three weeks after the stroke Moran
described what he termed"another disconcerting relic" of his patient's
illness: "He is liable to become emotional, so that without warning ...
he [inexplicably] 'blubs like a child.'" Indeed, Moran had to persuade
Churchill not to convene any cabinet meetings for fear that if someone
made a speech saying how glad they were to have him back, he would
break down.57
Second, Churchill had suffered at least four separate transient is-
chemic attacks and strokes over a four-year period, involving not only
the large vessels to the left side and both posterior halves of the brain but
also the small vessels deep within it. In effect, from the standpoint of
vascular supply to the brain, Britain's prime minister was running on
only one cylinder by 1953-his right carotid artery.
Third, stroke victims are particularly prone to periods of apathy and
depression. Given Churchill's premorbid personality profile, Storr's
assertion that cerebral atherosclerosis eventually "broke down his de-
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fenses against his lifelong depression" is understandable-not to men-
tion its impact on his leadership.58 Frequently thereafter, executive
function came to a virtual standstill. By way of example, Colville
reminded Moran that he had shown the prime minister a number of
Foreign Office telegrams "which a month ago would have riveted his
attention" i now he hardly glanced at them. He read novels instead or, to
use his own words, "merely doodled," taking holidays when he was
supposed to be making decisions.59
One immediate result of his illness was the need to postpone for at
least six months the Bermuda Conference at which Churchill had hoped
the Americans would finally agree to later talks with the Russians. He
was distraught over the imposed delay, for he mistakenly believed that
he was at the peak of his influence with world leaders, particularly the
Soviets, just before the stroke occurred. Yet was anything truly lost?
Probably not. Churchill's plan was a vainglorious and futile gesture to
recapture the past. In the opinion of most observers (including key
members of his own government), he clearly overestimated his influ-
ence with both Soviet and American leadership at the time.6o
Moreover, his uncharacteristically pacific stance toward the Rus-
sians seemed inexplicable to many at the time, including Beaverbrook:
"Like Paul on the road to Damascus, Churchill had suffered a blinding
revelation ... that had overturned some of the convictions by which he
had conducted his political life and thoughts for half a century....
Churchill had set the heather on fire [in his celebrated Iron Curtain
speech at Fulton, Missouri, in 1946]. Now it seemed he was sending for
the fire engine." 61 Why?
Contemporary neuropsychologists might offer one plausible expla-
nation: Churchill's vision of a detente between the superpowers, or-
chestrated by himself, served to bolster his self-image. Having led his
nation to victory in the war, he would embellish that feat by obtaining
an assurance between East and West that such horrors would not be
repeated. This would be the culmination of his political career. Viewed
in that perspective, his "revelation" offered him a final opportunity to
do what he had at one time done best: meeting with world historical
figures to decide the fate of humankind.
The eminent scholar A.J.P. Taylor spoke for many historians in
taking a more cynical view of the matter: "In his last senile days as
Prime Minister, Churchill once more announced the need for recon-
ciliation with Soviet Russia, and in particular emphasized that he was
the man to accomplish it.... He lived for crisis ... and when crisis did
not exist, he strove to invent it It is difficult to ~iscem in him any
element of creative leadership Churchill had no vision for the
Winston Churchill 133
future, only a tenacious defense of the past.... He was no beginning,
but an end-a fulfiller, not a prophet." 62
In assessing Churchill's skill as a strategist, still others emphasized
his rigid preoccupation with single issues. "Churchill always had a
deep-rooted tendency when concentrating on one problem to forget the
other problems which were bound up with its solution," the military
historian B. H. Liddell Hart has written. "He lacked the power of
relating one part to another, and the parts to the whole."63 Here is one
critical allusion to a quality that explicitly parallels the limitations of
the dementia victimis ability to assess things in proportion. In that
sense, an aging prime minister's perseveration with Russian detente
and American partnership represented as much a form of self-delusion
as a failure to employ the abstract attitude in weighing the implications
of his actions. 64
It is perhaps understandable that Churchill, rather than Eisen-
hower, would feel pressed to assure a culmination of unity between
English-speaking nations. Having become the junior partner in this
relationship, Great Britain needed the United States (and Churchill
needed its president) far more than the reverse. Not that Eisenhower
was altogether unaware of Churchill's motivations: "Winston is
[merely] trying to relive the days of World WarIL"65 As early as January
1952 he had despaired of his old friend's condition after their first
meeting since Churchill had reassumed office. "He simply will not
think in terms of today," Eisenhower lamented. "He no longer absorbs
new ideas." A year later the president confided in his diary the hope that
Churchill would withdraw and leave the reins of power to younger
men.66
What Eisenhower did not know in 1953 was that the prime minister
had suffered a stroke that June. Nor was he alone. Professionally sanc-
tioned deception had ~gainbecome the order of the day. Initially, Moran
and his consultants agreed to a vague medical bulletin concerning "a
disturbance of the cerebral circulation," while Butler gambled on public
assurances that merely lightening his duties would result in a "rapid
recovery." Either way, the bulletin of June 17, 1953, made no mention of
a stroke as such.67 Though Macmillan thought this appropriate, his
explanation borders on naivete: "Out of chivalry to Eden ... [Churchill]
must [not resign] unless he feels in conscience unable to serve.... To do
this it is not necessary to walk or make speeches."68 Macmillan's ap-
parent inability to see the hollowness of his own assertion is astound-
ing. Certainly there was more to be weighed than a man's abilities to
"walk and make speeches" when assessing a prime minister's lead-
ership capability. Nonetheless, Churchill's preoccupation with these
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minor functions dominated his conduct from that point onward. There
was little concern about the quality of his leadership so long as he was
able to put up a good front.
Moran remained a party to the deception. "If the Prime Minister is
to carry on ... I now agree with Salisbury that the less we say about the
strokes the better," he confided in his diary. Yet his conscience com-
pelled him to view Churchill's illness with foreboding, even if he
allowed himself to playa critical role in the cover-up to the very end. "It
is strange," he concluded, "that no one around the Prime Minister
seems to grasp what is the exact nature of his disability. This is not an
acute illness from which he may recover completely. He will never
again be the same man as he was before the stroke, because the clot in
the artery has cut off some blood which went to his brain and [which]
was the ultimate source of all his activities." 69
If a chosen few knew the facts of Churchill's illness and still failed
to grasp its full significance, the overwhelming majority of Britons
were left entirely in the dark. A Daily Mirror headline on August 17
demanded the truth about Churchill's condition: "Is there any reason
why the British people should not be told the facts about the health of
their Prime Minister? ... Let us know whether Sir Winston Churchill
is fit enough to lead us!" 70 The next day, as if on cue, Churchill
attended his first cabinet meeting since the stroke. Although he ap-
peared to handle himself well, Moran found him in a predictable state
of depression the following day.71 His inability to concentrate and his
distaste for work were manifestations of that, for sustained expen-
ditures of effort sap the limited reserves of the dementia vic1:im and
depression sufferer alike. His old· nemesis would become even more
prevalent in the days ahead.
Subsequent cabinet meetings on August 25 and September 8, how-
ever, reinforced Churchill's belief that he could still handle his job.
Informed medical opinion was less optimistic. Sir John Parkinson, a
cardiologist at the London Hospital, was shocked by the degree to which
Churchill had aged and felt certain that he could never again act effec-
tively as prime minister. The esteemed neurologist Lord Brain agreed.72
Yet Churchill simply refused to surrender, believing that he had vital
contributions to make to the world situation. If some perceive this
attitude as a demonstration of strength of character and will, perhaps
one clinical psychologist's assessment of deni~l reveals its negative
side: "The person using the mechanism of denial should not be seen as a
courageous person. A courageous person realistically appraises the sit-
uation ... and moves ahead." 73
From the perspective of the Conservative party's appraisal of his
abilities, Churchill's speech at the party conference at Margate in Oc-
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tober 1953 was an orchestrated success. As was his custom, he had
prepared assiduously. Moreover, one physician was in attendance to
spray his throat, and Moran was charged with "inventing" a pill to
insure against embarrassment at the rostrum. Moran responded by
administering the wonder drug of the decade, Benzedrine, which was
then being prescribed for all kinds of ailments. 74 "It completely cleared
away the muzzy feeling in my head," Churchill exclaimed to Moran. "I
felt just as I did before the stroke. It gave me great confidence." 75
A sense of enhanced mental powers and self-confidence are two of
the most prominent effects of amphetamines like Benzedrine. Yet the
perceived cognitive benefits are gained at the expense of a distressing
trade-off: psychological dependency that eventually becomes a bona
fide addictive state if the practice is continued. The need to make the
best possible appearance may have been paramount in Churchill's
thinking, but his premorbid personality, which included a neurotic
hypochondriasis, was an equally critical factor. He was psychologically
"hooked" from the start. From that point forward, the variability of the
prime minister's performance reflected both his underlying neurologic
condition and the drugs he used to conceal it.
This was how matters stood by the time he had sufficiently "recov-
ered" from his stroke to attend the long-awaited Bermuda Conference in
December 1953. To no one's surprise, the results of the meeting were
disappointing. Only a Russian proposal for a five-power conference
early the following year was accepted-and even that was to be a
meeting of foreign ministers, not a summit of heads of state as Churchill
had hoped.76 Since he had failed to sway the Americans and been denied
center stage at the next planned meeting, it is little wonder that when
Churchill reported to the Commons after his return, he was described
by one wag as "Father Christmas without any presents." 77
Churchill had not been as well at the conference as his physical
recovery seemed to imply. On December 5 he complained that he
felt "muddled and stupid." The ever present depression tugged at his
psyche. He had none of his old tenacity left, being described by his own
doctor as "nearly played out." To make matters worse, he suffered yet
another transient ischemic attack in the same vascular distribution
responsible for the episode of aphasia he had experienced in 1952,
manifested on this occasion by numbness of the fingers of his right
hand. 78
The new year brought no improvement in either the prime minis-
ter's medical condition or his political standing. In April 1954 he deliv-
ered a poor speech in the House of Commons during a debate on the
hydrogen bomb and, in the debate that followed, played into the hands
of those critics who insisted he was no longer fit. 79 Even the normally
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supportive Times reported that the prime minister's "sense of occasion
had deserted him sadly." This was Churchill's first major stumble in
public, and his depression recurred. In May 1954 he said: "I no longer
find life attractive. There is no fun in it. People are too base or too stupid
to master the new ways of the modem world." 80 Yet mastering the
ways of the modern world was precisely what Churchill himself could
no longer do.
For one thing, he was reluctant to deal with new and traditionally
"unacceptable" powers such as China, referring scornfully to its leaders
as "little yellow men." Not only did Churchill's rigid view of what
characterized "genuine historical figures" such as himself prevent
him from acknowledging other emerging powers in the world; he now
evinced a lack of interest, even an inability, to assimilate new facts as
they arose. The old imperial prejudices were simply too ingrained in his
psyche. In essence, he refused to be educated on issues that did not
interest him.
Yet he perseverated on those that did. "It is his belief-and this he
holds with fierce, almost religious intensity-that he, and he alone, can
save the world from a frightful war," Moran recalled, at the same time
his patient refused to confront the issue of his declining political stand-
ing at home.81 Pollsters predicted a Conservative defeat in the next
election unless a new government and a new prime minister emerged.
Given the upturn of economic indicators by 1954, the public's disen-
chantment with Churchill's conduct must have been a significant issue
in itself. The continued uncertainty about his resignation, discussed
openly in the press, had in Macmillan's opinion caused the government
"to cease to function with full efficiency ... as no one was coordinating
policy." It was only the business of meeting the Soviets and drawing the
Americans into his plan that kept him going.82
The implication was obvious even to his most supportive associ-
ates: Churchill was attempting to shield his weaknesses behind past
experience in handling the accouterments of power, without giving
much thought to its essence. Even though he deluded himself afterward
that his speech at the next party conference was"a huge success," those
in attendance did not see it as such; what they had really wanted to hear
was when he planned to retire.83 Following his stroke in 1953, Churchill
had used the party's and the public's responses to his speeches and
appearances to justify his staying on. Now that those responses were
unfavorable, he ignored them and still refused to resign.
That decision was significant for several reasons. First, Churchill's
perseveration with remaining in office long enough to meet the world's
leaders "without agenda," as he termed it, would allow him maximum
exposure with a minimum of effort. Preferring the drama of a face-to-
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face confrontation (with media coverage, of course), he was unwilling to
work through the necessary preparation required, depending instead on
his dwindling prestige. That formula was at once naive and delusional.
"I believe I can wheedle Eisenhower," he mused. "Then I shall be ready
for the Russians." 84 In his view, he needed no further preparation for a
summit meeting. Second, Churchill's endogenous depression, always a
threat to his well-being even in healthier times, was now activated time
and again-both by the continual reminders that he was no longer fit for
the job and by those increasingly rare expenditures of energy that
invariably left him flat the following day. Finally, and most obvious to
political observers of the time, he no longer had the tenacity to pursue
issues of foreign policy and defense that would have captured his imag-
ination at any earlier period, much less to consider the less interesting
but pressing domestic matters of economics or party reorganization.
In the end, even Churchill's skills as a speaker began to fail him. Just
one week before his eightieth birthday, in a speech at Woodford, he
inexplicably let the public in on a bit of a secret history. Under the
influence of drugs prescribed by his physician, the prime minister rashly
volunteered that he had ordered Field Marshal Montgomery to stack the
surrendered German arms in May 1945 so that, in his own words, "they
could easily be issued again to the German soldiers whom we should
have to work with if the Soviet advance continued." 85 The timing of
this revelation, coming during a period when he was seeking in vain to
bring the West's leaders together with the Soviets to effect a lasting
detente, underscored the perverse contradictions in Churchill's con-
duct. Obviously concerned that posterity should remember him as one
of the first to sound the alarm against Soviet aggression, he was attempt-
ing in the same breath to achieve reconciliation with that menace-
again, partly for the sake of his future place in history. Preoccupied with
a favorable historical appraisal, he undermined his only remaining
perceived usefulness on the political stage. How were the Soviets to
treat Churchill now, after he had admitted to such duplicity and cyn-
icism in 1945? If he were to represent Britain, how could meaningful
talks even be conducted?
Only a firm shove from such a close supporter as Harold Macmillan
ultimately effected a remedy that the Conservative party should have
insisted on long before. Macmillan's new position as defense minister
now afforded a despairing vantage point from which to assess Church-
ill's failing powers. Moran became privy to Macmillan's resolve on
January 9, 1955: "You know, Moran, " he said, "Winston ought to resign.
Since I became Minister of Defense I have found that he can no longer
handle the complicated matters properly. He can't do his job as Prime
Minister as it ought to be done. Winston has missed so many curtain
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calls when he could have gone with everyone applauding that it won't
be easy now." 86
In the very week that Churchill would finally announce his retire-
ment, Stalin's successor, Georgi Malenkov, fell from power. To the
exasperated prime minister's way of thinking, his last opportunity to
meet with the Soviets-his very reason for persevering-was now de-
nied him. Not that such a summit would ever have taken place, given
the evidence cited in this review and the Woodford blunder. Still,
Malenkov's unanticipated fall seemed to unmask the futility of it all.
On April 6, 1955, Winston Churchill therefore resigned-a bit of history
long overdue.
Some appraisals of Churchill's last four years in office, perhaps out
of deference to an aging hero, have been less than critica1.87 Perhaps,
too, the publication of Lord Moran's diaries just one year after Church-
ill's death evoked supportive attempts to reconstruct a tarnished image.
Sir John Colville set the pattern for the reconstructionists: "Ifhe had not
achieved all the goals for which he had striven, he could still claim an
unusually large score." 88 Yet before tallying the ledger, consider the
host of unsettled issues that Colville cited to justify Churchill's staying
in office: (1) determining the impact of nuclear arms on strategic consid-
erations; (2) improving Anglo-American relations; (3) unifying Church-
ill's concept of military commitments with Eden's vis-a.-vis the Suez
Canal Zone; and (4) ending the Cold War.
With regard to the first, Churchill has been credited with identify-
ing a new set of strategic implications, outlined in the 1954 Chiefs of
Staff White Paper on global strategy. If Churchill's influence on its
publication is not disputed, the originality of his contribution is less
obvious; he had merely elaborated points that must have been obvious
to any policymaker in the new age of nuclear armaments. Concerning
the second, no discernible improvement in relations with America's
leaders was forthcoming. On the third, it was Churchill (and not Eden)
who effectively surrendered his position with regard to Suez.89 Fourth,
and most distressing for the prime minister, his efforts to effect a
detente with the Soviet Union were essentially ignored.
In but one of the four issues, then, can Churchill's influence even be
acknowledged. Moreover, he evinced only passing interest in economic
recovery at home and European unity abroad. Although the economic
yardsticks were favorable at the time of his retirement, Churchill could
hardly take credit for that. As for a united Europe, his vacillation had a
profoundly negative impact that effectively clouded his earlier vision.9o
To be sure, it would be difficult to find fault with Churchill's view of the
future. "Something like a genuine detente has been brought about by
those that followed in the trail he blazed," Macmillan later wrote.91 But
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it was naive for either man to expect that Churchill alone could assure
British leadership in detente with Russia or partnership between the
two English-speaking peoples. The war had transformed England into a
second-rate power, and it was among the aging prime minister's princi-
pal failings that he refused to accept this obvious fact.
That may explain in part Churchill's preoccupation during his final
year in office with acquiring the hydrogen bomb. Not only did he believe
that its supposed deterrent effect made war less likely; he hoped that
possession of such a weapon would improve his country's standing
vis-a-vis the United States and assure Britain's position as still a great
power. Yet this quest for legitimacy was crucial to more than his patri-
otic ambitions; it was crucial also to his self-image as a leader.
Churchill's tragic flaw-admitted by even his closest confidants
and now argued to have been accentuated by disease-was the over-
estimation he accorded his own influence. Leaders in the United States
and Europe welcomed and revered him much more as Winston Church-
ill than as the prime minister of Great Britain.92 Yet he was a very
different man by then, as everyone close to him knew. To their chagin,
he never perceived either fact. As in the case of Roosevelt at Yalta, one
might argue that it was not so much the tactical shortcomings of his
conduct that deserve notice; rather, it was the unrealistic nature of the
goals he set for himself and his country. And like Roosevelt, Churchill
put too much faith in his ability to sway other international leaders in
face-to-face encounters.
The parallels between these two very ill men at the end of their
respective political careers are striking. Roosevelt was confident that he
understood Stalin; if the Soviet leader were simply given all he asked,
surely he would help to build a better world after the war. With Church-
ill's attempts to manipulate Eisenhower and Malenkov in a similar
fashion, one senses a disturbing feeling of historical deja VUe To the very
end of their respective careers, both leaders embraced similar preten-
sions, attempting to hammer out delicate and complex international
agreements solely through the strength of their personalities.
Having established the illusory character of Churchill's leadership
during his last tenure in office, we may now address the ultimate
question: how could a person of such previously extraordinary political
intuition have misread the signs of his last years so completely? This
review has c.ontributed to that answer in the form of a "second opin-
ion": the aged prime minister of Great Britain was suffering from a
well-defined medical condition that largely precluded his making an
objective assessment of his political and diplomatic alternatives. This is
not to suggest that Churchill's intellectual abilities were so compro-
mised that he lacked the intelligence to understand the issues with
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which he dealt. Rather, early signs of dementia manifested themselves
in more subtle ways. Depression became more prevalent, obstinacy and
one-dimensional thinking more typical, and denial pervasive. The bull-
dog had lost his tenacity-and with it, his taste for the fight. As Church-
ill's secretary quipped on one occasion: "Considering how much a
Prime Minister had to do, and how little Winston does, I think we have
been quite clever." 93
Individuals afflicted with dementia may subconsciously postpone
the inevitable progression of their affliction by involving themselves in
work or other forms of social interaction. Some may even approach
near-normal levels of activity that serve to hold in check many ele-
ments in their disturbed thought processes.94 In that sense alone,
Churchill's last four years in office were at best therapeutic for his
condition. The very requirements of his job assured a degree of personal
involvement that may have ameliorated the inexorable physiologic
progression of disease. Each orchestrated success served to augment the
failing prime minister's denial that anything was seriously wrong with
his conduct in office. His oratory, though weakened, was still stirring.
Aware that this skill above all others marked his greatness, Churchill
used the assiduously prepared spoken word to bolster his flagging self-
esteem.
One medical expert tangentially alludes to the problem as Churchill
may have subconsciously perceived it: "Two components of self-
esteem which are often extremely important to the elderly or demented
person are his measure of whether he feels his life has any value to
himself and others, and the more subtle ... measure of his capacity to
deal successfully with physical disease."95 The first, quite simply,
explains Churchill's motivation for acting as he did. The second was
secured in his own mind through the use of central-nervous-system
stimulants and the realization that he continued to make apparent
recoveries from each of the strokes and transient ischemic attacks that
plagued him. In relation to what we know of his depression, merely
remaining in office was one way of maintaining enough self-esteem to
ameliorate the effects of this recurring nemesis. Churchill's delusions
concerning detente with the Soviet Union and a unification of the
English-speaking peoples at least fostered the hope that he would again
be useful, sustaining him against the inroads of depression and progres-
sive dementia that ate away at his tenuous reserves.
To be sure, political circumstances came to Churchill's rescue
along the way. His foreign policy escaped bankruptcy, thanks to the
efforts of a skilled foreign secretary. Had the measure of the govern-
ment's success been weighed solely on the issues of Russian detente,
European unity, and relations with the United States, historians would
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have judged these years even more unfavorably than ,they do. For
Churchill's own reputation, Great Britain's diminished status as a
world power was paradoxically rather fortunate. Her new role one level
below the two superpowers appeared to mirror her prime minister's
increasingly compromised abilities. No historian would argue that he
was responsible for the dissolution of the British Empire or her devolu-
tion as a superpower; the war had done that. Yet this is precisely why his
deterioration as a leader has received so little attention: Great Britain
was suffering from the same circumstance. In that sense alone, Winston
Churchill was quite in step with the role of the nation he governed.
Psychology or physiology: which best accounts for a leader's be-
havior once he becomes ill? The intent of the three foregoing chapters is
to suggest that the two are not mutually exclusive.'For the short run, it
is obvious that either may impact on thought processes, emotions, and
attention span. Less appreciated are the long-term effects of illness on
personality. No doubt a proper understanding of character must begin
with the psychoanalytical. Indeed, there is little merit in implicating
disease at all unless the pathology in itself can be shown to have affected
those preexisting psychological factors that govern personality. That is
one reason the medical case studies of Stalin, Wilson, and Churchill
have such ironic relevance: all three leaders suffered from the same
illness, one that exacerbated certain attributes of their character and
adversely affected their private and official conduct-with unfortunate
ramifications for twentieth-century history.
Hypertension is of course a very prevalent malady continuing to
afflict a sizable portion of the population. Franklin D. Roosevelt fell
victim to the same disease in the end, though that had more to do with
transiently altering his thought process than affecting his personality
per see More ironic still is the manner in which the respective illnesses
of these four leaders were revealed to the public they served. Whereas
Wilson's, Roosevelt's and Churchill's medical conditions were deliber-
ately withheld in societies that champion openness and an informed
public, Stalin's final illness was depicted by the press in abundant detail,
despite the oppressive restrictions of a totalitarian regime that elevated
secrecy to high art.
The irony grows even larger in relation to the issue of declaring
disability. Whereas Grayson refused to certify an obviously disabled
President Wilson as such, those attending Stalin, as one of their first
official acts, declared that the stricken premier would thereafter be
removed from any decisions affecting affairs of state. Though Stalin was
obviously terminally ill, it bears remembering that in the initial stages
of Wilson's collapse, no one was certain that he was not. As for Church-
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ill, the power of his personality alone prevented Moran from acting on
what his intuition and medical acumen made all too clear.
These peculiarities aside, the available record now affirms that
long-standing hypertension played a major role in prematurely aging all
three leaders and accentuating certain features of their personalities. To
be sure, Stalin's premorbid paranoia was so pervasive that, with or
without an aging brain, he might have behaved as he did. Nor is there
much doubt that Churchill's recurring bouts of depression would have
. continued to plague him, just as Wilson's intrinsic self-righteousness
perplexed his opponents and supporters alike. Yet to ignore the adverse
influence of malignant hypertension on brain function and behavior
would render any retrospective psychological analyses of these men
incomplete. Absent that influence, perhaps the worst attributes of their
character would not have proved so intractable in the end.
PART III
Drugs and Diplomacy
Substance abuse has reached epidemic proportions during the past
decade, transcending class, race, and nationality. Long before the need
became apparent to publicize the problem, and unknown to virtually
everyone at the time, a few national leaders indulged in drugs while
in office. As prime minister of Great Britain, Anthony Eden admitted
to consuming large quantities of Benzedrine during the Suez Canal
crisis of 1956, and John F. Kennedy received frequent injections of
amphetamines throughout his presidency. To date, the pathogra-
pher's attention has focused on Eden's intermittent bile duct obstruc-
tion and Kennedy's adrenal gland insufficiency. Yet those diseases
probably had less impact on their private lives and public conduct
than the drugs they took to excess.
For four long years as Winston Churchill's foreign secretary,
Anthony Eden chafed under the yoke of his own subservient position
to an obstreperous political godfather and his nation's increasingly
subordinate role In international affairs. Shortly after Churchill's re-
tirement in 1955, an opportunity arose to redress both grievances
when Egypt seized the Suez Canal. Suddenly afforded a convenient
excuse to show the flag in the Middle East at the expense of Gamal
Abdel Nasser, Eden jumped at the chance, flagrantly rejecting both
the personal and official diplomacy that he had used so successfully
while serving as Churchill's foreign secretary. That impetuous leap
into what proved to be political obscurity was influenced as much by
his unstable temperament and poor health as by geopolitical events.
Yet one other little-known factor contributed to his inexplicable be-
havior: at the peak of the crisis, Eden was hooked on amphetamines.
If Suez cost Anthony Eden his political career, many commen-
tators believe that John F. Kennedy's televised debates with Richard
Nixon in 1960 won him the presidential election. A British physician,
Hugh L'Etang, embellished that pervasive belief with what may seem
a simplistic appraisal of his own: "Because of an absence of appropri-
ate make-up, Nixon's 'six o'clock shadow' accentuated on television
his sinister and somber characteristics, whilst Kennedy, the victim of
chronic pain and glandular deficiency, was carefully stage managed
and programmed to radiate charm and vigour." I Taking that summa-
tion beyond its "face value" raises more questions than it answers.
Had previous observers fallen prey to the ease with which Nixon
made himself such a ready target, while overlooking the real reasons
behind Kennedy's vitality? Just how was Kennedy "stage managed
and programmed?" Was there more behind the engaging demeanor of
the King of Camelot than his handlers let on-or even knew?
The search for answers leads to a German emigre physician by
the name of Max Jacobson, whom Kennedy had met a week before
the first debate. The doctor's list of patients reads like a social regis-
ter. On that day, he added a future president to his stable of affluent
socialites. That would have serious implications for Kennedy's
health, because the treatment Jacobson administered to his patients
was invariably the same: injections of various combinations of stimu-
lants, including amphetamines and steroids. Only a few scholars have
made reference to this disturbing indictment.2 Others have simply
concluded that the veil of secrecy surrounding Kennedy's health was
so effective that the entire story would never be told.3 But no pathog-
rapher has examined the impact of drugs on Kennedy's conduct in
any detail. As in the case of Eden before him, previous accounts may
have focused on the wrong disease.
CHAPTER 7
Anthony Eden:
Metamorphosis of a Statesman
Winston Churchill's role in Anthony Eden's failure was by no means
inconsequential, for theirs had become an increasingly untenable rela-
tionship as the younger man agonized over the prize his aging mentor
dangled before him. Many of Churchill's associates suspected that the
prime minister enjoyed playing upon his protege's increasingly fragile
emotions. Despite Eden's formidable reputation as a diplomat, he had
long been regarded by some as a spoiled brat. "You can have a scene with
a child of great violence ... and ten minutes later the whole thing is
forgotten," Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh once observed. "This is not possible
with grownups, but it's a regular thing with Anthony Eden." 1 To make
matters worse, Eden's longing to rid himself of Churchill's oppressive
shadow was only magnified by the Old Man's attempts to monopolize
any event that lent itself to favorable public exposure. This recurring
theme in their relationship suggests that between 1951 and 1955 the
political stage had become too small to accommodate them both.
Yet another vexing problem chipped away at Eden's wounded van-
ity, first as foreign secretary and later as prime minister: Britain's
postwar relationship with the United States and recently acquired sub-
servience to its stronger ally. His preeminent biographer, David Carl-
ton, believes that Eden's unwillingness to accept the role of a junior
partner was of paramount importance in understanding the last years of
his political career.2 That view is shared by Terence Robertson and
others: "Eden ... was resentful in the presence of [Secretary of State
John Foster] Dulles that his country's decline from greatness should
deprive him of the right to appear as the decisive presence in world
affairs; and that Dulles, representing a new and great power, was given
to tactlessly reminding Eden on occasion that despite the authority he
had once enjoyed, he now played a lesser role." 3
Might the effects of Eden's subordination to the likes of a Churchill
or a Dulles have carried over into the diplomatic arena? Did the con-
stant exasperation of playing second fiddle, on both a personal and a
diplomatic level, push Eden to bolster his flagging self-confidence with
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amphetamines? Could a combination of perceived inferiority and harm-
ful drugs that magnified his crisis orientation have been enough to
foster irrational policies in Eden's relations with Egypt and the United
States over the Suez Canal? Unanswerable questions, perhaps, but such
a scenario should not be rejected out of hand.
At what date Eden surrendered psychologically to the support of
stimulants is not clear, but certainly after 1953 one can trace a critical
acceleration in qualities associated with one such drug he is known to
have used to excess. Benzedrine, the first member of its class known to
induce central-nervous-system stimulation, had found its way into
medicine as a stimulant and euphoric in the late 1930s. At one point, it
was perceived to be as versatile a remedy as aspirin; a 1946 study listed
thirty-nine accepted clinical uses for the drug.4 Only later did Ben-
zedrine's dependency-producing properties become apparent; subse-
quently its use was drastically curtailed, and appropriately so. Accord-
ing to one leading pharmacologic authority: "Too freely available, too
readily prescribed, and probably more treacherous than any other ad-
dicting substance, amphetamines have damaged individuals far more
than they have helped. 11 5 These are disquieting observations indeed
when applied to a leader who admitted to being dependent on such
drugs in the midst of a grave international crisis.
Like so many others who abused the drug, Eden chose when and
how much of it to take.6 That he self-destructed as a result is more than
plausible. For one thing, amphetamine-induced mood changes correlate
with the underlying temperament of the individual. Though an average
dose may have only negligible effects on a person of calm demeanor,
even small amounts impact dramatically on the high-strung, tempera-
mental, anxiety-ridden individual, a personality profile Anthony Eden
appears to have exemplied.7 For another, restlessness, anxiety, insom-
nia, confusion, and fear to the point of panic are among the drug's
adverse short-term psychological effects.8 There is, then, cause for more
than passing interest in the observation of an associate who confided
that "the most forbidding aspect of Eden ... was his growing irascibility
and restlessness. 11 9
The reasons why people take amphetamines reflect Eden's situation
to the letter: the physical need to stay awake; the psychological need to
combat anxiety, depression, and feelings of inferiority; and the practical
need to think clearly and act forcefully. Laboring through the Suez crisis
with less than five hours of sleep a night, perceiving condescension in
the American president and his secretary of state, and resolved to send
Nasser a forceful message without losing face, the anxiety-ridden prime
minister needed a psychological crutch to bolster his self-confidence.
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Benzedrine offered a ready solution for one who had already been living
on his nerves for some time.
This is of singular importance in understanding Eden's perplexing
transformation during the 1950s. The early effects of twenty to thirty
milligrams daily (at least two but no more than six tablets) include
wakefulness, alertness, and a decreased sense of fatigue. Superficially,
amphetamines also increase initiative, embolden self-confidence, and
enhance one's ability to concentrate.10 Exceeding that amount, par-
ticularly on an ongoing basis, induces anxiety, irritability, loss of judg-
ment, delusions of persecution, and even a psychological dependency.
In fact, an overt amphetamine psychosis may occur in as short a period
as five days, even when the drug is taken orally at modest doses.!1 Not
that one need postulate a psychosis to understand how adversely Eden's
leadership capabilities could have been affected by amphetamines. The
motive for taking a central-nervous-system stimulant, the type of per-
sonality predisposed to its worst side effects, and the deleterious impact
on his behavior are all a part of the historical record.
Before the international crisis that precipitated Eden's character
disintegration, Great Britain was still a force to be reckoned with in
the Middle East-at least in the minds of archconservative officials in
the government who had nurtured imperialistic pretensions for years.
As the historian Hugh Thomas emphasized: "The word 'empire' was
hardly yet anachronistic. The continuing political weakness of France
and of Europe, combined with the unpopular dogmatism of United
States diplomacy, gave Britain the illusion of greater power than she
actually possessed." 12 This illusion received a substantial jolt when
Nasser unilaterally nationalized the Suez Canal during the spring of
1956 as a response to the decision of the United States and Great Britain
to withdraw from the Aswan Dam project, which Egypt deemed critical
to its economic development.
Britain's distaste for Arab machinations in the Middle East had
already been whetted by Jordan's unexpected dismissal of the British
commander of the Arab Legion in March, a move that Eden viewed as
Nasser-inspired.13 Piqued by the challenge to Britain's waning prestige
Eden had wanted a forceful resolution to that issue, but the United
States had refused to follow his lead. Though both nations paid lip
service to face-saving diplomatic negotiations, the resulting breach
between the two fostered a lingering resentment that contributed to
desultory attempts at best on the part of Great Britain's prime minister
to resolve the Suez conflict.
While ostensibly playing the diplomatic game, Eden fell under the
influence of the French in accepting a conspiratorial plan of military
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intervention to crush Nasser. The indictment of history rests on the fact
that the prime minister promoted the scheme without the knowledge,
much less consent, not only of Eisenhower but of his own government.
Ignoring any negotiated gains being made on the issue, he cynically and
secretly prepared for war. The plan unfolded with the inducement of
Israel to invade the Canal Zone, after which the French and British
entered the conflict disguised as a "peace-keeping" force. Once hostili-
ties began, however, Eden crumbled under Eisenhower's fierce rebuke
and reversed himself completely, after which much of his duplicity in
the affair came to light.
Eden's prior track record only magnifies the tragedy of the Suez
Canal crisis in relation to compromised British leadership. When he was
appointed prime minister in 1956, Eden probably had fewer enemies
than any politician of his day. He had been the obvious successor to an
aging Churchill for so long that few of his colleagues in the cabinet were
prepared to oppose him. Indeed, Eden was said to possess "a silencing
authority" in foreign affairs on the basis of his previous diplomatic
triumphs. 14 At the beginning of his tenure, the Daily Telegraph com-
mented: "Training, knowledge, and courage are the unquestionable
assets of our new Prime Minister." IS
Those assets notwithstanding, there were problems other than
Eden's strained relationship with Churchill that would affect his con-
duct during the Suez crisis. One had already been festering for two years:
conflicts between Dulles and Eden had waxed and waned, but by 1956
their mutual distrust was a permanent fixture in the diplomatic order. It
had come to a head when Eden reneged on his assurance to participate in
an anti-communist alliance with the United· States in the Far East.16
Aside from its unfavorable effect on his relationship with Dulles, such a
move led to later charges that Eden was an appeaser of Communism-a
harsh and painful indictment against a man who had once resigned from
the cabinet of Neville Chamberlain because of his own prime minister's
appeasement of Adolf Hitler.
Still another problem arose during Eden's tenure as foreign secre-
tary. Taking a card from Churchill's hand, he had sought to thrust
Britain into a unique position linking Western Europe with the United
States. That was a vainglorious gesture, considering Britain's depleted
economic resources and its status, in American eyes, as just another
European state. At this pivotal period in its history, Great Britain
seemed to have inherited the worst of both worlds: Europe took Eden
seriously as a neo-isolationist; the United States did not take him
seriously enough but was too polite to say SO.17 Therein lay the seed of
further national and personal humiliation. Even so, few could accuse
Eden of significant misjudgments during his tenure in the Foreign
Anthony Eden 149
office. His performance there stands in stark contrast to his later record
as prime minister. Why, then, the change?
The historiography of this period supplies conflicting answers.
What might be described as the "official" party line on Suez is outlined
in Eden's memoirs and those of his chancellor of the exchequer, Harold
Macmillan. Both blamed the United States for failing to support Britain
in achieving a rapid solution to the crisis, thereby leaving Eden little
alternative but the use of force. 18 Although Nasser claimed that the
cancellation of funding for the Aswan Dam was his main reason for
nationalizing the'canal, Macmillan and Eden saw the seizure in a much
more sinister light. To their way of thinking, Nasser was a reincarnation
of Hitler and Mussolini rolled into one.19
Eden in particular lambasted his critics for failing to draw the
appropriate parallel and see its ultimate implications: "From the onset,
there had been those who were not prepared to see this dispute for what
it was, the denial of an international arrangement recently reaffirmed
by the Egyptian government, and the seizure by force of international
property. They preferred to look upon it as the expression of a nation-
alist mood in a country recently emancipated, for which ... benevolent
allowances must be made." 20 He therefore had to institute a secret plan,
all the while making public references to the need to settle the dispute
by peaceful means. Although Macmillan portrays his prime minister
as showing "the greatest moderation and prudence" at this juncture,
Eden's real intent was unmasked by the following reflection in his
memoirs: "From the start we had to prepare to back our remonstrances
with military actions. The Chiefs of Staff were instructed to get ~eady a
plan and a timetable for an operation designed to occupy and secure the
Canal, should other methods fail." 21
It became immediately apparent, however, that the United States
would not lend active assistance to such a venture. Dulles favored
instead an international Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA) to man-
age the canal, and Britain reluctantly backed this proposal as a means of
keeping the lines of communication open with the United States. Yet
both Macmillan and Eden were soon to indict the United States on three
separate occasions for torpedoing efforts to negotiate forcefully with the
Egyptians during September 1956, allowing Nasser to believe that he
could safely disregard the threat of force. By Eden's own admission,
September 13 was the date on which Britain became irrevocably com-
mitted to force for lack of a suitable alternative.22
Ostensibly, there still remained one last hope for a peaceful settle-
ment: On October 9, direct talks began in New York at the United
Nations between Britain's foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, and the
Egyptian foreign minister. In truth, these negotiations were nothing but
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a smoke screen. Eden and the French minister, Christian Pineau, had
already met secretly in London on October 2 to firm up their mutual
understanding. Terence Robertson's account highlights the importance
of that meeting:
They were alone in the privacy of Eden's study for a meeting which can
be recognized in retrospect as the hinge of the crisis. Use of force ... was
reborn and established so firmly as Anglo-French policy that the excited
activity and hopes at the United Nations were actually of no conse-
quence at all. When the talks at Downing Street ended that evening,
there was agreement in principle between Pineau and Eden that their
two countries would act jointly in concert with Israel against Egypt; and
further, that Eden and Lloyd should go to Paris on October 18, after the
formality of taking the crisis to the United Nations had been com-
pleted, to discuss the next steps in detail. [Emphasis added)23
Britain and France, unknown to virtually all members of Eden's own
government, had already embarked upon their fateful plan.
Following several other clandestine meetings, the military charade
commenced on October 29 with Israel's invasion of Egypt. There fol-
lowed a turbulent week in which the United Nations censured Israeli
aggression and the House of Commons was in an uproar over the
unauthorized war. Eden retorted that he was not prepared to give any
details of what was happening in the Middle East. Only with great
reluctance did he finally admit that Great Britain was a cobelligerent.24
As opposition to Britain's involvement in the duplicitous scheme
arose both at home and abroad, Eden's fortunes slipped as quickly as did
his resolve. On November 6 the cabinet precipitately agreed to a cease-
fire on the recommendation of its now confused and beleaguered leader.
That was a dramatic and inexplicable reversal. No doubt the cornered
prime minister was politically compromised by events. Yet his tenuous
health may have had more to do with his perplexing behavior than the
hostile political and diplomatic climate.
With official papers concerning Britain's involvement in the Suez
crisis either nonexistent, unavailable for study, or destroyed,25 Eden's
memoirs have been dismissed by most as a diplomatic apologia. And
Macmillan's account is of interest as much for what it omits as for what
it says. Hugh Thomas was one of the first historians to assess in an
impartial fashion what few data remain. He certainly asked the right
questions. Should Dulles be saddled with all the blame? Did Suez
represent a military or political failure? If it was a political one, was that
the result of a breakdown of cabinet government, or had it been a
"collective aberration? 11 Finally, if it was a personal more than a collec-
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tive failure, did illness playa decisive role in disturbing the judgmentof
the prime minister at the time? 26
To understand Eden's perception of the problem and its political
implications, one must know something of the history of British in-
terests in the Middle East. Though realistic enough to sacrifice the
Crown's influence in certain regions of the Empire, successive British
governments demonstrated extreme reluctance to forfeit control in the
Arab world. Not surprisingly, when Nasser seized the Suez Canal in
1956, British reaction bordered on panic. Anthony Nutting, a member of
the Foreign Office who later wrote his own critical account of the crisis,
explicated the essence of that reaction in captivating metaphor: "If
Britain was going to revert to nineteenth-century methods to settle a
dispute, it must find a twentieth-century pretext for doing so. If they
were going to commit an assault, they must appear to be wearing a
policeman's uniform."27
Certainly Eden's coconspirators in France had substantial reasons
to be involved, the least of which concerned the Suez Canal itself. The
French regarded the nationalization of Suez less as a disaster than as an
opportunity to crush Nasser. Their consuming objective at this time
was to win the war in Algeria-for which they held Egypt ultimately
responsible, believing as they did that military support for Algeria was
coming directly from Cairo. At least from the standpoint of person-
alities, Eden and French Premier Guy Mollet saw eye to eye on how to
handle the Egyptian upstart. That such a meeting of the minds may have
been inappropriate (at least for Eden) was suggested by Lester Pearson:
France was already fighting the Arabs and had nothing much to lose, but
the British had more to lose and less to gain.28 The results would
ultimately speak for themselves: Britain gained nothing and lost a great
deal. Eden, for his part, was to lose his reputation as well.
With Nasser's seizure of the canal, Eden at last had his pretext for a
forceful showdown in the Middle East. Even when increasingly effec-
tive economic sanctions, combined with growing pressure from the
Arab League, induced Nasser three months later to accede to terms that
Selwyn Lloyd described as offering"an acceptable compromise," these
initiatives became a dead letter because of Eden's refusal to endorse any
plan short of military assault.29
Anthony Nutting foresaw the dangers of aligning too closely with
Israel or France and warned Eden accordingly. The prime minister's
reply, as reported by Nutting, revealed his true intent:
If we did not show strength now, we would eventually lose all our oil to
Nasser. The Americans did not really care about the Suez Canal ... but
the Israelis deserved to be allowed to use it.... He did not care whether
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[opposition leader Hugh] Gaitskell supported or opposed him. As for the
U.N., they had proved to be a dead loss Compromise with Nasser
would only serve to whet his appetite This man must be destroyed
before he destroyed all of us. [Emphasis added]30
Against the best advice of his closest advisers, then, Eden uncharac-
teristically adopted a pro-Israel stance, inaccurately gauged American
intentions, ignored the bipartisan support he needed for effective unity
at home, abandoned faith in the United Nations, and affirmed a personal
vendetta against Nasser.
Other blunders followed in rapid succession. Eden continued
to seek American support only on his own terms-"a vainglorious
course," his biographer noted, "for a junior partner with much at
risk."31 Nor did he make the most of the opportunities afforded him.
For one thing, he could have made any agreement to cancel the dam
project contingent upon an alignment of America's Middle Eastern
policy with that of Great Britain. In earlier years, such a skilled nego-
tiator would have asked for something in return. At this juncture,
however, Eden inexplicably ignored that possibility.
If Eden's goal was really to achieve a peaceful solution, his refusal to
support the negotiations at the United Nations was inconsistent. And
although he continued to claim that Nasser would never negotiate in
good faith, international pressures were already providing strong in-
ducement for the Egyptian leader to do so: by mid-October Nasser had
conceded the principle of user participation in the operation of the
canal. Yet Eden perceived that his efforts had been abandoned in favor of
Dulles's Users' Club arrange~ent, a fact that wounded his pride and
hardened his suspicions.32 He simply refused to acknowledge that the
new proposal gave Britain the essence of what it required to keep the
canal open.
Given the paradoxically threatening success of UN negotiations,
the French recognized the urgency of bringing Britain into the conspir-
acy being planned with Israel. Seizing the moment, Mollet's emissaries
arranged another clandestine meeting with Eden and Nutting on Oc-
tober 14. For one thing, they needed British bomber bases to protect
Israel's cities- against retaliatory Eygptian air raids. For another, an
unanticipated threat to their tenuous alliance had arisen: Israel had
fomented reprisal attacks on Jordan, and Britain, under the Tripartite
Declaration of 1950, was obligated to resist any attack across the ter-
ritorial borders of the Arab-Israeli world. Just prior to the secret meet-
ing, Eden had taken it upon himself to warn Nutting "not to plunge the
country into war merely to satisfy the anti-Jewish spleen" of his people
in the Foreign Office.33 Strange words indeed from a man whose intent
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was to find a pretext for launching a military operation of his own-and
who, on the following day, would enter into collusion with France and
Israel to drag his country into war after all.
At the meeting on October 14, French emissary Albert Gazier in-
quired what Britain's response would be if Israel were to attack Egypt.
Foreign Secretary Lloyd replied that the Tripartite Declaration effec-
tively bound Britain to a well-defined course of action-to which
Grazier countered with the somewhat specious argument that, among
other things, Nasser had recently contended that the Tripartite did not
apply to Egypt. Eden was ecstatic. "So that lets us off the hook," he
excl~imed excitedly. "We have no obligation, it seems, to stop the
Israelis attacking the Egyptians." 34 Such thinking, of course, ignored
the fact that whatever Egypt said about the declaration, Britain (as a
signatory to it) was still bound by its obligations. Yet by then Eden's
thinking was anything but clear. Whatever the advice of those few
colleagues who knew what he was up to, the prime minister had already
made up his mind to go along with the French plan.
The implications were clear at least to Nutting:
Our traditional friendships with the Arab world were to be discarded;
the policy of keeping a balance in arms deliveries between Israel and the
Arab States was to be abandoned; indeed, our whole peace-keeping role
in the Middle East was to be changed and we were to take part in a
cynical action of aggression.... And all to gain for ourselves guarantees
for the future operation of the Suez Canal which had only a day or so
before been substantially gained in Lloyd's negotiations with [the Egyp-
tians] in New York.3 5
In a vacuous defense for posterity, Eden attempted to make the
entire cabinet responsible for the affair, claiming that he had discussed
the situation with its members in such detail that they "had grown to
know each other's minds." 36 Yet cabinet unity, if it existed at all, was
more apparent than real. Eden deceived himself into believing that Sir
Walter Monckton, his minister of defense, resigned at this time solely
on the grounds of ill health. He made no reference whatsoever to the
resignation of Anthony Nutting. The testimony of one senior minister
highlights the cabinet's predicament in bold relief: "Eden had dictated
[to the cabinet] more than Churchill had ever done. In foreign affairs his
word was law. Thus, in the unfolding crisis of Suez, each decision taken
by the British cabinet was peculiarly Eden's" (emphasis added).37
No military force of the size required to mount such an offensive
had ever before been assembled without the knowledge, much less the
support, of the opposition leadership. This was one of Eden's first overt
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. acts of duplicity; another was his failure to inform the United States of
his plans. Veiled references to the use of force "as a last resort" hardly
covered planned military collusion with France on a specific scale and
with an outlined timetable. Just as his treatment of the Foreign Office
and the opposition undermined Eden's support at home, so did his
conduct toward the United States erode his support abroad.
Eden's precarious position did not pass unnoticed by his allies.
Prime Minister Robert Menzies of Australia ruefully recalled asking
Dulles whether the British and French had weighed the risks of their
venture carefully enough. "I asked Eden the same thing," Dulles re-
plied. "He said they'd rather risk a world war then sink to the level of a
third-rate power." 38 Selwyn Lloyd was horrified by the implications of
such thinking but powerless to change it, for at this critical juncture
Eden had cut himself off from the advice of most of those ambassadors
and civil servants who had held him in such esteem.
Over the next few weeks the prime minister entered a surrealistic
world. Committing 100,000 men to an undeclared war without bipar-
tisan governmental support was only the tip of the iceberg.39 Eden
refused altogether to seek the advice of his own foreign secretary when
the specifics of the plan for Allied-Israeli collaboration were being
outlined during his secret meeting with the French in early October.
The acceptance of the plan, then, was solely Eden's work, not his
cabinet's. To complicate matters, most of his military command re-
mained totally in the dark until the outbreak of hostilities.
Was it out of indecision or deliberate deception that Eden ignored
military and governmental input into the final plan? Even his allies-to-
be recognized his role as a conspirator to be somewhat out of character
for a man considered the world's foremost diplomat. The Israelis had
entertained some doubts about Eden's resolve all along. Aware of Great
Britain's traditional pro-Arab stance and its prime minister's tendency
to vacillate, Israel's Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was prescient
enough to require some form of written agreement. The British foreign
secretary's view, on the other hand, suggests an international deception,
pure and simple: "Appearances had to be kept. The Anglo-French
[forces] should appear at all times to be defending the Canal against both
sides.... Anything less than a full war could not be said to threaten the
Canal and therefore justify the great ruse.~'40 Eden and his French allies,
then, were not being hesitant, but actually intended to deceive. In the
words of one investigator, they "wished to appear virtuous while being
Machiavellian." To cover their tracks, the coconspirators took an oath
at Sevres on October 24 that "none would in the lifetime of the others
reveal what they had witnessed." 41
Later that same day, Eden gave his own cabinet what was in effect a
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casus belli, and the decision was vaguely made to intervene in some
way. At that point Anthony Nutting considered resigning: "I felt no
anger; only sadness ... that Eden, who had always in the past seemed
such a model of integrity in public affairs, should now debase our
standards of international behavior by this disreputable maneuver. II 42
These are not merely the bitter reflections of a colleague out of step with
the rest of his team. England had undertaken collusion with Israel in a
scheme that ran counter to the spirit of the Tripartite Declaration, as
France and Britain attacked the victim rather than the aggressor. The
1954 agreement with Egypt, which allowed the English to intervene
militarily only at the request of the Egyptian government, was similarly
ignored. Britain was also in violation of the United Nations Charter.
The results of all of this were catastrophic. A split with America ap-
peared irrevocable; the Commonwealth itself was divided on the issue;
and the Arab world was now firmly aligned against Great Britain.43
Yet Eden forged ahead with his scheme like a man consumed. At the
next cabinet meeting on October 25, though the "possibility" of conflict
between Egypt and Israel was acknowledged for the first time, even then
the precise timing of events remained unclear. The cabinet certainly did
not know that Israel would definitely attack on October 29. And if, as
Eden later alleged, detailed discussions did occur a full four days before
the outbreak of hostilities, then his later assertion that the British had
no time to inform the United States or the Commonwealth nations
simply cannot be defended. The truth of the matter is, he knew that
Dulles would have torpedoed the project in midstream. Events there-
after assumed an air of black comedy. The British ambassador to Israel
took it upon himself to warn Ben-Gurian that, should Israel attack
Egypt, Israel must anticipate retaliation on the basis of the Tripartite
Declaration. To which Ben-Gurion coolly remarked: "I think you will
find your Government knows more about this than you do." 44
If secrecy was the operation's mother, then dishonor was its step-
child. Once the opposition began asking questions, Eden stood before
his critics and announced that "the moment the French government
and ourselves had reached conclusions as to what we would do, I
authorized the dispatch of a full message to the United States explaining
our action before ever coming to the House." 4S Yet the telegram in
which Eisenhower was informed of British intentions was not sent until
after an ultimatum had been delivered and its terms publicly an-
nounced. Perhaps taking a card from Adolf Hitler's hand by precipitat-
ing an imaginary crisis as an excuse to overrun a neighbor, Eden had
belatedly disclosed the ultimatum to the House of Commons as a
"response" to alleged inflammatory Egyptian actions along the Arab-
Israeli border. When asked why Britain had not acted as required under
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the Tripartite Declaration, he speciously contended that there was
"nothing in it that precluded Britain from acting as she proposed to do."
When also asked why the Anglo-French intervention was not delayed
pending emergency Security Council deliberations, Eden responded
ambiguously that the Council would be prevented by veto from taking
the kind of immediate action required to defuse the crisis-the very cri-
sis that Britain and France had engineered with their own ultimatum.46
It was at this juncture that the opposition began to smell a rat47-
and with good reason: Great Britain and France cast vetoes against a
United Nations resolution to establish a cease-fire 1?y substituting UN
forces for British and French troops. The irony is obvious: for two
countries ostensibly bent· on limiting hostilities and separating the
combatants to use their veto power to defeat a resolution designed to
achieve that result testifies to the quagmire into which Eden and Mollet
had sunk. Nutting's prediction had proved true: Eden now found him-
self isolated from the United States, the Soviet Union, the Arab states,
and most of the Commonwealth-if not a growing majority of his own
parliament.
More than just isolated, the prime minister became the target of
accusations from Labourites and Conservatives alike. If at least one-
third of Eden's own party felt betrayed, opposition leader Hugh
Gaitskell struck to the heart of the matter when he labeled the Suez
scheme an "assault upon the three principles which had governed
British policy for ... the last ten years-solidarity with the Common-
wealth, the Anglo-American alliance, and adherence to the Charter of
the United Nations."48 Ducking under the crossfire, Eden blandly
assured Prime Minister Gerhardsen of Norway that he "knew nothing
which might give credence to the charges of collusion being leveled at
the British government." 49
Eden never did fully reveal his intentions to anyone-allies, opposi-
tion, cabinet, or the public he served. The United States received con-
firmation of the Anglo-French collusion only on November 2, and this
from the French, not Eden. In response, the cornered prime minister
received a thorough dressing-down from Eisenhower. From that point
on, the president refused to deal with the broken man. Under duress,
Eden rather precipitately announced that if Egypt and Israel would
accept a UN peacekeeping force, Britain would not oppose a cease-fire.
As an example of the magnitude and transparency of his duplicity, Eden
then proposed that the British and French should themselves constitute
the UN peace-keeping force! 50 The United Nations of course rejected
this proposal and immediately demanded a total withdrawal. The des-
perate statesman had played his last card, and it had been trumped
forthwith. Vehement denunciations from the opposition, not to men-
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tion Anthony Nutting's resignation on November 4, led Eden to the
brink of despair and exhaustion two days later.
Having entered into a war without the knowledge of either his own
Parliament or his most formidable ally, Eden compounded his offense
by rashly calling for a cease-fire without consulting either his own
military advisers or his coconspirators in France. Only belatedly did he
telephone his unilateral decision to the latter.51 In a manner of speak-
ing, one burglar had turned state's evidence against the other when
fingerprints of both were found at the scene. Now totally isolated, Eden
retreated to Jamaica on his doctor's orders. That more than just his bile
duct (damaged by previous gallbladder surgery) was responsible for his
deterioration was intimated by his physician, Sir Horace Evans, who
warned his beleaguered patient that he no longer could afford to depend
on the Benzedrine he had been consuming in large quantities through-
out the crisis.52 It was left for Eisenhower's secretary of state, himself
recuperating from cancer surgery, to point out the inconsistencies in all
this during Lloyd's visit to his bedside in the hospital. In a question"al-
most comic in its incongruity," Dulles chided: "Why did you stop?" 53
Lloyd had no answer for Eden's peremptory decision to suspend hos-
tilities. If there is one impression common to nearly every independent
account of this tragedy, it is that something unexplained had trans-
formed Eden's political and personal conduct. Anthony Nutting ad-
dressed the critical issue years later: "What has not been explained is
how and why Anthony Eden came to adopt a policy which [was] morally
indefensible and politically suicidal. ... Little or nothing is known of
the pressures, personal and public, physical and political, which explain
how and when and why Eden should have come to act so completely out
of character." 54
Nutting initially sought answers in the unsettling domestic and
international developments at the inception of Eden's prime minis-
tership. As problems mounted, a perceptible change became apparent in
both Eden's personality and the quality of his leadership. Domestic
issues, unfamiliar ground for the new prime minister, were among the
first to frustrate him. An editorial in the Daily Telegraph accusing him of
mismanagement in dealing with inflation and an adverse balance of
payments cut him to the quick. "I had never seen Eden so stricken,"
Nutting recalled. "He was positively writhing in the agony of this
barbed shaft which . . . struck him at his weakest point." 55 Under
duress, the prime minister's health took a tum for the worse.
Although Nutting was referring in this instance to Eden's failure as
a tactician, he clearly had in mind a more literal failure of anatomy as
well, for he surmised that nervous tension was beginning to eat away at
the "patchwork" of the prime minister's previous bile duct surgery.56
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Hugh Thomas alluded to his increasingly unstable temperament in the
same""manner: "EdenJs health was still problematicalJ ... for he was left
with a plastic join in the [bile] duct which apparently left him liable to
mysterious fevers and the normal consequences of a bad liver: a strong
temper and impatience. II 57
These inauspicious qualities had been festering long before Suez;
indeedJmany associates had wondered whether Eden lived too much on
his nerves for the position of power thrust upon him. His own lord
chancellor referred to EdenJs "chronic restlessness which ... affected
all of his colleaguesJII and to his "interference in departmental af-
fairs. 1I 58 R.A. Butler registered the same complaintJdespairing of "those
innumerable telephone calls o~ every hour of the day.1I This led some
observers to conclude that despite-perhaps because of-EdenJs con-
stant interferenceJ government failed to exercise decisive leadership.. 59
It was left to Hugh ThomasJ howeverJ to drop the most devastating
bombshell of all without recognizing its full significance: "Already in
July 1956J Eden was taking many pills. When the crisis came he told an
advisor that he was practicallyliving on Benzedrine ll (emphasis added).60
Few would dispute that the new prime minister was under intense
domestic pressure to assert both his own and his nationJs independence
of action during the spring and summer of 1956. Yet the deleterious
effects of the amphetamines that he was known to have abused have
been all but ignored. Without underestimating the impact that EdenJs
diseased bile duct undoubtedly had on his general healthJone can see in
retrospect that his increasing anxiety and nervous tension may well
have been a manifestation of central-nervous-system-stimulant effect.
What is not known for certain is the precise amount of amphetamine he
was taking. Medical records are unavailableJ and his private physician
lett no such detailed account as Lord MoranJs concerning Winston
Churchill. NeverthelessJ EvansJs parting comment regarding the need
for his patient to dispense with his Benzedrine habit warrants further
examination.
Certainly EdenJs motive for' taking amphetamines was clear
enough: he needed the courage to make his own way. Yet subsequent
pressures resulted in a progressive dependency on these artificial stim-
ulants to steady his increasingly unstable temperament. Nutting was
among the first to pinpoint a date when the stress of EdenJs new office
precipitated a crash. He described the blow to British prestige with
JordanJs sacking of the British Commander of the Arab Legion in MarchJ
coming on top of domestic unrest over EdenJs leadershipJ as "the last
straw. JJ61 Randolph Churchill felt the same: "The debate [on March 7]
marked the beginning of the disintegration of personality and character
that the public thought Eden to possess.1I 62 Backing a high-strungJ
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sensitive individual into a corner where he or she encounters criticism
often brings out the worst in that person, who, as pressures mount, is
likely to overreact or to seek refuge elsewhere. For those who have
access to them, drugs offer an escape.
Sad to relate, the trade-offs that come with taking Benzedrine to
excess-volubility, excitement, aggressiveness, paranoia, impulsive-
ness, and poor judgment-are all mentioned in contemporary descrip-
tions of Eden from that point onward. From the very start the prime
minister believed that "if Nasser succeeded, it would be the end of
Eden"; accordingly, this Arab prima donna "must be destroyed." That
only highlights his aggressive and impulsive behavior. On another occa-
sion, Nutting had counseled Eden to be more charitable toward his crit-
ics. "For my pains," Nutting recalled, "I was told that I knew nothing
about politics and that I had the mentality of a mere Foreign Office
official." That underscores his mentor's volubility and poor judgment.
Still later: "Eden's reaction to the Canal seizure was almost as if Num-
ber 10 itself had been attacked and a howling mob of Arabs was laying
siege to Downing Street." This epitomizes his excitability and paranoia.
To complicate matters further, the prime minister's insecurity had be-
come his Achilles' heel: "Eden was not tough," Nutting admitted. "The
storm which had struck him so suddenly and so soon after realizing his
life's ambition ... hurt his pride and shook his self-confidence." 63
The need for Eden to redress these shortcomings was never greater
. than at that moment. Finally thrust on to center stage where account-
ability for all decisions now rested with him alone, Eden found himself
temperamentally unsuited to bear the burden-not to mention that a
swaggering Egyptian dictator was attempting to drive one further nail
into the coffin of British imperialism. He needed support-political if
possible, phannachologic if necessary. Under the latter's influence
Eden's rationality began to erode, unleashing a stream of intemperate
acts and vituperative remarks that deeply disturbed his associates.64 He
no longer was the man they had known, as Nutting acknowledged:
Eden completely lost his touch. Gone was his old uncanny sense of
timing, his deft feel for negotiation.... He behaved like an enraged
elephant charging senselessly at invisible and imaginary enemies in the
international jungle. . .. A feeling [later] came over me that I was
talking to a total stranger. No longer did we see things in the same way.
. . . What I did not know was how much of this metamorphosis was due
to sickness and to the poison from the damaged bile duct which was
eating away at his whole system.65
The elegant metaphor strikes at the heart of the matter but misses
the central mark, for the neurologic and psychiatric manifestations of
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biliary system disease (known as "hepatic encephalopathy") scarcely
match Eden's behavior.66 Disturbances of awareness and mentation are
the harbingers of that condition, yet during his entire illness the prime
minister never experienced those symptoms. Then, too, shifting combi-
nations of such neurologic signs as rigidity (rigid body posture), hyper-
reflexia(increased reflexes), and asterixis (a slow, rhythmic tremor)
emerge in conjunction with these mental changes, and are invariably
present by the time clouding of consciousness becomes apparent.67
Again, Eden never demonstrated such physical signs. Bile-duct obstruc-
tion as an explanation for his uncharacteristic behavior is not, then, the
whole answer. It may account, at best, for only a few of the symptoms
described-whereas amphetamine effect fits virtually all of them and
would represent a far more sinister illness for a national leader.
Nutting's unflattering portrait reflected the views of others close to
the prime minister. Even in his foreign secretary years, "no one in public
life lived more on his nerves than Eden did," Lord Kilmuir had re-
marked.68 Ambassador Winthrop Aldrich registered his own concerns
about Eden's mercurial temperament: "I think his physical condition
led to his being even more likely than he had been in the past to
exaggerate the urgency of any problem with which he was faced. He had
a tendency to feel in every case that a crisis had arisen which required
immediate action." 69 Such a sense of temporal urgency and impulsive-
ness, shading into paranoia, are features consistent with amphetamine
effect.
Though no one could agree at what point their ever anxious prime
minister reached an irreversible turning point, virtually everyone had
an opinion. Nutting recalled a conversation with Walter Monckton just
prior to the latter's decision to resign over Eden's handling of the Suez
crisis: "Before we parted, Monckton and I discussed at some length
what had brought about this nightmarish situation, and in particular,
what had happened to transform Eden so completely. [Monckton] made
no bones about his view that Eden was a very sick man. He had always
been excitable and temperamental, but in the last few months he had
seemed to be on the verge of a breakdown." 70
Others maintained that the watershed had been reached at a much
earlier date. In defense of the latter view, Eden's legal adviser had
decided by early June 1956 that Nasser's seizure of the Canal was justi-
fied as long as he did not close it to shipping-to which his prime minis-
ter responded by tearing up the report and flinging it in the lawyer's face.
Shortly thereafter, Eden received a letter from Eisenhower counseling
caution, which the befuddled prime minister somehow interpreted as
justifying force at a later date. One biographer, cogently noting that
"there were so many qualifiers in the letter that only Eden ... could
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have missed the point," concluded that Eden was"out of sync with his
old cautious, compromising self. He was obsessed, a driven man, his
vast experience and intellect reduced to tunnel vision." 71
As early as July, Eden's violent moods and peculiar behavior had
become the gossip of the corridors of power. 72 As Lord Moran wrote in
his diary on July 21: "The political world is full of Eden's moods at No.
10. All this is known to Winston.... He sees that things cannot go on
like this for long. " 73 Yet, if anything, they only got worse. On Septem-
ber 26, Eden enlisted Nutting to explore the possibility of a "present"
that he might extend to Mollet as a demonstration of Anglo-French
solidarity: "To my astonishment," Nutting recalled, "Eden suggested
that the Foreign Office should have another look at Churchill's offer of
common citizenship for all British and French nationals, which was
made in 1940 in a desperate effort to keep France in the fight against
Hitler. I replied that it seemed hardly appropriate to revive such an offer
at this stage.... In any event, nothing came of this strange notion." 74
To be sure, John Foster Dulles bore no small responsibility for
Britain's isolated position; his stormy relationship with Anthony Eden
is well documented. The irony of this situation lies in the dramatic
reversal of their positions: during the previous Indochina crisis Eden
had cautioned restraint, while Dulles had pushed for immediate action.
With Suez, the two leaders exchanged their swords and plowshares.
Perhaps one usually well-informed wag was not being entirely face-
tious, then, when he offered the opinion that Eden was "prostrated by
excessive doses of sedatives, pep-pills, and John Foster Dulles." 75
A transient delirium may also have played a role in Eden's be-
havioral aberrations as the crisis accelerated. On October 5 he came
down with a shivering fever just two days after the critical meeting
among the conspirators that one investigator termed "the hinge of the
crisis." What is known is that Eden's temperature reached 106 degrees.
Its cause was less certain. "His fever was of course connected with his
old bile duct trouble," Hugh Thomas concluded,76 and admittedly,
some of the symptoms described might have been due to an acute
inflammation of the bile-duct system known as "cholangitis." But
Eden's apparent (and temporary) improvement following this illness-a
state of "acute intoxication," in Nutting's words77-suggests instead
an untoward confidence and even euphoria that are the primary thera-
peutic effects of amphetamines in lower doses. With Eden confined to
bed under a physician's care during his brief illness, his access to
amphetamines may well have been restricted sufficiently that for a
short period thereafter, at least, he was not subject to the deleterious
side effects of the drug taken in larger quantities.
Even though Eden was able to return to his duties within a few days,
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he remained "in uncertain health and in constant need ofdrugs" (empha-
sis added). This led David Carlton to conclude: "The desperate charac-
ter of the choices facing him at the beginning of October had caused this
relapse [of his cholangitis]." 78 But life-threatening fevers ascribed to
intermittent bile-duct obstruction would scarcely have been induced by
stress or worry. What seems more plausible is that the stress of the
period may have prompted Eden to increase his amphetamine consump-
tion, which precipitated the deterioration and had perhaps contributed
to the high fever he experienced during the acute phase of his illness
before being hospitalized, as unexplained fever is one of the documented
physical signs of amphetamine overdosage. 79
From the medical perspective, it is noteworthy that the mysterious
fevers began to appear in early October at precisely the time political
pressures were becoming particularly burdensome and the change in
Eden's physical appearance and leadership qualities so apparent. Bear in
mind that David Carlton and Anthony Nutting have both described
Dulles's publicized refusal on October 2 to follow Eden's lead as a
significant tuming- or breaking point.8o In view of what is now known
of the physical effects of increasing amphetamine ingestion, the ap-
pearance of "mysterious fevers" three days later may be more than just
coincidental. Acknowledging that Eden was taking large doses of Ben-
zedrine prior to this time and accepting Carlton's observation that after
October 5 he was "in constant need of drugs" makes this belief more
plausible still.
Unfortunately, large gaps in Eden's medical record preclude abso-
lute certainty. That has prompted some retrospective diagnosticians to
continue to defend the"accepted" diagnosis. To cite but one example:
"Doubtless the bile, traditional spring of odd tempers, had had an earlier
effect on Eden's personality."81 This reference to bile is a throwback to
medieval beliefs about it as one of the "four humors" responsible for
physiologic function and temperament. What Eden's behavior suggests
instead is the presence of a fifth and very evil humor, whose effect goes
far beyond the most fertile imagination of the medieval physician. The
evidence is simply too compelling to ignore: marked deterioration
during a period of intense stress just prior to an exacerbation of Eden's
presumed cholangitis, followed thereafter by a brief interval of apparent
improvement when access to the drug would have been restricted; then,
from mid-October-when a new round of pressures may have induced
Eden to increase his drug intake once again-until the end of the Suez
crisis, a progressive change for the worse in his behavior and decision-
making.
As a measure of the toll the entire affair had taken on the failing
prime minister, one image remains indelibly etched on tabloid copy the
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day Eden was forced to pay the piper in explaining his conduct to a
woefully uninformed Parliament. Gone was the heady self-confidence
of the foreign secretary years, the graceful demeanor, the imposing,
almost pristine appearance. "The Prime Minister sprawled on the front
bench, head thrown back and mouth agape," a gallery correspondent
noted. "His eyes, inflamed with sleeplessness, stared into vacancies
beyond the roof, except when they twitched with meaningless intensity
to the face of the clock." 82
It is one thing for some writers to ascribe Eden's physical decline to
his incapacity to withstand incessant interrogation and the sleepless
nights that ate away at his physical reserves.83 It is quite another to
ignore drug effect. Allusion has already beel1: made to the insomniac
properties of amphetamines and their frequent abuse by individuals
forced to function without sleep. Both a motive (sleeplessness) and the
result (an unkempt physical appearance and perplexing behavior) sug-
gest that during these climactic days Eden's use of the stimulant may
have reached a higher plateau than ever. That the casual observer might
have overlooked this is understandable; the Benzedrine abuser may not
exhibit obvious signs of drug dependence but will show signs of deterio-
ration-such as a rundown physical condition and unkempt appear-
ance-and also tends to become unreliable, irritable, and unstable.84
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that indecisiveness characterized
the prime minister to the very end. By November 4, for example, Israel
had announced that it would accept a cease-fire if Egypt agreed. Yet
Eden admonished Lloyd that it would be wrong to call off an operation
that had been carried so far, thus ignoring one remaining possible escape
route: the United Nations Emergency Force resolution, which might
have been used to justify canceling the troop landings in Egypt.85 In a
highly emotional scene, Butler proposed just such an escape in speaking
against the pending British airborne assault. That seemed to "nonplus"
the prime minister, who could only "respond in silence by going up-
stairs to consider his position." A more graphic account suggests a far
less composed confrontation, with Eden "totally collapsing, weeping
unashamedly, and retreating to his bedroom, threatening resigna-
tion." 86 After much vacillation, Eden nevertheless authorized the at-
tack. But when on the following day Eisenhower delivered his own
ultimatum, Eden capitulated within the hour and accepted a cease-
fire. 87 Abandoned by his allies, victimized by a failing biliary tract, and
addicted to amphetamines, Eden had finally self-destructed, taking his
scheme and his coconspirators with him.
Now he was fighting for his political survival. Whereas Macmillan,
Butler, and Salisbury had questioned his thinking enough in the end to
challenge his leadership, Eisenhower ignored him completely. Eden no
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longer had anyone on his side. His isolation allowed the United States to
insist on a total British withdrawal before serious negotiations began, a
situation that Eden "did not foresee," as he admitted in his memoirs.
The same lack of foresight applied to his inability to assess his own
position. In an oblique reference to Macmillan and Salisbury, Eden later
charged that "there are always weak sisters in any crisis." 88 Had he
looked into the mirror, he might have seen the weakest of the lot. From
the medical perspective, such self-delusion is readily understood, for
one hazard of the self-administration of psychotropic drugs is the in-
ability of the abuser to assess his physical condition, mood, or perform-
ance accurately. That goes a long way toward explaining both Eden's
bizarre conduct and the equally bizarre conclusion to his nefarious
scheme.
Those less medically inclined have concluded that "Eisenhower
showed himself to be in no mood to bargain, with the result that Eden
... saw no rational alternative to unconditional surrender."89 The
complete record now offers a second opinion that may have accounted
for Eden's remarkable volte-face: he was in no condition to consider
rational alternatives at all. One alternative might have been to acknowl-
edge the whole scheme and play to the chauvinistic side of British
popular sentiment by forging ahead against prevailing world opinion.
Choosing among options, however, was no longer a part of his intellec-
tual repertoire during those dark hours. In a state of exhaustion and
shock, he left to his subordinates the task of announcing a humiliating
capitulation and retreated to Jamaica on the advice of his physician.
Unknown to anyone but his own doctor, Eden's final collapse may
have been triggered by a belated attempt to dispense with his phar-
macologic crutch. Those who try to kick the habit frequently experi-
ence a "crash," the symptoms of which include extreme lethargy,
fatigue, anxiety, and terrifying nightmares; the victim tends to be ex-
tremely irritable and demanding, which drives people away just when
their help is most needed.90 There hardly exists a more apt description
of Anthony Eden during the final days of the Suez crisis. In all like-
lihood, abrupt amphetamine withdrawal indirectly contributed to the
isolation he experienced when suddenly confronted with ~ crisis of
overwhelming proportions.
To emphasize the magnitude of one man's poor health on history,
the ultimate implications of the Suez debacle speak for themselves.
First, the crisis effectively undermined what little clout Britain and
France still had in the Middle East, making it necessary for the United
States to fill this vacuum lest the Soviets do SO.91 This only enhanced
the authority of American presidents to use shows of force in foreign
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affairs as they deemed necessary. Following Roosevelt's undeclared war
in 1940-41 and Truman's dispatch of American troops to Korea without
congressional approval, executive fiat in foreign affairs became a self-
perpetuating prerogative with the promulgation of the Eisenhower
Doctrine in the Middle East-largely through default by weakened
European powers.
Second, Suez represented a stroke of good fortune for the Soviets and
an intoxicating tonic for Great Britain's detractors. William Hayter,
British ambassador to the Soviet Union, bemoaned the fact that "Suez
had ... been a Godsend to Russia" by diverting world attention from
Soviet machinations in Hungary to British imperialism in Egypt.92 Even
the Third World bloc in the United Nations used the Suez affair to
justify its more aggressive posture toward the superpowers. As Theo-
dore White pointed out: "That fall of 1956 was a moment of transition in
international discourse. The massacre of Hungarians by the Russians
had not engaged the emotions of the Triple A block-that was white
against white. But the strike of the English and F.rench to repossess
control of the Suez Canal had thoroughly disturbed them-that was
white against colored." 93
Other losses became obvious with time. In Anthony Nutting's stark
appraisal: "We had achieved none of the objectives, whether pretended
or real. ... We had not separated the combatants; they had separated
themselves. We had not protected the Canal; it was blocked. We had not
safeguarded British lives and property. We had not seized control of the
Canal. We had not toppled Nasser. And even the French had turned on
Britain for calling a halt." 94 To the bitter end, Eden ignored the in-
creasingly obvious lessons of twentieth-century history that Britain
should never venture far in foreign policy matters independent of Amer-
ican support. He had assumed that Eisenhower, as an old friend of the
Grand Alliance, could be separated from the influence of Dulles. More
than just an unfounded assumption, that was a flagrant exercise in poor
judgment.
The biggest mistake the prime minister made, however, was to de-
ceive his own people. Always the epitome of honesty as foreign secre-
tary, now Eden deceived even himself by believing that chauvinistic
public opinion required, as ~e later termed it, "a spot of adventure." 9S If
so, he chose the wrong place to accommodate it, despite the warnings of
more prescient friends. Nor did he appreciate that by October the public
psychology had changed: any agreement reached on the basis of negotia-
tions in good faith would have been far more palatable for the man on
the street than the defeat his country was forced to swallow in the
aftermath of Suez. Eden's whole career should have prepared him to be
the right man at the right time to deal with just such a crisis. He might
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even have emerged the hero of the negotiation process once again, had
he allowed Lloyd's initiatives with Egypt to reach fruition. Instead,
"obstinately deciding ... to scratch out the eyes of his opponent," he
did not consider what would happen afterward.96
Further, the Suez affair erased much of the popularity Eden had
assiduously cultivated in the Middle East during his years as Churchill's
foreign secretary. True, there had already been a decline in British power
and prestige during the first third of the twentieth century, but it
accelerated during the next twenty years, concluding with Suez, when
Eden was either close to the helm of or guiding the ship of state. Any
historical analysis of this decline, then, will undoubtedly focus upon
Eden simply because the extent of Britain's vulnerability was blatantly
exposed on his watch. Yet Suez was but one milestone in that process,
and for this reason, some historians and biographers would choose to
judge his role less harshly. To Carlton's way of thinking, "Suez may
seem a relatively unimportant event, more symbolic than seminal,
more an effect than a cause of national decline:" 97 Few would deny that
the debacle was symbolic, yet its importance should not be understated:
on the heels of four years of indecisive leadership under Churchill,
Eden's Suez adventure confirmed that Britain had lost control of inter-
national affairs.
In such a paradoxical fashion might Thomas Carlyle's Great Man
theory be vindicated. The lessons inherent in the Suez Canal crisis
spotlight the extraordinary influence a single individual can have on
events-in this instance, largely a negative influence. Perhaps Lord
Mountbatten said it best: "It was astonishing to me to see what one
really persistent man could do if he was Prime Minister. [Eden] never let
Parliament know what was going on. He really never let the Cabinet
know." 98
Had Eden abandoned his time-honored role as a negotiator under the
stress of witnessing Britain's diminishing role in world affairs? Had he
chafed for far too long under the thumb of a legendary prime minister,
uncertain of his own succession, until he had lost confidence in his
ability to make his own way? Or had the effects of chronic ampheta-
mine abuse on a naturally high-strung individual under continuous
stresses robbed him of his senses? There is room to debate whether Eden
was propelled by extrinsic domestic and diplomatic pressure, as the
traditional view suggests, or whether powerful intrinsic pressures, tem-
porarily relieved yet complicated by drugs, were partly responsible.
In defense of the latter point, can it truly be said that the external
pressures were greater in the Suez crisis than at any earlier period in
Eden's career? For the first time, to be sure, he was as prime minister
taking full political responsibility for his decisions, rather than merely
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implementing another's orders. That may have made the extrinsic
pressures harder to handle. Yet this is also to admit that his untoward
sensitivity ~o these pressures could have been predicted on the basis of
his personality before the advent of disease. Eden's previous diplomatic
record notwithstanding, those political pundits familiar with his mer-
curial temperament might have done better to consider-long before
Suez-the dangers of allowing him to lead.
Historians considering the impact of illness on Anthony Eden's
leadership have in part missed the point by emphasizing his bile duct
pathology. Peter Calvocoressi spoke for the broad majority of inves-
tigators who acknowledged that Eden was ill yet rendered no verdict
concerning the implications of his illness. Taking Eden's inexplicable
reversal when he called for a cease-fire as an example, Calvocoressi
concluded: "There were a number of ingredients to this decision. The
principal ones-and I am not trying to put them in any order of impor-
tance-were American attitudes, British public opinion, and the Prime
Minister's health. We cannot enlarge on this last point because we do
not know enough about it." 99 Of course, Hugh Thomas's revelation
concerning Eden's injudicious use of amphetamines was made public
one year after Calvocoressi conducted his investigation. But subse-
quent investigators, who thereafter possessed the critical link to recon-
struct the complete puzzle of Eden's ill health, largely ignored its
overriding significance. Bile was not the only evil humor afflicting
Anthony Eden. That one-sided thesis may confidently be laid to rest.
While increasing his discomfort and compromising his overall health
substantially, Eden's damaged bile duct played a lesser role in altering
thought processes and behavior (and, consequently, leadership poten-
tial) than his abuse of amphetamines.
To ignore the effects of genuine international and domestic pres-
sures as they contributed to Eden's uncharacteristic and irrational deci-
sions during this period is to perpetrate a disservice upon the numerous
scholarly words that have emphasized them. Nonetheless, more must
be learned of any given leader's day-to-day health, and attempts made to
reconcile disease processes with their increasing limitations on per-
formance, if we are to understand why the individual functions as he
or she does at any given time. That Anthony Eden, for one, wrestled
unsuccessfully with those limitations assured the somber epitaph his-
torians have inscribed on his political tombstone.
CHAPTERS
John F. Kennedy:
Doctoring the Image
Accounts of John F. Kennedy's health both before and during his presi-
dency traditionally fall somewhere between preserving a myth and
unraveling a mystery. On the one hand, there is the indomitable JFK of
political folklore, wrestling against great odds to overcome chronic back
pain and a potentially fatal glandular deficiency. Like another Demo-
cratic legend who preceded him in the Oval Office, Kennedy turned his
physical handicaps into assets, enough for the mythmakers to conclude
that he was more than fit to bear the stress of the office. l On the other
hand, there are those who see something sinister in the lengths he went
to in order to conceal his underlying Addison's disease, leading one
to wonder what else may have been hidden once Kennedy reached the
sanctuary of the White House.2 To underscore the point, none of these
sources makes more than fleeting reference to his long-standing steroid
dependency-much less mentions his abuse of amphetamines while
president. A second opinion is therefore in order before accepting out of
hand, as his presidential physician once did, that Kennedy's health
remained at "optimal efficiency" for the performance of his official
duties.3
Before exploring the darker side of presidential substance abuse, we
would do well to remember that Kennedy had a drug problem of sorts
long before being introduced to amphetamines by Dr. Max Jacobson.
Not that he had consumed steroids for pleasure or through habit; rather,
as a member of Lyndon Johnson's entourage revealed during the Demo-
cratic National Convention of 1960, Kennedy had suffered from Ad-
dison's disease for years-a condition in which the adrenal glands lack
the capacity to produce enough steroid hormones to meet the body's
needs. Much has been made of this by subsequent pathographers;4 only
one was prescient enough to ask whether the treatment did not deserve
as much attention as the disease.s
Taken in excess, steroids elicit a host of undesirable side effects.
The most noticeable physical ones are a peculiarly flushed counte-
nance, a full, rounded face ("moon facies"), and excessive fat deposits
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between the shoulders ("buffalo hump"}-the last two induced by fluid
retention in the tissues. The behavioral effects are more subtle and
sinister, running the gamut from agitation and nightmares to hallucina-
tions and even paranoia. Little wonder that the senator's campaign
managers would have preferred to keep the lid on Johnson's disclosure;
they appreciated that, drug effect aside, Kennedy's underlying illness
had contributed to his lackluster performance as a freshman congress-
man.6 With higher stakes now on the table, his spin-doctors opted for
second best. By putting the best face on his disease, they managed to
transform their presidential candidate into a war hero with a Purple
Heart that was worth its weight in political gold.
Their success was hardly a surprise; after all, the Kennedy camp had
been well attuned to orchestrating medical cover-ups for some time.
Intimations of things to come occurred as early as 1946, during his first
campaign for a House seat from Massachusetts. Prone to excessive
fatigue, weight loss, chronic infections, and ill-defined stomach prob-
lems since his youth, Kennedy had apparently been taking an unknown
medication to treat at least some of these symptoms for years. That bit
of information we owe to his father, who, upon learning of his son's
collapse following one particularly strenuous trek on the campaign
trail, had asked a Kennedy aide whether "Jack had his pills." 7 What
those pills were, or where they came from, has never been determined.
We do know that between 1941 and the conclusion of his successful
campaign for the House seat, Kennedy made at least three trips to
Rochester, Minnesota. This led some to suspect that he had been receiv-
ing treatment at the Mayo Clinic all along. Certainly that had been the
case in January 1944, after he sustained a back injury in the now
legendary PT-I09 accident. Though his father remained optimistic
about his son's complete recovery, Kennedy's doctors apparently did
not share that opinion.8 Whether their concern lay with his back prob-
lem or his string of mysterious illnesses is uncertain, as no official
records of these visits are available. Even so, it should not pass un-
noticed that Mayo was then at the forefront of research activities di-
rected at Addison's disease.
Whatever treatment Kennedy might have received there during the
early 1940s, steroids were probably not among them.9 Dr. Elmer C.
Bartels of the Lahey Clinic in Boston was the first physician publicly
acknowledged to have used an analogue of the drug to treat JFK for an
Addisonian crisis in 1947. Kennedy had nearly died of acute adrenal
insufficiency while i~ London and returned to Boston for treatment-
but not before having frantially cabled an aide in Washington to have
two unknown prescriptions from a "Dr. Sullivan in Baltimore" sent to
him. Io For his part, Bartels asserted that this was the first time Kennedy
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ever knew he had unequivocal Addison's disease. Only then was he
treated with dietary restrictions and subcutaneous implants of desoxy-
corticosterone acetate (DOCA).
Who was the mysterious Dr. Sullivan, and what had he been pre-
scribing? Or was "Dr. Sullivan" a code name? If one acknowledges that
Kennedy was one of the first Addisonians to receive cortisone in oral
form,ll did that come from the Mayo Clinic or from Bartels? If from
both, did the two communicate so as to avoid overmedicating their
"shared" patient? In a worst-case scenario, was Kennedy being treated
for the same condition by still a third unidentified physician from
Baltimore in the late 1940s and early 1950s, with all that implies for the
difficulty in regulating the amount of steroid he received?
Speaking under conditions of strict confidentiality, a physician who
trained at the Mayo Clinic during the early 1960s asserts that numerous
calls were received by the chief of endocrinology from unnamed physi-
cians treating the president, seeking advice on the amount of steroid
replacement they were to administer. Despite Dr. Bartels's belief that
the mainstay of Kennedy's treatment from 1948 on was his own pre-
scription of 25 milligrams of cortisone and injections of 150-300 milli-
grams of DOCA every three months, it now seems plausible that his
patient may have been receiving more from other unnamed sources.12
Had the Kennedy penchant for secrecy and the clandestine activities
associated with his treatment (including stashes of a ready supply of
both cortisone and DOCA in safety deposit boxes around the country) 13
created a potentially dangerous situation in which the right hand of
medicine did not know what the left hand was doing?
By 1961 that seems to have been the case. In appearance alone, one of
the nation's youngest and ostensibly most vigorous presidents showed
unequivocal manifestations of steroid excess. Press photographers were
struck by the pudginess of Kennedy's face, which knowledgeable physi-
cians of the day recognized as the telltale "moon facies." More discon-
certing still, word circulated in medical circles that he had suffered at
least one psychological breakdown as a result of the drug.14 That hap-
pened to have been in the period when Dr. Max Jacobson entered the
picture. Though Kennedy's doctors were aware that amphetamines
were included in his intramuscular injections to the president, it ap-
pears that his concomitant administration of large doses of cortico-
steroids was overlooked until later analyses revealed their presence in
the vials Jacobson had in his possession (see below, p. 173).
The question remains: what was the potential-or real-impact of
steroid excess on Kennedy's conduct in office? If appropriately admin-
istered and monitored, the fatigue, apathy, and depression associated
with Addison's disease can be readily corrected with corticosteroids.
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Yet managing that treatment involves a delicate physiologic balance:
too little, and the patient lacks adequate reserves to respond to stress,
even though the overt signs of Addison's are ameliorated; too much, and
peculiar behavior emerges long before any untoward physical man-
ifestations become apparent. Virtually all patients on steroids demon-
strate inappropriate euphoria; for those willing to admit it, most at one
time or another are also victimized by restlessness, agitation, and inso-
mnia. Higher doses result in manic behavior and even paranoia. What-
ever the changes, they closely parallel the dosages administered. IS
Among the most sinister effects of steroid excess are drug-induced
delusional syndromes, defined as the "presence of delusions in a state of
wakefulness and alertness," falling just short of overt delirium.16 And if
a slug of steroid is combined with central-nervous-system stimulants
such as amphetamines? Mter all, the documented psychological effects
of both are virtually identical: either drug when taken to excess may fos-
ter delusions in concert with agitation, anxiety, insomnia, and irritabil-
ity, not to mention their additive effects when taken in combination.1?
Hence the alarming significance of Dr. Jacobson's admission (by
presidential invitation only) into the medical fraternity engaged in
treating the nation's chief executive. Yet the extent to which the doctor
was involved became a closely guarded secret of the era. Even though at
least one American reporter and one British pathographer drew fleeting
attention to the relationship in the 1970s,18 the most "hidden illness in
the White House" remained so obscure that it was not even addressed in
a recent and otherwise incisive study under that title, in keeping with
previous standard works on Kennedy's health.19
It was left to C. David Heymann, in a recent biography of Kennedy's
widow, to suggest that the president's abuse of amphetamines was far
more pervasive than anyone at the time realized. If Kennedy scholars
have taken exception to Heymann's methods, they cannot ignore that
he based his charges not only on Jacobson's unpublished autobiography
but on court testimony to which he had been given access by the
physician's widow, and transcripts of FBI files. To date, no published
second opinions by a physician have been advanced regarding the plau-
sibility of Heymann's claims that Kennedy was addicted to ampheta-
mines.2o Nor have historians assessed the potential impact of that on
his presidency.
As with the case of Anthony Eden before him, one must first
document beyond a reasonable degree of certainty that Kennedy abused
amphetamines, then seek behavioral patterns that match their known
side effects, and, finally, assess their impact on events during his tenure
that at least raise suspicion. To begin With, Jacobson went on record in
the press as having provided indispensable medical services throughout
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Kennedy's presidency. In his own words: "I worked with the Kennedys;
I traveled with the Kennedys; I treated the Kennedys; they never could
have made it without me."21 To be more specific, Jacobson asserts in
his autobiography that his ministrations were instrumental in seeing
Kennedy through the Vienna summit meeting, the Cuban missile crisis,
a threatened steel strike, and the clash between federal authorities and
the state over James Meredith's attempt to enroll in the University of
Mississippi.22 That Jacobson was known to have been treating the
president throughout this period only underscores the need to examine
these events with the possibility of drug influence in mind.
In the end, however, Jacobson proved to be his own worst enemy. He
himself later admitted to being an advocate of what he termed "tissue
regeneration," which entailed the injection of "supercharged" particles
of animal parts in suspension along with "nerve regenerating chemi-
cals" such as amphetamines, steroids, and vitamins. As Jacobson re-
corded in a 1968 publication for his Constructive Research Foundation:
"Without a general grasp of this [concept of Regenerative Therapy], it is
difficult ... to appreciate the reasons for the departure from the well-
trodden paths of conventional medical thinking." 23 This dubious claim
notwithstanding, it was by no means difficult for medical authorities to
appreciate that the doctor's unfounded practices bordered on quackery.
That view, coupled with some unfavorable publicity over the death of
one of his patients from an amphetamine overdose,24 was enough.for
the New York state attorney general's office to subpoena the records in
1972 from Jacobson's ramshackle and cluttered office, which doubled as
an illicit drug laboratory. What they revealed was ample evidence for
the state to initiate proceedings to revoke Jacobson's medical license.
Much to the chagrin of the Kennedy clan, he was found guilty on forty-
eight counts of unprofessional conduct.25
Despite assurances to the Kennedy family that Jacobson would not
implicate the president during these proceedings (a promise that was
apparently kept: in some 4,000 pages of testimony assembled over a
two-year period by the New York State Board of Regents' Review Com-
mittee on Discipline the White House is mentioned only once, and the
subject quickly dismissed),26 the self-assured doctor glibly spelled out
elsewhere his treatment of Kennedy. And there is nothing in the inquiry
report to suggest that he would have treated the president any other way
than he privately claimed to have done. His injections were all Jacobson
knew, a practice 'he continued to use on himself and all his patients
(regardless of the disease he was treating) until the day he lost his
license. That said, a universal indictment of the doctor's methods
emerges in the labored syntax of one witness: "Treatment for a myriad
of diseases all consisted to the extent of almost one hundred percent of
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administration of injections," which invariably included ampheta-
mines and steroids in combination.27 For his part, Jacobson downplayed
the amount of amphetamine used when he told the press that" the most
he ever'put in his concoctions [was] a 25 mg dose-usually ... the dose
is less." 28 Forget for the moment that the accepted oral dose is 5 to 10
milligrams in those rare instances when the drug is still used today; an
inventory of the vials of medication in his own laboratory revealed that
most contained from 30 to 50 mg/cc of amphetamine-"hardly 'trace'
amounts," as the inquiry report makes clear.29
Boldly manufacturing his concoctions without a license in his rush
to dispense them day and night ("Nightly mailings left respondent's
office at the rate of twenty to thirty vials to locations throughout the
United States and the world"), Jacobson failed to maintain adequate
quality control or sterility standards. He was found guilty of mal-
feasance on both counts; in the words of the inquiry summation:
"Adulterated drugs [were found] ... consisting of filthy, putrid and/or
decomposed substances." 30 Jacobson also failed to keep proper records
of the stimulants and depressants he prescribed. No doubt he dealt in
larger quantities, particularly when it came to the staples of his phar-
macopoeia, methamphetamine HCL and dextroamphetamine sulfate.
Within a two-year period alone, the doctor was unable to account for
1,474 grams of purchased methamphetamine.31
More alarming still was Jacobson's willingness to supply his pa-
tients with injectable medication to be self-administered. By the state
board's estimate, at least 90 percent of his patients were afforded this
dubious luxury.32 President Kennedy was perhaps among them; the FBI,
charged with analyzing these medications in 1961, uncovered five vials
that Jacobson had left at the White House, each revealing high con-
centrations of amphetamines and steroids. Robert Kennedy was so
alarmed by Jacobson's increasing access to his brother that he had the
Food and Drug Administration analyze fifteen separate vials. Both inde-
pendent reports coincide with what the state board later disclosed.33
Jacobson did not deny that he used amphetamines liberally, on
himself as well as his patients. They were not illegal at this early date;
nor were their negative attributes and psychologically addicting proper-
ties common knowledge. That in no way excuses their administration
in combination with hefty doses of steroid, garnished with vitamins,
ground-up bone marrow, placenta, electric eels, and whatever other
solubilized particles Jacobson perceived to be beneficial34-particularly
when his most esteemed patient was already taking cortisone in large
quantities.
The obvious question is how that sordid practice found a willing
recipient within the pristine walls of the White House. As most people
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do, Kennedy obtained his second opinion of sorts concerning Jacobson's
skills from trusted friends and other patients. Though Charles Spalding,
a close associate and Harvard classmate, recommended the doctor a
week before the first presidential debate, it was the Kennedys' pho-
tographer and travel companion, Mark Shaw, who spoke so highly of
Jacobson that the president finally agreed to see him. That was hardly
surprising; Shaw himself was already on the road to addiction, depen-
dent on "Dr. Needles" to supply his habit.35 Recognizing that this
German-trained general practitioner, who billed himself as a "multiple
sclerosis researcher," had a dubious reputation at best, Kennedy's other
doctors sought in vain to dissociate their patient from him.36 Yet Janet
Travell's warnings· regarding the side effects of amphetamines fell on
deaf presidential ears, and another Kennedy physician who flatly re-
fused to allow the president to receive further injections from Jacobson
was similarly ignored.37
Why, then, did Kennedy take so readily to his new doctor? Was
Jacobson something of a New Frontier physician, a "can do" innovator
who was willing to experiment on the cutting edge of medicine? That
seems to have been JFK's perception of the man, or so the brash doctor
would have posterity believe: "The treatment of stress had always been
one of my specialties," Jacobson confided in his unpublished memoirs.
"After his first treatment [the senator] told me his muscle weakness had
disappeared. He felt cool, calm, and very alert.... First impressions
never change. II 38 Moreover, Kennedy had been programmed for years in
the belief that steroid injections were responsible for keeping him alive,
and he had already discovered the dramatic, if transient, benefit of local
anesthetics for his back discomfort.39 Why should another injection be
any different? Not that he could turn for answers to Jacobson, who
invariably rebuffed those foolish enough to inquire with a brusque
"None of your business." 40 As a final measure of Kennedy's guillibility,
he later dismissed his brother's horror at what the FDA analysis had
uncovered with an equally brusque, Trumanesque reply: "I don't care if
it's horse piss. It works." 41
The president might have thought differently had he known what
Jacobson was really concocting behind closed doors in his Constructive
Research Foundation. This pharmacologic cottage industry masquerad-
ing as a research laboratory rivaled the best bootlegging operation of the
Roaring Twenties. To be sure, the times aided and abetted that: purport-
ing to find a cure for multiple sclerosis during the 1950s and 1960s
allowed for as much quackery as medicine. Testimony derived from his
hearing underscores the point: such quests "encourage the successful
exploitation of many forms of quack treatment ... and orgies of poly-
pharmacy." 42 Jacobson, perhaps unwittingly, took at least part of that
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lesson to heart. To accommodate (and exploit) those socialites who
were naive enough to judge a physician's credentials by his social
visibility, there was much to be said for this up-and-comer to erect an
impressive facade over his office while cultivating a reputation as "Dr.
Feel Good" among those who passed through its doors.
One is reminded of Adolf Hitler's doctor, Theo Morell, who adver-
tised himself as a skin and venereal disease expert while also making a
small fortune in the drugs he manufactured, labeled, and sold in his own
laboratories. Like Jacobson, amphetamines were the mainstay of Mor-
ell's treatment of the Fuehrer, who, like Kennedy, had been introduced
to his future physician through social connections. Such well placed
contacts played into the hands of two physicians cut from the same
cloth, motivated as they were by building a socially prominent clientele
that would eventually catapult them to the attention of their respective
national leaders.
That Hitler eventually fell captive to his unprincipled physician's
administration of a staggering array of central-nervous-system stim-
ulants has been adequately documented.43 Moreover, Morell's methods
were as sloppy as Jacobson's would prove to be. Wandering through the
bunker with his bag of drugs in hand and a soiled rag tucked into his belt
with which he swabbed off the residue from used hypodermic needles,
Morrell would pump injections into the Fuehrer's body at a moment's
notice. In the White House, aboard Air Force One, at Hyannisport, or
within Kennedy's far more fashionable "bunker" at New York's Carlyle
Hotel, Jacobson did the same for the president-dumping out drugs and
syringes from his ubiquitous bag and rummaging among unlabeled
vials, with fingertips blackened by medication, until he found one that
had not been used.44
If both doctors had a loyal retinue of ardent admirers, those further
removed from their needles were more critical. One historian simply
dismissed Morell as a "quack and a charlatan"; others drew attention to
the fact that by the time he had drawn the Fuehrer into his net of
medications, Morell "had probably not practiced serious medicine for
twenty years"; and his contemporaries in orthodox medical circles
considered him a phony.45 Max Jacobson's medical status was similar:
he belonged to no professional societies; he was granted no staff priv-
ileges at any New York hospitals; and the New York State Board's
indictment speaks for itself. Some of those who had worked with him
couched their criticisms in less measured terms. According to one of his
own nurses, "Max was absolutely a quack ... totally off the wall ...
[and] out of his mind./ 46
Perhaps the shared roots of these two German doctors had some-
thing to do with their borderline skills. Both spent their formative years
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in a country where medical science and training programs were literally
transformed by the scourge of National Socialism. In but five short
years, one of the most advanced medical systems in the world was
bastardized by SS dogma, whose agents chaired the major departments
in Germany's medical schools and reduced the nation's best physicians
to unwitting converts of the Reich, rewarding those who succumbed.
Details of Jacobson's early career in Germany before he fled to France
(where he allegedly developed his theories on tissue regeneration and
the injections to achieve it) are scant. But one notable irony stands out:
in 1934 he claims to have served as medical consultant to the German
Davis Cup tennis team.47 To what did a Jewish doctor owe such good
fortune? That unanswerable question aside, it. may be said that ·Ger-
many in the 1930s was hardly a conducive environment in which to
hone the skills necessary to treat world figures, whose health and
leadership qualities were both at stake.
Before addressing the president's conduct in relation to the drug
issue, we need to clarify two prevailing misconceptions. One involves
amphetamines themselves; the other, Kennedy's "harmless" sexual
exploits. For many amphetamine users, the real danger lies not so much
in the ephemeral effects as in the psychophysiologic crash that follows.
Truman Capote, himself a devotee of Jacobson's injections, describes a
typical amphetamine experience in more graphic terms than medical
textbooks afford:
You feel like Superman. You're flying. Ideas come at the speed of light.
You go 72 hours straight without so much as a coffee break. You don't
need sleep, you don't need nourishment. If it's sex you're after, you go
all night. Then you crash-its like falling down a well, like parachuting
without a parachute. You want to hold onto something and there's
nothing out there but air. You go running back to (Jacobson's office on]
East 72nd Street. You're looking for the German mosquito, the insect
with the magic pinprick." 48
Was there more than meets the eye in the perpetual energy of Camelot?
Could drug effect have accounted in part for Kennedy's insatiable sexual
appetite? Potentially most damaging of all, did the president ever exper-
ience an amphetamine-induced rush (or crash) at a time unpropitious
for the national interest?
Yes; probably; and perhaps. Not that the last two considerations
were necessarily mutually exclusive in Kennedy's White House, f~r
presidential philandering itself may have left the nation vulnerable on
occasion. LeMoyne Billings, Kennedy's former Choate roommate and
political confidant, readily perceived what his more cavalier friend let
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slide: "It never occurred to Jack that some of these women might be
considered dangerous." 49 Langdon Marvin, a longtime consultant and
aide, recalled one evening wIlen the president had successfully evaded
the Secret Service in order to render his own service in secret to a call girl
in a townhouse across from the Carlyle Hotel. Looking out the window
at an army lieutenant standing on the curb with an attache case hand-
cuffed to his wrist, Marvin suddenly tumbled to the danger inherent in
the tryst he had had a part in arranging: "Jack was off getting laid and the
Bagman with the satchel had been left behind. The Russians could have
bombed us to hell and back, and there would have been nothing we
could have done about it." 50
If Kennedy's now legendary exploits (adequately detailed elsewhere)
might be traced in part to amphetamine effect, the pharmacologist
would point out that steroids also enhance one's sexual appetite.51 Dr.
Gerald Erhlich, a specialist in psychosexual conditioning and its related
disorders, highlights this side effect in no uncertain terms: "All that
cortisone over a prolonged period probably did increase Kennedy's sex-
ual drive.... Give a man large doses of cortisone and he often becomes
miraculously, wonderfully priapic, or at least rampant." Erhlich saw
more in Kennedy's unsatiated libido, however, than a mere physical
need, physiologically induced; there were psychological pressures as
well that drove him to such behavior, among them "the need to prove
himself, the compulsive risk taking, the sense that societal rules didn't
apply to him." 52 What the neuropsychologist would hasten to add is
that both amphetamines and steroids accentuate those psychological
imperatives which Erhlich speaks of and Kennedy personified.53
To be fair to both history and JFK, and reaching far beyond his
private life, the implications of drug effect on Kennedy's public conduct
must be addressedand for a very simple reason. Although his associa-
tion with Jacobson and his use of amphetamines were made known at
least as early as 1972, when Boyce Rensberger's bombshell was dropped
in the lap of the New York Times, it required the 1989 publication of
Heymann's biography of Jackie Kennedy to bring the problem into
popular focus. Given the public's understandably fallible perception
that amphetamine abusers become slaves to the drug's influence, a
public figure's job performance would be expected to suffer accordingly.
True, the judgment of pathography indicts both Adolf Hitler and An-
thony Eden on that count. On the basis of the available record, the same
cannot necessarily be said for Kennedy.
To argue the point requires a cursory examination of the president's
conduct during the period he was known to have been seeing Jacobson.
That in itself is difficult to decipher from the "official" record. Whereas
Kennedy's physicians would have us believe that Jacobson had little if
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any role to play in the president's care, both the doctor and a few of JFK's
associates have gone on record to argue otherwise. For one, Charles
Spalding later confirmed that Jacobson supplied Kennedy with am-
phetamines on a frequent basis. For another, one of Jacobson's as-
sistants, Horace Mann, told the National Enquirer in 1975 that he had
examined the doctor's medical bag after one tryst with Kennedy at the
Carlyle Hotel (a short block away from Jaobson's New York office) and
found used amphetamine vials and a damp syringe. In retrospect, he
recognized that Kennedy's flushed face represented "a sure sign of
amphetamine injection." As if on cue the president had exclaimed that
he "felt like a new man." 54
Skeptical historians, of course, would demand better documen-
tation than an unpublished memoir of a physician who had already dis-
tinguished himself as a social climber, National Enquirer interviews
obtained second hand, and a popular biography of the president's widow.
Although more "authoritative" sources are scarce, thanks to Kennedy's
handlers' ability to camouflage their charge's prolific indiscretions,
recent revelations from Secret Service files and the White House gate
log substantiate that Jacobson visited Kennedy there no less than thirty-
four times through May 1962.55 Combining that information with data
from such primary documents as the record of the New York State Board
inquiry, which outlines Jacobson's universal treatment of all his pa-
tients in painstaking detail, compels one to accept much of the doctor's
claim.
Yet a critical thread of evidence is missing to tie Kennedy's am-
phetamine abuse to malfeasance in office. Given the drug's relatively
short-term effects, it is difficult to attribute cause to effect without a
precise account detailing Jacobson's treatment of the president on any
given day. Therefore, the evaluation that follows remains circumstan-
tial. Although no one would argue that Kennedy's drug problem was so
pervasive as to have become an ongoing day-to-day pharmacologic cross
for the president to bear, a few specific instances raise the pathogra-
pher's suspicions and demand some comment.
We begin with the intriguing surmise already alluded to: had Ken-
nedy been "staged and programmed" in a more literal sense during the
presidential debates than his handlers were aware of? Probably not. For
one thing, in Jacobson's own account of his ministrations to the presi-
dent there is no mention of a role in the debates themselves. For a man
who wore his PT-I09 tie clasp as a badge of honor commemorating his
services to Kennedy,56 it would have been consistent for Jacobson, had
he been even tangentially involved, to take credit for the youthful
senator's timely performance. Not only did Jacobson fail to do so, but
his next recorded treatment of Kennedy appears long after the debates,
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while the president-elect was vacationing at Hyannisport.57 Moreover,
the debates occurred very early in their evolving relationship, and
Kennedy was probably circumspect enough not to entrust his perform-
ance to the vagaries of a drug he had taken only once before.
Shortly after assuming office, Kennedy became embroiled in per-
haps the biggest eyesore of his presidency, the Bay of Pigs debacle. On
the surface, this disastrous debut into covert operations was so similar
to Anthony Eden's involvement in the Suez Canal crisis as to suggest
historical deja VUe Both operations were undertaken by free-world Cold
Warriors reacting to headstrong dictators who were careening dan-
gerously toward the Communist bloc and despotism. Nasser's unlawful
seizure of the Suez Canal and denunciation of Western interests there
was mirrored by Castro's suspension of due process of law and renuncia-
tion of a military pact with the United States. And just as a swaggering
Egyptian upstart invited a forceful confrontation with Great Britain, a
cigar-chomping Cuban dared the yanquis to invade Cuba.
The casts of characters even bear a family resemblance: John Foster
Dulles was calling the shots for Eisenhower during the prelude to the
Suez crisis; his brother Allen, as director of the CIA, was responsible for
overseeing the day-to-day preparations for both Ike and JFK during the
Cuban buildup. Then too, the motivation of the respective national
leaders was the same: to teach small-fry dictators that snubbing the
major Western powers would not be taken lightly. Finally, both ven-
tures met with disaster-and both Eden and Kennedy took ampheta-
mines to excess during their respective tenures. Since that certainly
affected Eden's conduct in the one crisis, it would seem only natural to
look for similar effects in Kennedy.
Yet much the same problem that applies to the presidential debates
arises when one considers the possible contribution of amphetamines
to a president's poor judgment in sanctioning an invasion of Cuba.
Again, Jacobson makes no reference to having seen, much less treated,
Kennedy during the time when the fiasco occurred. To be sure, the
impact of steroid excess cannot be discounted so readily; that alone
might still have predisposed the president to some inexplicable and
impulsive behavior. Yet Kennedy was, if anything, both more cautious
and more dubious about the merits of this holdover project from the
Eisenhower administration than were his advisers, who had virtually all
assured him that there was an excellent chance of its succeeding.58
The problem, it seems, lay with the CIA's slipshod preparations and
faulty intelligence. Indeed, it would be difficult to construct a more ill-
starred venture or one more susceptible to Murphy's Law. Suez had been
a political more than a military failure; the Bay of Pigs debacle proved
just the opposite-but not for want of a rational president in charge. If
180 DRUGS AND DIPLOMACY
in retrospect one sees cloudy thinking on Kennedy's part, he was at
least willing to acknowledge that himself: "How could I have been so
far off base?" he mused. "All my life I've known better than to depend
on the experts." 59 That is something Anthony Eden would never have
admitted in the aftermath of Suez; moreover, intuitive reflection and
self-reproach are hardly qualities that doctors associate with an am-
phetamine abuser. Though Kennedy's advisers apparently confused
image with reality, as one commentator has suggested,60 that had little
to do with a befuddled president-much less amphetamines.
Rather, the new president had been in office only briefly when the
CIA informed him that the time was ripe for an invasion of Cuba.
Advisers like Allen Dulles, steeped in Cold War rhetoric, played on
Kennedy's fears by reminding him that there would be a heavy political
price to pay in the 1964 election were he to betray the trust of those
Cuban emigres whose opportunity to restore a free government in their
homeland only u.S. support could assure.61 Yet the president bided his
time, seeking any opinion from an informed source that might confirm
his skepticism. None appeared, at least from the senior ranks. Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., later admitted that had just one senior adviser spoken
against the plan, it would have been cancelled.62
And well it should have been, for what Kennedy was told and what
in fact was true were two entirely different things. An elite band of 1,400
CIA-trained guerrillas was to establish a beachhead on a remote, aban-
doned stretch of shoreline with a full seventy-two-hour window of
opportunity before Castro could even respond. There they were to be
joined by thousands of their countrymen and a second wave of u.S.
troops if necessary. Failing that, the invaders would "melt into the
hills" to continue insurgent warfare until the tide swung in their favor
under cover of American air support.
So much for the image. In reality (and unknown to Kennedy), all
military training had been suspended a full five months before, at which
time La Brigada's effective force numbered fewer than three hundred
men. As for Castro, he was aware of the invasion at least twenty-four
hours beforehand; moreover, the"abandoned" strip of beach the CIA
had chosen three years earlier had become a public park glittering with
lights (one commentator likened the charade to a handful of Russian
commandos making a hostile landing on Coney Island).63 And what of
the mountains that would serve as a refuge should the initial invasion
falter? Not only were they some eighty miles away, but this con-
tingency had never been spelled out to the insurgents in advance. Nor
was any second wave made up of U.S. support troops even considered, as
Kennedy himself made clear, despite CIA assurances to the contrary.
The president's horror in the aftermath of the failure speaks from the
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heart as much as for itself: "My God, the bunch of advisers we inherited.
. . . Can you imagine being President and leaving ... all those people
there?"64 In the final analysis, Kennedy's willingness to depend on
subordinates had more to do with inexperience than with drug-induced
impulsiveness.
Though Max Jacobson's footprints emerged for the first time after
Kennedy's election in the sands of Hyannisport, the doctor's trail to the
White House itself remains cold until we discover that he treated the
president there shortly before Kennedy's first state visit to Canada in
May 1961. The effects must have been beneficial, because four days after
Kennedy's return he asked Jacobson to fly to Palm Beach to "treat" his
wife for migraine. From that moment on, the stings of the "German
mosquito" became a family affair. The real importance to Kennedy's
drug habit of the trip to Canada was that he continued to receive one
injection after another for the painful back spasms he suffered after
planting a tree there. According to Jacobson, that convinced the presi-
dent that his new doctor was irreplaceable.65
It was not until Kennedy's next diplomatic journey that the doctor's
trail to the president began to heat up considerably. Still reeling from his
disastrous debut in Cuba, Kennedy accepted Nikita Khrushchev's invi-
tation to meet at Vienna. This would be his first summit, preceded by a
stopover in Paris and followed by a layover in London to meet with
Charles de Gaulle and Harold Macmillan, respectively. As events
proved, Kennedy needed a doctor who could treat his back and bolster
his confidence during these encounters with older and more experi-
enced statesmen. To secure both, the president spared no expense. That
included chartering a separate transatlantic airliner for Dr. Jacobson and
his wife alone, at no small cost to the American taxpayer.
Although Dr. Travell was taken along as a more visible part of
Kennedy's entourage aboard Air Force One, Jacobson provided the es-
sential treatment-the first of which took place with the president's
plane still perched on the tarmac at Idlewild Airport. Alleged to have
become "mildly addicted" to amphetamines by this time, Kennedy
requested an injection before taking off.66 The morning after their
arrival in France, Jacobson gave him a second slug of amphetamine prior
to a round of talks with De Gaulle. Those discussions appear to have
been "substantive," though Jacobson thought the old general seemed
more intent upon catching Jackie's eye than lending an ear to her
husband.67
His wife's charm would hold the visiting couple in good stead (at
least socially), but Kennedy was not about to rely on that alone when it
came to meeting Khrushchev in Vienna. "No sooner had we arrived,"
Jacobson recalled, "when I was hurried up to ... the President's room.
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'Khrushchev is supposedly on his way,' Kennedy said. 'You'd better give
me something for my back.'''68 With his dependency on drugs now
clearly accelerating, the question remains whether that was reflected in
the president's performance at Vienna. Perhaps we will never know for
certain: the two men met alone in the presence of a single interpreter,
and as of this writing the Kennedy Library has not yet released the
official transcripts of the Vienna summit. What we do know is that
Kennedy failed to anticipate the ultimatum that Khrushchev cast before
him, threatening to sign a separate accord with East Germany unless the
United States yielded on the Berlin issue. If some have questioned the
president's judgment in attending the summit at all, so soon after the
Bay of Pigs debacle,69 the question arises whether inexperience and a
lack of preparation account for his poor showing-or whether ampheta-
mines were now playing a greater role than Jacobson's gullible patient
was willing to acknowledge.
To complicate matters, the administration's press policy proved
woefully inadequate in either explaining what really happened or diffus-
ing its impact. Leaving such spin-doctors as Charles E. Bohlen to white-
wash the meetings through the press with banalities about their
"amiable nature," Kennedy took it upon himself to grant an incriminat-
ing interview to James Reston. Bear in mind that few really knew things
had gone so badly for the president in Vienna, much less that an
ultimatum had been placed on the table. That information had to be
gleaned by the press corps secondhand, a fact that disturbed them and
damaged the president's credibility.7o
Reston's revelations didn't help matters: Kennedy seemed to be "in
a state of semi-shock" when he met the reporter in a dimly lit room
in the American Embassy. "Pretty rough?" he asked the president.
"Roughest thing in my life," Kennedy replied, describing Khrushchev as
"rude" and "savage." The president's confidence had been severely
shaken; he even intimated that the Soviet premier's suspicions of his
shortcomings had probably been confirmed. By demanding that the
"bone" of Berlin be "removed from the Soviet throat," Khrushchev was
serving notice that Kennedy could be intimidated and blackmailed.71
And for the moment, he clearly was. Little wonder that Khrushchev
would later reflect that he had been "genuinely pleased" with the
meeting in Vienna.72
As for Max Jacobson, left alone in a darkened foyer outside the
Vienna meeting to ponder how his medicated patient was faring, the
truth of the matter seemed to have escaped him. Greeting the president
as he emerged, Jacobson asked how he was feeling. Kennedy replied
with a touch of sarcasm: "May I be permitted to take a leak before I
respond?" Returning, he sent Jacobson packing to the hotel, as his
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services were no longer required. 73 Was Kennedy implying that the
doctor's ministrations had failed him?
Jacobson's pharmacologic props notwithstanding, the inexperi-
enced president had clearly been intimidated by Khrushchev. Arriving
in London the following day in a state of thinly disguised depression,
Kennedy sought out Jacobson for yet another "treatment/' 74 Whether
his back pain (as was alleged) or his wounded psyche required the
doctor's services is not entirely clear. Suffice it to say, the aura of despair
did not lift, even after the presidential party had returned to Wash-
ington. Despite the Reston interview and a nationally televised address,
the public was in the dark as to what Kennedy's next move would be.
So, it seems, was he. Rather than "mobilizing the nation," as more
than one commentator publicly urged him to do, Kennedy failed to
respond. Allegedly "ill with his back ailment" for several days after
returning from Vienna,7s the president held no press conferences for an
entire month. Though some believed that merely reflected his indeci-
sion over what to say about Berlin, one wonders whether Kennedy
might have been rendered unable"to sort out his thoughts" 76 at least in
part by amphetamine withdrawal. Mter all, other Jacobson patients
(one of whom had also received a series of injections for back pain) later
testified that they had become psychologically and physically addicted
to amphetamines in as short a time as six months, only to suffer from
severe depression once the drug was withdrawn.77 Was it a coincidence
that Kennedy's return from Vienna marked a six-month milestone in
his relationship with Jacobson, following which the president became
mysteriously less visible in his official duties? Jackie was away from
Washington during the time in which Jacobson makes no allusion to
further drug treatments, and that roughly correlates with the period of
Kennedy's "illness." Indeed, it was only after Mrs. Kennedy's return,
Jacobson wrote, that he began to be called into service on a regular basis,
"at least once a 'Veek and occasionally as often as three and four times
weekly." 78
Had two successive setbacks so early in Kennedy's presidency set
the stage for Jacobson's increasing role in energizing the king of Cam-
elot and his court? Whether in recharging the president's voice with an
emergency injection before his scheduled speech to the United Nations
General Assembly on September 25, or steadying his hand during the
Cuban missile crisis, the threatened steel strike, or the Meredith con-
frontation (as Jacobson alleged he was charged to dO),79 how pervasive
was the influence of amphetamines on the Kennedy presidency?
The Vienna setback and its immediate aftermath perhaps excepted,
probably not as much as Jacobson would have us believe. As history
recalls, the president's patience and sense of timing during the Cuban
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missile crisis are the stuff of which the Kennedy legend is made. On
October 16, 1962, McGeorge Bundy informed the president of unassail-
able photographic evidence that the Russians had offensive missiles in
Cuba. Kennedy called an emergency session of the executive committee
of the National Security Council to assess his alternatives, only to find
that the majority was initially in favor of immediate air strikes against
the missile sites. Had Kennedy been under the influence of ampheta-
mines or overdosed with steroids, such an impetuous course might have
been consistent with the behavior those drugs are known to induce.
On the contrary, the president carefully weighed the options still
open to him in a series of round-table discussions with his advisers. He
was also prescient enough to discount the Air Force chief of staff's claim
that no Russian response would be forthcoming should the alternative
of military force be followed. 80 Taking his cue from cooler heads (which
included Robert McNamara, his brother Robert, and legal advisers from
the State Department), he settled upon a blockade instead. Once in-
formed by Nicholas Katzenbach that a "quarantine" could be legally
justified under the circumstances (and only after learning that the
majority of the executive committee was now in favor of it), Kennedy
seized the initiative and delivered a nationally televised revelation in
conjunction with a carefully worded letter to Khrushchev.81
As still another measure of Kennedy's ability to keep things in
perspective, he joined others in condemning Adlai Stevenson's sugges-
tion that the United States should agree to withdraw its missiles from
Turkey in exchange for ~ussian withdrawals from Cuba.82 That had
been, after all, one of Khrushchev's secondary aims in fomenting the
Berlin crisis at Vienna, and Kennedy was not about to fall prey to that
ploy now. Moreover, he exercised enough reflection to acknowledge,
when congressional reaction to the quarantine plan proved more mili-
tant than he would have liked, that this mirrored his own thinking upon
first learning of the missiles' presence in Cuba just six days before.83
What the record of this thirteen-day period depicts, then, is a calm,
detached president coolly weighing his alternatives as changing circum-
stances dictated. Had he been hyped up on amphetamines, at the very
least he would have failed to cover all his bases. Yet his diplomatic
orchestration of events proved flawless. Gaining the support of the
United Nations Security Council and the Organization of American
States was precisely the kind of skilled nuts-and-bolts diplomacy that
Anthony Eden had neglected in a similar crisis. Nor did Kennedy miss
any cues when it came to safeguarding American interests at home. In
response to a Pentagon report that the Cubans had lined up their planes
wingtip to wingtip as the Americans had done at Pearl Harbor, inviting
destruction, the president was wise enough to ask whether U.S. air
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bases in Florida had done the same thing. They had-and Kennedy
ordered the aircraft to be immediately dispersed.84
With Khrushchev now on the ropes but not yet down for the count,
Kennedy shelved his advisers' suggestion to order an air strike two days
later if the Russians had still not capitulated. He instructed his brother
instead to answer Khrushchev's separate and contradictory responses
with a draft that agreed only to those items that met with American
conditions already agreed upon. The rest, as they say, is history. Ken-
nedy managed to compel Khrushchev to agree to a proposal that the
Soviet premier, in effect, had never really made.8s The blockade held,
and the Russians capitulated.
Yet even in victory, Kennedy was empathetic enough to appreciate
the price Khrushchev had paid for backing down. There would be no
gloating over an American victory. Unlike Eden, he sought some modi-
cum of gain in what he and Khrushchev had just endured by using the
crisis as a catalyst to suggest the need for a nuclear test ban treaty.
Kennedy's cool judgment under fire made the best of a very frightening
situation. That is hardly what one would anticipate of someone truly
addicted to amphetamines or overmedicated with steroids.
If anything, John F. Kennedy seemed to grow in office with each
passing crisis. So what, one might ask, is the problem? "The problem,"
we are told, "is not what actually happened, but what potentially could
have happened." 86 The intent of this chapter has been to deflect atten-
tion from what proved to be a manageable glandular ailment to a more
sinister affliction that has yet to be critically addressed. Not that the
impact of steroids can be ignored, as their psychological effects are
much the same as those induced by amphetamines.
Given the huge dosages of amphetamines and steroids to which
Kennedy was subjected, it is a wonder that his performance as president
was as exemplary as history recalls. Even if the management of Ken-
nedy's Addison's disease had something to do with "the remarkable
success of modem medicine," 87 we are left with the question whether
the treatment was potentially or actually as bad as the disease. More-
over, who was really orchestrating and monitoring this "remarkable
success" story? Those ostensibly in charge by the time Kennedy became
president failed to appreciate that there was a loose cannon on deck,
freely firing off steroids and amphetamines in combination during some
very critical happenings in our history.
That Kennedy was taking amphetamines frequently, if not reg-
ularly, is now a matter of record. Whether he was truly"addicted" to
them is difficult to tell, as there is little in the way of irrational behavior
in his professional conduct to suggest that. Despite some notable early
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stumbles in the arenas of covert operations and diplomacy, the drug
factor seems to have had no appreciable impact on what came to pass-
at least as far as we have yet been allowed to know.88 That caveat in
itself remains a source of grave concern. AIe there still other snakes-
and perhaps other Jacobsons-in the woodpile? Have previous patho-
graphical accounts emphasized the wrong issues of health?
One wonders, too-assuming that Jacobson's involvement was as
prevalent as the record suggests-what might have happened as a result
of Kennedy's drug indulgence had he survived to live out his term. In the
final judgment, perhaps we dodged that b~llet only because the real
thing on November 22, 1963, made such considerations painfully moot.
Of one thing, however, we can be certain: the largely successful
cover-up of Kennedy's medical history represented the rule and not the
exception with respect to presidential health. That subject deserves
further consideration.
PART IV
The CrippledPresidency
December 1799: The Father of His Country is dying. Scarcely able to
speak as a result of severe tonsillitis, George Washington's life hangs
in the balance between choking spasms of breathlessness.- The first
physician to make his way through the snows enveloping Mount
Vernon that morning, Dr. James Craik, hastily bleeds the former
president in a vain attempt to assuage his suffering. Defying the pre-
scribed medical practice of his time, Washington fails to respond.
Within the day two other physicians arrive, and a heated discus-
sion ensues over the alternatives of treatment available to them. The
youngest of the three, Elisha Cullen Dick, is a thirty-seven-year-old
doctor from Alexandria, Virginia. He argues in favor of an aggressive
surgical approach: cutting a hole in the windpipe below the area of
swelling to bypass the blockage. With a penchant for innovative
thinking perhaps rare for his day, Dick surmises that if they can
temporarily reconstruct Washington's breathing passage, the life-
threatening swelling may yet run its course as the inflammation
subsides.
Fearing to take responsibility for possibly contributing to the
death of the country's first president, Dr. Gustavius Brown con-
vinces Craik that such a novel and risky treatment might meet with
disaster. Dick counters with a willingness to absolve them both of
any blame for Washington's death should that occur through his sur-
gery. Common sense tells him that the hallowed practice of bleeding
an elderly patient might well prove fatal in itself. As the young doc-
tor summarizes the situation for his more conservative colleagues:
"Our patient needs all of his strength-bleeding will only diminish
it. 11 1
Here is a physician willing to take a stab at the problem (in a very
literal sense) by eschewing tincture of time in favor of reason. Yet the
views of his older and more respected colleagues, tempered by cau-
tion and circumstance, win the day. Washington is bled for a fourth
time. Later that evening, with his ebbing vitality spent in dried blood
stains on crumpled bedsheets, the president dies. Established medical
principles, not to mention the views of the medical establishment
itself, have prevailed-and with that, some dubious precedents for
the future have been set.
Dr. Craik later confessed to his associate that "our good friend
might have been alive today" had he and Dr. Brown listened to their
younger colleague.2 Although Washington was no longer in office,
their predicament presaged what future presidential physicians would
all too often ignore: when it comes to treating sick presidents, estab-
lishing diagnoses and rehashing therapeutic alternatives demand the
very best, which only a second professional opinion (or even a third)
can assure.
This assumes that the president's doctors know their patient is ill
and are willing to divulge such information to the public they also
serve. Neither proposition is as straightforward as one might imagine.
Recognizing subtle disability in the chief executive can be a vexing
task. It also happens to be a chastening one for those charged with
protecting the president's political health. That is why the American
public will probably require a second opinion for itself at some future
date to fill a constitutional vacuum that remains today. Despite the
1967 ratification of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, dealing with
presidential disability, this sensitive issue bears reexamination-if
only to highlight the amendment's loopholes and to suggest how
those might best be closed.
CHAPTER 9
Precedents and Pitfalls
Though some precedents had arguably been established through the
shared failure of George Washington's doctors, Dr. James Craik's admis-
sion of error was not among them; humility would hardly become a
trademark of later presidential physicians. Nor, in a few cases, was
withholding desperate operations of the sort that might have saved the
life of our nation's first president. To be sure, some were as futile as
many scholars have suggested a tracheostomy would have been for
Washington. Abraham Lincoln, well beyond the benefits of the surgery
that a bullet fired into his brain at point-blank range had already made
moot, was still subjected to a frantic bedside operation in a vain effort to
debride the bullet's track. The futility of that exercise remains en-
shrined today on a surgical probe covered with presidential brain and
blood, buried in the cluttered archives of a military medicine museum
in Washington, D.C.l
Some sixteen years later, the searching fingers of a handful of
intrepid physicians were added to the list of probes used to violate
presidential anatomy. On this occasion, the attempted assassination of
James Garfield in 1881, the depth to which they penetrated was meas-
ured with the full knowledge, if not macabre fascination, of a captivated
public. The object of their search was the bullet that had been fired into
the president's back. The newspapers of the day not only chronicled
Garfield's progress but openly discussed the methods available for re-
trieving the bullet. This approach to keeping the public informed per-
haps justified in the eyes of some the later practice of reserving such
weighty matters to the physicians in ch.arge.
In a word, Garfield had become something of a medical curiosity.
Every quack had access to the ears of the White House, suggesting the
use of large magnets, suction machines, and other imaginative devices
to locate the bullet and extract it. One inventor described a jet stream
device for flushing out the wound's passages. Another at least brought
some name recognition to the task at hand: Alexander Graham Bell con-
structed an electro-magnetic apparatus, which he claimed operated on
the principle of "induction balance," to reveal the projectile's location
(Bell would have done well to seek a second opinion from bedmakers of
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his day, for he failed to take into account the metal bedsprings, which
altered the magnetic fields).2
Primitive principles of the scientific method were also used to
tackle the problem. One Faneuil Weisse, described as a "publicity-
seeking anatomist" at New York Medical College, sought to recon-
struct the projectile's trajectory through an experiment in which bullets
of the same caliber as that used in Garfield's attack were fired at similar
angles into a series of cadavers. His charts depicting the bullet's path
and supposed location were paraded before the public but served no
useful function other than to sell more newspapers. Dr. D. W. Bliss, a
Washington surgeon who had taken charge of Garfield's case at the
wounded president's request, dismissed that charade in favor of his own
theory. Yet after Garfield died and an autopsy revealed the precise
location of the bullet, neither the surgeon nor the anatomist proved to
have been anywhere near correct in their estimations. That prompted
one solicitous medical editorial to conclude: "Where ignorance is Bliss,
'tis folly to be Weisse." 3
The peculiar manner in which Garfield's medical care was handled
had serious implications for dealing with presidential disability. Of
singular importance, this was America's first long-term challenge with
a seriously incapacitated president in office. Garfield hovered at death's
door for fully eighty days before passing through it. Still another ex post
facto precedent was all but ignored by future generations: though cer-
tainly of no impact on Garfield's disability, presidential medical care
ultimately had the benefit of retrospective review in the autopsy that
was performed. For all the questions that have been raised with regard to
the deaths of other presidents while in office, their physicians (and the
public they serve) have rarely been afforded the chance to confirm the
"accepted" diagnosis.4
Although Bliss's tireless ministration to President Garfield became
the stuff of which doctors' reputations are made (one writer referring to
it as "the longest house-calion record"),S his approach was flawed in
one critical respect: he preempted all important decisions in the case for
himself and spumed the help of others, including the president's own
primary-care physician. How that situation was handled reflected
poorly on the man and set a dubious precedent for other presidential
physicians to follow. A reported encounter between Bliss and Garfield's
personal doctor, John H. Baxter, illustrates the point:
Baxter: I have come to ask you to take me in to see the President....
I have, for many years, been his physician.
Bliss: Yes, I know your game. You wish to sneak up here and take
his case out of my hands.... I know you are sneaking
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around to prescribe for those who have influence and will
lobby for YOU.6
This would hardly be the last time that professional jealousy and court
intrigue would impact on the care of a disabled president in office.
On the positive side of the ledger, Garfield's case proved to be the
first instance of presidential disability of which the American public
was fully informed. The assertion that the intensive search for the
bullet "took people's minds away from public matters and gave them
little opportunity to become panicky" 7 may seem h.ollow today, but at
least they were not hoodwinked, for all the specious merit of the
revelations made. In some subsequent cases of presidential disability
the public would be victimized by failed or misrepresented disclosures
of the facts.
History took precious little time to reveal how prevalent that prac-
tice would become. Not only did history refuse to wait; it repeated
itself, as it is prone to do. Twenty years later, in Buffalo, New York, yet
another assassin's bullet struck down President William McKinley.
Both McKinley's travails and the national crisis that threatened were
mercifully short-lived. He died nine days after the assassination at-
tempt, but not before other precedents of very dubious distinction were
established in ministering to seriously ill presidents. As fate would have
it, the physician in charge had been openly critical of the impasse that
had resulted during Garfield's medical management. Suddenly en-
trusted with the sobering responsibility of caring for a seriously
wounded president whom he had just met the day before, Dr. Matthew
D. Mann vowed that any appearance of uncertainty would not be re-
peated. For that error in judgment, he has been pilloried ever since.
Mann chose to operate immediately and without first transferring
his esteemed patient to the nearby University of Buffalo, where one of
the first x-ray machines available might well have aided him in locating
the bullet he was unable to find. That he failed to locate and extract it is
no surprise. Not only was he an obstetrician and gynecologist who had
never operated on a male victim of a gunshot wound, but he operated
with poor illumination and without a trained surgical assistant. Re-
signed to his failure, Mann could only repair the injured stomach lining
and close the gaping wound he had made. Worse, he failed to allow for
postoperative drainage, recognized even at that early date as an impor-
tant adjunct of surgical treatment to prevent subsequent infection.8
That was but a part of the tragedy and subsequent irony to be visited
on a critically ill president of the United States. Tragic, because McKin-
ley would die as a result, the victim of an overwhelming infection
buried deeply in his abdomen. Ironic, because shortly thereafter an
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expert in the treatment of gunshot wounds belatedly offered himself as a
consultant in the case.9 But the damage had already been done. McKin-
ley had fallen victim to one of the horrors of medicine: being operated
upon by a surgeon unfamiliar with the disease process, in compromised
circumstances, and without benefit of second opinions and consul-
tations.
Sad to relate, some of those who consulted after the fact only
complicated matters. The most counterproductive on record were the
services of Dr. Charles McBurney of New York City. Like later presiden-
tial physicians he took it upon himself to be the obligate spokesman for
the group and, in so doing, became one of the first in a long line of
doctors to release only news that was not politically damaging to the
president. Unrestrained (and unfounded) optimism pervaded his every
press release. As if to underscore the political aspect, one critic charged,
not entirely tongue-in-cheek, that the garrulous doctor had been sent by
none other than J.P. Morgan to prevent a precipitate drop in the stock
market.10
Grandiloquently describing Mann's operation as marking lithe
epoch of the century in surgery," McBurney assured his anxious audi-
ence that lithe door had been bolted against the green monster of death
by the skilled hand of modem medicine." 11 Better he had bolted shut
his mouth; for one of those listening was Vice-President Theodore
Roosevelt, who was so assured by what McBurney told him that he
packed up and went hunting in the Adirondacks while his president
hung in the clutches of death and his nation in limbo. Everyone (Roose-
velt included) was aghast when, on the ninth day after the assassination
attempt, McKinley suddenly died of fulminant peritonitis.
Not all subsequent presidential operations were emergencies trig-
gered by the twitching fingers of crazed assassins. A few were not even
reported at the time. Some twelve years after James Garfield's assassina-
tion, President Grover Cleveland underwent clandestine surgery aboard
a yacht to remove a cancerous growth from the roof of his mouth.
During the procedure he was anesthetized and strapped unconscious to
a deck chair propped against the ship's mast while nervous, if close-
lipped, surgeons explored the presidential mouth.
As befitted their perceived role (based as much on past experience
with a sensationalist press as presidential edict), the doctors involved
either refused to confirm or denied altogether the rumors that arose as a
result of the president's abrupt and unexplained disappearance from the
capital. In fact, the conspirators disguised their work so well that almost
a quarter of a century would elapse before one of the physicians told the
story. Even those indirectly involved in the scheme at the time were
unaware that the health at issue was that of the president. After the
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lesion was biopsied by Dr. Joseph D. Bryant, an esteemed head and neck
surgeon from New York, it was sent unlabeled to the Army Medical
Hospital for microscopic analysis. Cancer was confirmed in a specimen
identified only as "the most important ever submitted for examination"
because the nation's security was said to be at risk.
Cleveland himself set the tone for his conspirators: "If a rumor
gets around that I'm dying, then the country is dead too." 12 Far more
than just the president's health was at stake during that sultry summer
of 1893-or so at least he perceived it. America was in the grip of a
rapidly burgeoning depression, and Cleveland, a staunch gold-standard
adherent, balked at the prospect of relinquishing the office to his vice-
president, Adlai Stevenson of Illinois, who was a free-silver man.
Believing that the surgery had to be as secret as it was necessary, the
president and his family physician, Dr. Robert O'Reilly, took it upon
themselves to initiate a string of clandestine activities that would rival
the best efforts of our later CIA. Through secret meetings with trusted
envoys, Cleveland persuaded his friend Commodore Elias C. Benedict
to allow his yacht to become a floating operating room in the less-than-
antiseptic environs of Long Island Sound. It was then left to Dr. Bryant
to enlist the services of an anesthesiologist and a dentist to assist him,
while underscoring the seriousness of the scheme with a warning to
Benedict: "Should anything happen to the President, run us on the
rocks and sink us all!" 13
In late June the president was furtively whisked out of the White
House and transported by rail and dinghy to the Oneida, where he
steeled himself for the ordeal. The doctors' task was not made any easier
by what was found during surgery on July 1: the cancer extended so
deeply that a portion of Cleveland's jaw had to be removed, necessitat-
ing a second and equally secret operation to insert a prosthesis in the
gaping hole so that the president's speech would not be affected.
As luck would have it, the surgeons' skills matched their stealth.
Cleveland survived both operations and returned to his duties within
the month. The public remained unaware of the inordinate risks that
had been taken on their behalf at the behest of presidential whim. To be
sure, at least one investigative reporter had caught wind of the story by
late AUgust.14 But the participating physicians hid behind the ethics of
patient confidentiality. The crossfire of charges and countercharges
eventually passed, and the earlier explanation stood: "No operation
[had] been performed, except that a bad tooth was extracted." Not until
1917 did the famed surgeon Dr. William W. Keen, who had assisted in
the operation, disclose the entire story in the Saturday Evening Post. IS
No doubt presidential physicians and political subordinates alike
were only beginning to warm to the task of withholding potentially
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damaging information concerning the president's health. That practice
came to a boil on at least two notable occasions in the twentieth
century. Nearly 150 years after Elisha Dick's futile encounter with
presidential medical care by fiat, another youthful doctor found himself
at loggerheads with older physicians more closely linked to a president
than he. In March 1944 Lieutenant Commander Howard Bruenn was
commissioned by Franklin D. Roosevelt's personal physician, Vice
Admiral Ross McIntire, to examine the obviously failing president. The
results of the young cardiologist's examination were so disturbing that
Bruenn hastily convened a conference of medical experts to wrestle
with the despairing facts: Roosevelt's blood pressure was running out of
control at the same time that his heart was playing out. Bruenn force-
fully argued for administering digitalis to prime the failing pump, but
he was opposed by the committee on this and other recommendations.
Only by threatening to resign did Bruenn eventually get his way and the
president of the United States get appropriate treatment for the alarm-
ing symptoms he had been experiencing all along.16
Much to Bruenn's chagrin, McIntire reserved for himself the final
say not only in what treatment would be administered but in what the
public would be allowed to know qn the eve of another reelection
campaign; after all, he was the lieutenant's superior officer. Denying
Roosevelt's infirmities to the end, McIntire evinced self-serving sur-
prise and dismay when Roosevelt suddenly died of a hypertension-
related brain hemorrhage at Warm Springs, Georgia, a year later. I ?
Bruenn, recognizing that most of his communications to his military
superior had been altered to put a better face on their "public" patient,
was equally dismayed to find that the medical records had mysteriously
disappeared from the hospital safe the day that Roosevelt died. IS
Ross McIntire was an ear, nose, and throat doctor who had learned
both his card-playing and his press relations well from another navy
doctor who oversaw the last tragic year of Woodrow Wilson's adminis-
tration. Taking a card from the hand of his older associate, Dr. Cary T.
Grayson, McIntire believed that the political health of the president
should weigh as heavily as his physical well-being.19 Any damaging
revelations had to be held close to the vest or placed face down on the
table of public review, just as his predecessor had done when Wilson was
felled by a severe stroke in 1919. In clear disregard of Article 2 of the
Constitution, Grayson had never considered certifying the invalid pres-
ident disabled.20 Our national interest, not to mention the stability of
international relations, suffered as a result (see Chapter 5.)
The pent-up steam of public frustration with such practices tem-
porarily blew off the lid of complacency after successive insults to the
heart, bowel, and brain of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Concerned law-
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makers, immersed in this public pressure-cooker, gave the problem a
detailed look in the 1960s. The Twenty-fifth Amendment, dealing with
presidential disability, resulted. With its ratification in 1967, Congress
placed a constitutional seal on the issue, having assured itself that all
contingencies were finally covered. Yet even now the amendment
seems little more than a purge-valve to some skeptics, constructed
largely for the purpose of diffusing political fallout. What its authors
neglected to seek was a second opinion from organized medicine, which
by its very nature would be concerned with knowing something more of
disability's essence than merely its unsavory political aroma.
Events in Washington during Ronald Reagan's tenure (see Chapter
10) suggest that it is time to reexamine the distasteful ingredients of
presidential disability. To do so requires a review of the history leading
to the adoption of the amendment. For nearly two centuries before its
formulation the public welfare had been bound by imprecise wording
below a constitutional sword of Damocles that threatened to sever the
legal discovery from the occurrence of inability in our chief executive.
On at least four occasions during the last one hundred years alone,
executive function has been paralyzed by medically defined presidential
inability, while two perplexing questions restricted a satisfactory reso-
lution to the problem. First, in such a circumstance, does the office of
the presidency devolve to the vice-president, or does the latter merely
serve as an acting president? Second, who shall determine when the
president becomes disabled and at what point that disability has ended?
In the first instance, the amendment's sponsors deemed it appropri-
ate for the vice-president to assume the powers and duties (but not the
office itself) if the president became disabled. As for the second, they
proposed that the vice-president and the cabinet should be jointly re-
sponsible for determining the duration of inability when, for medical or
other reasons, the president himself is unable to do so. These notewor-
thy advances notwithstanding, the Twenty-fifth Amendment still suf-
fers from some glaring inadequacies. Today, as in the past, we remain
dependent on the presidential physician, whose opinions may not afford
an unbiased and unrestricted revelation of the medical facts should the
question of disability arise. Certainly our past experience with the
duplicity of presidential physicians is cause for grave concern, yet their
conduct was but one symptom of a long-standing and unresolved consti-
tutional problem.
By all accounts the framers of the Constitution produced a remark-
able document that has endured since those stifling summer months of
1787 in Philadelphia. They spent little time, however, discussing the
issue of presidential succession and said virtually nothing about what
would happen should a president become disabled while in office. These
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shortcomings did not pass unnoticed by at least one participant there,
though John Dickinson's warnings were all but ignored as the sessions
drew rapidly to a close. Not surprisingly, scholars and politicians alike
spent the next two centuries grappling with what one senator later
termed "this blind spot" in our Constitution.21
Intimations of problems to come arose for the first time in the new
republic when President James Madison fell victim to a three-week
siege of "bilious fever" in 1813. The press played on the fears of some of
its readers with perhaps unsubstantiated hyperbole when the Federal
Republican reported that "not a few who have recently visited [the
President] have left his chamber under a full conviction of the derange-
ment of his mind." 22 True, these fears eventually receded with Madi-
son's full recovery; yet the disquieting specter of a disabled president in
office had at least been raised.
Nearly three decades later the first death of a president in office
occurred, compelling Vice-President John Tyler to succeed the deceased
William Henry Harrison. In subsequent Senate debates a vexing ques-
tion arose: what would happen if a temporarily disabled president re-
covered, only to find a vice-president occupying his office? As later
scholars pointed out, in this instance the vesting clause of the Constitu-
tion was at variance with its succession clause.23 Clearly the former
provided for a single, and not plural, chief executive. Yet the framers
failed to recognize that the latter precluded the use of an "acting"
president when the legitimate bearer of that office was disabled. Accord-
ingly, more than one political observer began to realize that in practice
the succession clause would have to be reinterpreted to allow the
temporary discharge of executive power by someone else when the
president was unable to perform the duties of office.24
James Garfield's protracted disability in 1881 underscored, however,
that there was really no chief executive at all when a president was
incapacitated. Caught between an ill-defined legal position and charges
of being a usurper, Vice-President Chester Arthur fell victim to the
limitations of the succession provision. Both his actions (or lack of
them) and those of the cabinet defined the problem in practical terms.
Public business was suspended, ultimately compelling the cabinet to
consider asking Arthur to act.
Yet Arthur never moved to end the crisis. The vice-president had his
own reasons, both political and constitutional, for refusing to assume
the office. To begin with, Garfield and Arthur were from opposite wings
of the party. This led to a second consideration: the cabinet feared
Garfield's ouster for the remainder of his term lest he improve-and his
doctors were predicting full restitution of powers, despite compelling
evidence accumulating to the contrary.
Precedents and Pitfalls 197
From the constitutional perspective, moreover, there was no agree-
ment on the meaning of disability, its determination, or its permanency
in Garfield's case. Although his mind was sound during the first weeks
following the assassination attempt, Garfield was clearly unable to
discharge the duties of his office. During the entire eighty days of his
disability the president completed only one official act, the signing of a
minor State Department paper. Meanwhile, foreign relations deterio-
rated, and fraud in the Post Office reached scandalous proportions.
Though the cabinet continued to conduct affairs of government, the fact
remained that important questions of public policy could be resolved
only by an active president.
Despite earlier optimistic press releases, Garfield's mental state
eventually deteriorated. Two months into his disability, the previously
supportive Boston Evening Transcript was forced to admit that Garfield's
mind had become "weak" and that he suffered "hallucinations."25
With his decline, many persons agreed that the vice-president should
now be free to declare the president disabled, but no one knew how
to compel him to do so. Others, cabinet members among them, agreed
neither to such a declaration nor to the contingent assumption of the
office itself by the vice-president. Proposals abounded, including a plan
for delegating but not devolving executive powers to Arthur. The coun-
try continued to flounder about in its first real succession crisis until
Garfield expired. Yet political scars remained, and fears for the future
grew.
Those fears had already arisen some fifteen years earlier after Abra-
ham Lincoln's assassination. From the standpoint of disability in office,
the deadly aim of an assassin had rendered that consideration moot with
Lincoln's death the same day. Few persons were aware, however, of less
dramatic forms of disability lurking behind the doors of the White
House long before "John Wilkes Booth" became a household name.
Unknown to the public at the time, Lincoln not only had to wrestle with
very personal forms of covert and overt disability but also had to minis-
ter to the perplexing illness of his anxiety-ridden wife. Moreover, the
president himself was unaware of a physical ailment that at least one
investigator claims would have taken his life within the year had Booth
not been afforded the leap (in a literal sense to the stage below) into the
blackest pages of our history. For Lincoln is said to have been a victim of
Marfan's syndrome. If so, his heart and aorta were rapidly playing out
long before his visit to Ford's Theater.26
Whereas such festering disability had no effect on Lincoln's conduct
in office, one equally subtle condition arguably did: an inbred depres-
sion that had plagued him since its activation by the failed loves of his
early manhood.27 Whether as a result of migraine or depression, he was
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often prostrated for days on end by excruciating headaches. In the
absence of other symptoms related to the nervous system, it is doubtful
that these headaches were the result of a blood clot sustained in his
youth with consequent brain damage, as has been alleged.28 More to the
point, physicians of the present day are aware of the deleterious effect
depression alone may have on the decision-making process, with or
without headaches.
Obviously, the Founding Fathers and those who have later wrestled
with the disability issue had no intention of removing a president from
office on the basis of depression. Yet Lincoln's experience attests to the
fact that not all burdens borne in the office are the product of politics,
diplomacy, or physical infirmity. If Mary Todd's detractors are to be
believed, "social diseases" should be added to the list-though firm
evidence is lacking to link hers to the sort now associated with the term.
Still, some social diseases did impact on a few of America's presidents
that could result in disabling others in the future. By far the most
prevalent of these is alcoholism, which had victimized both Franklin
Pierce and Ulysses S. Grant. Yet the two men differed in one respect:
whereas Pierce continued to embrace the bottle when a crisis emerged
during his presidency, Grant was disciplined enough to eschew its
allure, for the most part, during his eight-year tenure.
In recent decades medical knowledge and public education have
advanced to the point of accepting alcoholism as a disease-and like all
diseases discussed in these pages (Lincoln's alleged Marfan's syndrome
excepted), it shares the indictment of affecting the way one thinks. For
all of alcohol's superficial virtues of loosening the tongue and inhibi-
tions (enough, perhaps, to make one a proficient and prolific speaker),
the drug has few other redeeming virtues-particularly when it is used
as a crutch in times of crisis, a lubricant in social interaction, or a mask
to hide unhappiness.
A more devastating form of presidential disability visited itself
upon the office when Woodrow Wilson fell victim to a serious stroke in
1919 during a very critical time in our history. The complete story and
its implications have already been detailed (see Chapter 5), including
the conclusion that Wilson may have been disabled, in the medical
definition of the term, by poorly controlled high blood pressure long
before his debilitating stroke.29 For the purpose of this review, the
impact of the president's less controversial stroke-induced disability
bears repeating. A recurring scenario unfolded-and with it, recurring
questions begging for answers. No one was willing to address the ques-
tion of who should judge the president's impairment or what in fact
signified constitutionally defined disability-including a befuddled
vice-president, Thomas R. Marshall. Consequently, whatever veneer of
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executive function remained was vested in Wilson's wife and his per-
sonal secretary for the next four months. During the debate over Amer-
ica's entry into the League of Nations, Mrs. Wilson's pithy response to
senators begging to deal directly with their president epitomized the
plight of an isolated and broken man: "Gentlemen, I am not interested
in the President of the United States. I am interested in my husband and
his health." 30 In the long run, ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was
dealt a fatal blow, a victim as much of presidential illness as of partisan
politics.
Much else was lost in the interim following Wilson's stroke besides
American participation in the League of Nations. Venerable principles
of executive accountability and checks-and-balances headed the list.
Fully twenty-eight acts of Congress became law without presidential
review. One scholar has surmised that public policy was formulated by
those "whose stand was not necessarily Wilson's, by persons whose
capabilities were not always commensurate with their loyalty to Wil-
son, and by people who had no legal mandate." 31 Secretary of State
Robert Lansing convened a score of cabinet meetings in an attempt to
transact neglected executive business, thereby indirectly forestalling
any congressional moves to establish a case for presidential disability.
His reward was a demand for his resignation from the stricken and para-
noid president. This was but one intimation that by the time Wilson
began to resume a more active role in affairs of state, he was captive to
the dictates of an organic brain syndrome that marked him as a changed
man.32
No one outside the inner circle was aware of Wilson's true condition,
as Dr. Grayson had stipulated that potentially damaging information
regarding the president's health be withheld from the vice-president and
cabinet, not to mention the American public.33 If Marshall never con-
sidered assuming Wilson's office for fear, in part, of being assassinated,
others hesitated on less personal grounds to voice their concerns.
Though several justices of the Supreme Court suspected that Wilson
was seriously ill, any certification of presidential inability was argued to
be outside their purview on the basis of separation of powers. Since
neither Congress, the vice-president, nor the court could or would make
a move, it was left to the cabinet or the White House itself to take the
next step. But the cabinet was led t~ believe by Grayson's palace guard
that the president was well on his way to a complete recovery; accord-
ingly, no action was deemed necessary. As his trusted aide Joseph P.
Tumulty admitted, the sole motive was loyalty to the president.34
Twenty-five years later virtually every question that remained un-
answered during the period of Wilson's disability reappeared when
Franklin D. Roosevelt became seriously ill during his last year in office.
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Victimized by malignant hypertension, heart failure, and progressive
pulmonary insufficiency, Roosevelt began to experience transient peri-
ods of clouded consciousness that arguably affected his conduct in
several intrawar conferences. The parallels are striking. Both Roosevelt
and Wilson fell prostrate with exhaustion while attempting to act as
world peacemakers; one presidential physician's failure to disclose
unpleasant facts presaged another's denial of his patient's failing health.
Such thinking ultimately allowed Roosevelt to run for an unprece-
dented fourth term despite the fact that he was dying.3s
Certainly Roosevelt's manifestations of disability were far more
subtle; he neither suffered a major stroke nor disappeared from view
altogether as president until the day he died. This brings to mind a
question that haunts the succession process to this day: how compro-
mised must a president be to warrant a certification of disability under
the letter and intent of the Constitution? No doubt a strictly medical
determination would have been enough to certify both Wilson and
Roosevelt as impaired (see Chapter 10). But medicine is not the law-
and law, most assuredly, is not politics. The restrictions to legal discov-
ery of potential disability in our chief executives remain as formidable
now as they were in the past, largely for political reasons. Beyond a
doubt, had the Twenty-fifth Amendment then been in effect, neither
Wilson nor Roosevelt would have willfully exercised his duty under
Section 3 and declared his disability. Thus (under Section 4) we would
have been solely dependent on the opinions of the presidential physi-
cian, who, in both instances, would have similarly refused to support
findings of disability that the cabinet and the vice-president might
otherwise have jointly declared.
Taking this argument one step further, a division of opinion be-
tween the vice-president and the cabinet-had the facts been known-
might well have arisen in either case. Without Robert Lansing's forced
resignation, he might ultimately have succeeded in bringing the issue of
Wilson's health to a vote in the cabinet, even though Vice-President
Marshall steadfastly refused to become involved in any declaration of
presidential disability. As for Harry Truman, he had been so far removed
from any working relationship with Roosevelt that he would have been
unlikely, whatever his suspicions, to certify his superior as being dis-
abled under Section 4's provisions. Nevertheless, more than one mem-
ber of the cabinet was bothered enough by what he had seen of the
president's appearance at his fourth inauguration in 1945 to register
doubts about his ability to speak for the United States at Yalta.36
Any determination of disability, then, had the Twenty-fifth
Amendment applied, would have devolved to "such other body as
Congress by law shall provide." In practice, McIntire in all likelihood
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would have had the final word, as he alone reserved the right to be
Roosevelt's exclusive medical spokesmanj and as we now know, poten-
tially damaging facts about the president's health, uncovered by McIn-
tire's subordinate, were either hidden or destroyed.37 Nothing, it seems,
had been learned from past experience. Public awareness in the Roose-
velt era was as restricted as it had been in Wilson's time, dependent
upon both the fallibility and duplicity of a presidential physician.
Perhaps that is why the country's next experience with presidential
inability was both precedent-setting and cause for optimism in future
cases, or so it was believed at the time. With Dwight D. Eisenhower's
succession of illnesses, a consensus evolved regarding several unre-
solved issues, among them the right of a president to certify the onset of
his own disability and its termination. Yet other vexing problems re-
mained: the lack of accessibility to medical facts concealed by physi-
cians bound by a unique relationshipj the hesitancy of a vice-president
to act for fear of being labeled a usurperj the forced resignation of cabinet
members aware of a president's compromised ability and willing to
testify to itj and the potential for turning the whole issue to the political
advantage of the opposing party.
On September 24, 1955, Eisenhower suffered his first heart attack,.
Recalling the Wilson debacle, he decreed that the facts of his illness and
their implications be revealed to the public as well as to Richard Nixon.
Unlike Wilson, Eisenhower approved of his vice-president's assump-
tion of the powers and duties of the presidential office. Within a week
Eisenhower had recovered enough to declare his disability ended, there-
by setting a precedent for what would become the essence of Section 3 of
the Twenty-fifth Amendment. A similar scenario unfolded during and
immediately after Eisenhower's later emergency operation for a bowel
obstruction~As it turned out, no crises occurred during either of the two
illnesses.
A year and a half later, red flags of warning unfurled again when
Eisenhower suffered a small stroke that affected his speech, only to
be lowered just as quickly with his rapid improvement within twenty-
four hours. Ominously enough, this disability affected brain functionj
equally significant, the president denied that such was the case.38 We
will never know whether his intransigence would have endured had the
effects of his stroke been permanent. Yet Wilson and Roosevelt's re-
spective encounters with similar neurologic disability underscore the
serious implications involved when a national leader's brain dys-
functions. Disorders of the presidential heart and bowel are sources of
legitimate concernj when the thought processes and decision-making of
the chief executive are at risk, concern becomes alarm. A transient
speech disturbance in and of itself may not disaffect the political proc-
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ess, but it may presage future problems. Will the next stroke carry a
stricken president into the twilight of inactivity, if not into clouds of
incomprehension altogether? Might the disappearance of overt disabil-
ity camouflage subtle underlying injury to the powers of abstraction and
problem solving?
At the time, politicians were faced with more concrete considera-
tions. As Richard Nixon pointed out, Eisenhower's stroke had come at
the worst possible moment, just before a NATO summit and amid
burgeoning insecurity vis-a.-vis the Russians. Yet in the wake of this
brief flirtation with disaster, the Justice Department reached no con-
clusion as to what procedure would be legal should the president be
unable (or, as in this case, refuse) to certify his own disability. Not all
hesitation was grounded in constitutional considerations; political fac-
tors also weighed heavily in the failure to reach a consensus. For exam-
ple, the distasteful option of handing over the keys of the White House
to Nixon arguably discouraged a skeptical Congress from taking Eisen-
hower's admittedly brief inability more seriously.39
The Eisenhower experience had at least broken ground in the field of
presidential succession; for one thing, Section 3 became a logical exten-
sion of what had already occurred in practice. Yet much remained to be
clarified. Just how disabled can a president be and still remain a sal-
vageable political entity in the eyes of his colleagues? Does presidential
disability cover only mental compromise? Should it be declared only
when the public interest suffers? Most troubling of all, did political
scientist Clinton Rossiter have the final word in suggesting that the
presidential inability problem was in practice "insoluble?" 40
Answers to these and other questions began to crystallize by con-
sensus during public debates and Senate hearings in the early 1960s,
preceding the passage of the Twenty-fifth Amendment-but not before
the American public unwittingly dodged yet another bullet that may
have disabled its president, at least on occasion, long before he fell
victim to the real thing. Aware enough that John F. Kennedy had
suffered a wartime back injury that necesitated a major (and what
proved to be a life-threatening) operation, we all but ignored the more
troubling revelation in 1960 that he had been suffering all along from a
glandular deficiency for which he required drug replacement.41 For
those with access to medical journals of the day, that startling revela-
tion would have come as no surprise. A 1955 issue of the Archives of
Surgery discussed an unnamed thirty-seven-year-old patient with Ad-
dison's disease who had undergone a back operation on October 21,
1954, and nearly died from the stress of surgery. When Kennedy's name
later surfaced as a legitimate presidential contender, it required no
mental gymnastics to put two and two together: in 1954, Kennedy had
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been thirty-seven years old and had undergone a lumbar fusion on
October 21 of that year at the same institution.42
What the public never knew during Kennedy's lifetime about sub-
stance abuse in high office was potentially even more harmful. The in-
tent of the preceding chapter was to point out that Kennedy's prolific
use of drugs is now a matter of record, even if their impact on his con-
duct in office is less apparent. That Kennedy required chronic steroid
replacement before and after his brush with death in 1954 would hardly
be a cause for concern, could we assume that it had been properly
administered and monitored. But the specific drugs used (cortisone
orally, and its intramuscularly injected analogue desoxycorticosterone
acetate, or DOCA) and the doses administered were at time both poorly
controlled and excessive, as has already been detailed. Moreover, we
now know that DOCA is so slowly metabolized by the body when given
intramuscularly that an excess of steroid often results-even without
such additional injections as those the president received at the hand of
Max Jacobson. On balance, that practice seems to have been less a factor
than those familiar with both steroid and amphetamine effects might
have expected. That it was allowed to occur at all, however, remains a
source of grave concern.
The record, as in all things medical pertaining to Kennedy, remains
clouded by the restrictions placed on today's scholars by his family. Yet
thanks to the Freedom of Information Act and the diligence of a handful
of relentless investigators, the fog is beginning to lift, presenting future
pathographers with much still to ponder and recalling the questions
with which formulators of the Twenty-fifth Amendment wrestled dur-
ing the same decade.
Acknowledging that a few among them perceived the problem of
presidential disability to be insoluble, less fatalistic participants at
Senate hearings on the issue sensed that the public·welfare demanded
more than "patience, prayers and improvision" in what one skeptic
aptly described as "a messy situation. 1J43 To their credit, theyeven-
tually agreed that disability was recognizable, certifiable, and applicable
to an incumbent president who was unable to exercise his powers as
public business required. Moreover, they agreed that a president should
have the right to declare both the beginning and end of his or her
disability.
Yet what to do with a president who could not, or would not, declare
disability remained the burning question. Experts who had already
studied the problem could not agree. Opinions ran gamut from a verdict
of "insoluble" proposals of various instruments for making a deter-
mination: a panel of distinguished citizens, the Supreme Court, an ill-
defined "disability commission." In the absence of informed medical
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second opinions, each proposal foundered on its own weaknesses both
perceived and real.
No group had more impact on the deliberations than did a powerful
committee of twelve lawyers from the American Bar Association. Not
only were physicians excluded from that panel; a review of the lengthy
transcripts of Senate hearings during 1963-64 fails to uncover any mean-
ingful testimony from either organized medicine or individual physi-
cians skilled in the determination of disability. Hence, perhaps, the bias
that crept into the ABA committee's recommendations against any
proposed disability commission: "A commission of purely medical
personnel would be undesirable, because a determination of whether
inability exists is more than a medical question." 44 Such a determina-
tion is undoubtedly more than a matter of health; yet the ABA commit-
tee and the senators and representatives who listened failed to perceive
that what little allowance they did make for medical input into the
question had already proved inadequate in the past. In effect, those
ultimately empowered to decide the issue were merely "expected" to
consult with the president's physician and "others." 45
History was ignored and the issue eventually resolved through
general consensus: if the president did not declare his disability, that
determination should fall to members of the executive branch, as would
be compatible with the doctrine of separation of powers. Since the
Constitution reserves the power to act through the contingent grant-of-
power principle to his successor when the president is disabled, the
vice-president (with the help of the cabinet) was perceived to be the
rightful judge of the facts. 46 Congress, however, reserved the right to
involve itself in the process through "such other body" as it might
provide, should the provisions for keeping the matter within the ex-
ecutive branch prove inadequate. That was at least in keeping with the
original (albeit ambiguous) intent of Article 2, Section I, Clause 6 of the
United States Constitution, which stipulates, in part, that "the Con-
gress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation
or Inability [emphasis added], both of the President and Vice-President."
These guidelines, then, were embodied in the Twenty-fifth Amend-
ment as eventually passed by Congress in 1965 and ratified by the states
two years later. For the moment, at least, the vexing issue of presidential
disability was laid to rest.
CHAPTER 10
Resuscitating the
Twenty-fifth Amendment
The Twenty-fifth Amendment has been hailed as a providential safe-
guard against virtually every contingency likely to be faced in future
cases of presidential inability. Yet precisely where the vice-president
and cabinet are to obtain the pertinent medical facts to pass judgment,
should a stricken president fail to certify his or her own disability, was
all but ignored by the amendment's sponsors. They chose instead to
honor the dubious precedent of depending on presidential physicians. If
these doctors have occasionally misled us, it is now naively assumed
that the media at least will not. We expect to be immediately and fully
informed of a change for the worse in the president's health. As Clinton
Rossiter put it: "If we cannot have confidence in our ability to make
such a judgment [based on these revelations] ... then what in heaven's
name can we have confidence in at all? /I 1
The one thing we can be confident of in this age of the public
presidency is that any determination of presidential disability will be
argued in a political forum, for that determination is strictly a political
decision-or so it has been erroneously argued. History would suggest
instead that much more than politics is at stake-including the nation's
best interests and on occasion even its security. That is why both the
state of the President and the state of the Union must be taken into
account in any judgment of disability.2
Few would take exception to that view. Yet the modest proposal of
this chapter entails a corollary: let professionals skilled in disability
determination but not directly responsible for the chief executive's care
be the initial judges of the presidential state in a medical sensei then let
the politicians judge the state of the Union, as the president might effect
it, through the procedural guidelines of the Twenty-fifth Amendment.
To assure this proper division of responsibility, certain clarifications are
required in that amendment as currently worded. We simply must
maximize the public's assurance that the data which the vice-president
and the cabinet use to determine the duration of inability, when the
president cannot, are valid.
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A Presidential Disability Commission, staffed at least in part by
physicians skilled in disability determination, could be chosen or ap-
pointed before the inception of the next administration. Potential nomi-
nees could be asked to testify beforehand in House and Senate hearings
as to their professional qualifications for (and personal views on) disabil-
ity determination in general, in order to assure selection of the best and
most unbiased candidates. Equally divided by political persuasion, such
a commision would be charged with monitoring the president's health
on a yearly basis and reporting its findings to the vice-president. It
would have no power to intitiate proceedings against the president,
much less to depose him; its duties would be restricted to gathering
medical facts to assist the vice-president in making an informed deci-
sion should the question of inability arise. As the amendment expressly
states, only the vice-president or cabinet can initiate any deliberations
relevant to a determination of presidential inability.
Nor would the implementation of such a commission require fur-
ther amendment, since Section 4 already acknowledges the right of
Congress to provide "such other body." 3 A simple concurrent resolu-
tion of both houses of Congress might satisfy this most compelling
need, and would be compatible with both the spirit and the letter of the
law as currently worded. Moreover, such a resolution would hardly
represent a usurpation of power. Because a concurrent resolution is but
an expression of congressional opinion (and therefore has moral but not
necessarily legal force), 4 the commission's findings would serve only as
a guide-but a useful and necessary one-for the vice-president should
disagreement arise between him and the cabinet.
One mechanism to expedite the process already exists: specific
guidelines for evaluating disability and permanent impairment, which
have been in force since the American Medical Association published
its first Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment in 1971. As
earlier discussed, the Guides go to great lengths to differentiate between
impairment (which is "directly related to the health status of the indi-
vidual") and disability (which "can be determined only within the
context of the ... occupational demands or statutory or regulatory
requirements that the individual is unable to meet as a result of the
impairment").s The determination of impairment can be done only by
physicians, whereas determination of disability is recognized as having
"social, administrative, economic and legal consequences beyond the
domain of medicine." 6 An impairment rating, then, merely serves as a
useful starting point for subsequently weighing the consequences of that
impairment.
To make the procedure as uniform as possible, today's physician
breaks down the process into four steps. Any proposed Disability Com-
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mission would act accordingly. First, a thorough medical history and
physical examination are undertaken, supported by appropriate diag-
nostic tests. Second, these findings are analyzed to determine the nature
and extent of the patient's impaired bodily functions. The third step
entails a comparison of the results of that analysis with the criteria
specified in the Guides. That need not be performed by the same physi-
cian (or physicians) responsible for the initial examination. The final
step in rating medical impairment takes into account all relevant con-
siderations in order to reach a "whole person" impairment rating on a
percentage basis.7
Examples from recent history may illustrate what a "percentage of
impairment of the whole person" means. To begin with, several criteria
are included in the evaluation of brain impairment, among them distur-
bances in language, complex and integrated cerebral functions, and
emotions, as well as the presence of temporary or permanent neurologic
deficits.8 Applying these 1984 Guides criteria to Franklin D. Roosevelt
during his last term in office allows the pathographer not only to
substantiate but to quantitate his impairment retrospectively.
Though medical evidence suggests that Roosevelt's impairment
was less pervasive than, say, Woodrow Wilson's (see Chapter 5), the last
criterion of "episodic neurologic disturbances" may be readily applied
to FDR, who was frequently stricken with transient periods of impaired
awareness on the basis of poorly controlled hypertension. This is
termed an "encephalopathy." 9 Categorizing that impairment at its first
and lowest level as an "an episodic neurologic disorder of slight severity
... such that most of the activities of daily living can still be per-
formed," Roosevelt would have been rated as 15 percent impaired as
early as March 1944. Later, particularly after the 1945 inauguration, it
can be argued that his compromise extended to a higher level; that is, it
was "of such severity as to interfere moderately with the activities of
daily living," thereby extending his percentage of impairment to 20-45
percent. IO In addition, he suffered from life-threatening disturbances of
heart, lung, and blood-pressure function, each category with its own
particular percentage of impairment. What should concern us most, of
course, is neurologic impairment as it impacts on cognition and deci-
sion-making-and both Wilson and Roosevelt were quantitatively im-
paired in that respect by strictly defined criteria. Would the American
public choose to be led by presidents with certifiable impairment, from
the standpoint of brain dysfunction alone, at more than 50 percent?
The Guides acknowledge that the concept of "permanency" may
vary considerably, but the guidelines for permanency are more than
adequate to declare disability constitutionally as applied to the presi-
dency per se: "The concept of permanency ... relates to a provision in a
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contract, policy, or regulation in which the time limit for permanency
of disability is defined." II The election of a president is, barring mal-
feasance in office or inability, a four-year contract. Therefore this def-
inition could be used by the vice-president and cabinet in those
circumstances where they are charged by Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment to determine the duration and termination of the inability
of the chief executive. Should a proposed Disability Commission antici-
pate the president's impairment to extend beyond a four-year period-
and, therefore, be defined as "permanent" as far as the office's"contract,
policy, or regulation" is concerned-the vice-president and cabinet
would be on more solid ground in denying the president's resumption of
powers and duties, absent improvement.
Such a decision presupposes that they have certified in kind that the
"urgency of public business" requires an active president to act. This
judgment would extend beyond the domain of any Disability Commis-
sion, as the Guides applied in a more general sense make clear: "Each
administrative or legal system . . . should define its own process for
translating the [permanent impairment] rating into an estimate that the
individual's capacity to meet occupational demands ... is limited by
the impairment" (emphasis added).12
This is all to reemphasize, as the Guides have done, that physicians
must refrain from speculating about nonmedical consequences of any
impairment they have certified. They should consider only whether or
not the specific medical condition can cause the type of observed
failure. That is a medical decision; it is left to others to decide whether
in a particular case it did cause failure. And that, most assuredly, is
beyond the profession's mandate. While a physician may properly make
an inference about the risk of allowing an impaired individual to con-
tinue in his or her present employment, it is not the medical examiner's
duty to determine the acceptability of that risk. That decision is more
properly made by nonphysicians on the basis of nonmedical considera-
tions.13
If those entrusted with Wilson's and Roosevelt's care were guilty of
allowing their own opinions on nonmedical issues to influence what
should have been strictly medical determinations, how has the present
system of impairment determination fared today when applied to ex-
ecutives of major corporations and the like? Independent clinical stud-
ies substantiate that when the Guides are used properly, permanent
impairment can be rated with reasonable accuracy, uniformity, and
dispatch.14 In essence, the machinery for such determinations has been
in place since 1971 and has worked well. It would seem, then, no great
leap of principle to extend the practice to the workings of the Twenty-
fifth Amendment.
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One can hardly imagine a more politically charged event threaten-
ing to blow the succession mechanism apart than disagreement be-
tween the vice-president and the cabinet as to whether the president is
disabled. This potential bombshell must be defused. The findings of a
Disability Commission with no political axe to grind would be of
immeasurable benefit to a vice-president, who might otherwise be
accused of being a usurper. Such distasteful suggestions, coupled with
the formidable restrictions placed on the public's right to remain in-
formed about the health of its most powerful and trusted servant,
blocked the transfer of power on more than one occasion in our past.
Nor does the potential for subterfuge end here. Other less obvious but
equally formidable problems remain.
Section 3 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment deals with situations in
which the chief executive is aware of his or her disability and is able to
communicate to the vice-president the date of both its onset and its
termination. Fewer problems might have arisen in such cases in our
history in which Section 3 would have been invoked had the amend-
ment then been in force. Take, for example, the issue of general anesthe-
sia for surgical procedures: Grover Cleveland could have notified the
vice-president of his impending surgery and effected a temporary trans-
fer of power until his recovery. For political reasons, he refused to do so.
Two later presidents, Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson, did
choose to relinquish their powers temporarily to their vice-presidents,
in keeping with at least the spirit of Section 3 as later written: Eisen-
hower's experience has already been detailed, and similar provisions
were made by Lyndon Johnson prior to two separate operations for the
removal of his gallbladder and of colon polyps.
Yet providing for temporary inability under the Twenty-fifth
Amendment has had its share of problems. Ronald Reagan twice under-
went general anesthesia for surgery: the first as an emergency following
the attempt on his life in 1981; the second on an elective basis for re-
moval of a colon cancer. Though no disasters resulted, both events were
fraught with disturbing implications. One became immediately obvious to
many Americans who saw Secretary of State Alexander Haig announce
to a skeptical television audience after the assassination attempt that he
was "fully in charge" of matters at the White House. Though the
president had been awake just prior to undergoing emergency surgery, a
formulation of policy prescribed by Section 3 for temporarily devolving
his powers to the vice-president was not put into effect.
The second implication remains obscure to all but physicians famil-
iar with the effects of general anesthesia on the thought processes of the
elderly in the immediate postoperative period. That manifested itself
with serious consequences following Reagan's elective colon surgery
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in 1985. The question was, when did the period of Reagan's inability
(that is, the effects of general anesthesia on mentation) really end? The
president had signed a document temporarily delegating the powers of
the presidency to the"acting" president, George Bush. Then, following
his surgery, he signed another document declaring that his inability had
ended. But medical purists would point out that Reagan was arguably
incapacitated for far longer on the basis of anesthetic effect, during
which period of time some key decisions were made regarding proposed
arms sales to Iran. A similar argument could have been applied to the
lingering effect of general anesthesia on Dwight Eisenhower following
his bowel operation in 1956. Within two days of his surgery, the presi-
dent had actively resumed the powers and duties of his office. Fortu-
nately, nothing of consequence was occurring in political or diplomatic
affairs at that time, in contradistinction to Reagan's experience some
thirty years later.
The Reagan experience aside, past performances suggest that the
provisions of Section 3 are well defined and not subject to much im-
provement. The murky issue of determining when a period of disability
has ended, however, is less well defined under Section 4. In essence,
application of that provision has yet to undergo trial by fire. Critics of
the amendment would argue that we simply may have been lucky or, at
least in Reagan's case, merely improvident. Here is why.
Though constitutional scholar Ruth Silva has argued that the deter-
mination of presidential inability is a policy matter based on political
circumstances,IS one discerning senator during the 1960s, Roman
Hruska, disagreed-perceiving correctly that such a determination is,
at least in its initial stages, first and foremost a medical matter divorced
from politics. I6 History spoke to at least this one critic of the Twenty-
fifth Amendment quite clearly. After all, many suspect that it was the
partisan fears of facing Richard Nixon in the White House that kept
Congress from acting with dispatch during the period of Eisenhower's
disability. And as noted, the risk of appearing as usurpers accounted in
part for the inaction of Chester Arthur and Thomas Marshall during
their respective superiors' protracted illnesses. Whether or not any of
the three vice-presidents would have performed more capably than their
disabled superiors is not (at least from the standpoint of impairment
determination) the salient issue. What is important is the need for a
timely, apolitically motivated gathering of the facts to initiate such a
determination in the first place. Depending solely on elected or ap-
pointed officials to pass judgment on a president's impairment without
legislatively mandated medical expertise runs the risk of putting the
political cart in front of a questionably disabled horse.
It goes without saying that such officials should seek out the best
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advice available before acting. Yet under the provisions of Section 4,
soliciting medical opinions per se is merely suggested-and then only
during the eleventh hour when disagreement has already arisen be-
tween the vice-president and cabinet. Recall, for the moment, the sticky
dilemma facing Garfield's cabinet during his prolonged disability: in the
absence of a realistic medical appraisal of the president's prognosis,
political and personal considerations only contributed to the gridlock.17
If dispatch is the key to preserving the integrity of ongoing and effective
executive function, potential pitfalls in such a scenario today can well
be imagined-not to mention that the selection of medical experts after
the fact by a politically conscious Congress or presidential physician
might well depend on the doctors' party affiliations as much as (or more
than) on their medical skills.
A second potential problem exists with the current wording of
Section 4 in that the language employed is hardly specific enough to
satisfy the degree of authority and urgency required. Disagreement
arose at the start over how specifically to spell out the procedure for
handling a case of disability. Everett Dirksen successfully argued for
keeping the wording simple ("such method as Congress may by law
provide"), consonant with the tenor of the remainder of the Constitu-
tion. Senators Birch Bayh and Samuel Erwin opposed Dirksen, believing
that such generalities would give too much power to Congress. As they
pointed out, provisions for impeachment, a situation argued to be in
some ways analogous to disability proceedings, were quite specific. I8
Because their opinions were eventually overriden, critics continue to
voice concern that Section 4 fails to specify how"such other body" is to
determine disability. Having provided the legal framework for both
initiating and concluding the process, Section 4 is vague on how"such
other body" arrives, if you will, at point B from point A. The solution
seems clear: medical expertise of the highest order should be either
mandated by law or cloaked with the moral authority implicit in a joint
resolution of Congress.
Section 4 also fails to address a third and very real potential prob-
lem: a cornered president might lash out defensively, before the issue
reaches crisis proportions, and force the resignation of any cabinet
members perceived as threatening. Wilson did precisely that during his'
period of disability. That is why the Disability Commission should be
linked not to the cabinet but to the vice-president, who cannot be
forced by the president to resign. In like manner, it would be naive to
argue that Congress could act by statute (as Section 4 leaves it open to
do) should disgreement arise between the vice-president and the cabi-
net. After all, the president has a constitutional right to veto any
legislation passed by the legislature and might be inclined to exercise
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that power should such an emergency statute be perceived as a threat
to his political survival.
Therein lies the rationale for a concurrent resolution of Congress to
define the procedural issues prospectively. This would carry with it such
moral force that any president would appear less than circumspect in
overriding its intent-an intent well defined and already outlined prior
to the onset of any future crisis. Hastily handpicking a group of medical
experts after the fact, and only after disagreement has arisen between
the vice-president and the cabinet, would foreseeably divide the selec-
tion 'process of the commission along partisan lines and bog down the
proceedings at precisely the time the data required to make a decision
should be arrived at with dispatch.
As currently provided for, there simply is not much time allowed for
wrangling over such issues. Sponsors of the Twenty-fifth Amendment,
acknowledging that the powers and duties of the chief executive must
never lie dormant, recognized the need for prompt action once a pre-
viously disabled president declared the intention to resume office. As
matters now stand, the cabinet and the vice-president are given but four
days to review the data and make a determination. If disagreement
exists, then the vice-president retains the powers and duties of the office
while Congress considers the matter. A decision in the legislature must
then follow within twenty-one days.19
In order to expedite that determination during the first four days
before risking the pitfalls of a longer process, a prospectively selected
committee already in force is essential. As presently mandated, such a
committee or any other "body as Congress may by law provide" cannot
even be formed, much less solicited, before disagreement arises. The
fourth potential problem with the current wording of the amendment,
then, is this matter of expediting the procedure without surrendering
exactitude. Bringing a medically staffed commission into the process at
an earlier stage than presently provided for would go far toward assuring
both.
Yet if the findings of the commission are not bound to the vice-
president, the validity of that determination might well be called into
question long enough to frustrate the entire process. The examples of
both Arthur and Marshall during the disabilities of their superiors
showed that though the cabinet may be willing to declare a president
still disabled, a squeamish vice-president (for either personal or political
reasons) may choose to abstain, thus leaving the determination to the
whims of Congress. A vice-president to whom the findings of a Disabil-
ity Commission were made known before the four-day deadline would
be more inclined to act. Without the force of an authoritative body that
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has prospectively evaluated the relevant medical data, it is doubtful that
any consensus could be arrived at in such a short time.
During the debate over the Twenty-fifth Amendment, Senator Bayh
posited a view that risks confusing the responsibilities of the partici-
pants involved: "The cabinet, as well as the Vice-President and Con-
gress, are going to have to judge the severity of the disability and the
problems that face our country." 20 Lumping the two responsibilities
into one, without making specific provision for which instrument is
responsible for either, introduces a fifth potential problem for any future
case. Few would dispute that judging the severity of the problems facing
the country should remain within the purview of government officials.
That they might also be called upon to judge the severity of the presi-
dent's medically defined impairment, however, would represent an un-
skilled exercise of power. The burden of that particular responsibility
should rest with medical experts.
A sixth potential problem arises as an extension of the fourth and
fifth just discussed. As a constitutional scholar points out: "In deciding
the issue [of inability in a president] Congress can proceed as it thinks
best.... Thus, it may request that the President undergo medical tests
and examinations or submit to questions at hearings" {emphasis
added).21 In short, under current provision, medical examinations are
not necessarily required, though surely such a requirement is the very
least the public deserves. Yet even if they are performed at congressional
request, precedent virtually assures us that the president's personal
physician will have the last word. That has been shown to have its share
of limitations; few of these doctors in the past possessed the necessary
training in neurologic and psychiatric disease to play such a dominant
part in any impairment determination related to brain dysfunction. Nor
should we assume that they would take seriously opinions elicited from
experts in that field. Not only do presidential physicians guard their
preeminent positions jealously; they may be inclined to dismiss or even
hide revelations that would be politically harmful.
Tests and examinations alone, then, are not enough. Who conducts
them, and how the findings are revealed are equally crucial matters. Is it
too much to ask that those experts who gather the data do so without
consideration for personal gain or political proximity to the president?
Should the rendering of opinions on those data be bandied about by
laypersons in a public forum? Our proclivity today to entrust sensitive
or classified information to the televised charades we now know as open
House and Senate committee hearings, complete with prime-time po-
litical exposure for the participants, disregards the solemn warning of
more prescient individuals to divorce the initial process from any con-
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sideration of political advantage, personal prejudice, or other extra-
neous factors. Yet in this age of mass media exposure the cynic cannot
conceive of the twenty-one-day period of debate currently mandated
under Section 4 not being televised in open hearings. Public demand in
the post-Watergate and post-Iranscam era has so whetted the collective
appetite for information that televised hearings have become the cit-
izen's inalienable "right" of passage into the political process. The
current arrangement, then, begs for media exploitation. It is one thing to
spill our political guts out on the table for public consumption in open
hearings on covert government activities; it is quite another to lay open
sensitive matters of presidential health in a public forum, complete
with hand-picked medical experts waxing philosophical under the kleig
lights.
This assumes, of course, that any information as serious as medical
impairment would be divulged by those entrusted with the president's
health. Such has not always been the case, either for political reasons or
as a result of restrictions inherent in the physician-patient relationship.
It assumes, too, that all domestic and diplomatic concerns at the time
the impairment occurs would be known to those entrusted with deter-
mining the seriousness of the problems facing the country. Yet in this
era of covert operations such activities might remain unknown not only
to those responsible for such a determination but even to the presi-
dent.22
The implications are clear: past executive styles of leadership and
methods of monitoring the president's health have often precluded an
effective determination of his ability to lead and the problems facing the
nation at the time that ability has been called into question. Nothing
exemplified this more than our experience with Ronald Reagan's recur-
ring medical impairment and, arguably, his lingering disability. With all
due respect to President Reagan, revelations regarding the Iran-Contra
debacle and other matters appear to affirm at least one underlying
suspicion: a perceptible transition occurred in the effective exercise of
the president's powers and duties during the last half of his tenure. Did
Reagan's advanced years constitute another form of subtle disability?
That was a question I myself raised in 1988.23 Whether any proposed
Presidential Disability Commission, had one existed, would have
agreed at the time is admittedly a tough call. The indisputable lesson to
be learned from the Reagan experience, however, is that the provisions
of the Twenty-fifth Amendment were never invoked to protect the
presidency and the nation, though at three different times their consid-
eration was clearly warranted.
The first, during Reagan's emergency surgery after the assassination
attempt in 1981, has been eloquently detailed elsewhere.24 For the
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purpose of this review, two conclusions bear reemphasizing: on the
basis of the trauma itself, the general anesthetic he underwent, and his
prolonged convalescence, Reagan was impaired in the medical sense
and perhaps disabled constitutionally for far longer than we knew;
moreover, the mechanism specifically provided for determining the
onset of his disability and its termination was ignored, compelling
reasons for invoking it to the contrary. Ironically, similar errors of
omission were repeated in 1985 before and after Reagan's elective colon
surgery, which would have singular implications for the Iran-Contra
scandal. Finally, as late as 1987, at least one Reagan associate was
bothered enough by what he had seen and heard of the president's
performance to ask whether Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment
should be invoked. Yet the issue went no further, nipped in the bud by
one individual on the basis of a single presidential interview.
What still defies explanation is that in all three instances no specific
medical inquiry into those aspects of impairment necessary to raise the
issue of presidential disability was even considered, much less under-
taken. More ironic still (and emblematic of the limitations of relying on
presidential physicians), two of the doctors closest to Reagan were
neurological surgeons, professionally trained to recognize and treat
disorders of the brain that affect the way one thinks and behaves.25 The
available record now affirms that a Presidential Disability Commission
might well have judged his degree of impairment obvious enough to
warrant an inquiry, or for Vice-President George Bush and the cabinet to
at least consider the matter-which is precisely what architects of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment had in mind.
If the assassination attempt provided the first opportunity to test
the provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, Reagan's handlers
clearly failed to seize the moment. Neither Section 3 nor Section 4 was
invoked, despite the president's obvious disability. No doubt such fac-
tors as ignorance concerning those provisions on the part of the cabinet
and vice-president, the latter's willingness to defer to the wishes of the
White House staff, political concerns for the message that might be
conveyed to the American public, and the guile of one staffer in par-
ticular played major roles in that impasse.26 Yet the real deterrent to
prompt action, as has forever been the case in such matters, was the lack
of authorized medical opinion necessary to certify the president's ob-
vious impairment in the first place. Even the White House physician
involved, Dr. Daniel Ruge, intimated as much when he later reflected
on the failure to consider the Twenty-fifth Amendment. "I think that it
should have been invoked," he recalled. "Maybe I am responsible,
because I really hadn't thought about it too much." In Ruge's defense,
no one specifically asked him about the president's cognitive capaci-
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ties.27 That would have been a task tailor-made for a Disability Com-
mission already established prospectively.
Years later, virtually every doctor involved agreed that the Twenty-
fifth Amendment should have been invoked, not only during and im-
mediately after Reagan's surgery but for a considerable period of time
thereafter.28 Though the president himself later professed little doubt
about his ability to handle his office effectively, that speaks volumes to
the often misguided perceptions of those suffering from the lingering
effects of general anesthesia in particular and subtle brain dysfunction
in general. If a president will not or cannot acknowledge the residua of
disease-induced disability, Section 4 offers a remedy-one inexplicably
ignored by all concerned.
True, Reagan's aides would have us believe that something akin to a
review process did in fact take place. While the president was in surgery,
Howard Baker and Edwin Meese briefly consulted with the head of the
trauma service at George Washington University Hospital concerning
his potential inability to function in the immediate postoperative pe-
riod. To Dr. Joseph Giordano's credit, he acknowledged the effects of a
general anesthetic and "heavy-duty" pain medication as reasons why
Reagan should not be asked to make major decisions. Despite that, the
White House staff decided not to invoke the amendment. Not only was
this the sole instance in which Reagan's aides consulted a physician
(and only one at that) regarding the president's anticipated medical im-
pairment, but the subsequent judgment of both impairment and disabil-
ity was made by them-and not by the cabinet and vice-president, as
envisioned by the amendment's authors. As White House Communica-
tions Director David Gergen admitted, everyone was hesitant to act for
fear of expressing "less than full confidence" in their chief executive
rather than the "serene view" they wished to convey to the American
public.29
That inaction would present its share of problems when it came to
assuaging the concerns of those who had already questioned Reagan's
ability to govern on the basis of his age alone. In one press conference
after another following his formal return to an office he had never really
relinquished, Reagan fumbled questions from the press and was unable
to remember even the most general details of important events. Witness
the embarrassment of everyone in the room (including the president
himself) during one such briefing when he lost his thought in midsen-
tence concerning a compromise on the MX missile project and left its
explanation to a startled John Tower standing in the wings.3D Whether
he knew anything of the details to begin with or lost them under the
heat of the kleig lights is immaterial. Perhaps we were seeing the linger-
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ing effects of his trauma and general anesthetic-if not the vintage
Reagan of years to come.
To be sure, those in the administration had already passed some
troubling signposts along the way. Within weeks of his return to the
White House, the president began to doze off during meetings. That
practice gave rise to one tongue-in-cheek description of the cabinet
room: "seats thirteen, sleeps one." Though his staff was more alarmed
than amused, Reagan seemed to find it funny. "When I leave here," he
quipped, "they'll probably put a plaque on the back of my chair in-
scribed 'the President slept here.'''31 Other problems could not be
laughed away so easily. During the first presidential debate of 1984,
Reagan appeared irresolute and failed to field questions with his usual
aplomb. Few will forget the period of suspense between the two debates
as we awaited the verdict on whether Reagan had grown too old to be
entrusted with the duties of his office. Within the year that verdict
would be called into question by yet another disabling illness.
What makes the following indictment all the more disturbing is
that the White House staff and its doctors had ample opportunity to
make preparations, once the president announced his plans to go under
the knife for his colon cancer in 1985. Pleading ignorance in the heat of
battle as the staff had done in 1981 would not suffice this time. Yet they
seemed to have learned little. That would eventually embroil an im-
paired president in the gravest threat to his political health-which
brings us to a brief discussion of Reagan's mental health vis-a-vis the
Iran-Contra scandal.
If the failure to invoke the Twenty-fifth Amendment in 1981 was
related in large measure to ignorance of its provisions on the part of
those involved, the amendment's inherent ambiguity as to who was
responsible for determining the presence of any medical impairment in
the first place had a great deal to do with the similar failure in 1985.
True, Reagan's handlers had at least learned enough from their earlier
experience to urge the invocation of Section 3, whereby the president
was allowed to declare his own disability before undergoing a general
anesthetic. Yet Reagan's sadly uninformed stand set the tone for his
staff: he issued a strong disclaimer that the temporary transfer of power
to George Bush had anything to do with the Twenty-fifth Amend-
ment-for fear of establishing "a poor precedent"! He even went so far
as to stipulate that anesthesia and surgery were conditions for which the
amendment's provisions were not intended.32 (Its architects, of course,
saw things differently; Senator Birch Bayh, for one, flatly asserted that
Reagan had botched the chance to set an important precedent.)33 That
would color every subsequent aspect of what transpired in 1985, includ-
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ing the critical need to determine the end of the president's disability,
defined all too broadly by Section 4.
Any knowledgeable physician would view with unveiled skep-
ticism the method the White House staff ultimately chose as an appro-
priate test of the president's mental capacities during the immediate
postoperative period: they simply asked him to read a few lines of a
letter. Sad to relate, chief of staff Donald Regan and others were operat-
ing in a medical capacity totally outside their expertise. It was left for
Dr. Herbert Abrams to elucidate later what should have been obvious to
the palace guard: "To read is not necessarily to understand. II 34
So what might this have to do with the Iran-Contra scandal? Just
two days after emerging from his surgery, during a meeting in the
hospital with Regan and Robert McFarlane, Reagan agreed in principle
to open up the Iranian initiative for the sale of arms.3S Having assumed
the president was thinking clearly, his associates gave little considera-
tion to the effects of a general anesthetic and narcotics on Reagan's
thought processes. Nor was any medical opinion on the matter even
solicited. That oversight would return to haunt them all once the
scandal broke and the president was left to fend for himself-only to
compromise his credibility further with seven distinct contradictions
during a press conference in which he bungled his attempt to lay the
whole affair open.36
Within a subsequent three-week period Reagan first stated that he
had not approved the arms sales; then, that he had; and finally, that "he
could not remember-period." 37 Strangely, the last admission seems
the most plausible, for medical studies uniformly affirm that elderly
individuals in particular suffer a distressing degree of memory loss
during the first week after anesthesia and are routinely advised to make
no major decisions during that time. Some studies extend this period 'of
compromise to six weeks.3s That the president specifically approved
the plan a second time some six weeks after the first meeting, then, is no
assurance that the lingering effects of his general anesthetic had cleared,
as some would argue.39 I, for one, believe that the president truly
forgot-and that frightens me more than the acts of duplicity that have
apparently become routine among government officials. The key ques-
tion is no longer, what did Reagan know and when did he know it? It is,
rather, what did he know and when did he forget it? A deficient memory
is a poor servant for any public figure. For an aging president, it threat-
ened thereafter to become a mainstay in his intellectual repertoire-
as might be anticipated in most individuals seventy-seven years of age,
the effects of two general anesthetics within a four-year period not-
withstanding.
How else to explain the Tower Commission's frank portrayal of a
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man wholly out of touch and of "ineptitude verging on incompetence,
from the President on down"? Having earlier adopted comprehensive
procedures for monitoring covert activities, Reagan subsequently ig-
nored them. He did not recall signing one Covert Action draft con-
cerning the CIA, and he later signed (but did not read) a second draft
making the United States a direct supplier of arms to Iran. To make
matters worse, Reagan so perseverated on the release of victims of an
airline hijacking as to overlook the obvious fact that bargaining with
terrorists for their hostages' release merely justifies their methods. Such
behavior brings to mind the most sinister effect of cognitive compro-
mise on any executive: conduct that impacts negatively on occupa-
tional duties. As the Tower Commission Report concluded, the president
"did not seem to be aware of the full consequences of his actions"
(emphasis added).40 That indictment alone should raise red flags even
among those without medical training.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., once aptly portrayed Ronald Reagan as "the
Master Illusionist." But illusions go only so far in dealing with terrorists
and arms merchants-or in being dealt with by a cynical media. The
fragile yolk of credibility becomes scrambled once the protective Teflon
ages and erodes. Enter a befuddled Reagan, no longer sunny side up, as a
skeptical Congress leaves a bag of burning questions concerning his
involvement at the presidential door. Hastily stomping on the bag to
snuff out the flames licking at his credibility, Reagan discovers to his
dismay that it contains incriminating excrement that explodes under-
foot. Like many an old codger victimized by the pranks of neighborhood
jackals, the president was described by an unnamed adviser at the time
as "still not understanding what's happening; but every time those guys
come down from the Hill and beat up on him, he just gets his back up
more." 41 Kids on the block understand this obstreperous quality in
their elderly neighbors; as for aging leaders, so do opposing politicians.
To accuse Ronald Reagan of subconscious duplicity or overt dishon-
esty squares with neither the image nor the essence of the man. On
balance, it appears that the president really may not have known the
details of what was being done in his name. Yet what little he was
allowed to know, he seemed to have forgotten-including his approval
for opening up the Iranian initiative in the first place. Like The Speech
he continually revised to reinterpret history while picking up a few
votes along the way, Reagan's explanations for half-baked schemes were
typically long on narrative and short on substance. By 1986 they were
often wrong as well, for the Great Communicator was no longer master-
ing his briefs. His pledge that "as long as Iran advocates the use of
terrorism, the u.S. arms embargo will continue" belied the revelation
that shipments to Iran had already begun some fifteen months before.42
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That was enough for Schlesinger to describe the Iran-Contra scandal as a
watershed in the Reagan presidency: "The fact that he does not com-
mand or even comprehend details of policy need not be of major po-
litical consequence-until Iran."43 The question remains whether
medical circumstances at the time likewise signified a watershed in
Reagan's health.
Subsequent evidence affirms just how prevalent such concerns were
to become among many White House associates. By February 1987
disorder in the Oval Office seemed to have reached epidemic propor-
tions, and Howard Baker replaced Donald Regan as White House chief of
staff. Baker asked James Cannon to interview a number of aides to
ascertain the cause. What Cannon learned of the president himself
disturbed him so much that he wrote Baker a memorandum reading in
part: "Consider the possibility that section four of the 25th Amendment
might be applied." Though Cannon doubted that Reagan had slipped
that far, and even suggested later that loyalty to the deposed chief of staff
may have motivated the charges, almost everyone else said in one way
or another that "the president was inattentive," that he had "lost
interest in his job."44 Not unexpectedly, both Regan and Baker later
came to Reagan's defense. "I didn't take Cannon's memo lightly," Baker
recalled, "but from the first time I saw [the President], he was fully in
control and I never had any question about his mental co~petence."45
Though doubts had been raised, neither Baker nor Regan solicited
informed medical opinion at the time to support their own favorable
assessment.
Personalities, like stores of knowledge, become to some degree
more rigidly defined with age. While meticulous preparation may aid in
obscuring that, all the coaching in the world cannot immunize an aging
actor against foot-in-mouth disease during a press conference when the
mind fails to tum the page of its notebook of prepared answers. Sam
Donaldson described the confusion that often resulted: despite his dress
rehearsals, the president was still "perfectly capable of getting things
mixed up ... forever calling up figures that [were] wrong, asserting facts
that [weren't], and re-writing history." 46 Little wonder that the press
conference became an endangered political species during Reagan's
second tenure.
Perhaps that would have been all for the better. Take one press
conference in particular in June 1986, in which Reagan clearly outdid
himself in making mistakes. When asked about the Supreme Court
ruling on abortion, he launched into a discussion of a completely unre-
lated court decision. Queried about a Warsaw Pact proposal to reduce
standing armies in Europe, he responded with a dissertation on missile
deployment. The president then revealed that new plans for the space
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shuttle were in the works, when in fact no such plans were yet being
considered. Finally, he denied that cruise missiles were being installed
in the B-S2, though he had authorized that decision himself two weeks
before.47
Elder statesman may not only have trouble recalling what they
think they know; they may also have difficulty learning new informa-
tion. As one measure of both, a year after leaving office, Reagan fell back
on the same accounting of the Iran-Contra affair that he had embraced
from the beginning. No matter what revelations had subsequently
surfaced, it was as if the myth had been rehearsed so many times in the
past that he could scarcely divorce it from his mind. Yet the realities of
the matter Reagan left hanging in clouds of memory lapses to which he
readily confessed. Though even the most skeptical reporters believed he
was telling the truth, his truth was almost eerily at odds with the facts.
And that was precisely what made his performance during the 1990 trial
of John Poindexter so unnerving. If this represented what Newsweek
called "fresh evidence of the workings of Reagan's mind," 48 it may also
have reflected a progressive change for the worse in what knowledge-
able observers had recognized long before.
Not that subtle deterioration in cognitive function necessarily fol-
lows a steadily progressive course. Good days alternate with bad, cam-
ouflaged in part by the universal observation that aging individuals
perform best in structured situations. This is why the teleprompter may
be of immeasurable benefit for an actor-president turned revered senior
citizen, as Reagan's convincing performance at the 1992 Republican
National Convention in Houston attests. Yet ghosts of extemporaneous
performances past would remain to haunt him. Describing Reagan's
testimony at the Poindexter trial as "sad and embarrassing," 49 an in-
creasing number of observers are now willing to attest to his tenuous
grasp on the office we once felt he had firmly in hand.
For all of the indictments implicit in this review, let me be the first
to admit that I have never met Ronald Reagan, much less ministered to
his medical needs. Moreover, I genuinely like the man, as I suspect most
Americans on either side of the political fence do. The Poindexter affair
aside, I would also admit that it is difficult to discern a clear progression
of cognitive and behavioral deficits some six years after the president
stumbled through the Iran-Contra fiasco.5o Nor can one ignore that
Reagan succeeded in elevating the art of politics to a new level. Two
questions, then, come to mind: (1) Are we reading too much into
anesthetics and aging as they affected Reagan's presidency? (2) If not,
then how did he manage to survive it virtually unscathed?
To be sure, other journalists who observed Reagan on a day-to-day
basis at close range were less than sanguine about this sensitive issue.
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At a recent Washington conference, "Medical Care of the VIP," four
panelists from the news media were as one in admitting that they did a
poor job of reporting the effects of mental compromise on Reagan's
occupational duties during his last two years in office. Jack Nelson,
Washington bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times, spoke for them all
when he asserted: "It was all too obvious to us that the President was
not processing information very well." In their defense, former White
House spokesman Ron Nessen pointed out that following the unseemly
coverage of the president's bowel movements after his colon operation,
Mrs. Reagan had taken it upon herself to limit the medical news coming
out of the White House. Nevertheless, Reagan's performance led these
commentators to admit that "our handling of this issue of mental com-
promise remains remarkably unsophisticated to the present day." 51
In retrospect, the implications are sobering. Reagan may well have
remained to the end the premier spokesman for law, order, and virtue,
but he arguably debased public ethics at home and made the United
States a law unto itself abroad.52 Ignoring the rules of international
diplomacy, the president created a few of his own. He violated the UN
Charter by occupying Grenada; he defied the World Court in refusing to
face its ban on mining the harbors of Nicaragua; and some would argue
that he was devoid of good sense in attempting to assassinate terrorist
Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. Time and again, Reagan imposed his
own brand of frontier justice on world affairs. Military aid to the free-
dom fighters of Nicaragua in clear violation of congressional mandate
was but an extension of a myopic world view grown old and more
dangerous with time.
If some of those actions found a receptive audience at home,
thoughtful economists had problems with his persistent harangue
about the federal deficit, even as it was allowed to balloon to its highest
level in history. Once Reagan began to believe in something-even
something as fantastic as increased defense spending, reduced taxes,
and a decreased deficit rolled into one-he adhered to it with the
tenacity of a pit bull. Yet pit bulls, like old men, may become so
impassioned that they shred the object of their attention-or rip out
their own teeth trying. Though the presidential dentist has yet to be
heard from, the American public is still paying the bill.
The suspicion remains, then, that the flexibility of Ronald Reagan's
mind weathered neither the storms of a crisis that nearly toppled his
presidency nor the inroads of aging that in the end came to define it.
If his subsequent behavior happened to square with public sentiment,
such inflexibility paradoxically became a sourc~ of political strength.
Perhaps this, as much as anything, explains his enduring popularity
through a decade that seemed to worship materialism and abhorred
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making waves on domestic shores. Like Eisenhower's before him, Rea-
gan's style fit the times-times that demanded less innovation and
more avarice. Riding the crest of conservatism, Reagan's ship reached
the presidency. Fortunately for the sake of his reputation, he happened
to have been on the right boat.
When measured against a youthful if naive predecessor, Reagan's
record seems deceptively impressive. In Jimmy Carter's case we reaped
the harvest of what we sowed: substituting a seasoned infighter with an
inexperienced outsider in the Washington game. Our satisfaction with
having survived that oversight should not blind us to the fact that we
failed to recognize what effect aging and anesthetics may have had on
Carter's successor. In that sense, future historians may be less kind to
Ronald Reagan than his popular acclaim in the twilight of his presi-
dency implied.
As regards the three instances of presidential inability during Rea-
gan's tenure, it bears reemphasizing that one individual was largely
responsible in each case for withholding the application of the Twenty-
fifth Amendment: Richard Darman (acting through James Baker) in
1981; the president himself in 1985; and Howard Baker in 1987. What
that dubious legacy suggests is the need to seek a second opinion from
someone other than "official sources" should we again be faced with a
disabled person in office. Establishing a source for that second opinion is
a formidable task, and the attempt is likely to be opposed by presidential
physicians and politicians alike. For both have something to lose-the
one, a seat next to the throne; the other, control over a process that has
immense political implications. In the passage of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment, the views of the politicians and a handful of lawyers
carried the day; pathographers, with a critical eye on the past and a
worried look to the future, have yet to have their say. For all the
amendment's good intentions, a second opinion in the form of a pro-
posed Presidential Disability Commission is long overdue. Can objec-
tions to that proposal be overcome? To that question we now tum.
The concept of a Presidential Disability Commission staffed at least
in part by physicians is hardly new. Harry Truman first proposed the
idea in 1957 in a letter to the New York Times. He called for a "select
group of medical authorities from the top medical schools in the coun-
try" to monitor the health of the president and "so inform Congress"
should questions of presidential inability arise.53 Dwight D. Eisen-
hower initially favored physician representation in the process as well,
and numerous academicians-among them such heavyweights as
James MacGregor Bums and Paul Freund-argued the same in Senate
hearings during those critical months of 1964 antedating formulation of
the Twenty-fifth Amendment.54
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Three major objections to the concept were raised as early as 1957 by
Eisenhower's attorney general, Herbert Brownell: first, presidential in-
ability is argued to be a political, and not exclusively a medical, issue;
second, entrusting the question to non-elected officials such as physi-
cians would grant them too much power; and third, the doctrine of
separation of powers, in and of itself, precludes individuals outside the
executive, legislative, or judicial spheres from participating.55
On the basis of the first objection, Clinton Rossiter stridently op-
posed the creation of such a commission: "Let us not go beyond the
President and Vice-President in search of machinery to decide doubtful
cases of disability, lest we construct a monstrosity." He concluded that
"physicians should not have a say" in the matter and, presumably,
should speak "only when spoken to." Rossiter added as an aside that
certain members of the Supreme Court would agree.56 Perhaps. Yet
most members of the medical profession even remotely familiar with
the problem would certainly differ. That may come as a surprise to those
who participated in the 1964 Senate subcommittee hearings, as the
opinion of organized medicine was not solicited, much less considered,
during those proceedings {though Birch Bayh later conceded that they
"might have been in error" in excluding medical testimony).57
Another opponent of the commission proposal, Dr. Ruth Silva, has
pithily observed that "Congressmen, editors, lawyers and professors of
political science had had a field day trying to imagine the identity or
composition" of such a commission.58 Doctors, it appears, have yet to
have their say. Yet since these medical Moseses in the political wilder-
ness are routinely charged with determining disability in corporate
executives, it would seem shortsighted to deny those most skilled in
this combination of art and science a part in Silva's call for"an organ so
legitimate in its own right" that the nation "would be disposed to ac-
cept its judgment without hesitation." 59 Indeed, one suspects that the
American public is justifiably cynical enough to resist leaving the med-
ical aspects of such weighty determinations to the vagaries of the
political process alone.
At least one participant in the proceedings leading to the Twenty-
fifth Amendment was wise enough to define presidential inability in its
proper medical context as "some very grave disability visited upon [the
President], nervous, mental, or physical."60 What Senator Roman
Hruska understood better than most was that any subsequent decision
must first rest on relevant and reliable facts regarding the president's
mental and physical faculties. Leaving such a delicate determination
solely to the discretion of elected or appointed public officials has served
our nation poorly in the past, and one doubts that their diagnostic
acumen has improved with the passage of time.
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It would seem implicit in Senator Bayh's clarification of the word
"inability" appended to the body of the amendment ("an impairment of
the President's faculties") that the second objection raised against in-
volving physicians in the determination must be reconsidered. Em-
powering such expert opinion as can only be found in the medical
profession for judging presidential inability would hardly represent a
usurpation of constitutional power. Mter all, the amendment gives
Congress the expressed right to substitute another body for the cabinet.
Moreover, that body would still be required to act with the vice-
president, as the revised wording and punctuation of Section 4 ulti-
mately agreed to make clear: "the Vice-President and a majority of
either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such
other body as Congress may by law provide" (emphasis added).61 Bind-
ing the Presidential Disability Commission to the vice-president by
concurrent resolution or statute would eliminate the fear of a physician-
induced witch-hunt. The commission could neither raise the question
of inability for discussion unless asked to do so by the vice-president nor
act alone on the matter.
There is one additional benefit of binding the proposed commis-
sion's members to the vice-president rather than to the cabinet: neither
could appear the usurper, whether a vice-president allegedly acting for
personal gain or physicians assuming constitutional powers not ac-
corded them. Though the potential successor has been granted the right
to be part of the determination process, he or she should be relieved of
the embarrassing duty of taking the initiative-at least without firm
medical grounds for doing so. Senator Hruska might also have appreci-
ated the strength of an arrangement which, in his own words, would
provide the"advantages of a disinterested group ... without extraneous
motivations." 62
One not so disinterested motivation, to be sure, is hardly extra-
neous. In a very real sense, the role of presidential physicians is an
unenviable one. They are required to weigh a doctor's obligate respect
for the patient's privacy against the implications for society of any
compromise found in its leader. Given the restrictions inherent in this
"central ethical dilemma," according to two scholars, "it seems sim-
plistic to argue that the President's physician should always be candid
with the public.... [After all], if the President cannot confide in his or
her physician, he or she might let symptoms stay untreated. Moreover, a
worrisome medical report at certain junctions could readily lead to
overreaction or the weakening of the United States in a crisis. Secrecy
[therefore] plays a legitimate role in effective govemment."63
Because no one would dispute that, one of the merits of a Presiden-
tial Disability Commission is that it would relieve the presidential
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physician of sole responsibility for judging the patient impaired. Natu-
rally, the White House doctor's opinion would be solicited; in all like-
lihood he or she would act as the president's advocate by adding
personal insight and necessary balance to any incriminating data the
commission might gather. Failing that, one might even choose to hide
behind the Hippocratic oath of confidentiality. A president who under-
stands that his or her physician has that right would feel more inclined
to be candid with the doctor without fear of public disclosure.
This is all to say that to warrant consideration of the removal of a
president from office, inability should be so obvious to a majority of
physicians on the commission that breaches of confidentiality in the
doctor-patient relationship would hardly be necessary. Moreover, if
secrecy is an obligate part of the game in Washington, the deliberations
of such a commission should be accorded the same protection: the
public would not need to know that a current review of the president's
health was underway. Should circumstances require it, the president's
physician could still speak optimistically from a whitewashed bully
pulpit. Only if the commission's findings pointed to a health problem
that the vice-president and cabinet found relevant to current political
circumstances and decision-making would revelation become neces-
sary.
The third objection to the concept of a Presidential Disability Com-
mission assumes that introducing participants outside appointed or
elected government positions would violate the constitutional prin-
ciple of the separation of powers. Most who have studied the problem
agree that the executive branch should be responsible for ironing its
own laundry; hence the decision to conduct "in house" any investiga-
tion of a prospective case of presidential inability, the ultimate decision
to be made in concert with the potential successor.
It is hardly surprising that those who see a determination of presi-
dential inability as a political matter rather than what it really is to
begin with-a medically based determination of physical or mental
impairment enough to effect executive function-would deem any
organ composed of non-executive-branch officials as a breach of the
doctrine of separation of powers. But Congress has already refused to
surrender all possible jurisdiction to its executive counterpart by retain-
ing the right to appoint some"other body," should a future case not be
adequately provided for by the arrangement outlined in the amend-
ment. Vesting a preestablished Presidential Disability Commission
with the power to investigate cases when they arise and to report its
findings to the vice-president would assure that such deliberations
remain tied to and function within the executive branch. Moreover,
should the collective wisdom of any cabinet-wisdom that accrues
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from being close to the president, in a position to know the facts, and not
likely to rule against the chief executive without good reason-come in
conflict with the individual wisdom of the vice-president, both parties
would benefit from the conclusions of medically trained experts having
both the trust of the general public and the professional skill to evaluate
the president's state of health.
The take-home lesson is this: under the current wording of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment, Congress has been granted a constitutional
right to resolve by statute or concurrent resolution this last remaining
blind spot in our presidential succession policies. If a Presidential Dis-
ability Commission were mandated as an advisory panel answerable to
the vice-president, there could be no objection to the concept on the
grounds of separation of powers. As has already been made abundantly
cle~r: "The Vice-President [remains] the key to the effectiveness of
the procedures prescribed in the Amendment." 64 Rather than being
shackled by the restraints of a hasty congressional move to assemble
"such other body" in the eleventh hour, when agreement cannot be
reached with the cabinet, the vice-president would be immeasurably
strengthened by the contributions of a committee skilled in determin-
ing individual cases of impairment from the onset of any such potential
crisis.
These last two chapters have outlined the pervasiveness of presi-
dential inability in our past history and the limitations of the original
constitutional provisions for dealing with the problem; traced the gene-
sis of the Twenty-fifth Amendment from the important precedents set
during Eisenhower's administration through its ultimate formulation;
and shown that not all contingencies have yet been adequately provided
for.
Certainly our experience with Ronald Reagan exemplifies the diffi-
culties inherent in determining disability. What may have appeared as
adequate (even normal) behavior and function from the perspective of
those empowered with that determination was viewed with alarm by
many physicians outside of government who deal on a daily basis with
the effects of aging and general anesthetics. For some within the admin-
istration who shared that disquiet, further investigation was precluded
by the charge that they were only being more loyal to their deposed chief
of staff than to the president. By such political sleight-of-hand can
legitimate concerns be swept under the rug.
That perplexing case will hardly be the last we shall see of this grave
threat. The emergence of a youthful Bill Clinton notwithstanding,
national leadership is often awarded those experienced enough to mas-
ter its intricacies yet, paradoxically, aged enough to be subject to dis-
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eases that impact adversely on the way they think and behave. Many
believe that the blinders to the problem we wore for so long were
removed by passage of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. This study offers
a second opinion to the contrary. Are we forever willing to entrust the
health of our chief executives-and the decisions about how much to
reveal-to medical friends of the president's family or military physi-
cians? Will the political establishment accept the perhaps distasteful
but urgent and necessary proposal to allow medical experts divorced
from this unique physician-patient relationship a role in preventing
recurrences of our physiologic flirtations with disaster? Can we afford to
ignore the proposals of previous presidents and distinguished academi-
cians who have suggested variations on this theme?
Legislative means are still at our disposal to strengthen the provi-
sions of an amendment that has only begun to focus on the problem of
presidential disability.
Postscript-
or Apologia?
Two eminent writers from distinctly different generations and cultures
have made cogent observations about the discipline of history that
have particular relevance to this study. The better known, the early
twentieth-century Italian philosopher-historian Benedetto Croce, once
remarked, in effect, that the only real history is modern history. Taken
to its lowest common denominator of understanding, "If it ain't recent,
it can't be relevant." The other, Arno Karlen, is an American editor and
writer who has used the best elements of eclecticism to elevate the
relatively modern disciplines of biohistory and pathography to high art.
Karlen's work reflects his own understated ability to perceive the study
of history as "a changing state of mind."
Both views have influenced the tenor and methodology of this book.
What began as a rather lighthearted survey of select kings, emperors,
and mystics of the past was .transformed in midstream into a more
pedantic examination of figures prominent in our own time. One sus-
pects that Croce would have understood: the closer history is to us, the
more relevant it becomes to our own lives. From the studies of Stalin,
Churchill, and Eden through the examination of America's presidents,
even the most casual reader should have tumbled to the realization that
we are suffering today from the consequences of what has recently ailed
others. What should interest us most about these pathographical dilem-
mas is the hope of avoiding them in the future. It is one thing to be
entertained; deciphering the implicit message and learning from it is
quite another, as Croce would surely have argued.
Karlen, too, would perhaps recognize my transition in style and
content for what it is intended to represent. As he so succinctly de-
scribed historical scholarship, "Each generation repaints the portraits of
its past, keeps seeking a new present, and revises its expectations of the
future." This book, viewed as a continuum, began by refurbishing a few
musty pathographic portraits of the distant past, only to shift its focus
toward rethinking those cases that have had more direct impact on our
present circumstances. The last chapter detailed at least one proposal
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for a way of revising the future to the benefit of the American public as
a governed people.
Certainly the conclusions drawn from the first few chapters are
subjective and inferential, a direct reflection of the distance between the
medical records of my subjects and the current methods that modem
science can defensibly apply to them. In medical practice today, diag-
noses are usually missed not on account of faulty reasoning but because
our initial observations are wrong in the first place. The passage of years,
not to mention the murkiness of the data at a modem physician's
disposal, arguably reduce our judgments in these remote cases to spec-
ulative exercises in mental gymnastics.
The same should not apply to the twentieth century, for which most
of the data have been painstakingly recorded somewhere, if the pathog-
rapher only knows where to look. Not that it's always available. Close-
lipped physicians to the rich and famous continue to keep medical
records to themselves. This is precisely why the observations and testi-
monies of friends, associates, and family members become so impor-
tant. As every good clinician knows, probably 80 percent of diagnoses
come from the medical history the patient or family gives the physician.
The pathographer, like the prudent diagnostician, must be an eclectic
of the Karlen mold to track down whatever data remain outside those
withheld by the historical subject's physician.
There is no such excuse when the primary data are available but not
sought-a lesson I once had to relearn: without the benefit of as yet
unpublished primary sources, I had assumed that Wilson's viral illness
in early April 1919 had more impact on the proceedings of the Paris
Peace Conference than probably was the case (see Chapter 5). Without
diligence and circumspection, we all too easily brand our historical
patients with unwarranted diagnoses, at least insofar as they are alleged
to have influenced history at a given point in time. In fact, I still feel
somewhat uncomfortable with two of the diagnoses rendered in this
study. For one, I am not at all certain that Adolf Hitler really suffered
from temporal lobe epilepsy. Not that a lack of data is to blame; the
problem in Hitler's case is the breadth of data to master. Above all, it is
difficult to sort out the psychopathic god of the psychoanalyst's studies
from the host of central-nervous-system stimulants Hitler took to ex-
cess. Or perhaps allowances simply have to be made for a few madmen
in our past after all.
Another questionably relevant diagnosis applies to Ronald Reagan.
How much was his conduct a mere reflection of the man, and how much
was it exacerbated by the signs of aging that the record cannot ignore?
Would anything really have happened differently during his administra-
tion had he been in his fifties rather than his seventies? What troubles
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me most about my observations and assessments, I suppose, is that for
all the foibles and obvious missteps during his second term, it is difficult
to discern the clear progression in the aging process that often typifies
such cases. Either Reagan's public conduct was so controlled and or-
chestrated that further inroads of aging were not allowed the light of
day, or the process itself was relatively static. Knowing something of
our past experience with presidential health is justification enough for
the cynicism that has emerged in my treatment of the man; even so, my
instincts as a physician may have misled me.
That said, it is still the case that those who choose to ignore the
impact of Reagan's age on his behavior risk being charged with sticking
their heads in partisan sands. Nor would it be consistent with what the
media have done to the private lives of public figures for the physician to
continue to ignore their medical records on the basis of "ethical" re-
straints. Surely how a president thinks in the Oval Office is more
important for the national interest than how he performs in the bed-
room-or bedrooms. Yet insofar as the impact of Reagan's age on
history is concerned, there is definite room for argument. For I suspect
that the presidential synthesis view of history-that the president
himself has the power to mold events as he sees fit despite whatever
historical and political processes come to bear-has its weaknesses
when applied to the office as we know it today. Indeed, the Reagan
experience may be the best example one can conjure up of the institu-
tion of the presidency running itself even if no one is home. Quite apart
from the person who holds the office, the modem presidency appears to
be a self-perpetuating force on the world stage.
If that is true, then what is the point of the whole chapter on
American presidents? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that, at least on
occasion, the bearer of that office-and of its counterparts elsewhere-
does indeed supersede the historical process. With a potential nuclear
holocaust not yet altogether out of the question, we should not remain
oblivious to what effects disease might have on the thought processes of
unstable terrorists in the Middle East and elsewhere.
On the more mundane level of scholarship, this whole area is
something the American public is only now beginning to warm to,
given the increasing number of publications dealing with leadership
health. Yet to be a part of this new genre compels the need to be as
circumspect and impartial as one can be. Pathography is a delicate area,
full of pitfalls for the unwary and untrained. There will continually be
the need, as Arno Karlen has so amply demonstrated, to rethink our
history with new methodologies as they become available. To do so will
serve to make modem history as real as possible. And that, one suspects,
Benedetto Croce might well have appreciated.
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